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The health of the British Army deteriorated catastrophically during the first winter of 
the Crimean campaign to create a Sanitary Disaster; but this tragedy did not persist and 
the way the situation evolved to the spectacular Sanitary Success evident during the last 
nine months of the campaign is the principal question addressed in this thesis. 
Emphasis is placed on the analysis of large numerical data sets of published and 
unpublished contemporary documents; and by considering events strictly in date order 
errors in interpretation associated with the knowledge of hindsight are avoided.  
The most notable conclusion made is that the mortality at Scutari from diseases 
such as continued fever, diarrhoea, dysentery, frostbite, pneumonia, scurvy, and typhus 
mirrored almost exactly what occurred in the Army as a whole. This is not surprising as 
most patients came from the Crimea and it suggests there is no justification in 
considering the hospitals in Scutari as a special case, and indeed the Army’s health 
problems were not solved there, as has been implied by commentators who have 
concentrated almost exclusively on events in the Barrack Hospital where Miss 
Nightingale was based, but principally in the Crimea where the Army was located. 
There were no notable advances in medical science during the campaign and 
there is little evidence to support the assertion of that the Sanitary Commission saved 
the Army, or indeed that their efforts were more than subsidiary. Rather, it was the 
progressive improvement in the standard of living of the troops by providing adequate 
food, clothing, fuel and shelter, coupled with improvements in health care in the camps 
and general hospitals in the Crimea, from early in 1855 which resulted in the Sanitary 
Success of 1856, and which Lord Panmure acknowledged when proposing a vote of 





I became interested in the Crimean War nearly 25 years ago when I was on the 
academic staff of the Veterinary School of Bristol University and I discovered that one 
of my 2x great grandfathers, James William Dewar, served throughout the campaign as 
an officer in the 49
th
 Regiment, and on the Army staff as a Town Major of the 
Sevastopol Garrison. My principal research interest at the time was the infectious 
diseases, particularly those involved with public health, and this prompted my curiosity 
in the medical aspects of the campaign. I then appreciated just how many of Dewar’s 
contemporaries died of so called ‘zymotic diseases’, an obsolete term which included 
afflictions such as cholera, erysipelas, small pox, tuberculosis, typhoid, and typhus; and 
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There are relatively few authoritative contemporary assessments of the medical aspects 
of the Crimean campaign, and I wish to acknowledge the considerable contribution to 
the subject made by Lieutenant General Sir Neil Cantlie, RAMC, and John Shepherd, a 
former Surgeon Captain in the RNR and a senior lecture in surgery at Liverpool 
University. I have read and re-read their books ‘The history of the Army Medical 
Department’ and ‘The Crimean Doctors’ respectively, and they have provided me with 
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The research reported in this thesis was carried out under the aegis of the War Studies 
Department, King’s College London. The study focused principally on the events 
occurring in, and directly relating to, the Black Sea theatre of war between September 
1854 and June 1856, and which involved about one year of active hostilities. 
The surviving records have been evaluated from first principles in order to explain 
the causation, consequences, and resolution of the health problems that beset the Army 
during the years 1854 and 1855. Methods of analysis employed include those 
appropriate for large sets of numerical data on medical and surgical conditions in 
contemporary published and unpublished documents at a level of detail never attempted 
hitherto. A guiding principle adopted throughout was that events should be addressed 
strictly in the order of occurrence, in order to minimize bias introduced by knowledge 
based on hindsight, while primary sources have been accorded greater significance than 
more recent secondary sources. For example, letters, despatches, and reports in the War 
Office (WO) and Foreign Office (FO) series in the National Archives (TNA) at Kew; 
the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) archive; and the official and personal papers 
of key individuals preserved in various archives including the National Army Museum 
(NAM) and county record offices, as well as published and unpublished diaries and 
letters of other participants, both medical and military. In addition, digitized versions of 
Parliamentary Papers (Blue Books), The Times, London Gazette, Illustrated London 
News, and other national and regional journals have been consulted extensively. 
The focus has been on events which influenced the health and well-being of the 
British Army in the Crimea, and how these affected what occurred in the camps, on the 
hospital transport ships and in the general hospitals, including those on the Bosphorus. 
References will be made where appropriate to the Royal Navy (particularly the Royal 
Naval Brigade serving ashore), Land Transport Corps (LTC), and French Army. 
Two contrasting formats have been adopted for the presentation of the principal 
results. Chapters 2-8 are based principally on the analyses of numerical data and in 
which use has been made of tables and graphs; while a narrative style, albeit strictly 
evidence based and in which comprehensive supporting evidence is presented in a 
tabular format, proved more appropriate in Chapters 9-11 which deal with recruitment, 
the supply of the necessaries for life, provision of facilities for invalids and 
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convalescents, including those repatriated, and the various commissions of enquiry into 
the conduct of the war. 
 
War with Russia, 1853-1856 
 
The Crimean War is the term frequently used to define the conflict that took place 
during 1853-1856 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and the British, French, and 
Piedmont-Sardinians. This term is misleading however as hostilities took place in 
present day Romania and Bulgaria, eastern Turkey, the Caucasus, the Baltic, the White 
Sea, and on the Russian Pacific coast. A more accurate title is the War with Russia, a 
term not infrequently used in contemporary accounts. 
The conflict was the only one in Europe between 1815 and 1914 that involved 
British troops and although the conduct of the campaign tended to follow 18
th
 and early 
19
th
 century military principles in several respects ‘with authority concentrated in the 
commander and his small staff; [a system which proved] wholly unsuited to […] 
operations [requiring] co-ordination between the different branches of the Army, as 
well as between the Army and Navy.’1 On the other hand, it also involved the 
employment of modern technology including rifled muskets, steam powered ships, an 
electric telegraph, a railway network, steam-powered saw mills, and a floating bakery 
and factory ship. 
From a British perspective the war was fought to curb Russian expansion into 
south east Europe at the expense of Turkey, the ‘Sick man of Europe’, as this would 
have altered the balance of power in the region, and threatened Britain’s trade routes to 
the east, particularly India. The French involvement was for different motives since they 
had lost prestige following the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte and this conflict provided 
an opportunity for his successor, Napoleon III, to restore French pride, and to play a part 
in influencing world events. Similarly, the Kingdom of Sardinia, or Piedmont, 
participated on the side of the allies as a means of winning a place at the peace 
conference when convened, and thereby facilitating the move towards the unification of 
Italy under Piedmont’s ruling house at the expense of Austria.2 
 
                                                 
1  Harrison (2004), p. 11. 
2  For further details see Collier (2008). 
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Turkey declared war on Russia on 5 October 1853 following its occupation of the 
Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (modern day Romania) on the 
pretext of preventing internal disorder. The prospect of an escalation in hostilities 
increased following the Russian’s destruction of a Turkish flotilla moored at Sinope on 
30 November 1853.
3
 The British government responded by ordering the Mediterranean 
fleet to enter the Black Sea during January 1854, several regiments to embark for Malta 
on 22 February, and for a fleet to sail for the Baltic early in March. Relations with 
Russia continued to deteriorate and the British and French governments declared war on 
28 March 1854. 
The first allied troops arrived in Turkey during April 1854 and after some two 
months the British and French Armies moved to Bulgaria to support the Ottoman Army 
engaged with the Russians along the River Danube. The Turks put up a stout resistance 
and following the raising of the siege of Silistria on the 22 June 1854 the Russians 
withdrew across the River Pruth thus bringing the initial phase of hostilities to an end. 
Austria, which remained neutral, then occupied the principalities thus separating the 
combatants. 
The allied armies remained in Bulgaria until shortly before landing in the Crimea 
on 14 September 1854. The main battles took palace in the weeks that followed: at the 
Alma (21 September), Balaklava (25 October), and Inkerman (26 October and 5 
November). Thereafter the conflict continued as static trench warfare. There was a 
further battle at the river Tchernaya on 16 August 1855, which involved the French and 
Sardinians, and two major assaults on Sevastopol on 18 June and 8 September. The 
French captured the Malakov tower on the second occasion and this resulted in the 
Russians evacuating the city; which was then occupied by the British and French. There 
was little serious fighting following this and hostilities ceased officially on 27 April 
1856 with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris signed on 30 March 1856. The bulk of 
the allied armies had left the Crimea by the end of June with the last British troops 
leaving Balaklava on the 12 July 1856. 
Within the Crimean theatre, the principal focus of this thesis, the forcing of the 
river Alma was seen as a heroic military success and earned Raglan a field marshal’s 
baton while the battles of Balaklava and Inkerman were also perceived as impressive 
feats of arms. However, the outcome of these engagements was indecisive and the 
                                                 
3  For a Turkish account see Hinton (2012). 
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stalemate that ensued, coupled with the worsening conditions in the Crimea during the 
winter of 1854-55, had a destabilizing effect on the political situation at home. The 
result was that Lord Aberdeen and his coalition resigned on 30 January 1855 although 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the new Government, Sir George Lewis, did not 
consider that the ‘substitution of Lord Panmure for the Duke of Newcastle’ would 
‘change the course of the campaign, or to convert failure into success.’4 In the event the 
news from the Crimea continued to cause concern for Palmerston’s Government, as 
confirmed by Lewis shortly before the fall of Sevastopol: ‘As long as our Army remains 
in the trenches before Sebastopol, no Government can have any stability, our domestic 
politics are dependent on the events of the siege as they occur from day to day;’5 a view 
that echoed a remark made by Clarendon to Stratford before the invasion: ‘Until 
Sebastopol is taken there is no chance of […] a binding peace. […] the command of the 
Black Sea and the fate of Constantinople are in the hands of Russia and England and 
France are disgraced.’6 
The War with Russia has been considered an inappropriate and pointless 
adventure by some commentators because it proved inconclusive since ‘we had only 
driven the robber from the gates of Turkey but we have refused to take him into 
custody’ and that it was a peace that ‘France insisted upon, and which the British people 
sulkily acquiesced in’,7 and in consequence the Black Sea only remained demilitarized 
for fourteen years. On the other hand, Small, in his revisionist analysis of events 
concluded that the conflict was not a ‘historically irrelevant mistake’ but suggested that 
(1) the Allies had fought a ‘just’ war, and that they had the moral support of all Europe 
in going to war in defence of the principle that nations, despite their differing 
ideologies, should coexist and not seek to expand their territory at their neighbours’ 
expense; (2) the war was winnable given that Britain, the world’s only superpower, with 
a relatively powerful France ‘had a mighty ascendancy over unindustrialized Russia’; 
and (3) the objectives were limited and achievable, i.e. the liberation of the Russian 




                                                 
4  Sir George C. Lewis to Sir Edmund Head, 2 Feb. 1855; Lewis (1870), p. 292. 
5  Lewis to Head, 17 Aug. 1855; Lewis (1870), pp. 297-8. 
6  Clarendon to Stratford, 23 Aug. 1854; quoted by Royle (1999), p. 193. 
7  ILN, 10 May 1856, p. 798. 
8  Small (2007). 
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By contrast evidence of Russian propaganda suggests the war was viewed in a very 
different light. For example, a POW reported that it was ‘implicitly believed in by 
Russian serfs’ that: 
 
The Turks massacred the Russian Bishop and several Russian priests at Jerusalem. God, in 
his wrath, sent a squadron of angels to carry away the tomb of Christ, which remains at this 
moment suspended in the heavens, and he commissioned the Czar to avenge the pagan 
sacrilege. When the Emperor Nicholas shall enter Jerusalem a conqueror, as, by the aid of 
Heaven, he certainly will do, Christ’s tomb will be restored to its place. The phalanx of 
angels will line the road along which the conquering Russian army will pass, and will present 
arms to them. Then the Czar will be master of the whole world, which will renounce its 




Military campaigns, 1808-1852 
 
Mark Harrison observed: ‘Each theatre of operation [is] ecologically distinct and 
[presents] unique problems,’10 and in this respect Crimean theatre posed a number of 
specific challenges which had to be resolved. It is, therefore, inappropriate to compare 
the medical aspects of different campaigns; except possibly in a superficial manner; and 
of the campaigns involving British troops during the first half of the 19
th
 century it is 
only the Walcheren expedition that has certain similarities with the Crimean War. For 
example, both involved a sea-borne invasion, were of relatively short duration, had only 
a limited objective, were fought in a temperate rather than a tropical region, and were 
characterized by a high incidence of infectious diseases. However, the absence of 
detailed medical records from 1809 makes it impossible to make more than the simple 
comparisons set out in Table 1.1. The table includes reference to the Gallipoli campaign 
of 1915 as this has features similar to the other two. One attribute that distinguished the 
Crimean campaign from the other two was that the occupation continued after hostilities 
ceased and this allowed time to demonstrate that the medical problems had been 
overcome to provide a Sanitary Success. By contrast, the Sanitary Disaster was not 
resolved in the other campaigns, and it is this aspect of the Walcheren expedition which 
is particularly remembered.
11
 A commission of enquiry convened after the Walcheren 
                                                 
9  ILN, 20 Nov. 1855. 
10  Harrison (2010), p. 291. 
11  See Howard (2012). 
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expedition exonerated the doctors but blamed the Medical Board; the members of which 
were dismissed, for ‘poor planning and a failure to cope urgently with the disaster.’12 
 
Increased public awareness of the disasters in the Crimea and Turkey has led some 
commentators to conclude the Crimean War was in some way exceptional. However, it 
was not unusual for deaths from disease to exceed those from the fighting by c.4:1
13
 
while overall the mortality was not dissimilar to several other wars fought during the 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries (Table 1.2). The reviews of Cantlie and Shepherd of the 
medical aspects of earlier campaigns indicate that many of the successes and failures 






For example, faults in organization such as the absence of stretcher bearers and 
trained orderlies, the want of a mobile field medical unit, and the limited number of 
ambulance waggons resulted in the delay in attending the wounded after battles in the 
Peninsula. The ‘means of transporting the sick and wounded have ever been deficient 
and cruel, as all testify who attended the bullock cars of the Peninsula,’16 and though the 
situation was ameliorated to an extent when sprung waggons were introduced these 
were heavy and cumbersome and frequently blocked the roads. 
Overcrowded general hospitals were recognized as being an ‘artificial cause of the 
destruction of armies’ because the ‘effect of accumulation evidently corrupts the air, 
and this generates an artificial malignancy’ and ‘relapses are the leading cause of 
mortality.’17 Soldiers ‘sent to general hospitals [were] rarely restored to [their] corps 
during the campaign’ and thus regimental hospitals were preferred because ‘not 
collecting soldiers into one spot reduces the chances of contagion.’ and ‘the average 
duration of sickness is always less in regimental hospitals.’18 
The shortage of hospital mates [orderlies] during the Peninsular War coupled with 
their lack of training was perceived as the weakest link in the medical services, while 
                                                 
12  Shepherd (1991), pp. 4-5. 
13  Ponting (2004), p. 334. 
14  Cantlie (1974), I, pp. 292-493. 
15  Shepherd (1991), pp. 1-72. 
16  Fergusson (1846), p. 62. 
17  Jackson (1803), pp. 345-6. 
18  Fergusson (1846), p. 60. 
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the employment of convalescents for hospital duties ‘denuded’ the regiments, which 
would have been rendered unnecessary if there had been a medical corps.
19
 
Some lessons learnt during the Peninsular War had seemingly been forgotten by 
the battle of Waterloo as many of the wounded were operated upon on the battle field or 
in crude regimental posts by inexperienced MOs, and there were considerable delays in 
moving casualties to makeshift general hospitals in Brussels.
20
 Given this example of a 
short corporate memory span it is perhaps not surprising that the British Army proved 
ill-prepared for a campaign prosecuted forty years later and considerably futher from 
home. 
 
There were, however, examples of good practice. The rapport between Wellington and 
his PMO McGrigor resulted in improvements in the medical services due to attention to 
sanitary discipline and the provision of abundant food, and better clothing coupled with 
the increase in the experience gained by the MOs. In addition, improvements in the 
regimental hospitals resulted in patients being treated in the forward areas and were thus 
spared an arduous trek back to base hospitals. This reduction of movements, together 
with the separation of surgical and medical cases and convalescents in general hospitals, 
and regimental hospitals when static, reduced the risk of cross-infection and thereby 
improved the chances of survival.
21
 Hospital Regulations issued in 1813 stipulated that 
there should be separate hospital buildings for cases of continued fever, dysentery, 
surgical cases, and convalescents. 
 
Despite McGrigor’s best intentions there was little reform of the Army Medical 
Department (AMD) between 1815 and 1854. For example, Millingen’s proposal for a 
Hospital Ambulance Crops made in 1819 went unheeded,
22
 while the need for an army 
medical school, which had been ‘strongly advocated […] by such reformers as Richard 
Brocklesby [d.1777] and Robert Jackson [retired in 1819],’ and was one of McGrigor’s 
‘most cherished ambitions,’ never materialized.23 
                                                 
19  Cantlie (1974), I, pp. 312, 339, & 506. 
20  Cantlie (1974), I, p. 440 and Shepherd (1991), p. 6. 
21  Cantlie (1974), I, pp. 338-9, 357 & 368. 
22  Cantlie (1974), I, p. 375 and van Millingen (1819) quoted by Shepherd (1991), p. 7. 
23  Cantlie (1974), I, p. 439. 
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Furthermore, Surgeon Maclean speculated that if newspaper correspondents had 
covered the China War of 1839-1842, which was ‘one of the most disgraceful episodes 
in military history [and] which cost so many lives’, it is probable that ‘public opinion 
would have been so effectively called to the defects in our military and sanitary 
organization, as to have led to reforms in both that would have gone far to prevent the 
miserable breakdown in the Crimea.’24  
 




The health of the general public, particularly the urban poor, obtained an increasingly 
high profile during the 1840s
25
 with the Health of Towns Commissioners concluding 
that ‘defective drainage, neglect of house and street cleansing, ventilation, and imperfect 
supplies of water, contribute to produce atmospheric impurities, which affect the 
general health and the physical condition of the population.’26 Legislation was 
subsequently enacted,
27
 and it resulted in progress being made, albeit not universally, 
with the appointment of qualified surveyors and inspectors of nuisances. Medical 
practitioners were originally employed on an ad hoc basis, a policy the editor of the 
AMJ considered unsatisfactory as he considered preventive medicine a legitimate new 
branch of medicine that was equally important as that of healing, being ‘but sister 
branches of the same tree.’28 However, despite this positive opinion preventive and 
community medicine, as we now know them, did not exist as disciplines in their own 
right; and in this respect military surgeons were probably no more or less ineffectual 
than the majority of their civilian counterparts, whether they were Miasmatists or 
Contagionists.
29
 In consequence ‘many of the subsequent criticisms of the medical 
                                                 
24  Maclean (1895), pp. 96-7. 
25  For an assessment of urban sanitary issues see Gavin (1848). Gavin, a Sanitary Commissioner, 
died following a shooting accident shortly after he arrived in the Crimea. 
26  1st and 2nd Reports of the Health of Towns Commissioners dated June 1844 and Feb. 1845, 
and quoted in the AMJ, 11 May 1855, p. 434. 
27  The Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Act 1855 defined ‘nuisances’ as any ‘filthy, 
unwholesome, or dilapidated house, building, or premises; any foul or offensive pool, ditch, gutter, 
watercourse, privy, urinal, cesspool, drain, or ashpit; any animal so kept as to be injurious to 
health; any decaying to offensive accumulation or deposit.’ The background to this legislation and 
current medical opinion were discussed in extenso in seven editorials published in the AMJ 
between 4 May and 4 July 1855 under the title of ‘Sanitary Legislation’. 
28  AMJ, 4 May 1855, pp. 411-2. 
29  For further comment see Miles (2009), pp. 112-3. 
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services in the Crimea are unfair because they ignore the state of medical knowledge 
and treatment available at the time.’30 
Certainly, ‘the army doctor before 1854 received little specialised instruction in 
the medical or surgical problems encountered on service,’ and ‘there was a near total 
neglect of teaching of the principles of hygiene and preventive medicine.’31 
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, the concepts of proverbs, such as ‘Prevention 
is better than cure’32 and ‘Prevention is so much better than healing, because it saves the 
labour of being sicke,’33 would have been appreciated by most medical men. However, 
at that time there were only two diseases for which specific methods of prevention were 
available, viz. vaccination against small pox and the issuing of lime juice to prevent 
scurvy, although the control of cholera would have been feasible, if Snow’s explanation 
for the mode of transmission by contaminated water had been generally accepted.
34
 
An important principle of hygiene for an army on campaign was enunciated in 
Deuteronomy 23:12-13: ‘Thou shall have a place also without the camp, whither thou 
shalt go forth abroad: and thou shalt have a paddle upon thy weapon; and it shall be, 
when thou wilt ease thyself abroad, thou shalt dig therewith, and shalt turn back and 
will cover that which cometh from thee.’ The MOs would have been known of these 
verses as well as the writings of 18
th





 who championed the importance of basic hygiene, and of the need to supply 
troops with an adequate diet and a supply of pure water, as well as keeping them well 
clothed and protected by adequate accommodation, while Luscombe, writing after the 
Napoleonic wars, made several sensible proposals about the care and effective 
management of soldiers which were equally as good as any of those recommended in 
1858 by the Royal Commission chaired by Sidney Herbert.
37
 
Pringle, who is considered the ‘father of modern military hygiene’, was well 
ahead of his times since ‘even in the twentieth century’ his ideas ‘are thought by many 
                                                 
30  Ponting (2004), p. 192. 
31  Shepherd (1991), p. 14. 
32  Latin proverb in Browning (1988), p. 406. 
33  T. Adams (1618) quoted by Simpson (1981), p. 146. 
34  These issues persist in the 21st century since it has been suggested that priority should have been 
given to sanitation and the provision of a clean water supply when tackling the cholera epidemic in 
Haiti, rather than the introducing a vaccination programme; Wampler (2011). 
35  Pringle (1752). 
36  Monro (1780), pp. 1-159. 
37  Luscombe (1821), pp. 108-15. 
 -25-
doctors to be a comparatively recent discovery,’38 a view that echoes that of the editor 
of the AMJ who noted on 4 May 1855 that: ‘Preventive medicine has within a few 
years been called into active existence, or [rather] revived; for many facts and opinions 
which seem to us novelties were well understood by older physicians.’ 
 
When war appeared inevitable the Director of the AMD, Dr Andrew Smith, had the 
foresight to send Drs Dumbreck, Linton, and Mitchell to make a reconnaissance in the 
Balkans and Turkey. Dumbreck visited the Danubian Provinces and made a number of 
sensible suggestions in his report.
39
 For example, the need for more appropriate summer 
and winter clothing, prophylaxis against malaria, the adoption of strict hygiene 
measures, and the filtration of water. Smith requested the military authorities to 
implement Dumbreck’s recommendations but in the most part no action was taken. 
 
In the event Smith had ‘to create a wartime organization from scratch,’ and, as only a 
short war in the principalities of Moldovia and Wallachia was envisaged there would 
have been little incentive for ‘the Army Medical Department [and the Army as a whole 
it should be said] to have laid contingency plans for an invasion and prolonged 
campaign in the Crimea.’40 The potential for a Sanitary Disaster was therefore present 
from the start, and when it came to pass its conversion into a Sanitary Success was not 
due to advances in the understanding of disease or other aspects of medical science, or 
the achievement of any one person, group of persons, or one military department. 
Rather, as will be described in later chapters, it was due to the incremental improvement 
in the living standards during 1855, with the provision of an improved diet, better 
clothing and hutted accommodation, etc. Progress towards this end was associated, inter 
alia, with the application of simple sanitary measures by the military authorities, 
improvements in primary health care and facilities in the regimental and general 
hospitals, and the conditions obtaining during the transport of patients to the base 
hospitals in Turkey and thence back to England; developments which were clearly 
facilitated by the use of modern industrial technologies, such as railway and steam 
powered shipping to solve basic logistical problems. 
                                                 
38  Starling (2002). 
39  M&SH, I, Appendix 1; and summarized by Cantlie (1974), pp. 18-9, Shepherd (1991), p. 39, and 
Scotland and Heys (2013), pp. 212-3. 
40  Royle (1999), p. 205-6. 
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Status of the Medical Officer 
 
‘Surgeons were ranked above washerwomen and below tailors’ during the reign of 
Henry V while by the time of Elizabeth I they were ‘coupled with drummers and paid 
accordingly.’41 Matters had improved by the beginning of the 19th century although 
MOs remained in ‘one of the lowest positions on the military hierarchy [and were] often 
regarded as neither a soldier nor a gentleman;’ a situation that prompted Jackson to 
recommend in 1803 that they should have military rank and powers equivalent to those 
of military officers and that a sanitary officer should be appointed to provide advice on 
the location for camps and hospitals; and to ensure compliance with regulations 
introduced to control epidemics.
42
 Needless to say these suggestions went unheeded, 
and although McGrigor during his time as DG had endevoured to enhance their status,
43
 
MOs still ‘occupied a hybridized and inequitable position. Occupationally and 
geographically removed from civilian counterparts […] they were not fully integrated 
into the mainstream of the medical profession, neither were they equals, in terms of 
rank, pay, status, or conditions of service, of their fellow officers in the services.’44 
As a consequence MOs still had little or no executive authority in 1854 and hence 
Hall, whose rank was equivalent to a Brigadier, was not involved with operational 
planning; surprising perhaps given that Raglan had been Wellington’s military secretary 
during the Peninsular War and would have seen first-hand the advantages of the 
beneficial relationship between him and McGrigor.
45
 Hall was thus ‘kept in total 
ignorance of the movements of the army […] until the last moment,’46 although when 
things went wrong he was ‘held accountable, both by [the military authorities] and the 
public, for its medical arrangements’ and as a result ‘no small measure of abuse was 
heaped on him and the department for what they termed its shortcomings;’47 an issue 
that will be considered later in the thesis. 
                                                 
41  Sweetman (1975). 
42  Jackson (1803), quoted by Shepherd (1991), p. 7. 
43  Blanco (1971). 
44  Bartrip (1996), p. 114. 
45  Cantlie (1974), I, pp. 338-9, 357 & 368. 
46  Hall made this point to the Royal Commission on 22 June 1857; BPP (1857-58), No. 2318 and 
Mitra (1911), p. 316. 
47  Hall to Smith, PoL, II, Appendix 42. A ‘rough copy’ entitled ‘Report of the Medical Arrangements 




The literature on the medical aspects of the Crimean campaign is best described as a 
series of distinct sources. Among the most important are documents relating to the 
Crimean War in TNA, particularly the WO and FO series, and the RAMC archive, now 
at the Army Medical Services Museum, which includes, inter alia, Hall’s official papers. 
In addition, papers in the NAM associated with Lord Raglan, General Wetherall, Hall 
and other participants have been consulted as have those of Herbert and Major Generals 
Estcourt and Airey in county records offices, as well as the letters and diaries of other 
individuals listed in the bibliography. 
 
The Director of the AMD kept copies of the letters he sent and received from the time 
he was told to prepare for service in the East until the end of war. A synopsis of these 
documents entitled Précis of letters written and received by the Director-General of the 
Army Medical Department in reference to the medical arrangements required at the 
commencement and during the War with Russia 1854-55-56 (PoL) was printed in two 
volumes after the war, but not officially published. In addition to abstracts of numerous 
letters there are a number of appendices comprising tables of statistical data and listing 




A second group of records are contemporary official publications. Hansard and the 
London Gazette were well established sources of information when the war commenced 
while contemporary official publications, commonly known as Blue Books, provide a 
wealth of statistical and documentary evidence, albeit usually with little or no analysis. 
Several of relevance to various aspects of the war are referred to in later chapters,
49
 with 
the most important being the ‘Medical and Surgical History of the British Army which 
Served in Turkey and the Crimea during the War Against Russia in the Years 1854-55-
56’ (M&SH),50 and it is analyses of data contained therein that form a significant 
component of this thesis. 
                                                                                                                                               
formerly Principal Medical Officer, British Army, Crimea, 20th Jan. 1857’ is preserved as 
RAMC/527. There are some minor textual differences between the two versions. 
48  The original documents or copies of them in out-letter books can frequently be found in the 
RAMC archive, TNA, and other archives. 
49  The full list of titles is included in the Bibliography. 
50  BPP (1857-58), No. 2434 and referred to as the M&SH in the text. 
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The first of the two volumes provides, inter alia, details of the medical problems 
encountered during each month by 14 cavalry and 52 infantry regiments, including a 
comprehensive table that lists the number of ‘admissions into hospital and deaths’ each 
month together with a separate column for the those who ‘died in general hospitals 
during the war’, but not those killed in action. The second volume comprises two 
principal parts that cover disease (pp. 34-252), and wounds and injuries (pp. 253-396). 
The section on disease concludes with five comprehensive tables, designated General 
Returns A-E, of which A is the most important as it summarizes the reasons for the 
primary admission of NCOs and men into the ‘hospitals of the Army of the East’ during 
each month,
51
 together with all the deaths that ‘occurred in regimental and general 
hospitals, in hospital ships, or suddenly, or from violence, with the exception of those 
which occurred in action with the enemy’. The reasons for admission and deaths are 
listed in 19 categories and General Return A alone provides some 7,344 items of 
information, including nil returns. The two sets of data in the Return are not directly 
comparable, however, as they were prepared from separate sources. This means that 
mortality rates cannot be determined by expressing the deaths in any month as a 
proportion (%) of the admissions as individuals may have died some weeks after 
admission to hospital and at a location other than the Crimea.
52
 
On the other hand, the calculation of the ratio (%) of ‘total deaths’ to ‘total 
admissions’ in General Return A provides an approximation of the overall mortality rate 
and these are included in the right hand column of Table 1.3. The highest ratio was 
59.5% for cholera. It was 19.5% and 8.5% for two scourges of the first winter, frostbite 
and scurvy, and c.10% over the whole campaign for fever, gastrointestinal disease, and 
wounds or injuries. Incidentally, several conditions which occurred infrequently also 
had relatively high ratios, viz. nervous disease (20.5%), eruptive fever (20%), and 
cardiovascular disease (15.5%). This topic will be considered in detail on Chapter 6. 
The second volume concludes with an Appendix which includes tables with a 
similar format to General Return A for nine General Hospitals, viz. Scutari,
53
 Varna, 
Abydos, Smyrna, Renkioi, and four in the Crimea (see Figures 1.1 to 1.4), together with 
                                                 
51  The totals in General Return A omit 5,113 primary admissions for disease when the month was not 
known; and there is ‘no reference to commissioned officers or men of the LTC, Mounted Staff 
Corps, and the MSC.’ 
52 The time between admission and death are given in the M&SH, II, General Return C. 
53 The General and Barrack Hospitals were the largest hospitals on the Asian side of the Bosphorus 
with those known as Haidar Pasha, Palace a and Kuleli (also spelt Kululi, Koulali, and Koulalee) 
hospitals were smaller and opened after the two others came in to use. 
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details of 187 voyages in which the sick and wounded were evacuated from the Crimea 
to Turkey. 
 
It was reports in newspapers published during the autumn and winter of 1854-55 that 
alerted the British public to the serious health problems in the Army. Correspondents, 
such as W.H. Russell and E.L. Godkin of The Times and Daily News respectively, were 
permitted to reside within the allied camps and their uncensored reports resulted in the 
public at large becoming aware not only of the problems of mismanagement but also of 
‘the privations and sufferings, the courage and stubborn endurance displayed by the 
private soldier.’54 They also provided a considerable amount of unbiased and sometimes 
commonplace factual information on daily life in the camps and elsewhere.
55
 
The government mindful of mounting disquiet among the British public 
engendered by the newspaper reports sent three commissions of enquiry to investigate 
matters on the spot, viz, the Hospital, Supplies, and Sanitary Commissions.
56
 After the 
resignatation of Aberdeen’s administration the House of Commons convened a Select 
Committee chaired by Mr J. Roebuck, MP, to ascertain what had been going wrong, and 
who was to blame.
57
 The reports of these initiatives provide an incomparable source of 
information of what transpired during the critical months after the invasion. For a more 
detailed discussion of these Blue Books see Chapter 11. 
 
Two relatively recent texts that provide detailed and well balanced factual information 
on the medical problems encountered during the Crimean campaign were published by 
Lieutenant General Sir Neil Cantlie, RAMC, and John Shepherd, a retired surgeon, in 
1973 and 1991 respectively.
58
 A more recent publication by two surgeons, Thomas 
Scotland and Steven Heys, considered the evolution of military medicine and surgery 
during the 19
th
 century and included chapters on the Crimean campaign and the 
medical reforms that that took place thereafter.
59
 These topics are of relevance to this 
thesis but their reliance on secondary texts for much of the narrative, rather than 
                                                 
54  Troubetzkoy (2006), pp. 44-5. 
55  The reports in The Times can be viewed on-line in The Times Digital Archive. Those in other 
newspapers can be accessed via the British Library 19th Century Newspapers website. 
56  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920; BPP (1856), No. 422 & 2007; and BPP (1857) 2196. 
57  BPP (1854-55), Nos 156, 218, 247, & 318. For details see Shepherd (1991), pp. 373-411. 
58  Cantlie (1974) and Shepherd (1991). 
59  Scotland and Heys (2013), pp. 204-76. 
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consulting primary sources, including the Blue Books, limits its value as a source of 
reference. 
Cantlie considered the Crimean War in the context of developments which took 
place ‘from the creation of the Standing Army in 1660 until the formation of the 
RAMC in 1898’ and this includes an account of the medical and surgical aspects of the 
campaign set within the framework of the ongoing military operations. References were 
made to the M&SH and Smith’s PoL as well as the reports of the Roebuck Committee, 
and the Hospitals, Sanitary and Royal Commissions, but not the Supplies Commission. 
Cantlie had access to the RAMC archive but there only two references to Hall’s diary 
and none to his other papers, or to diaries and letters of other participants, except Dr 
Cattell. There are no references to medical journals or newspapers, the London Gazette, 
Hansard, or documents in TNA, NAM and other archives. There are eleven simple 
summary tables on medical matters and four on the number of available hospital beds, 
but otherwise there are no detailed analyses of the numerical data in the M&SH or 
elsewhere. 
By comparison Shepherd’s account is more comprehensive as it included two 
chapters on the Royal Navy, a topic beyond the scope of this thesis, three on Miss 
Nightingale and the Scutari hospitals, and one each on commissions and committees, 
civilian surgeons, and the Turkish contingent. He made extensive use of reports in the 
medical press and scientific journals, personnel letters and diaries, The Times and ILN; 
and the text includes extracts from these sources. He also quoted secondary sources of a 
general nature. Shepherd considered M&SH an ‘indispensable text’ and although he had 
access to the RAMC archives there are no references to the PoL, Hall’s papers, or to 
documents in TNA and NAM. 
It should be noted that Shepherd’s account, like that of Cantlie, is essentially 
descriptive and there are only 27 simple summary tables based on data from the M&SH, 
and no graphs. In addition, neither author expounded on the reasons for the 
improvement in the health of the troops in the latter part of the campaign. 
 
General accounts of the Crimean War, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on the 
causes and the conduct of the conflict; and several comprehensive books on the subject 
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having been published within the last 25 years.
60
 Most, but not all, touched on medical 
matters but most references were made en passant as part of a general narrative and 
contain little or no detailed clinical or epidemiological information which might inform 
the analyses presented in later chapters (see Table 1.4). 
 
There is but one biography each for Drs Smith and Hall;
61
 while in contrast there is an 
extensive literature on Miss Nightingale, both her own writings and numerous 
biographies.
62
 As a consequence some commentators have tended to overemphasize 
events in Scutari and to overlook what took place in the Crimea where the main Army 
was located; and, as will be demonstrated, where the causes of the serious health 
problems experienced during the first winter were largely overcome. While Nightingale 
soon became immersed in dealing with the consequences of what was occurring at the 
front her terms of engagement did not extend to the Crimea, and hence reports of her 
achievements in the Barrack Hospital are inevitably of limited relevance to the 
objectives of this thesis. Similarly, several of the accounts listed in Table 1.4 mention 
the Scutari hospitals in varying amounts of detail but give little or no information about 
the medical arrangements in the Crimea. 
Nightingale became seriously ill when in the Crimea during May 1855 and any 
influence that she might have exerted was never realized. She paid two further visits to 
the Crimea after the fall of Sevastopol but by this time the health of the Army was much 
improved; and the troops were routinely cared for in the camps where no female nurses 
were employed. As a consequence there would have been little justification for the 
authorities to introduce any changes in management practices that she might have 
suggested, or to invest in infrastructural improvements, particularly after the signing of 
the Peace Treaty in March 1856 when it became the priority to evacuate the Crimea as 
soon as possible. 
 
                                                 
60  For example: Hibbert (1961), Curtiss (1979), Lalumia (1984), Conache (1987), Sweetman (1993), 
Goldfrank (1994), Royle (1999), Keller (2001), Fletcher & Ishchenko (2004), Ponting (2004), 
Troubetzkoy (2006), Rappaport (2007), Small (2007), Badem (2010), Figes (2010), and Lambert 
(2011) with Kent (2016) providing an account of the complex history of the Crimea from the 
classical times to the present day. 
61  Kirby (1965) and Mitra (1911), plus two essays on Hall by Major General Barnsley, RAMC, viz. 
Barnsley (1963 & 1966). 
62  For example, Cook (1913), Woodham-Smith (1950), Goldie (1997), Small (1999, 2013), Gill 
(2004), Bostridge (2008), and McDonald (2010a, b). 
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While it would have been desirable to have included a comparative element in this 
thesis there is no equivalent body of literature on the French, Turkish, Sardinian and 
Russian armies, thus making it impossible to make any detailed comparisons, though 
some general comments on the French experience are included in Chapter 6. The 
French authorities never published official casualty figures; suffice it to state that 
Bodart’s summary suggests that despite initial praise for the French medical services it 
would appear that overall the French Army fared worse than the British during the 
campaign (Table 1.5), and particularly during the final months.
63
 The number of 
Russians who died was probably over 450,000 but ‘the records are so poor it is 
impossible to analyse the causes of death;’64 and although Nikolai Pirogov is renowned 
as a surgeon who employed triage to manage massed casualties it was not a new 
concept having been introduced in the 1790s by D.J. Larry, Surgeon-in-Chief to 
Napolean’s Imperial Guard.65 An account of Pirogov’s career has been published,66 
while other summaries of his achievements are in general terms;
67
 and none can be 




Up until the Napoleonic wars it was oil paintings, tapestries, and murals that ‘espoused 
Georgian England’ by depicting heroic military exploits ‘as the ultimate stage for the 
highborn’,68 but in general these works of art would only have been available to upper 
class families, and their visitors and households. However, by the time the Crimean War 
commenced it was possible to reproduce images such as lithographs and woodcuts 
relatively easily and cheaply, and in large numbers. This resulted in ‘picture journalism’ 
in the ‘illustrated press’ which provided a more realistic presentation of the campaign, 
than hitherto; and featured principally the ‘rank and file as the principal actors’ rather 
                                                 
63  Royle (1999), p. 441. 
64  Ponting (2004), p. 334. 
65  Robertson-Steel (2006). Incidentally, no reference to the term triage has been found in 
contemporary British documents, though it is likely the surgeons would have automatically 
categorized their patients in a similar manner, given it was a matter of common sense so to do. 
66  Hendricks et al. (2016). 
67  For example, Curtiss (1979), Porudominsky (1995), Royle (1999), Fletcher & Ishchenko (2004), 
and Figes (2010). 
68  Lalumia, (1984), p. 150. 
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than the ‘aristocratic martial caste;’ a topic considered in extenso by Lalumia69 and 
Keller,
70
 while other authors have published invaluable illustrated catalogues of 




Prints and lithographs: The published images were based on sketches provided by 
both professional artists and talented amateurs, including military officers,
72
 and were 
published in journals such as the Illustrated London News
73
 and Illustrated Times, or as 
collections in albums, and thus reached a wide audience, particularly among the 
increasingly influential and vociferous middle class.
74
 
From the point of view of the objectives of this thesis the depictions of the battles 
are not particularly informative as they did not include the activities of the surgeons 
during the action. On the other hand, those illustrating the burying of the dead and the 
various ways by which invalids were conveyed from the camps to the ports do provide 
an indication of the conditions near the front (Figures 1.5A-C and 1.6A-F).
75
 On the 
other hand, the appearance of the Crimea during the first winter portrayed by Simpson 
when conditions proved so difficult for the Army tend to understate the situation as his 
scenes would not have been dissimilar to those experienced during a hard winter in the 
British Isles (Figure 1.7A-C). 
Similarly the portrayal of the military hospitals failed to support the harrowing 
accounts of the conditions reported in private letters and by the press. An issue on which 
Keller opined: 
 
Remarkably, in the contemporary arts spectrum from press illustration to academic painting 
[…] save for an indifferent view of a ward at Scutari and a somewhat mythologizing image 
                                                 
69  Lalumia (1984). 
70  Keller (2001). 
71  For example, Massie (2003), Koç (2006), and Hutchinson et al. (2009). 
72  Several military officers were gifted artists and some of their watercolours are particularly graphic 
in nature; though the majority would have been for private consumption and would not have been 
available to the general public. For reproductions of the paintings by Colonel the Hon. G. 
Cadogan, Grenadier Guards, Major the Hon. H.H. Clifford, Rifle Brigade, and others see 
Calthorpe (1979), Kerr et al. (1997), and Massie (2003). 
73  The Illustrated London News was sufficiently successful to have its own artists in the 
Crimea, such as Crowe and Guys. As a consequence: ‘In 1855 Punch had quipped that the 
Crimean War was undertaken for the benefit of the Illustrated London News;’ Keller (2001), 
pp. 77& 252. For details on the artists employed by the journal see pp. 71-106. 
74  Incidentally, the circulation of newspapers would have been boosted during 1855 by the repeal of 
the 1712 Stamp Act. 
75  For paintings of the evacuation of an officer on a stretcher and the French ambulance by Captain 
Wilkinson and Colonel Cadogan respectively see Massie (2003), pp. 295 & 277. 
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devoted to the ‘Lady with the Lamp’ (Figure 1.8A), the great Illustrated London News 
showed no interest in how the sick and wounded were housed ─ and this was not for lack of 
evidence. The Crimea and Bosphorus were littered with hospitals which […] accommodated 




Keller suggested that this omission may have occurred because: ‘At a certain 
threshold of horror, it seems, art stopped serving eyewitness functions, considering 
itself bound to contemporary standards of propriety;’77 and although scenes, ‘some 
fictitious’, were circulated as lithographs, they were bereft of anything likely to 
cause revulsion and tended to emphasize the beneficial involvement of female 
nurses in the wards (Figures 1.8A-D).
78
 This is in contrast to the disarray found in 
a Russian hospital in Sevastopol after the evacuation of the city (Figure 1.8E),
79
 
though even this image fell well short of reality given that AS Wrench reported to 
home that: ‘The scenes in the hospitals were awful, quite too disgusting to narrate 
[…] some of the dead are supposed to have been so for a few day if not weeks. 
Many of our men fainted who were employed removing them;’80 while Airey noted 
in his diary on 12 September that he had visited the barracks: ‘whence they were 
bringing out the dead, which were lying in some of the large rooms […] the 
effluvia from the bodies was dreadful  and the appearance of some of the bodies 
defies description.’81 
 
Photography: Roger Fenton, who was sent to the Crimea by Thomas Agnew and 
Sons, ‘consistently avoided all controversial subjects from hospital to trench 
conditions’ which meant that none proved specifically relevant to the topics 
covered in this thesis; except perhaps the ‘studio style’, and hence contrived 
photograph of a cantinière treating a wounded zouave (Figure 1.9). Fenton also 
failed to ‘document the numerous improvements which, according to all accounts, 
including his own letters, had began to make themselves felt by March 1855,’ and 
thus, when all things are considered, he ‘missed the very war that had drawn him to 
the Crimea,’ principally because he ‘had [seemingly] come to photograph heroes 
                                                 
76  Keller (2001), p. 106. 
77  Keller (2001), p. 107. 
78  For analysis of these images see Keller (2001), pp. 109-12. 
79  For the original in colour see Massie (2003), p.315/ 
80  Wrench to his sister Sara, 14 Sept. 1855; Nottingham University: Wr C/152/2 (Copy of original). 
81  HRO: BY/53/2. 
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[principally officers] not places.’82 In addition it was also necessary for the images 
to be ‘commercially appealing’ and not ‘embarrass the sitting ministry’ while 
Agnew would regard ‘photographs of the battle dead unmarketable.’83  
The other principal photographers were James Roberson and his 
collaborator Felice Beato who generally ‘eschewed individual and group 
portraiture for subjects that better revealed the destructive forces of war’ and the 
‘unaltered reality of the siege’ and hence ‘achieved the most faithful version of the 
Crimean War with the camera,’84 though the images were not taken until evidence 
of the carnage had been removed. 
The impact of images captured by Fenton, Robertson, and others would 
have been limited because the large scale reproduction of the photographs was not 
then possible. Only a relatively small number of copies would have been available, 
therefore, for exhibition and purchase, ‘unless [they were] translated into line 
engraving’ for mass distribution though this would inevitably result in the image 
being ‘robbed of its specific character;’85 as exemplified by the images of Sergeant 
Thomas Dawson, Grenadier Guards, an amputee who received the Crimea medal 
from the Queen on 16 May 1855.
86
 The photograph taken at Chatham by J.J.E. 
Mayall
87
 is particularly striking while the subsequent augmentation to include his 
wife and the medal resulted in a distinctly less impressive engraving that was 
published in the Illustrated Times on 9 June 1855 (Figure 1.10A & B). 
 
There is no doubt that the general public’s engagement in the Crimean War was 
influenced by the considerable amount of uncensored information published in the 
press; and in some instances these accounts were enhanced by including 
illustrations based on paintings and sketches sent back home by people on the spot. 
However, there was clearly a limit on how far the publishers were prepared to go in 
terms of realism and this unofficial censorship clearly limits the value of the 
majority of the images entering the public domain as historical documents, 
                                                 
82  See Keller (2001), pp. 123-50.  
83  Lalumia (1984), p. 118. For examples of Fenton’s oeuvre see Baldwin et al. (2004) and Jones 
(2012). 
84  Lalumia (1984), pp. 123-4. For a selection of photographs taken in the Crimea and in and around 
Constantinople see respectively Jones (2013) and Öztuncay (2013). 
85  Keller (2001), p. 171. 
86  The Times, 17 May 1855. 
87  Royal Collection Trust, RCIN 2500126. 
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although they did go some way to indicating how things were in the camps and 
trenches before Sevastopol, especially when dealing with scenes of a more 




The science of statistics was in its infancy during the mid-19
th
 Century and some of the 
methods of data-handling appear unusual by today’s standards. Nevertheless, the debate 
that followed the publication of the 3
rd
 edition of Nightingale’s ‘Notes on Hospitals’ 
during 1863 illustrated some of the muddled thinking current at the time. The topic was 
re-evaluated in a paper entitled ‘100 apples divided by 15 red herrings: a cautionary 
tale from mid-19
th
 century on comparing hospital mortality rates.’88 It is not intended to 
enter into this debate in detail, but the two examples of misrepresentation described 
below illustrate the importance of analyzing data from first principles, as has been done 
in this thesis, and not to accept what has been previously published, and from which it 
may be possible to draw the wrong conclusions. 
 
Colonel Tulloch’s denominator: It is nonsensical to calculate the average weight of 
a growing child by adding the weights on each birthday and dividing the sum by the age 
in years. It is inappropriate, therefore, to adopt a similar approach for estimating the 
numbers at risk in the Army as this is influenced by gains from reinforcements and 
returning convalescents and losses from enemy action, disease, and redeployment. It is 
for this reason that the method adopted by Tulloch is questioned, viz. the summing the 
number of deaths during ‘n’ months and dividing the total by the average monthly 
strength during that period. His data are summarized in Table 1.6
89
 with the overall 
mortality rate estimated at 39%. However, Tulloch’s approach produces an exaggerated 
approximation as the denominator is bound to be less than the total number at risk. This 
is illustrated clearly when the whole campaign is considered (Table 1.7). Tulloch’s 
denominator of 37,324 men was far too low given that the number sent to the East was 




                                                 
88  Iezzoni (1996). 
89  Tulloch (1857), p. 152. 
90  Returns provided by the AG on 29 Apr. 1856, and summarized in Sayer (1857), p. 415 
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Nightingale’s mortality rates: Death is a once in a lifetime experience and so 
quoting a mortality rate in excess of 100% is illogical. Yet, Nightingale did so; as 
illustrated in Table 1.8. The cause of this distortion is the scaling up the rate to per cent 
per annum. She justified this by suggesting that giving a percentage figure ‘is simply 
misleading to the authorities, unless indeed, which is hardly likely, they are thoroughly 
au fait at statistical inquiries’ because the ‘standard comparison all over the civilized 
word would be in percentages per annum.’91 This approach may be useful for 
persuading policy makers to introduce change but it was not necessary because the valid 
statistic presented in the third column makes the point equally forcibly. 
 
Health of the British Army during the Eastern 
campaign, 1854-1856 
 
A number of important factors which influenced the disease status of the British Army 
cannot be quantified. For example, the inherent instability of the population of the 
various armies and the numerous civilians who came to the peninsular either on 
government business, such as merchant seamen, or unofficially in search of 
employment or the opportunity to trade, would certainly have favoured the 
dissemination of infectious pathogens and hence made matters more difficult for the 
medical services. 
This section summarizes some of the salient features of the health of the Army 
during the campaign based on data in General Returns A and B in the second volume of 
the M&SH by way of introduction to the detailed analyses presented in later chapters. 
The results are presented in Figures 1.11-1.12 and the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
Primary admissions to regimental hospitals for disease: Admissions for disease 
peaked in the summers of 1854 and 1855 and the winter of 1854-55 and then declined to 
low levels after the fall of Sevastopol until the end of the campaign (Figure 1.11). 
Primary admissions to regimental hospitals for wounds or injuries: Admissions 
reflected the times of greatest military activity, viz. September to November 1854 and 
the spring 1855 until the fall of Sevastopol (Figure 1.5). 
                                                 
91  BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, p. 367. 
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Deaths from disease at all locations: Most of deaths from disease occurred 
between July 1854 and August 1855 with the worst months being December 1854 to 
April 1855 (Figure 1.12). 
Deaths from wounds or injuries at all locations: Deaths from wounds or injuries 
were far fewer than from disease and mirrored admissions for these reasons (Figure 
1.12). 
Deaths from disease: Non-cholera deaths exceeded 4:100 during December 1855 
and March 1855 while in the spring and summer of 1855 the rate was in the region of 
1:200 before it fell to even lower levels after the fall of Sevastopol (Figure 1.13). The 
graph also demonstrates the timing of the two epidemics of cholera in 1854 and 1855. 
 
The presentation of summary statistics for the cavalry, infantry and ordnance allows 
general conclusions to be drawn about the health of the troop but these provide no 
indication of differences between divisions, brigades, or regiments which may have 
experienced very different conditions of service. 
This issue will become apparent in the description of several diseases in later 
chapters but the topic is introduced here by comparing the reported incidence of eye 
disease in the 47 infantry regiments remaining in the Crimea in May 1856 when the 
epidemic was at it worst (Figure 1.14). The admissions for eye disease were <15‰ for 
three quarters (35) of the regiments, while the seven with a rate of >20‰ were in 
different brigades, and between them accounted for nearly half of the 417 cases 
hospitalized during the month, thereby illustrating that differences between the different 
corps is an expected occurrence. 
 
The assessment of a hospital’s performance is a vexatious topic and it emerged as an 
issue following the publication of reviews of Nightingale’s ‘Notes on Hospitals’92 in 
the MT&G
93
 and The Lancet.
94
 These notices, together with letters from others, 
criticized Dr William Farr’s95 method of judging a hospital on mortality rates alone, as 
this ignored the case load, number of doctors employed and their experience, nature of 
the cases admitted, ratio of medical to surgical cases, and age and gender of patients. 
                                                 
92  Nightingale (1863). 
93  MT&G, Jan. 1864, pp. 129-30, with further correspondence on pp. 186-9, 211, 242-3, & 491-2. 
94  The Lancet, 27 Feb. 1864, pp. 248-50, with further correspondence on pp. 338-9, 365-6, 420-2, 
& 451-2. 
95  Farr was an epidemiologist and statistician employed in the General Register Office. 
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An overall conclusion to be drawn from these discussions is the need to compare like 
with like; and in the context of the Eastern campaign this is only possible for general 
hospitals in operation at the same time, as illustrated in Table 1.9. 
 
Format of the thesis 
 
The thesis reports a detailed assessment of the medical history of the British Army 
while in Bulgaria and the Crimea and how the Sanitary Disaster of the winter of 
1854/55 evolved into a Sanitary Success. The achievement of this objective necessitated 
the investigation of several topics that have not been considered in depth by other 
commentators, and which involved where appropriate the evaluation of how 
circumstances changed on a monthly basis, particularly with respect to disease. 
In contrast to civilian populations, which tend to remain relatively stable, the 
Army’s composition changed continually with the arrival of new regiments and other 
units, changes in deployment for strategic reasons, and the turn-over of personnel due to 
losses from enemy action and disease and the arrival of new drafts and the return of 
convalescents. 
A summary of the general development of the Army forms the basis of Chapter 2 
while recruitment is considered separately in Chapter 3 as the quality of recruits evoked 
complaints from both the military and medical authorities. Taken together these 
chapters provide a backdrop to the task faced by the AMD in providing medical care for 
the troops, and how it expanded to meet this challenge during the campaign is described 
in numerical terms in Chapter 4. 
The War with Russia was the first major European conflict that took place during 
a cholera pandemic and the devastation it caused is considered in Chapter 5, together 
with the morbidity and mortality associated with diarrhoea and dysentery. The 
epidemiological features of other important diseases are the described in Chapter 6, and 
when considered together these analyses provide strong circumstantial evidence that it 
was primarily poor conditions in the field in the Crimea, rather than the unsatisfactory 
state of the base hospitals in Scutari, that was responsible for the Sanitary Disaster. 
The analysis of battlefield injuries in Chapter 7 includes an evaluation of an 
important return prepared by the AG’s department not previously analyzed, and 
preserved in Hall’s papers. 
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A salient feature of the Crimean campaign was the urgent necessity to evacuate 
sick and wounded troops to Turkey by sea during the six months after the invasion. A 
summary of the problems associated with the transportation of patients from the camps 
to Balaklava and an analysis of voyages by which the men were evacuated is considered 
in Chapter 8. 
It emerged early in the campaign that provision was required for patients who 
could rejoin their unit within a reasonable time (convalescents) and those rendered 
ineffective and who required repatriation to England, and possible discharge from the 
Army (invalids). This presented a complex logistical challenge and the way it was 
resolved is discussed in Chapter 9. 
The Sanitary Disaster was associated principally with a collapse of the supply of 
the Army with the necessities of life following the hurricane of November 1854 and 
how this tragedy unfolded and was rectified is covered in Chapter 10. News of this 
tragic turn of events prompted the government to despatch three Commissions to the 
East (the so-called Hospital, Supplies, and Sanitary Commissions) to assess conditions 
on the spot, and, following the resignation of Lord Aberdeen’s coalition administration 
a Select Committee of the House of Commons, under the chairmanship of J.A. Roebuck 
was convened. The proceedings of these initiatives were published and their impact, if 
any, on the course of the war is assessed in Chapter 11. 
A notable post-war development was the convening of the Royal Commission to 
enquire into the sanitary state of the British Army. In the event the Commissioners 
concentrated more on future developments than on the past, and its legacy is considered 
in Chapter 12 in the context of how experience in some of the future conflicts resonated 
with what occurred in the Crimea; while the final pages comprise a retrospective 
discussion on the whole project. 
 
Terminology: In the interests of consistency and accuracy the following terms will be 
used in this thesis, except when quoting the words of others. 
 
War with Russia: Turkey declared war on Russia on 5 October 1853 following the 
Russian occupation of the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. 
Hostilities ceased officially on 27 April 1856 with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris 
signed on 30 March 1856. The allied armies finally left the Crimea on 12 July 1856. 
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The Eastern campaign: The period the British and French armies spent in Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and the Crimea: April 1854 to July 1856. 
 
The Crimean campaign: The active campaign for the British and French Armies 
commenced following the invasion of the Crimea on 14 September 1854, and ended on 
12 July 1856. 
 
The Allies: The British and French governments officially became allied with the 
Ottoman Empire when they declared war on Russia on 28 March 1854; the Sardinians 
joined the alliance on 26 January 1855. 
 
Army of the East: The official title for the army under the command of Lord Raglan and 
his successors. 
 
Spelling: There has been much debate about the spelling of place names; should it be 
Sevastopol or Sebastopol; Chernaya, Tchernaya or Chernaia; Woronzoff, Verontsov or 
Woronsoff? In general the names of countries and regions are spelt according to 
conventional English usage, i.e. Crimea and these will be used except in quotations 
when the original spelling will be used. Elsewhere it is intended to follow contemporary 
practices for ‘Romanizing’ the Russian place names, e.g. Sevastopol.96 
The ‘New Oxford Dictionary for Writers and Editors’ has been consulted for other 




Analysis of numerical data: The published medical statistical data can be analysed 
effectively to explain what occurred during the campaign in general terms, though they 
should never be considered as completely reliable for the following reasons: 
There were no accurate definitions for the individual afflictions comprising 
important groups of diseases, for example, the causes of fever and gastrointestinal 
diseases. 
The returns were frequently prepared under difficult conditions, and it is probable 
they are not complete. 
                                                 
96 See Robins (1995 & 2003). 
97  Ritter (2005). 
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Inevitably there would have been bias due to the personal preferences or beliefs of 




There was no provision for recording more than one illness, and hence the most 
dramatic may have been chosen, for example, diarrhoea or dysentery. Similarly the 
reason for admission may not have caused death, particularly if it co-existed with a 
potentially a more life-threatening illness. 
The records provide no information on the numbers treated as outpatients because 
the illness was too slight or there were insufficient hospital capacity during times of 
crisis,
99
 while virtually no individual case records have been preserved. 
These crucial constraints taken together militate against the employment of 
established statistical techniques such as analysis of variance, regression or multivariate 
analysis. A simpler, and what proved an effective approach, was to use Minitab
100
 to 
collate and organize the data in order to provide summary tables and the totals needed to 
prepare simple plots and bar charts using Cricket Graph.
101
 Trends in incidence in some 
graphs were calculated using the Resistant Smooth command in Minitab; the algorithm 
being based on a calculation termed ‘running medians’ a consequence of which is the 




                                                 
98  See Miles (2009), pp. 112-3. 
99  M&SH, II, p. 79. 
100  Minitab Statistical Software, release 8.2; Minitab Inc., 3081 Enterprise Drive, State College, PA 
16081-3008, USA. 
101  Cricket Graph, release 1.2.2; Cricket Software, 40 Valley Stream Parkway, Malvern, PA 19355, 
USA. 




Table 1.1: Summary of three amphibious invasions with limited objectives involving British forces, 1808, 
1854, and 1915 
Topic Walcheren Crimean campaign Gallipoli 
Dates July-December 1809 September 1854-July 1856, 
with the fall of Sevastopol on 
8 September 1855 
March 1915-January 1916 




Destruction of Flushing’s 
port facilities: Achieved 
Destruction of Sevastopol’s 
port facilities and prevention 
of Russian control of the 
Bosphorus: Achieved 
Control of the Bosphorus and 
access of the Black Sea: Failed 
Principal forces Army with essential naval 
support 
Army with essential naval 
support 
Army with essential naval support 
Principal 
belligerents 
British v. French and 
Dutch 
British, French, Turks, and 
Sardinians v. Russians 




Short Long Long 
Military actions Occupation and siege Pitched battles and trench 
warfare 
Principally trench warfare 
Naval losses Minimal Minimal Considerable 
Disease problems Serious epidemic of 
malarial fever that 
remained unresolved by 
the time of the evacuation 
Serious epidemics of cholera 
and enteric disease that were 
resolved during the campaign 
Serious losses particularly from 
enteric disease and PUOs; 
problems that remained largely 
unresolved by the time of the 
evacuation 
Casualties No large scale evacuation 
of casualties 
Many casualties evacuated 
by sea to base hospitals 
Many casualties evacuated by sea 
to base hospitals 
Supplies Some supplies obtained 
locally, except munitions  
All supplies brought by sea All supplies brought by sea 
Evacuation Unopposed Unopposed Largely unopposed 
 
 
Table 1.2: Losses sustained in conflicts in the 19th and early 20th centuries 
War Date Average casualty loss (%) 
Turkish-Russian War 1828-9 14 
Polish-Russian War 1830-1 14 
Sardinian-Austrian War 1848, 1849 4 
Hungarian insurrection 1848,1849 4 
Crimean War 1853-6 12 
Italian War 1859 9.5 
American Civil War 1861-5 14 
War of 1866 1866 8 
Franco-German War 1870-1 7.5 
Turkish-Russian War 1877-8 13.5 
Boer War 1899-1901 5 
Russo-Japanese War 1904-5 14 
[Bodart (1916), p. 16] 
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Table 1.3: Principal reasons for primary admissions into the hospitals of the Army of the East and also the 
deaths which occurred in the regimental and general hospitals and hospital ships with the exception of 
those killed in action, April 1854-June 1856 













(%) of all 
deaths 
Ratio (%) 
of deaths to 
admissions 
(c5/c3)*100 
I Fever 4 31204 19 3446 19 11 
II Eruptive fever 4 29 - 6 - 20.5 
III Respiratory disease 9 12382 7.5 644 3.5 5 
IV Cardiovascular disease 6 266 - 41 - 15.5 
V Diseases of liver and 
spleen 
4 1138 0.5 40 - 3.5 
VI Gastrointestinal disease 13 55765 34 5950 33 10.5 
VII Nervous disease 7 736 0.5 160 1 21.5 
VIII Cholera 1 7574 4.5 4512 25 59.5 
IX Rheumatic disease 5 5131 3 233 1.5 4.5 
X Boils and ulcers 4 12542 7.5 37 - - 
XI Venereal disease 7 3717 2.5 4 - - 
XII Urogenital disease 9 270 - 6 - 2 
XIII Wounds and injuries 8 18283 11 1761 10 9.5 
XIV Punishment (Punitis) 1 1733 1 0 - - 
XV Frostbite 2 2398 1.5 463 2.5 19.5 
XVI Scurvy 1 2096 1.5 178 1 8.5 
X VII Eye disease 1 3307 2 0 - - 
XVIII Skin disease 1 749 - 1 - - 
XIX Other diseases 34 3353 2 576 3 17 
Totals 121 162673 100 18058 100 11 
[Summarized from the M&SH, II, General Return A] 
* Listed in the order in the Return. 
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Army Medical Dept - - - - - ● - 
Disease - ● - - - - - 
Cholera ● See disease ● - - ● ● 
Scurvy - - ● - - - - 
Wounded/sick/casualties - ● ● - - ● - 
Ambulance - - - - - - - 
Hospital ships ● - - - - - - 
Railway ● - ● - - - ● 
Commissariat/supplies - ● ● - - ● - 
Land Transport Corps ● - - - - - ● 
Hospital Commission ● - - - - ● - 
Supplies Commission ● - - - - ● - 
Sanitary Commission ● - - - - ● - 
Roebuck Committee ● - - - - ● - 
Board of General 
Officers 
● - - - - ●  
Royal Commission - - - - - - - 










Army Medical Dept ● ● ● - - - 
Disease - - See cholera - - - 
Cholera ● ● ● ● - ● 
Scurvy - -  - - - 
Wounded/sick/casualties - - - - - ● 
Ambulance ● - ● - - - 
Hospital ships - - ● - - - 
Railway ● - ● ● - - 
Commissariat/supplies - ● ● ● ● - 
Land Transport Corps ● ● ● - ● - 
Hospital Commission - - ● - ● - 
Supplies Commission ● - ● ● ● - 
Sanitary Commission ● - ● ● ● - 
Roebuck Committee - - - ● - - 
Board of General 
Officers 
- - - - - - 
Royal Commission - ● - - - - 
Pages 341 240 523 196 348 323 




Table 1.5: Losses sustained by the British and French armies during the Crimean campaign 
Nationality Effective strength 
put into the field 
Killed or died of 
wounds 
(%) = (c3/c2)*100 
Died of disease 
(%) = (c4/c2)*100 
Total fatalities 
(%) = (c5/c2)*100 
British 98000 4602 (4.7) 17580 (17.9) 22182 (22.6) 
French 310000 20240 (6.5) 75375 (24.3) 95615 (30.8) 
[Bodart (1916), p. 141] 
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Table 1.6: Calculation of mortality rates according to Colonel Tulloch’s method, October 1854-April 
1855 
Month Mean strength 
of infantry* 









October 19430 338 19430 338 1.7 
November 22360 848 20895 1186 5.7 
December 25003 1453 22264 2369 11.9 
January 26073 2462 23216 5101 22.0 
February 25780 2146 23729 7247 30.5 
March 24414 1239 23843 8486 35.6 
April 23333 529 23770† 9015 37.9 
General total 23770† 9015‡ Not relevant 
[Tulloch (1857), p. 152] 
* These figure are presumably the monthly totals of infantrymen in each month, and from this Tulloch calculated 
the average strength for the seven months 
† The average strength calculated on the basis that the campaign had finished during the month in question, i.e. the 
sum of the strength for ‘n’ months in column 2 divided by ‘n’. 
‡ In his analysis Tulloch deducted 608 deaths from wounds and injuries and added 841 (10%) to allow for deaths 
that were not reported. This gave a total of 9,248 deaths and a mortality rate of 39%, i.e. (9,248/23775)*100. 
 
Table 1.7: Mortality rate for the whole campaign calculated using Colonel Tulloch’s method, April 1854-
June 1856 
Comparable data to Table 1.5 Comparable calculations to Table 1.5 











1854 Apr. 8265 3 8265 3 <0.1 
May 21789 21 15027 24 0.2 
June 25122 17 18392 41 0.2 
July 28722 379 20975 420 2.0 
Aug. 30226 852 22825 1272 5.6 
Sep. 30329 858 24076 2130 8.8 
Oct. 30607 624 25009 2754 11.0 
Nov. 29791 937 25606 3691 14.4 
Dec. 32799 1847 26406 5538 21.0 
1855 Jan. 32469 3076 27012 8614 31.9 
Feb. 31027 2478 27377 11092 40.5 
Mar. 30082 1377 27602 12469 45.2 
Apr. 31328 531 27889 13000 46.6 
May 35063 543 28401 13543 47.7 
June 39226 830 29123 14373 49.4 
July 42919 414 29985 14787 49.3 
Aug. 44414 507 30834 15294 49.6 
Sep. 48243 208 31801 15502 48.8 
Oct. 48812 145 32696 15647 47.9 
Nov. 49942 206 33559 15853 47.2 
Dec. 50089 116 34346 15969 46.5 
1856 Jan. 50881 87 35098 16056 45.8 
Feb. 50319 39 35759 16095 45.0 
Mar. 55000 49 36561 16144 44.2 
Apr. 54452 37 37277 16181 43.4 
May 47472 24 37669 16205 43.0 
June 25935 6 37234 16211 43.5 
General total 37234 16211 Not relevant 
* Calculated from the M&SH, II, p. 43, column 2 and 6. 
† Transcribed from the M&SH, II, pp. 43 and 44, column 2, respectively, being the sum of those numbers recorded 
for the cavalry, ordnance (RA and RS&M), and foot guards and infantry. 
‡ The average strength calculated on the basis that the campaign had finished during the month in question, i.e. the 




Table 1.8: Mortality in the hospitals in England, Scutari, and Kuleli 
Location Mortality 
Rate per cent per annum 
of sick population 
Per cent. of cases treated 
Eleven London General Hospitals 82 7.6 
Fever Hospital 110.5 11.3 
Military and Naval Hospitals in London 39 2.4 
Scutari and Kuleli General Hospitals during 4 months* 203 19.8 
During 4 weeks 319 32.1 
During 4 week 415 42.7 
Kuleli during 4 week 608 52 
Scutari and Kuleli, summer 1855 34 2.2 
[Adapted from Nightingale (1859), p. 6] 
* The dates are not stated but the context indicates that these losses occurred during the first winter. 
 
 
Table 1.9: The months during which the hospitals of the Army of the East were in operation, April 1854-
June 1856 
Hospital* 1854 1854-55 1855-56 
A-
M 
J-S O-N D-J F M A-
M 
J-S O-N D-A M J 
Regimental hospitals ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Scutari  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Varna  ● ● ●         
Balaklava General   ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Abydos    ● ● ● ● ●     
Smyrna     ● ● ● ● ●    
Castle General      ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Camp General       ● ● ● ●   
Monastery        ● ● ● ●  
Renkioi         ● ● ● ● 
Number operational 1 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 8 7 6 5 
[Details of the hospitals of the cavalry and infantry regiments are included in the M&SH, I, while the tables for the 





Figure 1.1: Location of military hospitals in the Crimea 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Location of military hospitals in the Turkey and Bulgaria 
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A: General Hospital, Balaklava; Illustrated Times, 11 August 1855. 
B: Castle Hospital, Balaklava; Illustrated Times, 11 August 1855. 
C: Light Division Hospital; Illustrated Times, 12 July 1856.  
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Figure 1.4: Military hospitals in Turkey 
 
 
A: Barrack Hospital, Scutari; Illustrated Times, 8 December 1855. 
B: General Hospital, Smyrna; Illustrated Times, 24 November 1855. 
C: Prefabricated hospital, Renkioi; Illustrated Times, 1 December 1855. 
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A. The Siege of Sebastopol – Burial of the dead in front of the Malakoff Tower after Captain H.J. 
Wilkinson, 9
th
 Regiment; Illustrated London News, 21 April 1855. 
B. Interior of the Malakoff with the remains of the Round Tower. Lithograph after William Simpson. 
C. Graves at the head of the harbour of Balaklava, 1854. Lithograph after W. Simpson. 
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A: Siege of Sebastopol ─ Dr Smith’s hospital; Illustrated London News, 3 November 1854. 
B: French ambulance before Sebastopol; Illustrated London News, 16 December 1854. 
C: Carrying the frost-bitten to Balaklava; Illustrated London News, 3 March 1855. 
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D: Turks conveying the sick to Balaklava after Constantine Guys; Illustrated London News, 17 March 
1855. 
E: Near Sebastopol ─ Ambulance waiting for wounded; Illustrated London News, 2 June 1855. 
F: New Ambulance Transport Service; Illustrated London News, 4 August 1855. 
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A. Huts and clothing for the Army. Lithograph after W. Simpson 
B. Sentinel of the Zouavas, before Sebastopol. Lithograph after W. Simpson 
C. The Second Division camp. Looking East; Lithograph  after W. Simpson 
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A. Miss Nightingale in the Hospital at Scutari; Illustrated London News, 24 February 1855. 
B. Ward in the Hospital at Scutari. Lithograph after William Simpson 
C. The Great Military Hospital at Scutari. Lithograph published by Stannard and Dixon, 24 
February 1855. 
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D. Works of Mercy, Therapia Hospital. Lithograph by J.A. Vinner after H. Barraud and published 
by Ackerman, 19 February 1855. 
E. Dr Durgan attending Russian soldiers in a hospital in Sevastopol after E.A. Goodall; Illustrated 
London News, 6 October 1855. 
 












A: Sergeant Dawson and his daughter at Chatham by J.J.E. Mayall [Royal Collection 
Trust/© Her majesty Queen Elizabeth II, 2016] 






















Figure 1.13: Deaths from disease among NCOs and men in all locations, with and without cholera being 






Figure 1.14: Primary admission of NCOs and men in the infantry regiments with eye disease into the 





Organization and strength of the British Army of the East 
 
The complex structure of the Army illustrates the organizational challenges that the 
AMD faced in providing health care during the occupation of Bulgaria and the Crimea. 
In addition, there was a large population of civilians and camp followers within the 
allied lines for which the AMD was not directly responsible. Nevertheless, some of 
these had to be provided for, although not necessarily at the public expense, given 
Simpson’s response to a letter from Hall dated 16 Aug. 1855: ‘There is hardly any 
person in Balaklava, who does not receive some pay […] and I therefore recommend 
that no patient be treated free of expense, but be charged hospital stoppages.’103 
When fully constituted, the Army comprised, inter alia, 14 cavalry and 52 infantry 
regiments
104
 together with the RA, RE/RS&M,
105
 AMD, which will be considered in 
Chapter 4, and Chaplains’ Department. In addition, the Commissariat, a civilian 
department, initially under the control of the Treasury, but later the War Department, 
was responsible for supplying provisions, including food, clothing, and other 
necessities. During 1855 a LTC
106
 and AWC were established with the aim of relieving 
military personnel from transporting stores and equipment, and assisting with civil 
engineering projects. 
 
The contemporary documents consulted are identified in the footnotes. Other sources 
identified but not utilized include: summaries of the state of the Army of the East 
prepared each month by the AG and sent to Horse Guards;
107
 returns provided for the 
Cabinet by Horse Guards on 9 February 1854 and 8 February and 31 July 1855;
108
 
seven returns of the morning state of the British Army between 1 October 1854 and 13 
                                                 
103  PoL, II, Appendix 7. 
104  The 2nd battalions of the 1st Regiment and the Rifle Brigade were considered as separate 
regiments in the ‘order of battle’. 
105  The RE (officers) and RS&M (NCOs and men) were amalgamated during 1856 to form the Corps 
of Royal Engineers. 
106  The LTC was the precursor of the Royal Corps of Transport. 
107  WO/17/1730-1731. These detailed returns, which were not published, cover the period May 1854-
July 1856, except Sep.-Nov. 1854, which are wanting. 




 and details on the strengths and mortality in the cavalry, infantry, RA, 




Organization of the Army 
 
Preparation for the Eastern campaign commenced early in 1854 when several cavalry 
and infantry regiments, together with elements of the RA and a small number of 
Engineers, were mobilised for service overseas. The first regiments embarked during 
February 1854 while the last regiment to arrive, the 92
nd
, landed after the fall of 
Sevastopol. 
The time of arrival of the regiments between April 1854 and September 1855, 
together with their principal location during each month of the campaign, is summarized 
in Table 2.1 and illustrated in Figures 2.1-2.3. The 66 regiments were only together in 
the Crimea during September and October 1855 when 13 of the 14 cavalry regiments 
were withdrawn to Turkey for the winter.
111
 
The infantry and cavalry regiments can be divided into four groups depending on 
the time spent on active service (Tables 2.2 and 2.3 respectively): Group 1 passively 
supported the Turkish Army in Bulgaria before the invasion; Group 2 spent two weeks 
or more in Turkey before continuing to the Crimea; Group 3 travelled directly to the 
Crimea and were present during all or part of the winter of 1854-55; and Group 4 
arrived during May to September 1855. 











and one cavalry division with a Heavy and Light Brigade. Raglan’s successor, Simpson, 
reorganized the Army during August 1855 into seven divisions; the additional division 
being the Highland Division that incorporated the Highland Brigade as the 1
st
 Brigade. 
The Cavalry Division was restructured into three brigades, a third ‘Hussars’ brigade 






 Hussars, and 17
th
 Lancers while of the infantry 
divisions, the Guards Brigade and the 1
st
 Division were augmented with a second 
brigade. The composition of several of the brigades remained essentially the same; for 
                                                 
109  Elphinstone (1859), pp. 156-7. 
110  BPP (1857), Session I, No. 42. The report included four official returns dated between August 
and October 1856 which summarized the strength and mortality in various units in the cavalry, 
infantry, RA, and RS&M. 
111  The Cavalry Division, excepting the 11th Hussars, left the Crimea by the 16 Dec. 1855; 
WO/28/143. 
112  The 4th Division was not completed until after the landing in the Crimea. 
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example, the Guards Brigade, and both brigades in the Light Division and 2
nd
 Division. 





changed during the campaign. Table 2.4 provides a summary of the ‘order of battle’ of 
the British Army of the East on five occasions, viz. prior to the landing in the Crimea in 
September 1854, January 1855, August 1855 following Simpson’s reorganization, 
January 1856, and April 1856 when the Treaty of Paris was signed.
113
 
A further reorganisation to form two corps d’armée of three divisions each was 
planned for the spring of 1856 though this was not proceeded with, apart from the 
formation of an independent brigade based at Balaklava. 
 
Strength of the Army 
 
The ten cavalry regiments mobilised between April and July 1854 comprised between 
313 and 319 individuals at embarkation, while the regiments arriving in the spring and 




 Dragoons from India) and 




 Dragoon Guards from England). 
In contrast, nearly all the infantry regiments embarked between February and July 
1854 had 900-1,000 men while those arriving later were generally smaller: for example, 
between April and August 1855 all but two of the nine regiments numbered 500-850 
(Figure 2.4). 
The initial strength of the expeditionary force was c.26,000 with a ratio of officers 
to men of c.1:28 (Table 2.5).
114
 The value of this information is limited, however, 
because the date of the return and the corps included were not given. Nevertheless, it 
gives an indication of the numbers of troops that Raglan might have had at his disposal 
when planning the invasion of the Crimea if many of the troops had not been rendered 
partially or totally ineffective as a consequence of disease. 
The M&SH listed the number of men in the Army admitted to hospital between 
April 1854 and June 1856 and the ratio per cent to strength, and from this the number of 
personnel in the cavalry, infantry, and ordnance can be estimated (see Table 2.6 and 
                                                 
113  The organisation of the cavalry and infantry is based on McGuigan (2001), pp. 6-8, 32-5, 48-52, 
64-8, & 72-6. McGuigan summarized the order of battle for the Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman; 
the assaults on the Quarries (7 June 1855), Redan (18 June and 8 Sep. 1855); and the 
expeditions to Kertch (May/June 1855), and Kinburn (Oct./Nov. 1855). 
114  Sayer (1857), p. 416. This figure is similar to the estimated strength at the battle of the Alma, viz. 
22,000 infantry, 3,100 artillery, and 1,100 cavalry (p. 418). 
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 The infantry arrived first and by the time the Army landed in 
the Crimea they comprised c.80% of the total strength. Thereafter the proportion 
fluctuated; though it was never less than c.70% and increased after the signing of the 
peace treaty as the majority of the cavalry regiments and RA were sent home (Table 
2.6). 
The M&SH recorded the strength of the 14 cavalry and 52 infantry regiments each 
month and these figures were used to prepare Table 2.7. The results obtained are similar 
to the estimates in Table 2.6 and any discrepancies will not influence conclusions on 
how the size of the Army changed with time (Table 2.7). 
Using information provided by the AG’s office on 29 April 1856 Sayer calculated 
that out of c.94,000 NCOs and men sent to the Crimea up until the signing of the peace 
treaty; c.80% were infantry, c.10% each RA and cavalry, and 2% RS&M (Table 2.8). 
 
Changes in the size of the Army during the campaign 
 
The size of the Army fluctuated as a result of losses due to combat and disease, the 
arrival of fresh drafts, and the return to duty of convalescents. A table published by 
Sayer was used to summarize the overall changes in numbers in the principal corps 
during the campaign (Table 2.9).
117
 The decrease in the strength, as a proportion (%) of 
the total number of individuals that served in the guards, infantry, RA, cavalry, and 
RS&M (i.e. the sum of strength on embarkation and the number of reinforcements) 
varied considerably, being 49%, 39%, 34%, 27%, and 26% respectively. 
Irrespective of the numbers of individuals recorded in the several returns the 
Army increased in the size during the summer of 1854. Numbers remained relatively 
stable during the winter of 1854-55 with the build-up recommencing during May 1855 
and this continued until the fall of Sevastopol when the numbers stabilized once again. 
A final augmentation occurred early in 1856; presumably in anticipation of a possible 
campaign later during the year (see Figures 2.5 and 2.7). 
 
                                                 
115  M&SH, II, p. 43. 
116  The Ordnance included the RA and RS&M. 
117 Sayer (1857), endpaper. The regiments of cavalry, guards and infantry are listed together with the 
RA and RS&M. Comparable information of for the LTC, British German Legion and British 
Swiss Legion has not been considered as they were formed after the first winter (LTC) or after the 
fall of Sevastopol (German and Swiss Legions).  
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Number of officers and men in the cavalry and infantry 
 
The numbers of officers and men in the cavalry and infantry regiments comprising each 
brigade of each division in August 1854, January 1855, August 1855, January 1856, and 
April 1856 are summarized in Table 2.4.
118
 The totals for the officers and men are 
illustrated in a bar chart together with the comparable information from Sayer for 1 
April 1856.
119
 His estimated total, presumably based on different returns, was greater at 
>50,000 (Figure 2.8). 
On 1 April 1855 the Army, exclusive of the German and Swiss Legions, 
numbered c.67,000. The proportional (%) strength of the principal corps being infantry 
including the Guards (67%), RA (11%), LTC (10.5%), cavalry (9.5%), and RS&M 
(2%). 
 
Changes in the relative strength of cavalry and infantry 
regiments during the campaign 
 
Sayer listed the strength of each regiment when it embarked for the East
120
 while the 
returns in the M&SH furnished a figure for the monthly strength of each regiment. By 
using Sayer’s embarkation figures as the denominator and the monthly strength of each 
regiment as the numerator the proportion (%) of the embarkation strength was 
calculated and the results obtained for the cavalry and infantry regiments. 
A scatter plot reveals considerable differences between the regiments in the 
Cavalry Division for any month although there was a tendency for numbers to fall 
following their arrival in the East until the spring of 1855 when the numbers increased 
towards the end of the campaign, by which time most regiments were stronger than they 
were initially (Figure 2.9).
121
 
The numbers of personnel in infantry regiments varied month by month and 
Figures 2.10-2.13 illustrate the fluctuations on the Guards and nine line regiments that 
remained in the same brigade during their service in the East. 
                                                 
118  The composition of the brigades within division on five dates was adapted from McGuigan (2001), 
while the numbers of officers and men were collated from the regimental returns in the M&SH, I. 
119  Sayer (1857), endpaper. 
120  Sayer (1857), endpaper. There are inconsistencies between Sayer’s embarkation figures and those 
recorded in other sources, e.g. the M&SH. No attempt has been made to reconcile these differences 
as they will have little bearing on the topics covered in this thesis. 
121  The 1st Dragoons, 6th Dragoon Guards and 11th Hussars were below strength in June 1854 
because only part of these corps had arrived by this time. 
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The Guards Brigade suffered particularly severely during the first winter. They 
were then reinforced from time to time thereafter so when the peace treaty was ratified 
the regiments were stronger than when they left England (Figures 2.10). 
Overall the strength of regiments was reduced during the winter of 1854-55 with 
this increasing thereafter, though there were differences between them, even in the same 






) were still <80% below 
strength when hostilities officially ended (Figures 2.11-2.13). 
The topics of reinforcements and recruitment, together with the management of 
new arrivals, are considered in Chapter 3. 
 
Other military units 
 
The Royal Artillery comprised, inter alia, the field artillery, attached to the cavalry and 
infantry divisions, and the siege train, which, with the Royal Naval Brigade was 
responsible for bombarding Sevastopol.
122
 The RA comprised rather more than a tenth 
of the Army on 1 April 1856 (Table 2.9) while the monthly strength between 
September 1854 and September 1855 is set out in Table 2.10 and expressed graphically 
in Figure 2.14. The numbers of personnel involved in siege activities increased from 
c.1,200 at the end of 1854 to nearly 3,000 when the allies occupied Sevastopol. In 
contrast, the strength of the Field Artillery remained reasonably constant at c.2,000 until 
the summer when it was reinforced to c.3,500 at the end of the siege, perhaps in 
anticipation of the possibility of an active campaign in the field during 1856. In 
September 1855 the Siege Train comprised 29 companies of RA while on 1 October 





A small number of Royal Engineers and Royal Sappers and Miners were sent on a 
reconnaissance mission to Turkey and Bulgaria early in 1854 and several became 
involved unofficially with the hostilities involving the Turkish and Russian armies on 
the Danube. The Engineers played a vitally important part during the siege yet only 
comprised c.2% of the Army on 1 April 1856 (Table 2.9). 
 
                                                 
122  For details of the structure of the RA see Jocelyn (1911) and McGuigan (2001). 
123  Jocelyn (1911), p. 452 and Sayer (1857), endpaper. 
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The Royal Naval Brigade served ashore from October 1854 until September 1855. The 
brigade averaged c.1,200 officers and men and the numbers of who were either killed in 
action or died of wounds, died of disease or were wounded were, respectively, 8, 3, and 
30, and 116, 41, and 43.
124
 The Royal Marine Brigade landed from the fleet on 29 
September 1854 and re-embarked on 12 November 1855. The brigade was initially 
1,216 strong and received reinforcements totalling 831. The numbers either killed in 
action or died of wounds, died of disease or were wounded were, respectively, 0, 0, and 




Mawson provided a description of the organization of the Chaplains’ Department. 
Among 105 chaplains identified the denominations were: Church of England, 72; 




The Commissariat Department, which will be considered in more detail in Chapter 10, 
was commanded initially by Commissary General William Filder. Despite its obvious 
importance to any war effort it was hopelessly ill equipped in terms of both manpower 
and resources, including wheeled transport and pack animals, to deal with the demands 
that were placed upon it in Bulgaria and during the first winter in the Crimea.
127
 A 
summary of the numbers of officers and clerks employed during the campaign as given 
in Table 2.11. 
The rank of commissary general was equivalent to a brigadier although, being a 
civilian, he was never considered on an equal footing with his military counterpart, the 
QMG, whose rank was initially that of brigadier until 12 December 1854 when Airey 
was promoted to major general. 
The department was under the control of the Treasury until it was transferred to 
the War Office during December 1854 as this arrangement proved unsatisfactory.
128
 The 
deficiencies of the Commissariat became a serious political issue during January 1855 
when J.A. Roebuck, MP, moved in the House of Common that a Select Committee be 
appointed to ‘inquire into the condition of our army before Sebastopol and into the 
                                                 
124  Colborne & Brine (1857), Appendix 17. 
125  Colborne & Brine (1857), Appendix 18. 
126  Mawson (2002). 
127  See Sweetman (1973), pp. 44-7. 
128  See Sweetman (1984) and a memorandum on the topic was prepared by the AG, Horse Guards, 25 
July 1854; WO/123/157. 
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conduct of the those governmental departments whose duty it has been to minister to the 
wants of the army’. The motion was carried, and Lord Aberdeen’s administration fell. 
The report of Select Committee was presented to Parliament by Sir Denis le Marchant 
on 18 June 1855; ironically, the same day as the first unsuccessful assault on the Redan 
(see Chapter 11). 
 
Additional units in the Army 
 
Several other units were formed during the campaign to augment the Army, of which 
the Land Transport Corps was the most important. 
 
The problems of transport in Bulgaria and the Crimea, and the subsequent development 
the LTC, whose formation was authorized by a Royal Warrant dated 24 January 1855, 
has been reviewed by Sweetman.
129
 Its functions were to distribute stores (equipment, 
ammunition, and building materials) and supplies (consumables such as food, fuel, and 
forage), though sourcing and issuing remained the responsibility of the Commissariat. 
The corps eventually numbered >6,000 men with c.24,000 horses, and in February 1856 
it comprised 16 battalions; two with each division and the commissariat, and two for the 
reserve small arms ammunition.
130
 Codrington was of the opinion that the corps should 
have been formed using 800 men from each division,
131
 but in the event only the 
commissioned officers and NCOs were recruited from the Army with the majority of 
the men being ‘not British’ civilians with ‘Asiatics’ forming the great proportion. The 
ratio of officers to men was wider than in the Army as a whole, viz. 1:40-1:65 as 
compared to 1:25 (Tables 2.4 and 2.12). Sweetman concluded his essay with following 
succinct paragraph:  
 
The ineffectiveness of the commissariat’s land transport service […] led to the development 
of the land transport corps. In turn found unsatisfactory, this new corps was in process of 
reconstruction as the war closed. Experience […] emphasized the need for a permanent land 
transport force […] under the command of the General Officer Commanding. In this respect 
the Crimean War was invaluable for the British army. The Duke of Newcastle maintained 
that if a land transport corps had been proposed at the commencement of the war [...] it 




                                                 
129  Sweetman (1973), and a commentary on the LTC by the AG, Horse Guards, 10 Jan. 1856; 
WO/123/157. 
130  Codrington to Panmure, 18 Feb. 1856; WO/1/382/ff. 378-404. 
131  Codrington to Panmure, 3 Dec. 1855; WO/1/380. 
132  Memorandum on a Military Train by AG, Horse Guards, 15 Oct. 1856; WO/123/157. 
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The Turkish Contingent and Osmanli Irregular Cavalry, not to be confused with the 
Turkish Army commander by Omer Pasha, were in British pay and were concentrated 
sometime at Kertch. It comprised eight cavalry and 16 infantry regiments together with 
artillery,
133
 while Osmanli Irregular Cavalry had seven regiments.
134
 The absence of any 
worthwhile medical records precludes any further consideration of these units. 
 
 ‘Ad hoc’ support services 
 
Sweetman used the term ‘ad hoc’ in his review of the Mounted Staff Corps (MSC), the 
Civil Engineering Corps (CEC), and the Army Works Corps (AWC). He considered all 
were unsuccessful ill-conceived ministerial initiatives and ‘that their collective 
experience supports the popular conclusion that Britain went into the Crimean War ill-
prepared.’135 
 
A memorandum prepared by the AG in London during July 1854 outlined the functions 
of the Provost Marshal, and recommended the employment of ‘home police’ to form a 
Mounted Staff Corps.
136
 Volunteers from the Irish Police and Constabulary Force and 
the Metropolitan Police arrived in at Balaklava on 21 November 1854, after embarking 
horses at Gibraltar. The personnel suffered severely from disease and by mid-February 
their strength was reduced to 25 ‘effectives’.137  
At the beginning of January 1855 Raglan proposed, on the basis of a report by 
Major Grant, that the MSC should be re-organized along the lines employed by 
Wellington and that the men should be recruited from cavalry regiments and not the 
civilian constabulary as these had proved inefficient.
138
 The MSC, which was unpopular 
with the troops as the civilians were paid more, was disbanded in July 1855 and 
replaced by NCOs and men from several cavalry regiments who formed a Corps of 
                                                 
133  McGuigan (2001), pp. 78-79. 
134  Stevenson (2015). 
135  Sweetman (1988), pp. 135-40. 
136  WO/123/157. 
137  In a letter dated 22 Dec. 1854 the DJAG referred with a hint of sarcasm to the ‘fine Corps of 
Mounted Police whose effective strength had been reduced from an initial 52 to 25.’ Robins 
(2005), p. 54. 
138  Raglan to Newcastle, 2 Jan. 1855; WO/1/370. 
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Mounted Police; the remaining MSC men were then employed as mounted guards under 




A Civil Engineering Corps was formed on the initiative of the civil engineering 
company Peto, Brassy & Betts in order to build the railway network to facilitate the 
supply of the British and Sardinian armies.
140
 The navvies arrived in the Crimea during 
February 1855 and the railway commenced transporting supplies from the end of 
March. Between April and June 1855 the average number on the payroll was 530.
141
 
Most returned to England when construction was complete, leaving a few to operate the 
railway. Of the three ‘ad hoc’ corps it was the most successful, presumably because it 
had a well defined purpose under experienced civilian management, and its objectives 
were achieved without the need for integration into the management structure of the 




 proposed the formation of an Army Works Corps with the aim of 
providing manpower for civil engineering projects, thus relieving the army personnel of 
these tasks. The corps, commanded by a civil engineer, William Doyne, was more 
formally organized than the railway navvies, although this was modified in the light of 
experience; a process uncompleted when the campaign ended.
144
 
Personnel began to arrive in the Crimea during August 1855. Most were civilians 
not bound by the Mutiny Act thus making the maintenance of discipline difficult as they 
could not be tried by Courts Martial, except for ‘heavy faults’, and all that could be 
done was to impose a fine for their misdemeanours. The men were also paid more than 




The first troops embarked for the East during February 1854 and in all 14 cavalry and 
52 infantry regiments were involved in the conflict, together with the RA and RS&M. 
                                                 
139 The Times, 6 Oct. & 14 Dec. 1854, and 1 Mar. & 11 Oct. 1855; McGuigan (2001), pp. 10, 36, 
& 69. There is no reference to the MSC in the M&SH or Sayer (1857). 
140 Cooke (1997); Cooke was probably unaware of Sweetman (1988) as he did not refer to it. 
141 Cooke (1997), p. 27. 
142  Sweetman (1988). 
143  Sir James Paxton is remembered for his work at Chatsworth for the 6th Duke of Devonshire. 
144  The AWC, a forerunner of the Pioneer Corps, was disbanded in 1856. 
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The last infantry regiment arrived after the fall of Sevastopol with all regiments being 
present in the Crimea for about two months before 13 cavalry regiments were 
withdrawn to Turkey for the winter of 1855/56. 
The initial six divisions of the Army were reorganised in August 1855 into seven 
each with two brigades, except the cavalry that had three. A further reorganisation to 
form two corps d’armée was planned after the fall of Sevastopol but this was not put 
into effect. 
The infantry regiments sent to the East early in the campaign were between 900 
and 1,000 strong; thereafter the new regiments usually numbered between 500 and 850. 
The cavalry regiments were smaller; the first ten to arrive numbered a little over 300. 
The RA and the RS&M comprised a little over a tenth and about a fiftieth of the 
total force, respectively. 
The Army increased in size during the summer of 1854; thereafter numbers 
remained relatively stable during the winter of 1854-55 indicating that losses from 
enemy action and the effects of disease were balanced by the arrival of reinforcements. 
The build-up recommenced in May 1855 and continued until the fall of Sevastopol 
when the numbers stabilized once again. A final augmentation occurred early in 1856, 
presumably in anticipation of a campaign that never materialized. 
The strength of individual regiments varied considerably during the campaign. 
Despite differences between individual corps the trend was for numbers to fall 
following the invasion and during the first winter. Numbers increased during the spring 
and summer of 1855 although the complement of most infantry regiments never 
equalled that when they first landed. In contrast, most of the cavalry regiments were 
stronger in 1856 than when they first arrived in the East. 
The monthly ratio of officers to men varied in the cavalry regiments from about 
1:13 to 1:25. The ratio was more stable in the infantry regiments and was typically 
c.1:25. On the other hand, the ratio of officers to men in the LTC was wider at between 
1:40 and 1:65. 
The Army numbered c.26,000 at the beginning of the campaign while a return 
dated 1 April 1856 indicated that despite the losses, it had increased to c.67,000. The 
proportional strength of the principal corps at that time being: infantry including the 
guards (67%), RA (11%), LTC (10.5%), cavalry (9.5%), and RS&M (2%). 
Three ‘ad hoc’ corps, the MSC, CEC, and AWC, were raised in response to the 
manpower crisis that became apparent soon after the invasion. The CEC which 
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constructed the railway was probably the most effective although in Sweetman’s 
opinion all were ‘ill-planned and largely unsuccessful’, though the MSC and the LTC 




Table 2.1: Summary of the time of arrival in the East and the subsequent location of the 14 cavalry and 52 
infantry regiments 
Quarter commencing April 1854 Regiments listed in the order of their 
arrival I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Infantry regiments  
T/B B/C C C C C C C C Grenadier Guards, Coldstream 
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th
 
T T/C C C C C C C C 4
th
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nd
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Cavalry regiments  













 LD  
- T/C C C C C C/T T T 2
nd
 D 




 LD,  
- B C C C C C C C 11
th
 H,  






 L,  
- - - - - C C/T T T 1
st
 DG 
[Collated from the regimental returns in the M&SH, I] 
Abbreviations: T, Turkey; B, Bulgaria; C, Crimea; bn, battalion; RB, Rifle Brigade; L, Lancers, H, 
Hussars, D, Dragoons, DG, Dragoon Guards 
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Table 2.2: Grouping of the 52 infantry regiments in the Army of the East according the time they spent on 
active service 









1 24 23-27 Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and 
Crimea† 
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[Collated from the regimental returns in the M&SH, I] 
Abbreviation: bn, battalion. 
* The M&SH records that the 68
th
 Regiment arrived in the Bosphorus on 14 August; it then joined the 




 Regiments spent six months in Greece prior to 
reinforcing the Army in the Crimea; the 71
st
 regiment was stationed in Kertch for most of its time in 
the Crimea; while the 92
nd
 Regiment arrived after the fall of Sevastopol. 
† The 42nd Regiment went straight to Bulgaria. 
 
Table 2.3: Grouping of the 14 cavalry regiments in the Army of the East according the time they spent on 
active service 
Group Number of 
regiments 










































[Collated from the regimental returns in the M&SH, I] 
* This includes the time spent in Turkey when the cavalry regiments were withdrawn there for the winter 
of 1855/56. 
† The 17th Lancers spent a short time in Turkey when on route to Bulgaria while the 11th Hussars 
remained in the Crimea until the end of the campaign. 
‡ DG, Dragoon Guards; D, Dragoons; LD, Light Dragoons; H, Hussars; L, Lancers. 
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Table 2.4: Summary of the strength of the cavalry and infantry regiments in the Army of the East 1854-56 
Division Brigade  August 1854 January 1855 August 1855 January 1856 April 1856 
Officers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men 
Cavalry 1st Brigade 
(Heavy) 
Brigade total 68/1111 79/1066 111/1999 99/2344 99/2290 
2nd Brigade 
(Light) 
Brigade total 106/1371 67/853 78/1430 64/1750 74/1704 
3rd Brigade 
(Hussars) 
Brigade total - - 80/1508 75/2025 59/1517 
Division total 174/2482 146/1919 269/4937 238/6119 232/5511 
Light 1st Brigade Brigade total 120/3834 76/2992 93/2480 130/3355 170/3880 
2nd Brigade Brigade total 81/2643 109/2804 99/2616 109/2602 132/3249 
Division total 201/6477 185/5796 192/5096 239/5957 302/7129 
First 1st Brigade Brigade total 99/3169 100/2379 98/2353 98/2837 121/3320 
2nd Brigade Brigade total - - 141/3575 124/2766 128/3057 
Division total 99/3169 100/2379 239/5928 222/5603 249/6277 
Second 1st Brigade Brigade total 92/2545 74/2147 93/2433 104/2596 122/2943 
2nd Brigade Brigade total 83/2603 63/1909 95/2416 110/2217 136/2849 
Division total 175/5148 137/4056 188/4849 214/4813 258/5792 
Third 1st Brigade Brigade total 87/2558 128/3567 140/3435 116/2902 106/2345 
2nd Brigade Brigade total 55/1498 108/2297 110/2910 117/2832 105/2323 
Division total 142/4056 236/5864 250/6345 233/5734 211/4668 
Fourth 1st Brigade Brigade total - 82/2466 131/2872 130/3343 169/3928 
2nd Brigade Brigade total - 88/1535 100/2307 117/2545 144/3153 
Division total - 170/4001 231/5179 247/5888 313/7081 
Balaklava 
Brigade* 





168/4889 - - - - 
Kertch - - 26/890 30/870 33/870 
Total 168/4889 - 26/890 30/870 33/870 
Grand total 1049/29002 1119/28191 1598/38111 1690/41835 1974/46471 
Ratio of officers to men 1:27.5 1:25 1:24 1:25 1:23.5 
[Collated from the regimental returns in the M&SH, I] 
* This independent brigade, commanded by Brigadier Charles Warren was formed from the Highland 
Division during February 1856 and located near Balaklava. This represented the start of a further 
reorganization of the Army into two corps d’armee that was never completed. 
 
 
Table 2.5: General total of troops originally embarked for the East under Lord Raglan 
Officers Serjeants Buglers, trumpeters 
and drummers 
Rank and File Total 
933 (3.5%) 1257 (5%) 432 (1.5%) 23473 (90%) 26095 




Table 2.6: Return showing the number, ratio per cent. to strength, of primary admissions for disease 
alone*, in the Army, and in several arms of the service†, together with a calculated estimate of the 
strength Army and its component parts 
Year Month Admitted to hospital Ratio per cent. of strength Estimated strength‡ 
Army Cav. Ord. Inf. Army Cav. Ord. Inf. Army Cav. Ord. Inf. 
1854 Apr. 281 - - 281 3.4 - - 3.4 8265 - - 8265 
May 1961 32 41 1888 9.0 10.7 16.6 8.9 21789 299 247 21213 
June 2060 65 90 1905 8.2 4.1 8.5 8.5 25122 1585 1059 22412 
July 4854 591 526 3737 16.9 28 31.4 15 28722 2111 1675 24913 
Aug. 8433 1318 771 6344 27.9 49.9 46.1 24.4 30226 2641 1672 26000 
Sep. 5156 641 373 4142 17 22 20.7 16.2 30329 2914 1802 25568 
Oct. 6550 936 618 4996 21.4 35.4 22.8 19.7 30607 2644 2711 25360 
Nov 6286 910 657 4719 21.1 35.7 22.5 19.4 29791 2549 2920 24325 
Dec. 10299 691 885 8723 31.4 28.6 25.4 32.4 32799 2416 3484 26923 
1855 Jan. 11072 522 992 9558 34.1 22.9 31.1 35.4 32469 2279 3190 27000 
Feb. 6919 322 537 6060 22.3 17.2 17.3 23.3 31027 1872 3104 26008 
Mar. 5475 261 360 4854 18.2 13.9 8.8 20.1 30082 1878 4091 24149 
Apr. 3822 319 454 3049 12.2 13.7 10.7 12.3 31328 2328 4243 24789 
May 5049 598 627 3824 14.4 17.8 13.3 14.1 35062 3360 4714 27121 
June 8669 1021 1501 6147 22.1 30.6 26.2 20.3 39226 3337 5729 30281 
July 9013 1491 1397 6125 21 32.6 21.6 19.8 42919 4574 6468 30934 
Aug. 8483 1933 1174 5376 19.1 37.6 18.1 16.4 44414 5141 6486 32780 
Sep. 5548 1250 676 3622 11.5 21.2 9.5 10.3 48243 5896 7116 35165 
Oct. 4930 934 590 3406 10.1 16.5 8.9 9.3 48812 5661 6629 36624 
Nov 4295 663 534 3098 8.6 11 7.2 8.5 49942 6027 7147 36447 
Dec. 5059 888 812 3359 10.1 13.5 10.4 9.4 50089 6578 7808 35734 
1856 Jan. 4274 632 718 2924 8.4 9.7 9 8.1 50881 6515 7978 36099 
Feb. 3472 523 610 2339 6.9 8 8.8 6.3 50319 6538 6932 37127 
Mar. 3960 598 511 2851 7.2 8.6 7.8 6.8 55000 6953 6551 41926 
Apr. 3376 456 441 2479 6.2 7.6 6 6 54452 6000 7350 41317 
May 2516 227 397 1892 5.3 5.1 7.2 5 47472 4551 5514 37840 
June 804 98 138 568 3.1 4.3 4.7 2.7 25935 2279 2936 21037 
Total admissions 142616 17920 16430 108266         
Abbreviations: Cav., Cavalry; Ord., Ordnance; Inf., Foot Guards and infantry. 
* The first eight columns are transcribed from the table in the M&SH, II, p. 42; admissions for wounds, 
mechanical injuries, and corporal punishment are not included. 
† The wording used is the published rubric. 
‡ The estimated numbers were calculated using the formula 100(Admissions/Ratio per cent of strength). 
Rounding errors contribute to the inconsistencies between the estimate in column 11 and the sum of 




Table 2.7: Strength of the 52 infantry and 14 cavalry regiments, April 1854-June 1856 
Year Month Infantry regiments Cavalry regiments Cavalry and Infantry 
combined 
Officers Men Total Officers Men Total Officers Men Total 
1854 Apr. 438 13519 13957 - - - 438 13519 13957 
May 714 21521 22235 21 297 318 735 21818 22553 
June 791 22049 22840 97 1382 1479 888 23431 24319 
July 795 23362 24157 151 2247 2398 946 25609 26555 
Aug. 857 26222 27079 192 2780 2972 1049 29002 30051 
Sept. 828 24245 25073 171 2588 2759 999 26833 27832 
Oct. 762 21876 22638 152 2352 2504 914 24228 25142 
Nov. 720 24148 24868 143 2302 2445 863 26450 27313 
Dec. 824 24840 25664 143 2059 2202 967 26899 27866 
1855 Jan. 973 26272 27245 146 1919 2065 1119 28191 29310 
Feb. 988 26060 27048 146 1741 1887 1134 27801 28935 
Mar. 978 24725 25703 138 1732 1870 1116 26457 27573 
Apr. 1046 25491 26537 159 2165 2324 1205 27656 28861 
May 1179 28255 29434 211 3206 3417 1390 31461 32851 
June 1241 30227 31468 223 3612 3835 1464 33839 35303 
July 1188 31847 33035 231 4325 4556 1419 36172 37591 
Aug. 1329 33174 34503 269 4937 5206 1598 38111 39709 
Sep. 1496 35065 36561 263 5518 5781 1759 40583 42342 
Oct. 1494 35581 37075 274 5577 5851 1768 41158 42926 
Nov. 1506 36363 37869 251 5623 5874 1757 41986 43743 
Dec. 1465 35905 37370 239 6191 6430 1704 42096 43800 
1856 Jan. 1452 35716 37168 238 6119 6357 1690 41835 43525 
Feb. 1528 36371 37899 241 6039 6280 1769 42410 44179 
Mar. 1724 40537 42261 255 6013 6268 1979 46550 48529 
Apr. 1742 40960 42702 232 5511 5743 1974 46471 48445 
May 1599 38012 39611 194 4134 4328 1793 42146 43939 
June 882 22192 23074 113 2201 2314 995 24393 25388 
[These totals were obtained by aggregating the monthly strength of each regiment given in the returns contained in 
the M&SH, I] 
 
 
Table 2.8: Return showing the total number of NCOs and men sent to the Crimea from the 
commencement of the war to the end of March 1856 
Corps NCOs and 
bandsmen 
Farriers and rank 
and file 
Total Proportion (%) 
of total 
Cavalry 479 7814 8293 9 
Royal Artillery 443 10280 10723 11.5 
Royal Sappers and 
Miners 
81 1563 1644 2 
Infantry 4001 69298 73299 78 
Total 5004 88955 93959  




Table 2.9: Total strength of the cavalry, Royal Artillery, Royal Sapper and Miners, and the infantry when 
they embarked for active service in the East, and their subsequent increase or decrease, and strength on 1 
April 1856 




Decrease from all 
causes* 
Strength on 1 
April 1856† 
Officers Men‡ Officers Men Officer Men Officers Men 
Cavalry 287 4868 140 3425 183 2188 264 6089 
Royal Artillery 120 3095 268 7628 168 3600 220 7123 
Royal Sappers 
and Miners 
3 403 92 1241 51 402 44 1242 
Guards 95 2798 130 3706 125 3203 103 3363 
Infantry of the 
line 
1402 40841 1368 25954 1261 26057 1588 40524 
Total  1907 52005 1998 41954 1788 35450 2219 58341 
[Summarized from the endpaper in Sayer (1857), but excluding the LTC and the British German and 
Swiss Legions] 
* This total includes those who died in the East, or were invalided, taken prisoner, and in the case of 
NCOs and men, deserted. 
† Transcribed from Sayer’s original table. No explanation was provided for the inconsistencies between 
the strengths listed in cols 8 and 9 and the totals obtained by calculation using either cols 2, 4, and 6, or 
3, 5, and 7. 
‡ Men including NCOs. 
 
 
Table 2.10: Strength of the Royal Artillery, September 1854-September 1856 
Year Month Monthly returns* for the: Grand 
total Field Artillery, including the 




Effective Sick‡ Total Effective Sick‡ Total 
1854 Sep. 1853 127 1980 940 76 1016 2996 
Oct. 1634 351 1985 953 147 1100 3085 
Nov. 1706 343 2049 962 219 1181 3230 
Dec. 1576 438 2104 839 343 1182 3286 
1855 Jan. 1348 675 2023 1363 430 1793 3816 
Feb. 1293 603 1896 1198 482 1680 3576 
Mar. 1373 487 1860 1134 470 1604 3464 
Apr. 1416 405 1821 1882 437 2319 4140 
May 1829 318 2147 1727 496 2203 4350 
June 2715 323 3038 2025 380 2405 5443 
July 2986 634 3620 1924 295 2219 5839 
Aug. 2923 638 3561 2413 405 2818 6379 
Sep. 3158 527 3685 2394 496 2890 6575 
* Adapted from Jocelyn (1911), p. 542. The original returns are in WO/17/2691. 
† Includes detachments at Varna and Kertch. 




Table 2.11: Number of officers and clerks who served with the Commissariat in the Crimea, 1854-56 
Rank Return* Total 
I III IV V  
Commissary General (CG) - 1 - 2 3 
Acting CG - 1 - - 1 
Deputy CG 2 1 2 1 6 
Acting Deputy CG - - 1 - 1 
Assistant CG 1 3 6 11 21 
Acting Assistant CG 3 - 2 5 10 
Deputy Assistant CG 4 3 11 7 25 
Acting Deputy Assistant CG - - 5 14 19 
Clerk - 2 16 6 24 
Acting Clerk - - 2 2 4 
Total 10 11 45 48 114 
[BPP (1857), Session 1, No. 133] 
* Return I: Officers who served throughout the whole campaign; Return III; Officers who were absent 
for an interval and returned; Return IV: Officers who arrived after the first landing and remained in the 




Table 2.12: Numbers of officers and men in the Land Transport Corps, May 1855-March 1956 
Year Month Number of personnel 
Officers Men Officers:Men 
1855 May 22 43 (sic) 1:20* 
June 28 505 1:18 
July 29 1029 1:37 
August 40 1851 1:46 
September 46 1883 1:41 
October 46 1899 1:41 
November 52 2793 1:54 
December 63 3231 1:51 
1855 January 76 4835 1:64 
February 107 6122 1:57 
March 103 6566 1:64 
[Summarized from the M&SH, I, p. 460] 










Figure 2.2: Location of cavalry and infantry regiments during the Eastern campaign, 






Figure 2.3: Months when the 14 cavalry and 52 infantry regiments joined the Army of 




Figure 2.4: Strength of each of the 52 infantry regiments at the time the headquarters 







Figure 2.5: Estimated strength of the cavalry and infantry regiments, and the ordnance, 




Figure 2.6: Estimated strength of the cavalry and infantry regiments, and ordnance, as a 







Figure 2.7: Estimated strength of the cavalry and infantry regiments, during the Eastern 












Figure 2.9: Strength of ten cavalry regiments that served in Bulgaria and the Crimea as a 








 Division that served in 







Figure 2.11: Strength of three regiments in the 1
st
 Brigade, Light Division that served in 
Bulgaria and in the Crimea as a proportion (%) of the numbers originally embarked, 




Figure 2.12: Strength of the three regiments on the 2
nd
 Brigade, Light Division that 
served in Bulgaria and in the Crimea as a proportion (%) of the numbers originally 










 Division that served 
in Bulgaria and the Crimea as a proportion (%) of the numbers originally embarked, 










Selection of recruits and its impact on the health of the 
Army 
 
Disease and active warfare soon precipitated a serious manpower shortage and this was 
highlighted by the DJAG a month after invasion: ‘We do not have half enough artillery 
men, engineers, sappers or doctors;’145 while after the hurricane of 14 November 1854 
the QMG informed the AG, Horse Guards privately: ‘If we don’t get reinforced 
strongly […] we shall go to the wall, and the English Army be lost! We can’t re-embark 
before an offensive army […] Our Govt always looks alive too late;’146 similarly. The 
Times correspondent in Constantinople opined: 
 
The British have received […] a total of 2,800 men. The Queen of the South is expected daily 
with 1,200 more […] but if the campaign is to last throughout the winter […] this must not 
be occasional, but constant. The army is sickly, and men become hors de combat, at a fearful 
rate. […] to keep the British Army to even its present diminished standard of 16,000 or 





This state of affairs could not have been lost on the government but the reduction in the 
size of the Army following 1815 meant the deficiency could not be corrected within 
weeks and this was to have an impact on the health of the troops in the Crimea. 
 
Recruitment into the Army 
 
It can be deduced from Hardinge’s evidence to the Roebuck Committee on 10 May 
1855 that since 1815 there had been little strategic need to maintain a permanent reserve 
of trained troops, and since then existing regiments had been reduced in strength.
148
 
The augmentation of infantry regiments from 850-900 to 1,000 was authorized 
during February 1854, and the rewards for recruiting parties increased.
149
 The 
declaration of war resulted in the need to encourage more men to join up and to 
facilitate this the selection criteria were amended by a General Order and several 
                                                 
145  Romaine to C.J. Selwyn, 22 Oct. 1855; Robins (2005), p. 33. 
146  Airey to Wetherall, 13 Nov. 1854; NAM-1962-10-94-1. 
147  The Times, 29 Nov. 1854. 
148  BPP (1854-55), No. 247, p. 234. Hardinge conceded that as the ‘peace establishment [was] very 
low indeed; […] after […] we made the first effort to send out 25,000, we could do nothing but 
send out young recruits.’ 
149  Circular Memoranda No. 842 & 843, 11 Feb. 1854; WO/123/151. 
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Circular Memoranda issued by Horse Guards.
150, 151
 For example, the minimum height 
for the cavalry was reduced on 24 March 1854 and the maximum age for enlistment 
into infantry of the line was raised from 25 to 30 years on 3 July 1854; changes which 
where subsequently consolidated in a General Order (Table 3.1).
152
 No minimum age 
was specified though a Memorandum of 5 January 1855 stipulated that no lad under 17 
should be recruited into the infantry as it was ‘desirable’ that they ‘should be of 
sufficient age and strength to immediately enter upon the duties of soldiers.’153, 154, 155 
Men with a good character who had previously served in the cavalry and infantry 
were permitted to re-enlist up to a maximum age of 38 and 36 years respectively,
156
 
while the bounty paid to successful recruits was increased on 30 October 1854 and 
again on 22 January 1855 (Table 3.2). A further inducement was made on 30 April 
1855 when men aged between 24 and 35 years who volunteered for two years were 
offered the same bounty as those signing up for a longer period. This was subsequently 
amended on 10 July 1855 to include only ‘infantry regiments in the Crimea.’ 
Herbert, the Minister at War, contributed to the initiative by issuing a circular 
letter to officers commanding militia regiments on 20 November 1854. The need to 
augment the regular army was stressed although it was intended to limit the demand to 
a quarter of the regimental strength, while the bounty payable was to be increased by £1 
to £7.
157




                                                 
150  WO/123/141. 
151  The reduced criteria for height, but not age, for the cavalry, infantry, and RA, were summarized in 
a return supplied by the AG, Horse Guards on 24 Apr., and issued by the War Department on 10 
May 1854; BPP (1854-55), No. 247, p. 353. 
152  For a discussion on the problems of recruitment into the cavalry after the first winter see Dawson 
(2014), pp. 193-5. 
153  WO/123/151. 
154  A total of 2.3% of men in the line regiments were ≤17 years of age; M&SH, II, General Return D. 
155  The AG, Horse Guards wrote to the AG, Crimea on 14 Feb. 1855: ‘Ascertain if you can whether 
any drafts have gone out during the months of Nov., Dec., and Jan. containing men under 18 years 
of age […] Every care is taken to prevent it;’ WO/28/180. Estcourt’s reply has not been found 
though he probably sought the information since Lt Col. Dacres, RA, informed him that there had 
been only one recruit aged 17 between 1 Nov. 1854 and 7 Mar. 1855; WO/28/193/2. 
156  In all 3% and 2.5% of the cavalry and line regiments were aged ≥38 and ≥36 years respectively; 
M&SH, II, General Return D. 
157  The Times, 21 Nov. 1854. The recruitment of over 700 men into the Army from several militia 
regiments was recorded in The Times on 30 Nov. and 7 & 29 December 1854. Incidentally, on 1 
Nov. 1854 ‘an order […] from the Admiralty increasing the bounty for recruits entering the Royal 
Marines from £3/17/6d to £6 per man; a development which ‘will bring men forward if anything 
will;’ Hampshire Advertiser, 4 Nov. 1854. 
158  Circular Memorandum No. 912, 22 Jan. 1855; WO/123/151. 
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An indication of the progress of recruitment during the previous 12 months was made 
available to ministers by Horse Guards on 21 October 1854,
159
 and in a Cabinet paper 
on 18 August 1855
160
 (Table 3.3). Information supplied to the Roebuck Committee 
recorded that between March 1854 and March 1855 4,106, 40,316, and 4,755 men were 
recruited into the cavalry, infantry, and RA respectively, giving a total of 49,177.
161
 
The numbers recruited each month fell during the summer of 1854 but increased 
between November and January 1855 when >18,000 were selected for the three corps 
(Figure 3.1). 
The problem of recruitment continued to be vexatious as the campaign progressed 
and this prompted Palmerston to instruct Panmure on 10 June 1855 not to ‘let 
departmental or official or professional prejudices and habits to stand in our way; we 
must override all such obstacles and difficulties. The only answer [is] the thing must be 
done. We must have troops.’162 It is fortunate perhaps that significant warfare ceased 
some four months later, and there was no campaigning during 1856. 
After the conclusion of hostilities the AG in London reported that the service 
companies in the Army of the East had been reinforced with 26,302 men up to 29 
March 1856. A total of 8,197 men joined from the depot battalions at home during 
1854 while during 1855 and 1856 the numbers embarked for Malta and the East were 




A return prepared by the AG recorded that of 10,268 reinforcements sent to the East by 
April 1855 the majority were either teenagers or in their early twenties, viz. <18 years, 
162 (1.5%); 18-21 years, 5,318 (52%); 21-24 years, 2,132 (21%); 24 years, 545 (5%); 
24-30 years, 1,699 (16.5%); and >30 years, 412 (4%).
164
 
The age structure of the cavalry (14 regiments), foot guards (3) and infantry (49) 
is summarized General Return D in the M&SH with a listing of the ages of 70,425 
(86%) of 81,838 NCOs and men who participated in the Eastern campaign (Table 3.4). 
Two thirds were ≤25 years with nearly a quarter being teenagers (Figure 3.2). The 
                                                 
159  W&SHC/2057/F8/B/80c. 
160  WO/33/3B/76/55. 
161  AG, Horse Guards, 24 Apr. 1855; BBP (1854-55) No. 247, p. 351. 
162  Douglas & Ramsay (1908), I, p. 232. 
163  Sayer (1857), p. 416. 
164  AG, Horse Guards, 16 Oct. 1855; Sayer (1857), p. 417. 
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infantry recruited men at a younger age than the foot guards, with the cavalry 
occupying an intermediate position (Figure 3.3). 
 
Hardinge informed the Roebuck Committee that the new recruits were ‘pretty perfect in 
drill in the course of sixty days’ (see Appendix 3.1), although Newcastle opined that ‘it 
would have been very advisable to [keep the recruits] in this country another year, if 
possible.’165 Hardinge admitted that many of the recruits were ‘too young’ as they were 
‘almost gristle’ rather than ‘bone and muscle’, and he conceded, but without admitting 
it directly, that this policy must have influenced the losses sustained during the first 
winter as ‘it was impossible to expect [them to] stand the inclemency of the climate and 
the hard work in the trenches in the same manner as a similar number of soldiers would 
have done in 1808,’ when a substantial reserve of trained troops aged between 25 and 
35 years would have been available.
166, 167
 
It was suggested that while in Malta recruits should become accustomed to living 
in tents, cooking with camp kettles, and performing the ‘duties incidental to a soldiers’ 
life in the field.’168 It was as also recommended that if the weather became too 
inclement to remain under the canvas the men should return to England. 
 
The Queen’s Regulations stated that the officers commanding regiments and depots 
were responsible for ensuring that ‘no one is selected […] who is not in every respect 
calculated for the performance of the duty required of him.’ The selection procedure 
involved a medical inspection and though no contemporary returns have been found 
some records from a decade earlier have survived.
169
 Briefly, in 1844 and 1845 10,172 
(33%) of 30,910 potential recruits were rejected although the proportion varied between 
19% in Cork and Newry, and 45-46% in Edinburgh and Leeds. Rejections were 
principally for physical defects with relatively few for specific diseases such as syphilis 
(1.8%), diseases of the heart (1.5%), consumption or pulmonary disease (1.2%), and 
testicular disease or injury (1.1%); see Table 3.5. 
                                                 
165  BPP (1854-55), No. 218, p. 124. 
166  BPP (1854-55), No. 247, p. 234. Hardinge stated incorrectly that no men under 19 had been sent 
to the East. 
167  In a letter dated 10 Jan. Sir George Ballingale pointed out that immature recruits were more prone 
to disease; The Lancet, 20 Jan. 1855, pp. 77-9. 
168  Wetherall to GOC, Malta, 8 Dec. 1854; WO/3/117. 
169  RAMC/397/C/CO/2/5 & 6. 
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Instructions were issued that required that men embarked should be ‘fit and 
efficient for active duties’ and that ‘growing lads under 18 years’ should be rejected,170 
while the need to examine extra men during 1854 and 1855 required the assistance of 
private medical practitioners. In January 1855 the Deputy Secretary at War (Hawes) 
sent a circular to Inspecting Field Officers of recruiting districts, and COs of regiments 
and depots outlining the procedures that should be adopted in these circumstances.
171
 
There is evidence that that not all ‘medicals’ were as thorough as they might have 
been. For example, Tamar and Great Tasmania both returned to port after sailing to 
land cases of smallpox,
172
 while towards the end of 1855 Smith asked how the health of 
drafts was ascertained after the surgeon on HMS Assistance reported that men had 
embarked with venereal disease.
173
 Smith subsequently recommended to the Military 
Secretary that men should be inspected before embarkation and that the Admiralty 
should make facilities available at Portsmouth and Southampton for the purpose:
174
 




Not surprisingly, inadequacies in the system became apparent in the Crimea as 
confirmed in Hall’s monthly summary of the health of regiments during the summer of 
1855 (Table 3.6).
176
 It is probable that Smith’s letter to the Military Secretary referred 
to above prompted the issue of a Circular Memorandum on 12 December 1855 to the 
regimental depots of the Army of the East: 
 
The Field Marshal Commanding in Chief desires, that every man […] about to proceed to 
Malta or direct to the Crimea, may be examined by a Medical Officer […] and […] the list of 
the ages of men […] forwarded with the embarkation return [and] a certificate be appended 
[…] that each man has been found to be free from disease.177 
 
It cannot be ascertained whether this instruction benefited the health of the Army 
as by this time it was generally satisfactory, and, with the exception of the civilian 
element of the LTC Hall made no specific reference to the health of recruits arriving 
during 1856. 
                                                 
170  AAG to GOC, Portsmouth, 28 Oct. 1854; WO/3/116. 
171  War Office Circular No. 1173, 5 Jan. 1855; WO/123/181. 
172  The Times, 18 Dec. 1854 & 10 May 1855. 
173  Smith to PMO, Woolwich, 8 Oct. 1855; PoL. 
174  Smith to Military Secretary, 7 Dec. 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 81. 
175  Smith to PMO, Portsmouth, 30 Jan. 1856; PoL. 
176  RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1. 
177  WO/123/141 and WO/123/151. 
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Dr R. Battersby, a MO at Chatham, who saw the problem from a different 
perspective when he tended soldiers repatriated from the East, concluded that: ‘In 
consequence of the pressing demand on soldiers, the relaxed the criteria relative to the 
examination of recruits […] was carried too far’ and the ‘physical force’ of the Army 
was: 
 
by no means augmented. […] The consequences were soon manifest […] lads […] quickly 
succumbed while men who had lost the elasticity of youth […] found the education and 
discipline of a soldier too irksome, and many feigned or exaggerated ailments for the 
purpose of getting discharged. It was useless trying to retain such men; they could never be 
made soldiers. 
 
He concluded, however, that the ‘half-grown, sickly-looking men, who should 
never have been enlisted
’
 should be more ‘pitied than condemned for having 
undertaken duties, the nature of which they were ignorant of, and physically unable to 
perform.’178 
 
A return issued by Horse Guards on 22 March 1855 indicated that drafts did not arrive 
in numbers until a couple of months after the invasion, with most being destined for the 
infantry regiments, particularly those that spent time in Bulgaria (Table 3.7). 
The bad news received from the front did not seem to stem the flow of men 
volunteering to join up; and c.70,000 did so during the campaign. The British Army 
was thus composed of volunteers, and this might account in part for their tenacity and 
forbearance in the face of adversity. For example, letters written by two civilians, 
Bracebridge and Maxwell, refer to their stoicism,
179
 and this could explain why there 
were only twenty suicides during the whole campaign.
180
 The AG also noted that: ‘The 
regiments which fought their way here are the best; they bear their hardships 
wonderfully,’181 while AS Taylor wrote on 14 February 1855 that: ‘The men never 




Further evidence of the devotion to duty of the troops is provided by a report 
sent to the Ambassador in Constantinople on 3 February 1855: 
                                                 
178  M&SH, II, pp. 228-9. 
179  Bracebridge, letter, 13 Nov. 1854; RAMC/494 and Maxwell to Herbert, 8 Jan. 1855; 
W&SHC/3057/F8/II/B/363. 
180  M&SH, II, General Return A. 
181  Estcourt to Wetherall, 8 Jan. 1855; NAM-1962-10-95. 
182  Quoted by Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 142-3. 
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When the draft was mustered on deck [in Constantinople] some soldiers joined them from 
below, and requested [the MO] to let them go also. Several [were] so weak that they 
supported themselves on their muskets, but there they were equipped in heavy marching 
order [and begged] to be allowed, not to go home, but to return to the trenches. […] If this is 
not real heroism, I know not what is, and, as such devoted gallantry is displayed in a manner 




Similarly evacuees landing at Falmouth during February 1855 reported that ‘they 
had undergone considerable hardships, but no more than troops were often exposed 
to by the contingencies of war; and that they firmly believed that their sufferings 
were unavoidable, and produced by causes over which their officers had no control,’ 
and that Raglan had been ‘universally kind and attentive to their condition and 
interests, and was continually to be seen in the lines,’ while many of the men were 
‘so redolent of esprit de corps in the cause’ that many declared they would be delighted 
to return and have ‘another slap at the Russians.’184 Similarly, many of those arriving 
on Tynemouth also expressed ‘a desire to go out again.’185 
It is a testimony to the phlegmatic nature and good discipline of the British 
soldier that despite having lethal weapons within easy reach and living cheek by jowl in 
less than satisfactory conditions only three men were arraigned during the campaign 
specifically for killing a fellow soldier, and only one was hanged.
186
 In like manner, an 
assessment of the prospects at the end of 1854 in an unpublished draft of a history of 
the war prepared at Horse Guards concluded: 
 
Great as the sufferings of the Army were it is gratifying to record the fortitude and 
cheerfulness with what the soldiers bore up against them, and continued to the last a strict 
performance of their duties and a regard to discipline which must now reflect great credit 




Enlistment of Foreigners Act 1854: One of the consequences of the shortage of man 
power was the passing of the Enlistment of Foreigners Act in December 1854; a 
controversial policy as the mercenaries would be citizens of neutral countries and there 
would be complex implications as a consequence of both the countries’ domestic 
legislation and international law. The topic is outwith the objectives of this thesis; 
                                                 
183  Skene to Stratford, 3 Feb. 1855; FO/352/41B. James Henry Skene was appointed a Consul on 26 
Mar. 1855 and sent to the Dardanelles on 6 July 1855 to help organize the Bashi Bazouks. 
184  WB&CA, 9 Feb. 1855. 
185  Daily News, 7 May 1855. 
186  Hinton (2011b). 
187  WO/28/199/2. The paragraph was annotated ‘omit’ suggesting it would not have appeared in a 
definitive version. 
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suffice it to say mercenaries were recruited into the British German, Swiss, and Italian 
Legions and these were held in reserve at Kuleli, Smyrna and in Malta respectively, and 
none saw active service.
188
 
The possibility of recruiting men from North America was also investigated. 
This proved impractical but the initiative increased diplomatic tension between Great 
Britain and the USA with the result that President Piece dismissed ‘the British minister 
to the United States, J.F.T. Crampton and [revoking] the exequators of the British 
Consuls at New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati’ on 28 May 1856.189 
 
Organizational problems encountered after arrival 
 
The Royal Navy was responsible for transporting the troops to the East with the 
military authorities, particularly the QMG’s department, taking charge once they 
landed; but only when ‘tents and blankets were ready for them.’190 These instructions 
were subsequently amplified a few weeks later: 
 
Officers in command of troops coming to join the Army [are] responsible that every article of 
equipage (blankets, camp kettles, water canteens, haversacks, tents, hospital marquees, 
intrenching tools, and hospital panniers) are disembarked and in a state of readiness to be 




And again, on 6 June 1855 the QMG had to remind Captain Heath, RN, of the 




On some occasions disembarkation was delayed by ‘boisterous weather’ and once 
ashore things did not always go smoothly, and, judging from various reports, matters 
deteriorated noticeably from the beginning of November 1854, although not all 
dispatches were entirely pessimistic: 
 
A few young recruits fresh from the comforts of home, felt severely such a rude initiation 
into the realities of the profession, and seemed to think they could not be expected to go into 
the trenches in this bad weather, but they were soon shamed out of this unwillingness by the 
spirit of their comrades. 
 
The draughts (sic) of the regiments which I met on their way out to join looked with a 
curious air of disgust and horror at ‘this charming paradise of the Crimea’ but they were stout 
                                                 
188  Sayer (1857) gave the strength of the German and Swiss Legions as 3,738, and 2,036 respectively. 
189  For details on the ‘enlistment controversy’ see Brebner (1938). 
190  QMG to Captain Hamilton, 28 Nov. 1854; WO/28/137. 
191  QMG, Memorandum, 22 Dec. 1854; WO/28/196. 
192  WO/28/138 and WO/28/192. 
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young fellows, and would soon become accustomed to all the combinations of earth and 




Newcastle complained to Raglan on 6 January that he had heard that a 
detachment of Guards had marched to camp without a guide, and, after getting lost 
found on arrival in camp that nothing had been prepared from them.
194
 The tribulations 
encountered by three other regiments are described below, while the misfortunes that 
befell other regiments between mid-November 1854 and January 1855 are summarized 
in Table 3.8. 
 
An officer in the 46
th
 Regiment recorded that after marching eight miles from 
Balaklava on 8 November, singing and with the band playing, they found on arrival ‘no 
one expecting us, or knowing about us […] neither tents nor rations had been provided 
[…] so without food or shelter we passed out first night […] in the open air under 
heavy rain,’195 while similar sentiments were expressed in the official history: 
 
On the afternoon […] moved up to the heights […] the men being in a state of fine health. 
The tents did not arrive […] until 4 o’clock the following morning […] on the 9th […] 
upwards of 500 men were detailed for duty in the trenches, and on the 10
th









 Regiment arrived here on the 8
th
 of the month, on the 11
th
 it was attacked with 
cholera, and on the 14
th
 all the tents were blown down in the storm […] and the men both 
sick and well were exposed to the inclemency of the weather for many hours. This exposure 
served to aggravate the disease, and before the end of the month 414 cases of cholera out of 








 Regiment marched at once to 
the lines and was put on duty in the trenches. Cholera appeared two days later, and the 
next day 6 of 13 cases died.
198
 This episode was reported in several newspapers and 
described in the regimental history (see Appendix 3.2). It was also brought to the notice 
of Newcastle by a ‘gentleman of high standing, […] upon whom […] every reliance 
can be placed,’ and on 22 January 1855 he requested Raglan to provide an explanation 
                                                 
193  Dispatch by Russell, 14 Nov.; The Times, 12 Dec. 1854. 
194  WO/6/70/111. 
195  Robins (1994), p. 9. 
196  M&SH, I, p. 294. 
197  WO/17/1730. 
198  RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1. 
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why ‘the regiment marched to camp in the dark and had slept on wet ground before 
being sent almost immediately into the trenches.’199 
Airey provided his explanation (see Appendix 3.3), while Estcourt convened a 
court of inquiry under the presidency of Sir George Brown.
200
 The conclusions were 
forwarded to London on 6 March, and to these Panmure’s replied on 13 April 
(Appendix 3.4). Briefly, it was concluded that the only matter of concern was the delay 
occasioned by the exchange of their muskets for Miniés, and that the subsequent health 
of the regiment was due more to the ‘enervated state of the regiment’ when it arrived 
than the ‘hardships and exposures to which it was subjected after it had landed.’ 
 
A draft of the 23
rd
 Regiment arrived on 28 November and the PMO of the Light 
Division informed Hall that: 
 
They were landed at 4 p.m. […] and sent off to camp – a distance of seven miles – without 
guides or notice to the regiment.
201
 About 30 of the men found the camp […] between 10 
and 11 o’clock; but the rest wandered about, and found shelter as best they could in other 
camps. 
 
Hall forwarded the letter to the AG with the request that ‘more care may be taken 
in future in the disembarkation of troops arriving during this inclement season of the 
year.’202 This incident also came to the notice of E.L. Godkin of the Daily News who 
reported on 2 December: 
 
A very careless occurrence took place on the 29
th
 ult. Some drafts […] were disembarked 
shortly before sunset, and ordered to march to their respective regiments […] the roads 
almost impassable and quite obliterated from sight by mud. No officer of the Quartermaster-
General’s [showed] them the route […] none arrived at their destination until nearly an hour 
before midnight, many remained out all night, some were taken care of in the French camps, 
and one man [became] so ill that he died some hours afterwards. No notice was given of their 
coming […] so no food was prepared, no tents for their reception. No reason could be 
ascertained why they should have been sent on at so late an hour […] instead of remaining on 




Hall referred to the matter in his monthly report for January 1855: ‘The great 
mortality in the 23
rd
 Regiment has arisen from dysentery and diarrhoea and has been 
                                                 
199 Newcastle to Raglan, No. 213, 22 Jan. 1855; WO/33/1/9/55 and W&SHC/2057/F8/III/C/91a. 
The letter opened ‘I deeply regret to be again compelled to bring before your Lordship a report of 
a very serious nature, reflecting strongly on the conduct of […] your Lordship’s staff.’ 
200  WO/28/198. 
201  It got dark a little after 5 p.m. 
202  Hall to QMG, 1 Dec. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/990 and BBP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 106. 
203  Daily News, 19 Dec. 1854. 
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confined chiefly to the young and weakly lads who joined as recruits from England in 
November last, and who were quite unequal to the duties of a campaign.’204 
 
It is possible that this series of potentially avoidable episodes prompted a change in 
policy for new arrivals as letters of 2 and 13 December noted that ‘Lord Raglan has 
ordered that they shall not go into the trenches for the present,’205 and ‘Now they allow 
no new arrivals to go into the trenches for the first week.’206 
The official history of several regiments reveal that this policy did not necessarily 
make it easier for the men as they did not did not escape exhausting fatigues, cholera or 
other enteric diseases (Table 3.9). The policy was not formally ratified in General 
Orders but it was apparently in operation early in September 1855 when members of 
the 63
rd
 Regiment landed: ‘A respite of a few days at least from trench and guard 
duties, and other heavy work, was we found, customary […] in order that the men 
might recuperate a little after the confinement on board ship.’207 
 
The general public became aware of some of these problems before Christmas 1854 and 
so it is surprising it was not until 6 January 1855 that the Minister for War made his 
concern known to Raglan: 
 
Amongst other reports […] one relating to the landing, and march to camp of a strong 
detachment for the Brigade of Guards, [when] there was neither officer in attendance upon 
their landing, nor a guide furnished to conduct them to the camp, so, that in consequence they 
lost their way; and when at length after a march of unnecessary length they [found] neither 
tents or other accommodation provided for them. […] upon their first introduction to action in 
the field are compelled to lie out without shelter, when ample provision might with ordinary 




                                                 
204  WO/17/1730; RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1 (a similar version in Hall’s hand), and BPP (1856), No. 2007, 
p. 160. 
205  Letter from an officer, 30 Nov.-2 Dec.; The Times and Reynold’s Newspaper, 21 & 24 Dec. 
1854 respectively. 
206  Letter from an officer, 13 Dec. 1854; Cheshire Observer, The Examiner, and Manchester Times, 6 
Jan. 1855. 
207  Vieth (1907), pp. 28-9. 
208  Newcastle to Raglan, No. 202, 6 Jan. 1855; WO/6/77, ff. 136-43 (longhand) and WO/33/1/7/55 
(printed). 
209  It is not clear to which draft Newcastle was referring as the Guards were reinforced on several 
occasions, for example, by the arrival of the Queen of the South during the evening of the 20 Nov. 
(Russell, 20 Nov.; The Times 8 Dec. 1854), the Robert Lowe which left Portsmouth on 26 Nov. 
(The Times, 27 Nov. 1854), and the Royal Albert which arrived on 20 December (Letter from a 
gentleman, 21 Dec.; The Times, 12 Jan. 1855). 
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It is not known how Raglan responded as there is no official dispatch in 
WO/1/370. Incidentally, Hall recorded a similar incident in his diary on 24 November 
1854: 
 
A party of 200 Guards marched in the rain to cut fascines without a Medical Officer and 
cholera has broken out. The AG […] requested arrangements might be made for the transport 
of the sick and supply of medical aid. Requested Captain Grant to send an ambulance cart at 
once and directed Dr Linton to detach a Medical Officer […] to attend them.210 
 
Illness following arrival 
 
Many men landing during the first nine months after the invasion fell ill, often with a 
fatal result (see Table 3.8) and Newcastle sent Raglan his assessment of the health 
problems in the Crimea in no uncertain terms: 
 
The sad prevalence of sickness at this season amongst the newly arrived troops also requires 
explanation, and especially [as] the regts best placed have in many instances suffered most. I 
cannot keep thinking that due enquiry […] will bring to light the fact that there has been 




Raglan presumably passed the letter to Hall for reply, who pointed out with good 
reason that the poor health was due to several interrelated factors which if corrected 
should result in improvement: 
 
It is quite true that all newly arrived regts and […] recruits […] have suffered more than 
others from disease. Cholera [appeared] about the middle of November and proved very 
destructive. […] The weather was wet, cold, and tempestuous, the duty necessarily severe, 
and the exposure of the men in the trenches necessarily very great. Supplies of all kinds were 
obtained with great difficulty for want of transport, and from the almost impassable state of 
the roads […] Fuel was exceedingly scarce, and cooking consequently imperfectly 
performed. The shelter of bell tents, many of which were old, thin and torn, was inadequate 
to the climate and season of the year. There was no want of disposition on the part of any one 
to remedy the evils that existed, but at one time means were wanting, and the difficulties […] 
almost insurmountable. Of late […] the men are better clad, and fed, and the duty is lighter, 
and great efforts are made to get them more comfortably housed […] At a distance it is not 
easy to comprehend all the difficulties […] and a number of unforeseen accidents […] have 




Dr Robert Lyons, the pathologist, also recognized the problem when he noted in 
his official report that: 
 
Amongst even well-matured constitutions the hardships and fatigues, trials, privations, and 
exposure of campaigns, such as those of the past year in the Crimea, must almost of 
necessity prove largely productive of disease, and induce much mortality. But in the 
                                                 
210  RAMC/524/15/6. 
211  Newcastle to Raglan, No. 202, 6 Jan. 1855; WO/6/70, ff. 136-43 (longhand) and WO/33/1/7/55 
(Cabinet paper). 
212  Hall to Military Secretary, 25 Jan. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1333. 
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undeveloped frames and the unripe strength of the ill-seasoned recruit, such causes operated 




Incidentally, this issue was revisited after the war by Kinglake, who candidly 
summarized the position after the storm of 14 November 1854, and thereby supported 
Hall’s assessments: 
 
[The] reinforcements […] did not effect a […] sustained augmentation of the number of 
men […] for the new-comers [when] subjected to the hardships […] fell sick with appalling 
rapidity [to become] a superadded assemblage of hospital sufferers than an actual accession 
to strength. […] the 9th Regiment […] sickened so fast, that [after a few days they had] only 
a small remnant left. The Guards had received some strong draughts of men […]; yet [at the 
end of January] the three battalions could only muster […] 312 men. […] The 63rd 




As the living standards and the weather improved the health of the new arrivals became 
less of a concern and after the fall of Sevastopol Hall was able to write more 
optimistically: ‘The newly arrived regiments are getting acclimatized and we may 
reasonably expect […] improvements in the general health of the Army, as duty will be 
less severe, and the weather is becoming cool and pleasant.’215 Nevertheless, cholera 
claimed the lives of several recruits during October although ‘otherwise the health of 
the troops was good.’216 
 
Venereal diseases were the most prevalent in new recruits, although this may reflect in 
part the relative ease of detection by superficial examination. Cases were diagnosed 
throughout the campaign and in all 3,717 men were admitted to regimental hospitals.
217
 
A third was diagnosed before the invasion of the Crimea, with the highest rates in May 
and June 1854 (18‰ of strength). The rates were also somewhat higher than in 
previous months during May to October 1855 (4.2-5.8‰), presumably as a result of the 





                                                 
213  BPP (1857). Session I, No. 2229, pp. vii-viii. For a review of the report see Glasgow Medical 
Journal, IV (1857), pp. 129-46. 
214  Kinglake (1891), pp. 178-9. 
215  Hall to Simpson, 19 Sep. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/3134. 
216  Hall’s monthly summary for the 28th Regiment, Oct. 1855; RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1. 
217  M&SH, II, General Return A. 
218  It is not improbable that ‘ladies of the night’ frequented the bazaars, and they would have been at 
risk from their clients and vice versa. However, there are no references to prostitution in the 
Crimea in the indexes of books by Shepherd (1991), Gill (2004), Rappaport (2007), and 
Bosteridge (2008). 
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Tuberculosis was endemic in the British Isles during the 19
th
 century but the disease did 
not prove a serious clinical problem with only 279 cases being admitted to the 
regimental hospitals and no more than 20 in any month. On the other hand, phthisis was 
not an uncommon reason for discharge from the Army (see Chapter 9). 
 
Mortality in different age groups 
 
The age distribution of the men in the cavalry, foot guards, and infantry who died from 
disease and wounds were derived from General Return D in the M&SH (Table 3.11). 
The mortality rates were calculated using the figures in Table 3.11 as the numerator, 
and the number of men in Table 3.4 as the denominator. Overall the mortality rate 
tended to increase with age (right hand column in Table 3.11 and Figure 3.4). The 
trends in the mortality rates with age are expressed graphically in Figure 3.5. The rate 
was lower in the cavalry and was only ≥300‰ in two age groups. Conversely, the rates 
were always higher in the foot guards, and exceeded 400‰ among men in their 30s. 
The infantry occupied an intermediate position with 400‰ being recorded only for men 
in their late 30s. 
 
Land Transport Corps and Army Works Corps 
 
The LTC and AWC were raised during early 1855. The physical quality of many 
recruits was poor and Hall made several references to the unsuitably of the civilian 
‘lads’. For example, in January 1856 he noted that many joining the LTC were 
‘objectionable […] for the most part feeble boys recruited in the purlieus of London 
and […] would prove inefficient.’219 The next day he wrote to Smith that ‘the Corps has 
been filled up with young lads from London, and other places is very inconsiderate, and 
very expensive to government,’220 while a few days later he opined that recruits for the 
AWC ‘were totally unfit and were sent back to England,’ and that ‘men were recruited 
to make up numbers without consideration of their efficiency.’221 
Hall recorded his concern to Codrington officially on 18 February 1856 by 
stating that many admissions to the LTC hospital that week were ‘weakly, sickly, and 
                                                 
219  Diary entry, 4 Jan. 1856; RAMC/397/PC1/6-8. 
220  Hall to Smith, 5. Jan. 1856; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/3924. 
221  Hall to Smith, 22 Jan. 1856; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3/4063. 
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dissipated lads fit for little more than occupying a bed in the hospital;’222 and he 
returned to the topic the next week: 
 
Things in the LTC not so favourable. […] I was much struck by the youthful appearance of 
one poor boy [in hospital] he said he was 15, but he was told to say he was 20 when he 




Hall’s unfavourable opinion of the civilian personnel in the LTC subsequently 
received unequivocal support from the Sanitary Commissioners: 
 
The first thing that struck us was the difference in the physical constitution between the men 
in the [Land Transport] Corps and […] the Army. Many of the former were puny, ill 
nourished, and badly developed. Altogether they were an inferior race, a large proportion of 
whom would not have been accepted as recruits; many bore the marks of intemperance and 
bad habits, and the previous occupations of most of those we examined had not been such as 
to fit them for the severe duties and exposure incident to the service. […] It was stated to us 




The high incidence of sickness in the LTC prompted Panmure to request 
information, and to this Hall responded forthrightly: 
 
The cause is simple, the corps was filled up with weak lads who arrived here in the winter in 
great numbers, were unorganized, and not looked after, as the number of officers in the corps 
at first was far too few, and sickness was the consequence. Many […] were not more than 16, 
and one boy told me he was only 14 last birthday, but this will not appear on the returns as 
they were all instructed by the recruiting sergeant to say they were 18.’225 
 
Codrington clearly agreed with Hall’s assessment since he informed Panmure in 
an earlier despatch that ‘the greater proportion of sickness arises from causes which are 
detailed in Sir John Hall’s reports.’226 
Fortunately the health of these men improved during the spring of 1856 as ‘they 
were getting into shape,’227 while Hall could report that the PMO ‘thinks the men […] 
are looking healthier. […] getting better organized and acquiring the habits of 
soldiers.’228 The benefits of organization and discipline on the health of the LTC were 
also emphasized in the M&SH: ‘The men were sent out undisciplined, not organized, 
often insufficiently clothed; some too old, others too young and generally helpless in 
                                                 
222 Hall to Codrington, 18 Feb. 1856; WO/1/382/459-62. 
223 Hall to Codrington, 25 Feb. 1856; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3/4303 and The Times, 4 Mar. 1856. 
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225  Hall to Smith, 15 June 1856; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3/4987. 
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cases.’ 
228  Hall to Codrington, 17 Mar. 1856; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3/4451. 
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their new life.’ The health in general was better in ‘the detachments stationed with the 
Divisions of the Army’ as opposed to that in the two main wings of the corps because 
these ‘were much better organized, with a much better staff of commissioned and non-
commissioned officers to carry out orders and supervise the rationing and messing of 
the men.’ The value of military discipline and organization was made clear as the health 







Luscombe writing after the Napoleonic War recommended that recruits should be over 
19 and that those employed in agriculture or by outdoor ‘manufacturers’ were preferable 
to the town dwellers working in sedentary occupations.
230
 However, it was clear that the 
serious shortage of manpower necessitated a relaxation of selection criteria and this 
probably had a detrimental effect on the health status of the troops, although this cannot 
be quantified exactly as the recruits’ health records have not survived. 
The Eastern campaign took place during a cholera pandemic and not surprisingly 
the disease was commonly diagnosed in the reinforcements following their arrival when 
the disease was prevalent (See Chapter 5). The atrocious conditions experienced during 
the first winter took a serious toll on new arrivals committed to the rigour of camp life 
and trench warfare without having time to become acclimatized, or to receive 
instruction on how to deal with the conditions to which they were exposed. 
Hall complained about the poor physical condition of recruits several times and 
with obvious justification. 
The arrangements for the new arrivals were inadequate on occasions and this had 
a detrimental effect on their health. The faults lay principally with the military 
authorities who eventually attempted to ameliorate the situation by allowing them some 
time to acclimatize before moving to the plateau, although this was not an unalloyed 
success. 
The importance of training and leadership, and the provision of satisfactory living 
conditions, were illustrated by the experience of the LTC during the second winter. 
Many recruits were too young and callow to cope and they sickened and died in 
                                                 
229  M&SH, I, p. 462. 
230  Luscombe (1821), pp. 108-15. 
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relatively large numbers in comparison with the regular soldiers working alongside 
them who generally remained fit and capable of work. However, the employment of 
sufficient officers and NCOs to enforce discipline and order, and the improvement in 
the weather and living conditions, benefited their health towards the end of the 
campaign. 
Nearly a third of the men joining the Army during the campaign were <21 years 
of age. It is understandable, perhaps, that Hall concluded that these youths had a higher 
rate of mortality than the older troops, as nearly a quarter of the deaths from disease 
occurred in the younger lads. However, when the mortality rate was calculated with 
respect to age the converse was true as a higher proportion of the older troops died 
although the fatalities among those aged ≥36 accounted for only c.5% of all the deaths 
from disease (Figure 3.4). 
Tables 3.1-3.11 
 
Table 3.1: Criteria for recruitment specified in General Order No. 633 issued by Horse Guards on 30 
October 1854 
Corps Height Maximum age 
(years)* Minimum Maximum 
Heavy Cavalry 5 feet 5½ inches 5 feet 9 inches 25 
Light Cavalry 5 feet 5½ inches 5 feet 8 inches 25 
Infantry of the Line 5 feet 4½ inches† Not stated 30 
[Summarized from WO/123/141] 
* No minimum age was specified in the General Order but a Memorandum of 5 January 1855 stipulated 
that no 'growing lad’ below the age of 17 should be recruited into the infantry. 
† The minimum height was reduced to 5 feet 4 inches by a memorandum dated 19 December 1854 and 
this remained in force until 26 March 1856 when the height was increased to 5 feet 5 inches. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Bounty paid to men successfully recruited into the cavalry and infantry 
Corps Bounty* 
1 March 1854 30 October 1854 22 January 1855 
Cavalry £5 15s 6d £7 15s 6d £10 
Infantry £4 £6 £8 
[BPP (1854-55), No. 247, p. 352] 




Table 3.3: Recruitment into the British Army during 1854 and 1855 
Corps Year to 
21 Oct. 1854 
Year to 
18 Aug. 1855 
By regiments of infantry in the East (including the Guards) 11773 15493 
Regiments at Home, and the depôts of regiments in the  
Colonies (exclusive of the above) 
9289 10289 
Cavalry 1624 3333 
Subtotal 22686 29115 
Artillery 2577 4178 
Marines 2657 1829 
East India Company 2911 1261 
Grand total 29831* 36383 
[RAMC/397/C/CO/2/5 & 6] 
* The figures given indicate that the grand total should be 30,831. 
 
 
Table 3.4: Ages of men in the cavalry and infantry sent to the East, 1854-56 
Age  
(years) 

















(%) of total 
17 23 0.3 36 0.6 1330 2.3 1389 2.0 
18 522 7.4 184 3.0 6586 11.5 7292 10.4 
19 785 11.1 495 8.0 6382 11.2 7662 10.9 
20 811 11.5 505 8.2 5392 9.4 6708 9.5 
21 624 8.8 517 8.4 4320 7.6 5461 7.8 
22 591 8.4 562 9.1 3848 6.7 5001 7.1 
23 511 7.2 592 9.6 3559 6.2 4662 6.6 
24 463 6.5 543 8.8 3543 6.2 4549 6.5 
25 423 6.0 526 8.5 3646 6.4 4595 6.5 
26 349 4.9 372 6.0 3348 5.9 4069 5.8 
27 291 4.1 327 5.3 2535 4.4 3153 4.5 
28 246 3.5 249 4.0 2393 4.2 2888 4.1 
29 222 3.1 201 3.3 1990 3.5 2413 3.4 
30 208 2.9 178 2.9 1833 3.2 2219 3.2 
31 139 2.0 133 2.2 1342 2.3 1614 2.3 
32 136 1.9 133 2.2 1195 2.1 1464 2.1 
33 137 1.9 104 1.7 1001 1.8 1242 1.8 
34 110 1.6 110 1.8 817 1.4 1037 1.5 
35 100 1.4 99 1.6 713 1.2 912 1.3 
36 100 1.4 88 1.4 519 0.9 707 1.0 
37 63 0.9 70 1.1 338 0.6 471 0.7 
38 60 0.8 56 0.9 242 0.4 358 0.5 
39 42 0.6 35 0.6 160 0.3 237 0.3 
40 39 0.6 18 0.3 86 0.2 143 0.2 
≥41 75 1.1 27 0.4 77 0.1 179 0.3 

















Table 3.5: Causes of rejection of potential recruits for the Army during 1844 and 1845 
Cause of rejection Number (%) 
1844 1845 Total 
Weak intellect 12 (0.2) 8 (0.2) 20 (0.2) 
Unsound health (marks of cupping, leeching, setons, etc.) 499 (8.3) 351 (8.5) 850 (0.35) 
Muscular tenuity 458 (7.6) 158 (3.8) 616 (6.1) 
Afflictions of the eye 396 (6.6) 226 (5.5) 622 (6.2) 
Loss or decay of teeth 291 (4.8) 197 (4.75) 488 (4.8) 
Deformity of the spine 359 (6) 213 (5.1) 572(5.6) 
Want of due capacity or malformation of chest 391 (6.5) 364 (8.8) 755 (7.4) 
Defective superior extremities 244 (4) 141 (3.4) 385 (3.8) 
Hernia (inguinal, femoral, umbilical) 229 (3.8) 227 (5.5) 456 (4.5) 
Tendency to rupture from laxity of loins 321 (5.3) 289 (7) 610 (6) 
Varicose spermatic cord veins 424 (7) 264 (6.4) 688 (6.8) 
Disease or injury of testicles 59 (1) 56 (1.4) 115 (1.1) 
Varicose leg veins 582 (9.7) 517 (12.5) 1099 (10.8) 
Defective inferior extremities 694 (11.5) 468 (11.3) 1162 (11.4) 
Cicatrices, ulcers, wounds 380 (6.3) 252 (6.1) 632 (6.2) 
Consumption or pulmonary disease 83 (1.4) 37 (0.9) 120 (1.2) 
Diseases of the heart 91 (1.5) 64 (1.5) 155 (1.5) 
Impaired hearing 46 (0.8) 43 (1) 89 (0.9) 
Impediment of speech 25 (0.4) 13 (0.3) 38 (0.4) 
Syphilis 105 (1.7) 81 (2) 186 (1.8) 
Marks of corporal punishment 32 (0.5) 32 (0.8) 64 (0.6) 
Marked with letter D 13 (0.2) 17 (0.4) 30 (0.3) 
All other causes 292 (4.8) 128 (3) 420 (4.1) 
Totals 6026 4146 10172 
[RAMC/397/C/CO/2/5 & 6] 
 
 
Table 3.6: Dr Hall’s comments on the health status of newly arrived drafts 





The Regiment continued healthy until a draft of some 40 men arrived 
several of whom were in a debilitated state of health previous to starting. 
11
th
 Hussars Venereal cases were discharged to duty. The surgeon states that if proper 
attention had been paid before embarkation on the voyage the majority of 
men would have landed fit for duty, instead of hospital, and in the next 
month: 13 men from England admitted at once with various forms of 
venereal diseases. The men of the draft were found to be in a state of 
great filth both as to their clothes and persons, the surgeon reported this 





Strength increased by 141 men from England, a great number are sickly, 





 Regiment The recruits are now mere delicate boys, no stamina and physically unfit 














Table 3.7: Numbers of reinforcements joining infantry and cavalry regiments during the six months after 
the invasion 
Corps (No. of regiments) 1854 1855 Total  
(Ave./Regiment) Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. 
Initial besieging force (B+) (21)* 3 159 1637 1551 1809 1122 6281 (314) 
Initial besieging Force (B-) (7)* 0 0 444 158 371 213 1186 (198) 
Infantry joining in November (4) † NA NA 0 146 251 82 479 (120) 
Infantry joining in December (4)‡ NA NA NA 1 513 180 694 (173) 
Infantry joining in January (3)§ NA NA NA NA 0 465 465 (155) 
Cavalry Division (10)¶ 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 (0.3) 
Highland Brigade (3)# 0 100 0 92 0 54 246 (82) 
Totals 3 259 2084 1948 2944 2116 9354 
[Adapted from BPP (1854-55), No. 218, pp. 472-9: Adjutant Generals Office, Horse Guards, 22 March 1855] 
NA Not applicable. 
* B+, served in Bulgaria: Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Scots Fusilier Guards; 1st bn, 1st Regiment; 7th, 
19th, 23rd, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 38th, 41st, 44th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 55th, 77th, 88th, 95th Regiments, and 2nd bn, Rifle Brigade. 
 B-, from Turkey or direct by sea: 4th, 20th, 21st, 57th, 63rd, 68th, and 1st battalion Rifle Brigade. 
† The 9th, 46th, 62nd, and 97th Regiments. The hospital admissions of two companies of the 46th Regiment that 
landed in September have been excluded from the analysis. 
‡ The 17th, 18th, 34th, 89th, and 90th Regiments. No hospital admissions were recorded for the 18th Regiment in 
December and so it has been included with the January arrivals for other analyses. 
§ The 14th and 39th Regiments. 
 Heavy Brigade: 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons; Light Brigade: 4th and 13th Light 
Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars, and 17th Lancers. 
# Balaklava defences: 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Regiments. 
 
 
Table 3.8: Summary of reports from medical officers and others on the health and suitability of personnel 
joining the Army, November 1854-January 1855 
Date Corps* Comment [Reference] 
16 
Nov. 
62nd Regt The regiment […] disembarked […] on the 16th […] was moved up to the plateau […] the 
soldier was only in procession of the usual service kit and one blanket, the troops soon began 
to experience the ill effects of exposure; the duties […] were extremely severe […] The health 
of the regiment soon became seriously compromised, and suffered serious deterioration […] 
[M&SH, I, p. 340] 
20 
Nov. 
97th Regt […] the regiment immediately disembarked […] the weather was […] cold and wet, and the 
men were insufficiently provided with clothing suited to the climate […] encamped on damp 
ground on the heights […] the duties […] of such a nature to prove highly detrimental to the 
health of the soldier. [M&SH, I, p. 439] 
 
Hall, diary entry: The 97th were landed and kept in the rain for many hours and then ordered to 
encamp outside [Balaklava]. Why were they not allowed to remain on board ship like the 
Guards […] I cannot tell. At this time of year it is a hazardous experiment. [RAMC/524/15/6] 
 
On 26 November Hall forwarded a letter from the regimental surgeon to Smith which stated 
that five recruits had died, and eight others were dangerously ill [due to] want of fuel, camp 
kettles, and blankets, as well as proper shelter. [BPP (1856), No, 2007, p. 162] 
21 
Nov. 
17th Regt 102 recruits joined […] from England and cholera which had been absent since 14th October, 
once more appeared […] confined […] almost entirely to the men comprising this draft. 





A draft of 122 recruits, mostly boys, arrived on the 21st, and cholera soon made its appearance. 
[M&SH, I, p. 132] 
 
On the 28 November an officer wrote: We landed […] last Tuesday [21 November] and were 
first ordered to encamp near Balaklava, but I had no sooner marched up to the ground indicated 
about a mile from the bay, and got already for the tents, than an orderly came up with orders 
[…] to march up to the front […] we got our ammunition served out to us […] and began our 
weary march about 12 o’clock. […] Well, we proceeded on as best we could through the mud 
till dark, and to every enquiry as to how far the 3rd Division was ‘five miles’ was the invariable 
answer. As it became perfectly dark we began to suspect that our guide, an orderly from the 
13th Dragoons, did not know much about the country. […] at last we reached our camp about 8 
o’clock, after having by our wanderings converted a march of six miles into nearly 20. [The 
Times, 21 Dec. 1854] 
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A second draft of 101 joined […] composed of young inexperienced soldiers, and the change 
from the comforts they enjoyed […] on Queen of the South to the severe duty of camp during 
inclement weather, the salt diet, and the cold muddy tents, was most disastrous. [M&SH, I, pp. 
125-6] 
 
The regimental surgeon noted on 25 November: […] several of the men of the draft having 
been attacked with cholera of a passive, but fatal type. Severe diarrhoea and dysentery is 
prevalent amongst them. Possibly as the majority are young lads with little stamina, the voyage 
out may have weakened and predisposed them to the malady. [Robinson (1856), p. 222] 
28 
Nov. 
7th Regt Cholera was diagnosed in the drafts received on 21 and 28 November. [M&SH, I, p. 159] 
 
On 1 December Hall noted in his diary: Even no later than today the surgeon of the 7th Fusiliers 
writes that a draft of recruits [arriving] on 28 November, 100 strong, were landed at about 4 
p.m. (it gets dark a little after 5) and ordered to march to the camp […] a distance between 7 
and 8 miles. No notice was sent to regiments, no tents were provided, and no guide for the 
unfortunate strangers furnished. Only 30 reached camp between 10 and 11 at night, about 30 
more have since come in, but there still some missing .. and others were picked up on the road 






The amount of sickness is considerable; cholera appeared in newly arrived troops. [Hall to 





Weather drizzly, dreary, and cold, is trying our stamina. Our young recruits are suffering 
seriously from their new mode of life under a changeable climate. This cannot surprise […] the 
poor boys, who are like children as regards campaigning, return from the trenches wet, cold, 
and tired, and throw themselves down to sleep, reckless of the injury which must result to the 
vital powers from daring an opposition to the common laws of existence. […] a disease, call it 
cholera […] happily it is confined to the new arrivals, and will, I trust, disappear when the dry 
winds and bracing frosts set it. [From Our Own Correspondent, 28 Nov. 1854; The Morning 
Post, 19 Dec. 1854] 
30 
Nov. 
Letter An officer reported that the 46th have lost 90 men in the short time they have been out here, and 
the 62nd 70; the 9th came from Malta two days ago, and they are knocked up fearfully. The men 
are in such a state of desperation that they say when going into the trenches, ‘They would 
rather be shot by the Russians than to come back and die by inches.’ [The Times, 21 Dec. 1854] 
Nov. 19th Regt The recruits suffered more than the old soldiers. [Hall’s monthly summary; 
RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1] 
Nov. 30th Regt The mortality took place principally among the young men lately arrived from England, who, 
not possessing mature physical development, speedily succumbed to the unaccustomed 





[…] there is a considerable increase in sickness confined chiefly to the recruits and new 
regiments. The duty is very severe in […] the trenches. The weather for the last three weeks 
has been wet, cold, and tempestuous; the men are indifferently clad and not well fed […] [Hall 





A draft [mostly boys], arrived on the 21st, and cholera soon made its appearance […] Unless 
the troops are hutted, and provided with warm clothing and fuel […] the exertions of the 
medical officers [will be] of little avail. [Medical report from the Crimea; Nottinghamshire 
Guardian, 28 Dec. 1854] 
2 
Dec. 
Letter The armies, both English and French, are receiving recruits every week, and on these fresh 




Diary entry I [Mrs Duberly] know that the mortality amongst the newly-arrived regiments is very great; nor 
can any one wonder at it! We, who are acclimatized, can hardly make head against the 
hardships of the life, – what, then, must those feel who have just left an English barrack, or 





Some unfortunate drafts […] disembarked at sunset […] to march five miles to their 
encampments, ankle deep in sticky clay, and in almost utter darkness, this was, of course, not 
intended and messengers, in the shape of Dragoons, were sent by the Commander-in-Chief to 
meet them, and order them to halt, where they were placed under cover, and got a ration of 
rum. This was a fortunate accident for the poor fellows. […] Some of the drafts that had lost 
their way marched in this morning – they had met with kindness from the French and had 
‘much talk’ without having been able to understand one word. [A correspondent, 14 Nov.; 





The increase in sickness is mainly in the recruits and new regiments. [Hall to Smith, 6 Dec. 
1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1032, PoL, I, pp. 216 & 128, and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 22] 
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Table 3.8: Continued 
9 
Dec. 
Letter The constant exposure to rain, fatigue in the trenches, and scanty food introduce the plague 
(cholera) among them. Poor fellows! We bury upwards of 15 from the 9th almost daily. [A 





Cholera is raging in all the newly-arrived regiments, and many of the puny youthful recruits are 
so broken down by duty and the hardships of their position that they have not sufficient energy 
left to cook their rations, and they die, when attacked with any disease, from sheer exhaustion. 
[Hall to an unnamed recipient, 15 Dec. 1854; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 23] 
19 
Dec. 
89th Regt […] on the 19th […] disembarked, and joined the 3rd Division on the plateau. […] the troops 
were soon introduced to the hardships and privations of camp life […] the men were detailed 
for duty in the trenches in the same clothing they had used in the Mediterranean. […] The 
regiment […] was unfortunately attacked the first night of encamping with cholera and severe 





We can state on official authority that on the 21st of December (1854) […] that cholera (is) 




21st Regt The recruits of 18 and 19 years of age are totally unfit […] the first exposure in the trenches 
produces generally an attack of cholera, or brings on symptoms of collapse, from which their 
recovery is protracted, but which not unfrequently passes on to a fatal termination. [Surgeon 





Hall forwarding a complaint from the PMO, 3rd Division, to the QMG which reported that men 




Letter The men are too young; they die fast when put to work. [Estcourt privately to Wetherall, AG, 
Horse Guards; NAM-1962-10-95] (Incidentally, in a letter dated 6 Feb. the AG refers to the 
inadequate training of the new arrivals.) 
15 
Jan. 
63rd Regt […] the 63rd Regiment […] is gone. Gone in men, gone in spirit. […] The men I saw were 
mere boys […] Raw fellows and so cast down with disease and disgust at their fate, the 
hardships they have to bear; that they cannot stay here. [Estcourt privately to Wetherall, AG, 





It is quite true that all newly arrived regts and that all the recruits that have joined the Army of 







Of our last draft of miserable boys, four fifths are already dead. [Colonel A.J. Lawrence, Rifle 
Brigade, privately to Wetherall, AG Horse Guards; NAM-1962-10-97-15] 
30 
Jan. 
Report ... newly arrived regiments and recruits, who are suffering much from diarrhoea, and a great 
many of whom have already been swept off by disease to an extent that is perfectly appalling. 
[Hall to PMO, Scutari, 30 Jan. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1360] 




I have frequently been reminded of the utter uselessness of young soldiers being sent out from 
England to share duties of this campaign, which have been severe, and not altogether devoid of 
hardships and privations of an unexpected character. Many of the new arrivals have succumbed 
almost immediately after landing. Report to Col. the Hon. G. Upton, Commanding, Coldstream 
Guards, Jan. 1855; Wyatt, ‘History’, pp. 48-53, with an extract in M&SH, I, pp. 114-5 
* The 9th, 23rd, and 46th Regiments are not included as they are covered in the main body of the text. 
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Table 3.9: Experience of regiments that did not go directly to the plateau after disembarkation as 
summarized in the Medical and Surgical History, December 1854-August 1855 
Date Corps Notes [Reference] 
5 Dec. 90th Regt On the 5th […] disembarked, and encamped a little distance from the town. The site […] was 
bleak and much exposed to the weather […] it overlooked the head of the harbour, where 
accumulations of offal and filth were too frequently observed […] On the 13th December the 
regiment moved to the front. […] On the 8th […] cholera appeared […] [M&SH, I, p. 410] 
9 Dec. 34th Regt Landed at Balaklava on the 9th […] For the next three days it was encamped in the immediate 
neighbourhood of Balaklava, and hardly had the men been placed under canvas than they 
began to be affected with cholera and diarrhoea […] On the 12th the regiment marched to the 





A draft of 411 men [were] encamped about a quarter of a mile beyond the head of the 
harbour. The site […] after rain soon became broken up […] sickness, especially diarrhoea 
and dysentery, soon became prevalent, from the combined effects of cold and damp. […] The 
draft joined the battalion at the front on the 29th […] The reason of its detention at Balaklava 
for ten days was with the view that being exempted from trench duty for a short period […] a 
measure […] not attended with the good effects expected […] owing to the state of the 
ground and the of the weather, combined with the pestiferous exhalations arising from the 
polluted harbour of Balaklava. [M&SH, I, p. 100. The arrival of the drafts for the Coldstream 
Guards and Scots Fusilier Guards was mentioned on pages 113 and 126 respectively, but 
without comment.] 
 
A letter dated the 21 December described the same event: [The men] were disembarked and 
encamped for a day or two, on the sides of the hills opposite [Balaklava] before they go up to 
the front. It has been observed that by this plan [they] escape a good deal of sickness; it is a 
kind of acclimatizing before they are put to hard work in the trenches. December is a bad time 
to begin living in tents, and if hard work and bad accommodation have to be tried at the same 
time, great sickness is inevitable, as several newly arrived regiments have experienced. 
[Letter from camp, 21 Dec.; The Times 17 Jan. 1855] 
22 
Dec. 
71st Regt [A detachment] […] landed at Balaklava in December. During the first ten days […] they 
were in tents pitched near the head of the harbour, close to the Turkish burial ground. The 
weather was cold and wet. Numerous cases of diarrhoea, and two of cholera occurred […] but 
no deaths. [M&SH, I, p. 363] 
30 
Dec. 
18th Regt Landed at Balaklava on the 30th […] encamped on the slope of a hill about a quarter of a mile 
from the town. […] the Corps […] was provided with new tents, and was constantly 
employed […] carrying Commissariat stores to the camp […] and the harassing nature of the 
duties, and the constant exposure of the men after returning so recently from a tropical 
climate was productive of much sickness. About the middle of January the regiment was 
moved to the front […] [M&SH, I, p. 186] 
1 Jan. 39th Regt […] on arrival at Balaklava [the regiment] was detained on […] Golden Fleece for 27 days on 
account of the severity of the weather […] [but] sickness has prevailed considerably […] 
attributable to the crowded state of the ship […] [M&SH, I, p. 270] 
19 Jan. 14th Regt […] for a time remained quartered on board […] they were immediately employed on 
garrison duties and public fatigues of a very harassing description during very inclement 
weather, the severity of which was the more acutely felt in consequence of their sudden 
transfer from […] Malta. Diarrhoea soon became prevalent, and on the 27th two cases of 
cholera […] the right wing was landed on the 30th […] and placed under canvas on the hill 




The regiment arrived on 10, 17, and 28 August and they were encamped near Kadikoi, where 
the water was of ‘indifferent quality’ and cholera broke out almost immediately. It was noted 
that ‘an amount of tolerance to [the cholera poison] appeared […] to have been […] 
established among the men composing the bulk of the Army […] it was chiefly among the 





Table 3.10: Primary admissions to the regimental hospitals for venereal diseases, April 1854-June 1856 
Year Month Total 
admissions 
Incidence (‰ of strength) 
Syphilis/gonorrhoea* Other venereal 
complaints† 
Total 
1854 April 99 7.9 4.1 12.0 
May 382 11.0 7.0 18.0 
June 407 12.8 5.4 18.2 
July 217 5.2 3.6 8.7 
August 123 2.4 2.3 4.7 
September 51 0.9 1.1 2.0 
October 103 3.0 1.1 4.1 
November 78 2.1 1.1 3.2 
December 85 1.7 1.5 3.2 
1855 January 90 2.1 1.2 3.3 
February 80 1.7 1.3 3.1 
March 58 0.9 1.5 2.4 
April 83 1.7 1.6 3.3 
May 149 3.5 2.0 5.5 
June 128 2.2 2.0 4.2 
July 173 3.2 2.4 5.6 
August 142 2.2 2.1 4.3 
September 195 3.1 2.5 5.5 
October 213 3.6 2.2 5.8 
November 121 1.9 1.5 3.3 
December 129 1.5 2.1 3.6 
1856 January 103 1.7 1.1 2.9 
February 132 2.0 1.5 3.6 
March 153 2.1 1.6 3.6 
April 112 1.2 1.5 2.7 
May 79 1.0 1.1 2.1 
June 32 1.0 0.5 1.5 
[M&SH, II, General Return A] 
* These comprised 1,546 and 525 cases of syphilis and gonorrhoea respectively. 




























(‰) in the 
age group 
17 1 43 3 83 131 98 135 97 
18 21 40 51 277 1002 152 1074 147 
19 68 87 119 240 1359 213 1546 202 
20 81 100 125 248 1251 232 1457 217 
21 85 136 123 238 958 222 1166 214 
22 87 147 154 274 925 240 1166 233 
23 82 160 154 260 752 211 988 212 
24 84 181 171 315 881 249 1136 250 
25 56 132 150 285 836 229 1042 227 
26 63 181 83 223 893 267 1039 255 
27 49 168 89 272 662 261 800 254 
28 47 191 84 337 573 239 704 244 
29 42 189 68 338 450 226 560 232 
30 39 188 69 388 448 244 556 251 
31 31 223 58 436 310 231 399 247 
32 30 221 66 496 360 301 456 311 
33 29 212 33 317 276 276 338 272 
34 33 300 48 436 250 306 331 319 
35 22 220 40 404 191 268 253 277 
36 27 270 41 466 179 345 247 349 
37 13 206 33 471 146 432 192 408 
38 12 200 23 411 98 405 133 372 
39 14 333 15 429 59 369 88 371 
40 11 282 10 556 41 477 62 434 
≥41 11 147 10 370 30 390 51 285 
Totals 1038 - 1820 - 13061 - 15919 - 
[Summarized from the M&SH, II, General Return D] 





Figure 3.1: Number of men successfully recruited into cavalry, infantry regiments and Royal Artillery, 
March 1854-March 1855 
 
 




Figure 3.3: Age distribution of 70,425 NCOs and men in the cavalry, foot guards, and infantry 










Figure 3.5: Trends in the rates of mortality from disease and wounds in NCOs in the cavalry, foot 






Appendix 3.1: Circular Memorandum issued by the Adjutant General, Horse Guards, 28 August 
1855 
 
The time for the instruction for the detachments at Malta being limited, and it having been found 
impossible that the whole of the men should be thoroughly trained in the theory and practice of musketry 
before they are ordered on to the Crimea, it is of the utmost importance that the attention of instructors at 
the former station should be devoted principally to those men who most require instruction and 
particularly to those who may not have gone through a course of training at home. The General 
Commanding in Chief accordingly desires that a return […] may be forwarded with each draft […] 
detailing the exact amount of training which each man has received. By these means the instructors at 










 […] arrived at Balaklava on the 26th November 1854 […] and disembarked on the following day. 
Although the landing was effected at an early hour, the men were kept loitering upon the beach until the 
evening, for the purpose of exchanging the arms [and] did not reach the camp […] until 10 o’clock at 
night. […] no preparations made for their reception, except that tents had been pitched, but as this had 
been only recently done, and the weather was wet, the covered surface was in no better condition than the 
ground elsewhere. The men […] left Malta without winter clothing; and thus, after many hours exposure 
in Balaklava [and] a toilsome night march through the sea of mud which covered the roads and whole face 
of the camp − tired and exhausted, without straw or other bedding − without baggage − and without 
covering, beyond what each carried − men and officers slept on the wet ground. […] The following day 
the Regiment was on duty in the trenches discomforts rapidly accumulated round it − the soldiers […] 
                                                 
231  WO/123/141. 
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often, hungry and worn out, threw themselves on the ground unable or unwilling to undergo the labour of 








 Regiment arrived at Balaklava on the 26
th
 November 1854 and disembarked on the following 
morning an officer of the QMG’s Department, Captain Ewart, having been sent from headquarters to 
conduct them to camp […] Colonel Borton states that should the weather prove fine the regiment would 
have been ready to march off from the place of landing by 10 a.m. had it not been for the exchange of 
arms […] ordered […] by the Adjutant General just as the troops were leaving the vessel. This exchange 
delayed them till about 5 p.m. consequently they did not reach their camp till 10 or half past at night, but 
the tents having been sent in the morning were ready pitched for the men to go into on arrival. The men 




. On the evening of 28
th
 
November, the regiment furnished a covering party, and on the morning of the 29
th
 a working party for the 
trenches. The ground occupied by the 9
th
 Regiment is probably the most healthy of any in camp, being 
very dry, and facing South West, and sheltered from the North. The sickness and mortality in this 
regiment since its arrival in the Crimea may be associated for as follows:- The regiment passed the 
summer in Malta and suffered severely, from fever, the average number on hospital being between 80 and 
90, nearly every man of the Corps having been affected. When the order for embarkation was received 
several men (upwards of 20) whom the regimental surgeon had drafted as unfit to accompany the regiment 
upon service, were ordered to embark by the Principal Medical Officer of the island. The Colonel states 
that the whole of these men have died. Three were unable to proceed further than Scutari. When at Malta 
the sickness of the regiment was in part attributed to the dampness of the walls of a new barrack in which 
they were placed, as will appear by the correspondence of the Principal Medical Officer at that station. 
The opinion that the sickness of this regiment may be traced to the sudden change of climate of Malta to 
that of an exceedingly wet season in the Crimea, rather than to the bad selection of its camp or neglect of 
the responsible authorities, is strengthened by the circumstances that a draft of 90 men which arrived from 
England on the 8
th




Appendix 3.4: Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, No. 190, 6 March 1855 and Lord Panmure to 
Lord Raglan, No. 74, 13 April 1855 
 
Raglan to Newcastle: With reference to […] dispatch No. 213 […] transmit the proceedings of the Board 
[…] [concerning] the sickness and mortality […] in the 9th Regiment […] all the prominent matters of 
charge have been disproved […] with the exception of the men having been detained […] in affecting the 
exchange of the smooth bore arms for Miniés, the whole of the allegations are without foundation. […] 
the 9
th
 arrived at a moment when additional troops were urgently required […] I accordingly ordered that 
the regiment should disembark the following day if it should not be wet […] I expressly directed […] that 
the exchange should take place before the march commenced. Unfortunately it took [longer] and the 
regiment reached the 3
rd
 Division late; but the tents were pitched and ready for its reception and the 
provisions for two days had been cooked previously to the landing in the morning. With reference to the 
9
th
 being called upon for duty the afternoon following their arrival in camp, I may […] remark that a 
regiment which has just arrived might be fairly be supposed to be more equal to fatigue than one which 
had been exposed to arduous duty for some very considerable time. (The official report is followed by a 




Panmure to Raglan: I am happy to learn […] the alleged cause of the mortality were proved unfounded 
and that the sickness and mortality originated rather in the enervated state of the regiment on it’s leaving 
Malta than in the hardships and exposures to which it was subjected after it had landed in the Crimea.’ 




                                                 
232  M&SH, I, p. 106. 
233  WO/1/371 and a longhand draft; WO/28/198. 
234  WO/1/371/109. 
235  WO/6/70/74. 
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Chapter 4 
Army Medical Department 
 
McGrigor retired as DG in 1852 and his place was taken by Smith who was paid less 
than half of his salary, and whose status would inevitably have been been diminished 
thereby. At the time of Smith’s appointment there were 667 MOs distributed between 
the staff (185) and regiments including the RA (482) stationed in the UK, Colonies, and 
India. Smith had control over the medical staff officers, but little over the regimental 
MOs who were under the orders of their COs. There were also 80 regimental MOs and a 
few others in India, paid for by the HEIC, and over whom Smith had no authority.
236
 
On 25 February 1854 Smith proposed a medical establishment for 12,000 men as 
48 regimental surgeons (39 in 13 infantry regiments, 4 in 2 cavalry regiments, and 5 in 
the RA and RS&M), 20 staff MOs, 1 purveyor, and 1 purveyor’s clerk.237 He also 
recommended that Hall, serving in India, should be promoted to IGH and take medical 
charge;
238
 Orders to proceed to Constantinople within three days,
239
 and he arrived 
there on 18 June 1854.
240
 
When the proposed size of the army was increased to 27,000 Smith informed the 
then PMO (Dr Burrell) that the staff personnel should comprise 1 IGH, 4 DIGH, 12 
SS1, 13 SS2, 49 SAS, 1 chief apothecary, 3 dispensers of medicines, 3 purveyors, 6 
purveyor’s clerks, 2 medical clerks, 1 cutler and assistant. At the regimental level he 
recommended 1 surgeon and 3 AS for infantry regiments of 850; 1 surgeon and 1 AS 
for cavalry squadrons of 250; 1 AS for troops of horse artillery and field batteries; plus 
1 surgeon for general duties. The total of 205 MOs gave a ratio of 1:132 men. Smith 
also recommended a reserve of 68 MOs.
241
 
A considerable number of medical personnel and support staff served during the 
campaign and as none of the several published and unpublished returns appear 
                                                 
236  Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 3-4. 
237  W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/229. Equivalent to one MO to 175 men. 
238  Smith to Military Secretary, 1 Mar. 1854, RAMC/397/F/CO/2/2a. 
239  Smith to Hall, 3 Mar. 1854, PoL and RAMC/397/F/CO/2/1. 
240  General Order; WO/28/48. 
241  Smith to PMO, Army of the East, 17 May 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/2/3. The figures were 
published in (1) MT&G, 13 May 1854; (2) a printed pamphlet dated 20 June 1854; 
W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/239a; and (3) The Times, 18 Oct. 1854, with a letter from Smith 
reporting the ratio of MOs to strength at the Alma was 1:97, compared to 1:154 in the Peninsular 
War. 
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 In order to demonstrate how the 
medical services evolved during the campaign the foregoing analysis will be restricted 
to two returns. The first is an appendix in the M&SH listing the names and periods of 
service of surgeons, apothecaries, dispensers of medicines, hospital dressers, civil 
surgeons, storekeepers, book-keepers, and medical clerks on the medical staff in British 
pay (Table 4.1). The return does not include those employed in the RA, the Turkish 
Contingent, and German, Swiss, and Italian Legions.
244
 The second analysis is of an 
unpublished summary table prepared by Hall listing the numbers of personnel 
employed on the medical staff, and in the regiments, from April 1854 until April 1856 
(Table 4.2 with a summary in Table 4.3).
245
 In all Smith reported that 752 medical 
officers were sent to the East up until April 1856, and of these 418 (56%) had been sick 






Medical and Surgical History, I, Appendix VIII: Of 418 staff surgeons listed 64 
(15%) served in Turkey or Bulgaria, 135 (32%) in Turkey or Bulgaria and the Crimea, 
66 (16%) in Turkey, Bulgaria, and the Crimea, and 153 (37%) only in the Crimea 
(Table 4.1). 
Thirty-two of the surgeons were absent for a period and served two tours of duty, 
making 450 tours in total. The numbers of arrivals and departures were calculated for 
each month and from these figures the number of staff MOs potentially available was 
obtained by difference There were c.100 when the Crimea was invaded increasing to 
c.250 by March 1855 when the number stabilized with new arrivals being balanced by 
losses due to disease, detached duty, and death. The ratification of the peace treaty in 
                                                 
242  Unpublished: (1) A monthly return on the Army’s strength prepared by the AG contained the 
names of these individuals in the grades; WO/3/1730-1731; (2) The medical staff serving in the 
Army of the East; WO/33/3B/68-56/11-2 (Cabinet paper) and RAMC/397/F/RT/2 (Hall’s 
longhand version); and (3) An incomplete collection of longhand monthly returns of the strength 
of the AMD in WO/28/193. 
243  Published: BBP (1854-55), No. 126 and 428; BPP (1857), Session 1, No. 133; BBP (1857-58), 
No. 2434; PoL, I, Appendix VIII; the Army Lists for the years of the campaign; and General 
Orders. 
244  M&SH, I, Appendix VIII. 
245  The Army’s monthly numerical strength is included in a printed version (WO/33/3B/68-56/11-2) 
but not a longhand draft (RAMC/397/F/RT/2). It is not clear if this table included surgeons in the 
RA. 
246  Smith to Undersecretary at War, 2 Mar. 1856; PoL. 
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April 1856 resulted in a fall in numbers during the three months prior to the evacuation 
of the Crimea to leave only a few retained for the final withdrawal from Turkey (Figure 
4.1). 
 
Hall’s summary: The number of regiments increased throughout the campaign until 
shortly after the fall of Sevastopol (see Figure 2.1) and hence the number of regimental 
surgeons in post increased from April 1854 until the end of 1855 when the numbers 
stabilized at c.240 (Figure 4.2). When the staffing levels were related to the size of the 
Army the ratio of men to surgeon reduced from c.320-335:1 while in Bulgaria to c.170-
155:1 in the spring of 1855, after which the ratio widened to c.210-245:1 (Figure 4.3). 
Relatively few staff surgeons were employed in Bulgaria; the numbers increased 
after the invasion to reach c.200 during the summer of 1855, after which time the 
strength decreased to c.175 by April 1856. (Figure 4.2) The ratio of men to staff 
surgeon widened during the build up of the Army in Bulgaria to exceed 400:1. It then 
reduced to 150-160:1 during the first winter before gradually widening to just over 
300:1 when peace was declared (Figure 4.3). 
When the complement of surgeons was considered in relation to the mortality rate 
it can be seen that the increase in the rate during the winter of 1854-55 occurred in spite 
of an improvement in the ratio of men to MO (from c.160:1 to 80:1). This suggests that 
the combined effects of overwork, malnutrition and exposure, and the shortage of 
medicines and medical supplies were together so serious that the increased number of 
MOs was insufficient in itself to ameliorate the situation and mortality only decreased 
when living standards and the weather improved (Figure 4.4). 
 
The shortage of MOs was appreciated by Hall before the invasion;
247
 and by the DJAG 
soon after: 
 
We do not have half enough artillery men, engineers, sappers or doctors. In some cases 
doctors are doing the work of five men, where five men [would] be amply employed, you 




The provision of sufficient MOs on hospital ships and in the general hospitals 
prompted Hall to ask Raglan to permit the transfer of the third assistant regimental 
surgeon to the medical staff so they could be deployed on detached duty when 
                                                 
247  Newcastle to Smith, 2 Sep. 1854; NAM-2007-07-16-6. 




 Newcastle subsequently indicated that he favoured an increase in the 
complement of both regimental and staff assistant surgeons
250
 and on 29 January 1855 
informed Raglan that that the third assistant surgeon should be transferred to the 
medical staff, as the size of the regiments had been reduced and the numbers in hospital 
increased.
251
 Hall also pointed out it was usual for regiments to be ‘dissembarrassed of 
their sick’ by placing them ‘under treatment in General Hospitals,’ thus leaving the 
remaining surgeons ‘free to meet contingencies as they arise.’ Hall concluded that ‘No 
injury can accrue for the proposed alteration as it is equally easy to attach a staff 
medical officer temporarily to regiments when required.’252 This opinion was forwarded 
to the War Office with the following comment by Raglan: 
 
I am not disposed to question [Hall’s] opinion, but I attach so much importance to the 
maintenance of the regimental hospital system so long as circumstance[s] […] allow, that I 
earnestly recommend that this diminished number may be kept as efficient as possible, and 
that [surgeons] should not be transferred from [their] Corps […] on slight grounds, the 
advantage of them knowing the men […] being incalculable. 
 
In rely to Raglan Panmure wrote: 
 
I […] suppose that the varying requirements of the service will best be met by empowering 
your Lordship to make […] such disposition of the medical strength […] whither staff or 





The shortage of surgeons remained an issue, and later in the year Smith informed 
Hall efforts were being made to supply replacements for absent surgeons, and 
suggesting that staff officers should be attached to regiments during their absence.
254
 
In the latter part of 1855 the possibility of replacing the third assistant surgeon 
with a dispenser of medicines was discussed,
255
 and Panmure approved of this policy, at 
                                                 
249  Hall, diary entry, 27 Nov. 1854; RAMC/524/15/6. Incidentally, assistant surgeons on detached 
duty were ‘exempted from mess and band subscriptions;’ Wetherall to Raglan, 19 Aug. 1854; 
WO/3/116. 
250  Hansard, 12 Dec. 1854. 
251  WO/6/70. 
252  Hall to Military Secretary, 13 Feb. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1442 and WO/1/371/463-6. The 
Hospital Commissioners endorsed this as they considered that under normal circumstances a 
surgeon, an assistant surgeon, and a apothecary (sic: ? a dispenser) should be sufficient for an 
infantry regiment; BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 49. 
253  Panmure to Raglan, 16 Feb. 1855; WO/6/70/232-3. The despatch was annotated by Lieutenant 
Colonel Lefroy: ‘Lord Panmure’s despatch […] seems to close this correspondence.’ 
254  Smith to Hall, 7 Aug. 1855; PoL. 




 A few weeks later dispensers, many of whom had worked with 
chemists, were sent to the Crimea for regiments not having a third assistant surgeon,
257
 
an initiative that probably accounted for the increase in the number of dispensers 
recorded by Hall during early 1856 (Table 4.2 and Figure 4.5). In the event this policy 
did not find favour at Horse Guards and was ‘withdrawn in consequence of the opinion 
of the Commander-in-Chief;’ a decision opposed by Smith who considered that the 
continued want of staff assistant surgeons ‘would be more felt if the Army took to the 
field in the spring.’258 
Incidentally, the appointment of dispensers to regiments raised problems 
regarding their status, as most had not completed a medical training and did not equate 
to surgeons of the lowest rank. This dilemma necessitated Hall to inform Smith of: 
 
the anomalous, and unpleasant position, in which the dispensers attached to regiments are 
placed. The appointments being a new one and not defined by authority some Commanding 
Officers have objected to consider them as officers belonging to the mess of the regiments. It 
is probable this difficulty will be obviated by a new warrant, but if not, it would be well […] 




Smith replied to say that the ‘Secretary for War has decided that dispensers 
attached to infantry regiments are to be regimental officers, and have been 
commissioned accordingly;’260 Hall passed this information to the AG261 who informed 
a divisional commander of the decision that dispensers should be ‘received in every 
respect as such.’262 
 
Dispensers of medicines 
 
Medical and Surgical History, I, Appendix VIII: About half the dispensers were 
employed in Turkey and about a quarter each in Turkey and the Crimea or solely in the 
Crimea (Table 4.1). The original complement of dispensers recommended for an army 
of 27,000 was only three and, although this number increased to nine by November 
1854, it was not until the next month that it increased further to 29 and it remained 
between that number and 39 until the peace treaty was signed, after which numbers 
                                                 
256  Smith to Undersecretary, 14 Sept. 1855, PoL; Smith to Hall, 5 Oct. 1855, PoL. 
257  Smith to Hall, 7 Nov. 1855; PoL. 
258  Smith to Undersecretary, 24 Jan. 1856; PoL. 
259  Hall to Smith, 29 Feb. 1856; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/4323. 
260  Smith to Hall, 18 Mar. 1856; PoL. 
261  Hall to AG. 13 Apr. 1856; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/4617. 
262  AG to GOC, 1st Division, 14 Apr. 1856; W0/28/125. 
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were reduced so that only a few remained at Scutari when the hospital closed (Figure 
4.5). All the dispensers who joined the Army up until April 1855 remained in post after 
which time only a relatively small proportion departed until the Peace Treaty was 
ratified (Figure 4.6). 
 
Hall’s summary: The number of dispensers increased following the invasion of the 
Crimea to 24-38 between February 1855 and April 1856 when the number increased to 
54; presumably reflecting the attachment of dispensers to regiments in lieu of the third 




Medical and Surgical History, I, Appendix VIII: Hospital dressers were mainly 
medical students who volunteered to gain experience.
263
 It would appear that there was 
no provision for them prior to the invasion but the onset of military action prompted 
their recruitment with 23 arriving during December 1854, 13 in March, four in October 
and one each in November and December 1855. The numbers declined month on 
month thereafter, presumably as the need for their services decreased despite the 
continuation of the siege (Figures 4.7 and 4.8); of the 42, three died. 
 
Hall’s summary: The difficulty in obtaining sufficient qualified medical practitioners 
prompted Smith to send out twelve dressers and their arrival was recorded during the 
following month, December 1854.
264
 The numbers increased to 36 in March to May 
1855 before declining gradually to eleven in April 1856 (Table 4.2 and Figure 4.7). 
 
Apothecaries, purveyors, and support staff 
 
A Royal Warrant delineating conditions of service for apothecaries was signed on 23 
October 1854.
265
 Only three were employed during the campaign, namely, G.H. Reade, 
who died at Scutari on 28 November 1854 and was succeeded by J. Mackintosh, and F. 
Fernandez who served in the Crimea from October 1854 until July 1856. 
 
                                                 
263  For further details see Shepherd (1991), pp. 419-20. 
264  Smith to Hall, 9 Nov. 1855; PoL. 
265  The Lancet, 18 Nov. 1854. 
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The duties of the Purveyor included the provision of hospital equipment, the rations for 
patients and staff, hospital extras and medical comforts, the cooking of meals and diets, 
washing of hospital and patients’ clothes, cleanliness of all parts of the hospital except 
the wards, payment of staff, arrangement of funerals, and drawing up of wills.’ 
Smith and Hall made no reference to purveyors in their returns, possibly because 
they were not part of the AMD until the issuing of a Royal Warrant on 31 October 
1855.
266
 However, an analysis of the arrivals of purveyors and purveyor’s clerks 
recorded in the General Orders revealed that the staff of this department did not 
increase significantly until the beginning of 1855 with new arrivals joining the Army 
throughout the rest of that year. Five clerks were promoted to Purveyor during February 
and March 1855 and their number was deducted from the number of clerks (Figure 
4.9). 
 
The provision of medical services during the campaign was a considerable undertaking 
but it appeared from Smith’s return that despite this there were few store keepers 
employed and little clerical assistance.
267
 For example, two storekeepers only were 
employed at Scutari from February and May 1855 respectively with one book keeper in 
Scutari and in the Crimea from October and December 1855. 
Five of the fourteen medical clerks served only in the Crimea while one, who did 
two tours of duty, served in Scutari, Bulgaria and the Crimea. The number of clerks 
available for duty did not exceed three until July 1855. Thereafter, staffing increased 
regularly until April 1856. Some clerks were retained in Scutari until August 1856, 




Before war was declared Smith proposed the creation of a ‘Hospital Corps of at least 
600 men to serve as hospital orderlies and ambulance waggon drivers.’268 The 
suggestion was accepted in principle by Newcastle and Hardinge, but nothing was 
decided in advance of the troops arrival in Turkey and consequently the PMO at Scutari 
had to ‘recruit wardmasters, ward orderlies, stewards, storekeepers, and cooks, from 
men left behind at Scutari, many of whom would have had ‘no formal training and in all 
                                                 
266  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 60. 
267  M&SH, Appendix VIII, p. 525. 
 -121- 
probability would be the poorest soldiers in their respective units’ being ‘bad characters 
with long crime sheets.’269, 270 
A General Order dated 4 July 1854 required the 3
rd
 Division to provide orderlies 
and attendants at the General Hospital in Varna and the provision of hospital staff in the 
Crimea continued on this ‘ad hoc’ basis until a General Order of 11 May 1855 (see 
below), although 55 volunteers from the depots at Chatham were sent out to Scutari 




Maxwell, one of the Hospital Commissions, informed Herbert privately that that ‘the 
hospital is not sufficiently provided with orderlies’ and that: 
 
evil arises from the practice of removing hospital orderlies […] well enough to return to their 
regiments, so that surgeons have always to deal with wretched and unskilled convalescents 
[…] this might be attended with great advantage if the soldiers [taken] to do duty as 
orderlies, were left in that situation, [because, if they] shewed a capacity for learning their 
business, they would seem very efficient, and a smaller number would probably suffice than 
is now required. 
 
He then pointed out that ‘most of [the hospital’s] bad points would disappear if an 
efficient body of orderlies could be organized,’ but ‘the system will not work well [if] 
such duties are entrusted to rude uneducated men of sickly health, miserable habits, and 
more miserable propensities [and] it is but natural to shrink in dismay from the 
consequences of entrusting such duties to such men.’272 
The points made by Maxwell were reiterated officially by the Hospital 
Commissioners who regarded ‘this branch of the hospital service as most 
unsatisfactory’ and added that: 
 
The ward-masters and assistant ward-masters are generally intelligent and respectable non-
commissioned officers but they do not possess that degree of experience […] which ought 
[…] be an indispensable condition to their employment […] in our military hospitals [and] 





Later Maxwell gave evidence to the Roebuck Committee: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
268  Smith to Military Secretary, 18 Feb. 1854; PoL and WO/43/987.  
269  Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 11 & 20. 
270  Hall issued a printed document on 13 Aug. 1854 outlining the duties of hospital stewards and 
wardmasters; RAMC/397/F/CO/2/1. 
271  AG, Horse Guards to Raglan, 15 Dec. 1854; WO/3/116. 
272  Maxwell to Herbert, 10 Nov. and 5 & 10 Dec. 1854; W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/356 & 359-60. 
273  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 32 
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The whole system of hospital orderlies was radically defective […] The men were […] not of 
a strong constitution, but very often convalescents […] or not sufficiently strong to stand the 
hard work of the trenches. They did not volunteer, but were ordered […] Their work was 
incessant […] and they were very ignorant of their duties [and] upon being sufficiently 





One of the nurses at Scutari recognized that some men ‘thought well of as patients’ 
showed ‘a negligence, hardness, and indifference’ after becoming orderlies. She also 
indicated that no orderly ‘come back sober’ after leave to go out, although she accepted 
that they had some excuse, given that they were ‘confined day and night to the 
pestilential air of the sick words’ and ‘had to perform offices for the dead and dying 
much more trying than any we had to do; they were expected in addition to their day’s 




At the end of 1854 nearly 800 men were employed at Scutari ‘as orderlies, wardmasters, 
charge of stores, etc.’ which gave a ratio of 1:6-7 patients and that ‘the regulation of 
1:10 at home could not be carried out here’ as ‘attending the sick being very hard’. It 
was concluded, however, that ‘most of the men are efficient and fit for service.’276 
In April 1855 the ratio was still c.1:7 overall, the General Hospital had space for 
905 patients and 129 orderlies, the Barrack Hospital, 1,683 and 240, and the Palace 
Hospital, 400 and 63,
277
 while another return listed the deployment of 577 non-medical 
hospital staff as: 14 head wardmasters, 50 assistant wardmasters, 450 orderlies, 8 head 
cooks, 35 assistant cooks, 11 surgery men. 2 bath men, 4 dead house men, and 3 
barbers.
278
 Similarly, the scale of the commitment in the Crimea can be gauged by a 
return made in July 1855 listing the names of 21 NCOs and 222 privates employed as 
orderlies in the ‘Hospital establishments in Balaklava and on […] sick ships.’279 
The allowance of one orderly to ten patients could prove inadequate in General 
Hospitals with smaller wards, and particularly those in the Crimea, since one man in a 
ward could not carry out the routine duties in the day, attend to seriously ill patients, and 
                                                 
274  BPP (1854-55), No. 156, p. 671. 
275  Terrot (1898), p. 38. 
276  Paulet to AG, 30 Dec. 1854; WO/28/186. 
277  PMO, Scutari to Smith, 5 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
278  Deputy Secretary at War to Smith, 31 July 1855; PoL. 
279  Commandant, Balaklava to AG, 27 July 1856; WO/28/194. 
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then undertake night duty on a regular basis.
280
 Hall, therefore, informed the AG that 
three orderlies for two wards was the minimum to ensure they were kept clean and the 
sick properly cared for; hence 19 orderlies for the 21 wards in the General Hospital was 




Information on the ‘number of orderlies and other hospital attendants employed’ in 
regimental hospitals, and their ‘general fitness for their duties’ was sought by a 
questionnaire circulated by the Hospital Commissioners on 3 December 1854. The 
answers suggest that most surgeons were relatively satisfied with their hospital staff, all 
of whom were soldiers of the regiment, although problems arose when the regular 
personnel became sick, and had to be replaced by inexperienced men, while on 
occasions the number allowed by regulation could prove inadequate, although there 
was scope to draft in fatigue men on occasions (Table 4.4). 
 
Early in 1855 Newcastle informed Paulet that Smith was engaged in:  
 
the organization of a permanent hospital staff to supersede the use of orderlies taken from the 
ranks [as it was] obvious that the hospital duty cannot be well performed by a succession of 





Similarly, Cumming was told privately that ‘We are also sending out stewards 
and wardmasters, selected by Smith, and we hope gradually to give you a corps of 
permanent hospital orderlies to replace your ever changing body.’283 Paulet also 
received similar advice from the Hospital Commissioners who noted that: 
 
one of the most obvious defects […] is the utter absence of a trained body of orderlies [also 
hospital sergeants, wardmasters, and cooks]. The task which devolve on these men requires 
[the employment] of persons of intelligence and respectable character, good constitution and 
active habits [and who have] undergone some training. […] and those who prove themselves 




                                                 
280  Dr Matthews to PMO, Balaklava, 30 Apr. to 16 May 1855; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 191-
2. 
281  Hall to AG, 7 May 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/2031. 
282  Newcastle to Paulet, 5 Jan. 1855; WO/33/1/8/55, WO/6/70 and W&SHC/2057/F8/III/C/65. 
283  Herbert to Cumming, 5 Jan. 1855; W&SHC/2057/F8/III/C15. 
284  Commissioners to Paulet, 26 Jan. 1855; BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 346. Incidentally, on 12 
Feb. Paulet informed Raglan that he ‘never withdrew or changed [orderlies] except for gross 
misconduct;’ NAM-1968-07-393-8. 
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The shortage of manpower meant that men could not be spared from the Crimea 
and hence additional orderlies would have to be sent from England
 285
 Despite the 
apparent interest of ministers, progress was slow and Smith continued to hear ‘of 
inefficiency of the orderlies [and stressed] the necessity for some remedy being 
immediately adopted to remedy [this] evil.’286 (For a selection of other complaints, 
including the problem of drunkenness, Table 4.5). 
 
The temporary assignment of convalescent and other soldiers detached from their 
regiments for hospital duties could cause considerable problems following their recall 
for regimental duty at short notice,
287
 but it was not until a General Order of 11 May 
1855 obliged infantry regiments to select four ‘efficient’ men as permanent orderlies for 
the General Hospitals at Balaklava and the sick ships. The Order was amended on 7 
June to require regiments to replace orderlies who became non-effective. 
The work of the orderlies was arduous, and some requested to return to their 
regiments on that account,
288
 while others succumbed to disease, and some died. This 
situation probably provided the stimulus for a further Order on 17 May authorizing 
hospital serjeants and orderlies to receive free rations and an extra 8d and 4d a day as 
an inducement.
289
 This payment was backdated to 1 May and on 22 May the terms 
were extended to orderlies on hospital ships etc., while on 10 October 1855 the 
payment of a 6d field allowance, in addition to these allowances, was confirmed.
290
 
Problems persisted however and the need for a Hospital Corps, which could cater 
for 1,500 sick, and the provision of an ‘extensive’ Purveyor’s Department remained an 
                                                 
285  AG to Paulet, 13 Jan. 1855; WO/28/186 
286  Smith to Military Undersecretary, 26 Mar. 1855; BPP (1854-55), No. 156; BPP (1857-58), No. 
2379, p. 46; PoL; The Lancet, 28 July 1855. 
287  For example, Hall informed Raglan on 28 Dec. 1854 that the absence of orderlies when the QMG 
visited the General Hospital in Balaklava was because those from one regiment had be withdrawn 
by the military authorities before a new draft had arrived; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1204 and NAM-
1968-07-293. 
288  For correspondence on orderlies see BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 191-5. 
289  Hall informed Smith on 19 May that the increase in pay and free rations was to encourage 
recruiting; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1219 & 2127 and PoL. Smith replied on 8 June to say he hoped 
that this policy would ease matters until the Hospital Corps could be organized; PoL. 
290  WO/1/369. The allowance of 6d a day was granted to NCOs and men by a Royal Warrant dated 16 




 although the issue was not resolved until the arrival of members of the 




Medical Staff Corps 
 
The embodiment of the MSC was authorized by an Order in Council on 30 June 1855 
and confirmed by Royal Warrant on 20 September 1855.
293
 The objective was to recruit 
literate men of ‘intelligence and highest character’294 with the recommendation from 
Panmure that the NCOs should be fit enough for hospital duty though ‘not quite so 
robust’ as required ‘for active duty in the field’.295 The bounty and levy money was the 
same as for line regiments at home; the term of enlistment, ten years; age, 25-35 years; 
minimum height, 5ft 2ins; and pay, 2/- per day,
296
 and their principal duties were ‘to 
attend upon and assist generally […] patients, to apply […] simple portions of their 
treatment, to keep clean the portion of their ward under their charge, to collect the foul 
linen and distribute clean linen […] and generally to attend to the wants of the 
patients.’297 
The HQ was at Chatham and the full complement was to be 10 companies of 120 
men. Each would cater for 500 patients and would comprise two sections of 102 and 18 
NCOs and men in the Surgeon’s and Purveyor’s Department respectively (Table 
4.6).
298
 Smith suggested that officers promoted from the ranks would be ‘less likely to 
be sensitive, or apt to take umbrage at the light in which their position and duties 
might be received and perhaps remarked on by the officers of the more strictly 
combatant class.’299 
On 15 September 1855 the AG at Horse Guards ordained the MSC should be 
‘under the general superintendence and control of the PMO of each hospital’ but 
‘military discipline [will] be maintained and enforced by the officer commanding on 
                                                 
291  Hall to Smith, 8 Oct. & 5 Nov. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/3322 & 3524. 
292  NAM-1968-07-380-8B. 
293  For details see Sweetman (1975), pp. 113-9 and Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 149-50 & 171. 
294  Deputy Secretary at War to Wetherall, 11 May 1855; WO/123/141 and RAMC/397/FGO2/6; The 
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295  Deputy Secretary at War to Wetherall, 11 May 1855; WO/123/151. 
296  Circular Memorandum, 25 June 1855; WO/123151. 
297  See W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/237 for the proposed regulations for the Corps. 
298  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 426. 
299  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 149. 
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the station.’300 Smith, nevertheless, requested Hall to keep a ‘defaulters book’ and that 
the men should be informed that a record of their offences would thus be retained.
301
 
Smith also considered the Corps should remain under the control of the AMD and not 
be employed for military duties, and he informed Hall that he was endeavouring to 
‘place within his reach men whom no military authorities can affect.’302 
Smith was informed in mid-June that 37 sergeants, 27 corporals and 178 privates 
had volunteered,
303
 and by the next month recruiting ceased as there were sufficient 
men for eight companies.
304
 The first contingent of 300 men, including hospital 
stewards and wardmasters arrived at Scutari during November 1855. Some replaced 
regimental orderlies,
305
 while others were sent to the General and Castle Hospitals in 
Balaklava.
306
 Incidentally, the AG made the point privately to the AG at Horse Guards 
that the men had been ‘enlisted under several warrants’ and as a consequence they were 
‘in a fix’ as the ‘mode of dealing with them was very confused.’307 
Several drafts of men ‘perfected in their respective duties’ were sent to the East 
from time to time
308
 until the depot was broken up during May 1856, although last 







Of 341 volunteers sent to Bulgaria with the HAC 27, 30, 141, and 121 were were <35, 
35-40, 40-45, and 45-50 years old respectively, and two were >50
.310
 The men had the 
reputation for drunkenness and bad behaviour although subsequent enquiries by Tulloch 
concluded this unjust as all had ‘received good characters from their corps’ with sixty 
having between one and six good conduct badges, and seven the Good Conduct Medal. 
The aim was to have c.100 drivers selected from cavalry regiments with the remainder 
                                                 
300  WO/123/151, RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3 and RAMC/F/GO/2/5. 
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309  The Times, 18 Aug. 1856. 
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‘employed as hospital orderlies and servants for medical staff.’ However, this came to 
nothing as sickness diminished their ranks and the Corps became all but ineffective and 
by December 1854 it became necessary to: 
 
solicit the aid of the French ambulance to transport our sick down to Balaklava: artillery 
waggons were ordered to afford assistance, and finally the cavalry horses were employed for 
that purpose, by which means such men as were able to sit on horseback were got away, but a 





The AMD was let down by the government and military authorities because they 
failed to provide adequate land transport for the sick and wounded, and it was essential 
that any unit employed for this purpose should comprise trained able-bodied men, be 
equipped with spring carriages and pack animals with pannier seats, and be supported 
by farriers, wheelwrights, and other tradesmen.
312
 
Smith favoured having ambulances under the control of AMD, and not the QMG, 
because the divisional PMO was the best judge of the invalids’ needs and should 
possess the ‘power of independent action.’ He also stated that the Army would never 
derive full advantage of its AMD if it was rendered ineffective by regulations that made 
subservient to the judgment and interference of Military Officers.
313
 In the event his 
view did not prevail and neither did it for ‘the PMO of every campaign fought in the 




The integration of the AC into the LTC was under consideration during March 1855,
315
 
though it may have been Raglan’s support for the recommendation made on 24 May by 
the DG, LTC (McMurdo) for integration
316
 that prompted Panmure to order for this to 
be done in July 1855.
317
 McMurdo noted in early September that he thought that the AC 
‘would fall to pieces if [he took] it up just now; it is so fragile,’ and it would be ‘better 
                                                 
311  Hall’s comments to Smith on the Supplies Commission report; Mitra (1911), p. 484. 
312  Fisher (2013b). 
313  Smith to Military Secretary, 31 July 1855; PoL. 
314  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 147. 
315  Commandant, AC to QMG, 12 Mar. 1855; WO/28/197. 
316  WO/1/374/313. 
317  Military Secretary separately to Smith and Simpson, 17 July 1855; PoL and WO//28/175. 
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to leave it where it is in its present state.’318 In the event it was not until December 1855 




Age distribution of personnel in the Army Medical 
Department 
 
This section is based on information in an unpublished 2
nd
 edition of Margrave’s 
‘British Officers’, to which I had privileged access.320 The year of birth has been 
ascertained for a proportion of the surgeons, dispensers, dressers, and purveyors who 
served in the East in various locations and at different times. The results are 
summarized in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.11 and indicate clear differences in the age 
distribution of the personnel in the different groups. 
The majority of the older military surgeons were on the staff while nearly half of 
the younger surgeons were born in 1830 or later and would have been in the their mid-
twenties or younger. The civil surgeons tended to be older while almost all the 
dispensers and dressers were relatively young, not surprisingly perhaps given that many 
were medical students who had not completed their studies. The Purveyors comprised a 
number of experienced men and these were assisted by younger men, many in their 
mid-twenties or younger. 
 
Mortality among personnel of the Army Medical 
Department 
 
Of 752 MOs employed during the campaign, 418 (56%) reported sick, 48 (6.4%), died, 
and 186 (25%) were invalided home;
321
 and the loss of MOs during the summer of 1854 
and the first winter would have compounded the medical problems during this period. 
The ranks of MOs who died and their location are summarized in Tables 4.8 and 
4.9. Almost half the staff surgeons died in the Crimea and half in Turkey, while the 
preponderance of regimental surgeons died near the front. Incidentally, a further list of 
                                                 
318  Memorandum prepared by the DG, LTC on 4 Sept. in response to a General Order to be issued 6 
Sep. 1855; WO/28/110. 
319  General Order 28 Dec. 1855. 
320  Margrave (2008). For additional information on MOs see Peterkin and Johnston (1968). 
321  Smith to Undersecretary at War, 3 Mar. 1856; PoL. 
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surgeons and support staff who died on the Dardanelles and Bosphorus during the 
campaign was included in the PoL.
322
 
The mortality rate among MOs during the first year of the campaign was 132‰ 
and in the second 26.5‰ (Table 4.10); a figure within the range of the annual rate 
recorded during 1839-1854, viz. 21-56‰ (median 31‰).323 
 
Problems of communication during the campaign 
 
An army is run on a top down basis through a chain of command and hence Smith 
would have been expected to direct all communications on management matters to Hall. 
However, the distances between the Crimea and London meant that it could take at least 
a month, and frequently longer, for letters to pass between them. This resulted in Smith 
disregarding protocol and corresponding directly with the PMO at Scutari, and merely 
informing Hall that the exigencies of the Service demanded it.
324
 By so doing the DG 
effectively assumed executive control of the Scutari hospitals and the PMO, who held 
the same rank as Hall, looked to London for instructions. As a consequence Hall ‘began 
to fade out of the picture, although there was nothing to indicate that he made any 
formal protest against this whittling away of his powers.’325 This practical solution 
meant that there was little justification for Hall to visit Scutari a second time and hence 
any criticism leveled against him for not doing so is unjustified.
326
 
It would seem that the Minister of War also appreciated this problem, because, 
from early January 1855, he began to correspond directly with the military commandant 
on the Bosphorus; with his first despatch containing detailed instructions and advice on 




                                                 
322  PoL, II, Appendix XXXV. There names were subsequently inscribed on a memorial at Netley but 
this was destroyed when the hospital was demolished. 
323  BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, Appendix VIII. 
324  Smith to Menzies and Smith to Hall, 2 Nov. 1854; PoL. 
325  Paraphrased from Cantlie (1974), II, p. 70. 
326  For example, Shepherd (1991), p. 609. 
327  Newcastle to Paulet, 6 Jan. 1855; WO/6/70/112-33 (longhand copy) and WO/33/1/8/55 (Cabinet 
paper). 
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Status of the military surgeon 
 
The Queen’s Regulations provided basic instructions on the management of hospitals 
and duties of MOs but there was no guidance on the expected relationship between them 
and their commanding officer.
328
 This lack of clarity proved a problem at times since 
some senior officers did not consult them on any matter, particularly those who thought 
that surgeons were there only ‘to treat sickness, not to prevent it.’329 In essence MOs 
had little or no executive powers, a problem summarized by an unnamed military officer 
in the Light Division: 
 
Attached to the Division is a Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, who is said to be ‘in 
medical charge;’ and to each brigade a Staff Surgeon of the 1st class, having more direct 
charge in general matters of each regiment in his brigade. […] in no one instance has the 
medical officer […] been consulted as to the [camp] site occupied. Surely this demands an 
enquiry. […] It is the duty of military medical men to acquaint themselves […] with such 
sanitary subjects that prevent sickness, always more important than its cure. No such study is 
requisite before [military] officers in the British Army are placed upon the staff, whereas in 





Not unexpectedly these sentiments were echoed in the medical press, since the 
problems encountered were exacerbated by ‘the want of fuller power and authority in 
the heads of the AMD’ and not ‘from any absence of ability or deficiency of skill, is a 
sufficient proof of the necessity there is for entrusting all purely sanitary arrangements 
to properly qualified medical men.’331 
It would seem that some politicians and other commentators failed to appreciate 
the weak position of MOs within the military hierarchy. For example, Charles 
Newdegate, MP, suggested to the House of Commons that the failings in the Crimea 
were not due to ‘the regimental service of the army, which some hon. Members 
condemned as being aristocratic,’ but to the Medical Department and Commissariat, 
which were ‘not in the hands of the noblemen and gentlemen of the army.’ […] and that 
he [Newdegate] ‘trusted that hon. Members would speak with common fairness of the 
noblemen and gentlemen who, as officers of the army, had done their duty, and not 
                                                 
328  Queen’s Regulations (1844), pp. 285-90. 
329  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 26. For example, General Brown’s response to a reasonable request about the 
provision of medical stores on 10 June 1854, viz. ‘Refer […] to the PMO informing him that I by 
no means approve of the tone of this, and that in my judgement Dr Alexander had better defer such 
suggestions and strictures until they are asked for;’ BPP (1857-58). No. 2379, pp. 136 & 160. 
330  Letter, 2 Sep. 1854; Daily News, 21 Sep. 1854. 
331  Editorial, AMJ, 4 May 1855. 
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attribute to them discredit for calamities for which they were in no way accountable.’332 
This defamatory slur was subsequently supported publicly by Palmerston, an 
intervention considered by Russell to be as a ‘most extraordinary and uncalled-for 
insult’,333 and not surprisingly it provoked an angry editorial in the AMJ: 
 
If, then, as Lord Palmerston affirms, the army surgeons have shown a ‘want of capacity, a 
want of energy, a want of intellect and vigour’, it must be for some reasons peculiar to the 
army – the army system. The charge commonly made against army surgeons, is a want of 
moral courage in boldly making complaints, for fear of the injury to their promotion. And to 
what is this moral cowardice owing? Is it not to the practice of the higher military authorities 
to depress in every way the 
‘doctor’, to consider him as belonging to an inferior class, and to 
treat him as such, until he believes it, and loses his spirit? And having done this, the authority 
who has depressed him and his branch of the service blames him for a want of energy, 




The dissatisfaction of the MOs at the front was compounded by Raglan’s 
tendency to name only senior staff and regimental officers in official despatches, and 
thereby omitting to acknowledge other combatants. This prompted the editor of The 
Lancet to decry Raglan’s failure to ‘acknowledge the devoted services of the Army 
surgeons’, while a couple of weeks later a trenchant editorial in the MT&G listed the 
injuries sustained by several MOs during combat (Table 4.11).335 Hall also expressed his 
concerns privately to the PMO, Scutari: 
 
A thankless office we doctors have to perform. We work hard with no reward […] Had we 
neglected or abused means placed at our disposal, then we might have been ashamed, but 




Hall was not a lone voice, however, as exemplified by a graphic account penned 
by a surgeon at the front: 
 
For a considerable period [I was] within twenty-five yards of the advancing Russian columns, 
and amid a perfect hailstorm of grape, canister, round shot, shell, and bullets […] when three 
round shot passed close by me […] each shot striking a man, killing two outright, […] and 
mangling in a frightful manner the right arm of the third. The ‘thud’ with which the formidable 
missiles struck against the accoutrements and bodies of the men, was the strangest and most 




                                                 
332  Hansard, 19 Feb. 1855. 
333  Despatch dated 13 Mar.; The Times, 29 Mar. 1855. The tendency to snobbishness among officers 
was exemplified by Captain Goodlake, Coldstream Guards who wrote on 23 Apr. 1855: ‘Colonel 
McMurdo offered to make me his ADC. I declined […] the class of people with whom I would 
have to mix were not suitable to my position as I would wish;’ Springman (2005). p. 116. 
334  AMJ, 18 May 1855. 
335  MT&G, 11 Nov. 1854. On 13 Jan. 1855 the editor accused Raglan of ‘cowardly and unjust’ 
behaviour towards MOs. 
336  Hall to Menzies, 7 Dec. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1042. 
337  MT&G, 30 Dec. 1854 and Shepherd (1994), p. 232. 
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This report prompted the journal’s editor to comment: ‘Surely, when medical men 
incur such dangers […] it is too bad to deny them a share of the honours and rewards so 
ungrudgingly bestowed upon other classes of officers.’ Smith was also anxious that MOs 
should receive recognition and requested Hall to ‘send him, periodically the names of 
all the officers he can recommend,’ as he wished to show MOs that ‘laudable and 
successful exertions do not pass unnoticed.’338 Smith’s anxieties persisted, however, and 
a few weeks later he wrote to Horse Guards: 
 
It is generally admitted that highly valuable services have been rendered [by] Medical 
Officers […] exposed to hardships and dangers from the enemy, as well as from disease, fully 
equal to any other class. Rewards for good service [have] been liberally granted, but not to 
[…] MOs, which […]. has tended to produce discouragement likely to operate unfavorably to 
the interests of the service. […] When the morbid excitement roused by misrepresentations 
against the Medical Department shall have subsided […] the public will applaud […] the 
services of the MOs […] the public generally […] recognise the self-denying labours of the 
devoted men, who […] did so much to mitigate the sufferings, and to console […] those 




The continued failure of the establishment to acknowledge the contribution made 
by the medical profession also elicited a degree of bitterness at the front: 
 
I cannot tell you how depressing the continued slight of the services of the Regimental 
Surgeons is to us all. The [London] Gazette [reports] honours and promotions to the 
regimental officers […] But we have no friends, no parliamentary interest, and are not merely 




Clearly the medical profession remained unhappy and shortly after the conclusion 
of peace the editor of The Lancet returned to the issue: 341  
 
The want of proper appreciation […] of medical officers is shown in many ways, in none 
more so than the conferring of decorations. […] medical officers are entitled to double 
distinction, first, as soldiers; and, secondly, as professional men. The surgeon of the 7
th
 
Hussars who rallied some of the Guards on the heights of Inkermann (sic), gallantly led 
them to [rout] the Russians, and [save] the Duke of Cambridge, was entitled to distinction 
as a soldier; but are not […] the late Dr Jackson, Dr. Trotter, or Dr John Davy, entitled to 
distinction for their services in the army in a professional and scientific point of view? 
 
In the event a number of the senior MOs were accorded appropriate recognition 
by the award of the Order of the Bath and other orders bestowed by Britain’s French, 
Turkish and Sardinian allies, as well as the Victoria Cross (see Chapter 12). 
 
                                                 
338  Smith to Hall, 16 Feb. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2892. 
339  Smith to Military Under-Secretary, 17 Aug. 1855; PoL. 
340  Undated letter from a regimental surgeon; MT&G, 2 June 1855. 
341  The Lancet, 19 Apr. 1856. 
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Growing discontent amongst the military surgeons about pay and conditions was 
exacerbated by the better employment conditions offered to civilian surgeons and this 
resulted in three memorials being sent to the War Office between July 1855 and April 
1856.
342
 The first from 49 assistant surgeons did not receive Smith’s support and 
Panmure subsequently rejected it because it had been published in The Lancet before he 
had considered it.
343
 The second memorial was from more senior regimental surgeons 
who, inter alia, were aggrieved because they did not receive a share of the honours 
accorded to combatant officers, especially as they were also exposed to enemy fire, and 
this differentiated them from the other civilian departments.
344
 This memorial was 
forwarded to Panmure by the Smith and it was anticipated that a new Royal Warrant 
would be issued, but this proposal was rejected by the Treasury. A third memorial, 
however, prompted the convening of a House of Commons Select Committee on the 
Medical Department chaired by Augustus Stafford, and it was on their recommendation 
that a new Royal Warrant was promulgated.
345
 It redefined the terms of service, 
remuneration, and the status of military surgeons and was signed by Her Majesty’s 
command on 1 October 1858 by the Minister of War.
346
 (See Chapter 11) 
 
The AMD was a civilian department and MOs, unlike their military counterparts, were 
not entitled to a soldier servant. The daily allowance for hiring a servant was increased 
from 1/6d to 3/-
347
 but this was insufficient to met the high rates of pay demanded by 
civilians. In consequence, some surgeons were forced ‘to draw their own rations, cook 
their own food, and water their own horses,’ and ‘carry out these tasks under the eyes of 
their brother officers made an undignified spectacle which brought contempt upon the 
Department.’348 Matters were compounded by the need for senior medical staff to have 
three or more horses in order to fulfill their duties, and, as their care would take much of 
                                                 
342  For details see Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 181-3. 
343  The Lancet, 8 Sep. 1854. The editor strongly supported ‘our military brethren [who] should be 
classed amongst the purely military branches of the service, and should reap its share of the 
honours accorded to them.’ 
344  MT&G, 13 Oct. 1855. 
345  BPP (1856), No. 331. 
346  The text, comprising 26 paragraphs, was reproduced in The Lancet, 28 Oct. 1858 and Cantlie 
(1974), pp. 428-32. 
347  General Order, 30 Oct. 1854. 
348  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 132. 
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a servant’s time, a second servant was sorely needed, especially as the MO would suffer 
considerable hardship if his only servant was sick.
349
 
Raglan eventually took up the surgeons’ case when he enquired of Horse Guards, 
through his AG, if a scheme could be devised for improving the MOs circumstances 
with respect to servants. The shortage of military personnel would make it impractical 
to provide the numbers required,
350
 and it was hoped that civilian servants could be 
procured from ‘among the people who are constantly arriving from Constantinople or 
elsewhere.’351 The matter was considered at the highest level because Smith was 
informed by the Deputy Secretary for War on 26 July 1855 that Panmure agreed that 
medical staff officers should not have to waste their time doing things that ‘properly 
devolve on servants.’ He suggested that men should be enlisted into the MSC for the 
purpose;
352
 presumable from among the 50 servants allocated to each company of the 
Corps,
353
 while after the war Smith recommended the servants allowed to MOs should 






A few civilian surgeons accompanied the Army to Bulgaria and the Crimea but these 
appeared to have been employed locally presumably on Raglan’s authority and as they 
were not part of the Army establishment Hall made no reference to them in his returns. 
Towards the end of 1854 Lord Blantyre suggested to Aberdeen that civilian 
surgeons should be recruited as additional MOs. His letter was forwarded to Smith via 
Herbert who commented that ‘Lord Blantyre suggests improvement in our military 
hospitals by employment of civilians with better pay and allowances.’ Smith stated his 
reservations the next day: 
 
[Blantyre’s proposition is] wild and […] calculated to disorganize everything. If the Medical 
Department had power in itself to effect what it considers necessary we have no want of 
assistance from without. The Department has in itself men competent to all and every duty 
and I do hope they will not be insulted by the adoption of such a measure […] The time has 
                                                 
349  PMO, 4th Division to Hall, 18 Dec. 1854; BPP (1857-58) No. 2379, p. 166. 
350  AG to AG, Horse Guards, 26 May 1855; WO/28/109. 
351  AG to GOC, 3rd Division, 20 May 1855; WO/28/109. 
352  PoL. This opinion was sent to the AG in the Crimea by Wetherall on 7 Aug. 1855; WO/28/180. 
353  Deputy Secretary to Smith, 7 Aug. 1855; PoL. 
354  BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, p. lxxii. 
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arrived when the authorities must either support the servants of the public or sacrifice them 




Not surprisingly Hall was against mixing civilian and military MOs in the same 
establishment,
356
 while the Revd H.P. Wright, the principal chaplain, shared this 
reservation, when he suggested to Herbert that military surgeons were preferable to 
civilians as they would manage hospitals better under campaign conditions.
357
 
Conversely, in his assessment of the Scutari hospitals, S.G. Osborne recommended that 
they should be ‘placed under the management and control of civilians’;358 and indeed 
this system of management came to pass at Smyrna and Renkioi, but not in any other 
military hospital. 
Newcastle announced the employment civilian doctors on 29 January 1855 
because the ‘present state of the Army and of the hospitals, [makes it] necessary 
[despite opposition] to introduce into the Army Hospitals the civilian element.’359 Their 
employment was thus a political initiative, although prompted to an extent by public 
opinion,
360
 and the fact that physicians were needed as the principal clinical problems 
were medical, not surgical. 
The policy proved controversial, not least because the ‘civils’ were paid better 
than their military counterparts and most were spared the dangers and privations of 




 This caused resentment amongst the MOs and Hall called 
Smith’s attention ‘to the […] extravagantly high rate of remuneration they receive […] 
This inequality of pay has occasioned much discontent’363 although he conceded that he 
could not say this of ‘the gentleman who have been doing duty in camp who have […] 
                                                 
355  Blantyre to Aberdeen, 19 Dec.; Aberdeen to Herbert, 22 Dec.; Smith to Herbert, 23 Dec. 1854; 
W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/241. 
356  Raglan to Panmure, 11 Mar. 1855; WO/1/272/202. 
357  Wright to Herbert, undated; W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/246. Wright also stressed the need for 
adequate support staff and suggested that these could be provided from militia regiments. 
358  Osborne (1855). 
359  Hansard, 29 Jan. and MTG, 3 Feb. 1855. For a discussion on civilian surgeons see Shepherd 
(1991), pp. 412-51. 
360  Mr Augustus Stafford, Hansard, 19 Mar. 1855 
361  The medical press was divided on the issue; the AMJ’s editor generally favoured employing 
civilians, while the editor of The Lancet supported for the military surgeons and pressed for 
improvement in their status. 
362  The civilian orderlies were paid better making it difficult to recruit Maltese; DAQMG, Malta to 
QMG, 25 May 1855; WO/28/197. 
363  The civilian director at Smyrna was reportedly offered £2,000 p.a. while Smith was paid £1,300; 
The Lancet, 17 Feb. 1855. Similarly, Cumming told Hall on 28 Apr. 1855 that Panmure’s 
civilian pathologist [Lyons] was paid £100 p.m., with the caveat ‘Hide your diminished head;’ 
NAM-2007-07-16-24. 
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exerted themselves with great zeal and […] cordiality towards those whom they were 
associated […] we have been fortunate in securing their assistance.’364 
Hall also supported a junior colleague when ‘Civil Medical Officers of unknown 
reputation and totally unacquainted with military surgery’ attempted to assume at 
Scutari ‘a position much superior to that of Assistant Surgeons in the Army.’365 
 
The hospital in Smyrna opened during February 1855 and was staffed by MOs for a few 
weeks until replaced by civilians from mid-March. Its location far from the front meant 
that was inappropriate to send seriously ill or wounded soldiers there and it was under-
utilized, receiving only 1,887 patients during the ten months it was open. The 
prefabricated hospital at Renkioi, which received its first patients during October 1855, 
was strictly a civilian operation under the superintendence of Dr Parkes.
366
 
Apart from the publication of tables that listed admissions and deaths each month 
at Smyrna and Renkioi there was no analysis in the M&SH of their performance, though 
Parkes published a report on the formation and management of the hospital in 1857;
367
 
while Hall expressed his view on civilian hospitals in the draft of his memoirs: 
 
Had the Medical Department [the same means and facilities] given to the civil establishments 
[…] they would have accomplished as much, or more […] at considerably less cost to the 
public, and with equal efficiency, so far as the real wants of the sick were concerned […] and 




In like manner Hall pointed out to the Royal Commission during June 1857 that 
the civil hospitals proved expensive and, with the benefit of hindsight, unnecessary as 
sufficient beds were available in military hospitals.
369
 This was not entirely an 
expression of bitterness, however, as Newcastle, a prime mover in the establishment of 
the hospital at Smyrna, entertained similar sentiments when he visited there some two 
months before the fall of Sevastopol: 
                                                 
364  RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2884 and PoL. Incidentally, Hall’s report to Raglan on the assault on the 
Redan included the names of the ‘following gentlemen belonging to the civil establishment who 
did their duty zealously, viz. Dr Mcleod, Mr Wordsworth, Dr Frazer, and Dr Lyons;’ 
RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2412. 
365  Hall to Smith, 23 Apr. 1855, PoL. 
366  For details see Toppin (1981) and Silver (2007). 
367  Parkes (1857). Incidentally, the death of 50 (3.7%) of 1,330 patients admitted to the hospital at 
Renkioi might appear an endorsement for the undoubted brilliance of Brunel’s design. However, 
this is not strictly  the case as the comparable figures for the Army as whole were better, viz. 740 
(2%) deaths from disease among 36,794 hospital patients; see M&SH General Return A & General 
Hospitals Return IX.T 
368  RAMC/397/F/RT/2 and Mitra (1911), p. 378. 
369  Evidence given on 19 June 1857; BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, p. 180. 
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The present staff […] is decidedly too large, it consists of Colonel Storks, Dr Mayer, 25 other 
doctors, 13 lady nurses, 23 paid nurses, 47 military orderlies, and 36 civil orderlies. Besides 
these Colonel Storks has under him Major Chads and six other officers making in all a 
number about equal to the patients at the present time. […] That they are further from the 
seat of war than is desirable there can be no doubt, so indeed are those on the Bosphorus. 
[…] I doubt whether any so good a location can be found between it and Constantinople, and 
if this is the case, the political importance of retaining our hold upon this place until the close 




In his account of the AMD Cantlie noted that the Select Committee on the 
Medical Department condemned making the hospitals at Smyrna and Renkioi 
independent of Smith while he considered that the establishment of a hospital at 
Smyrna was unjustified in retrospect, while the opening of the hospital at Renkioi, 
when others were closing, was ‘a step of doubtful administrative value’ taken by the 
Secretary of State alone as Smith played had no part in it. ‘Both hospitals were, 
therefore, examples of the futility of a dual method of hospital planning directed on 
the one hand by the Medical Department and on the other by the Secretary of State.’371 
 
Thirty civilian surgeons were employed officially by the Army with three doing two 
tours of duties.
372
 Between one and three were in post until February 1855 when the 
number increased to 15 by which time the troops’ health was improving and mortality 
falling. The numbers employed remained between 15 and 22 until March 1855 when 




In 1803 Jackson referred to the employment of female nurses in medical, but not 
surgical wards,
373
 while ‘in the colonies coloured women were considered the best 
nurses in the world.’374 Since then much has been written on the topic and opinions 
proffered on their suitability are conflicting, and frequently obscured by entrenched 
religious or chauvinistic attitudes. Suffice it to state, nurses were not deployed in the 
regimental hospitals where most men were treated, and, as relatively few were 
                                                 
370  Diary entry, 13 July 1855; University of Nottingham, Ne/2F/10/1. 
371  Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 170 & 199. 
372  M&SH, I, Appendix VIII. This total does not include surgeons employed at Smyrna and Renkioi. 
373  Jackson (1803), pp. 82-3. 
374  Fergusson (1846), p. 63. 
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employed in the general hospitals at any one time, their contribution was necessarily 
limited, and certainly not quantifiable. 
Some pro-nursing commentators have criticized the military authorities, including 
the AMD, for a lack of enthusiasm towards their employment. Not surprising, perhaps, 
as it was a political initiative introduced without discussion or advanced planning. The 
nurses were, thus, superimposed on a management structure unprepared for employing 
civilians not bound by the Mutiny Act, and for whom no logistical provision had been 
made. In the event, responsibility for their maintenance was assumed by the military 
authorities although it has been inferred by some commentators that the AMD was 
remiss for not directly providing for their care. However, this is an unwarranted 
criticism, because there was no mandate for the AMD so to do without being authorized 
by the Commander of the Forces. 
The services of the small number of nurses employed in the Crimea were 
generally appreciated. For example, following the resignation of Mrs Bridgeman and 
the Roman Catholic nurses, Codrington wrote the following appreciation to Hall on 4 
April 1856: 
 
I request you to assure that lady of the high estimation in which her services and those of the 
nurses are held by us all; founded as that opinion is on the experience of yourself, the 
medical officers of the hospital and of the many patients, who during 14 or 15 months have 
benefited by their care. I am quite sure that their unfailing kindness will have the reward that 
Mrs Bridgman values, viz. the remembrance and gratitude of those who have been the 




Several biographies of Nightingale deal in extenso with her relationship with Hall and 
the Purveyor in the Crimea, David Fitzgerald; particularly with respect to the 
management of the general hospitals in the Crimea and the employment of the nurses 
following the fall of Sevastopol. In the final analysis the debate was little more than a 
clash of personalities, and to some extent religious bigotry and a struggle for power, 
than anything else. It certainly had little obvious relevance to the general health of the 
troops who were principally cared for in regimental hospitals, and where no female 
nurses were employed. That the physical appearance of the general hospitals, and the 
way they were managed, could have been improved is not in question, but any 
upgrading would have been cosmetic rather than essential, and, by the end of 1855 there 
was little incentive for the authorities to invest in extensive infrastructural 
improvements in the camps or elsewhere. 
                                                 
375  NAM-1968-07-380-8B. 
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Mrs Mary Seacole, a colourful personality from Jamaica, ran the so called British Hotel 
with her business partner Thomas Day. She practiced herbal medicine but her impact on 
the health of the Army as a single handed doctress who arrived after the worst of the 
first winter was over would have been limited as she was not employed officially in the 




Recommendations for the medical staffing of the Army 
 
The numbers of MOs and support staff sent to the East may have appeared reasonable at 
first sight but the numbers clearly proved inadequate, and hence Hall and Linton with 
their experience of campaigning under trying conditions were well placed to provide 
more realistic recommendations for staffing the field army and base hospitals in any 
future campaign. On 20 January 1857 Hall responded to a questionnaire from Smith 
and recommended the number of MOs and support staff for a field army of 40,000, a 
division of 10,000, and a brigade of three battalions given in Table 4.19.
377
 Similarly, 
the PMO at Scutari, at Smith’s request, suggested the number of medical staff required 
for base hospital with 3,000 beds was IGH, 1; DIGH, 4; SS1, 10; SS2, 9; AS, 76; 
dressers, 17; and dispensers, 17, giving a total of 134.
378
 These figures were 
subsequently increased in a more detailed estimate provided by Linton, Cumming’s 
successor, on 26 November 1855 (Table 4.20). The total staff for eight divisions of 375 
patients was over 900, comprising 133 surgeons (1:22.5 patients), 36 dispensers and 




The total number of regimental and staff surgeons increased from c.50 initially to c.320 
at the end of 1854. There was a further increase to c.400 in the spring while after the fall 
of Sevastopol the number was higher still at c.420-440 (Table 4.3, column 6). 
The size of the Army changed with time and this influenced the ratio of men to 
surgeons. It was c.150-160:1 prior to the invasion, after which it narrowed steadily to 
                                                 
376  See Robinson (2005) for a biography. 
377  PoL, II, p. 493, Appendix 42 and M&SH, I, p. 497. 
378  Cumming to Smith, 1 Nov. 1855; PoL. 
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c.80-90:1 during the spring of 1855. The ratio then widened to reach c.150:1 by the time 
the Peace Treaty was signed (Table  4.3, column 7). 
A few dispensers of medicines but no dressers were employed on the medical staff 
prior to the invasion. Thereafter numbers in both categories increased to a peak early in 
1855. The number of dressers then fell, despite the continuance of the siege; while the 
number of dispensers was not reduced until after the signing of the Peace Treaty. 
About 40% of MOs and 80% of dressers and dispensers were born during 1830 or 
later and hence would have been relatively inexperienced when they commenced their 
active service. 
The increased provision of medical care during the winter of 1854/54 was not 
sufficient to prevent the increased mortality, but this was not surprising as the principal 
predisposing causes were not medical in nature, rather it was the combined effects of 
exposure, overwork, malnutrition and living in unhygienic conditions that were 
principally responsible, and hence the health of the troops did not improve until their 
living standards improved and the weather became milder. 
 
Military officers tended to regard surgeons as their social inferiors and this resulted in 
problems, both administrative and personal. The failure of Raglan to involve Hall in the 
planning process inevitably left the AMD ill-prepared for what was expected of it. 
Raglan was also criticised for failing to acknowledge the part played by the AMD in the 
face of the enemy, though a degree of recognition was ultimately achieved with the 
award of a number of orders and medals, including three VCs. (See Chapter 12) 
A Select Committee addressed the conditions of service of MOs after the war and 
this resulted in the issuing of a Royal Warrant in 1858 which generally improved their 
status. 
 
The employment of civilian surgeons on an official basis was a political initiative, taken 
when matters were very pressing. It proved controversial and caused resentment among 
MOs because their conditions of service were better, particularly with respect to pay 
and, for those stationed in the hospitals in Smyrna and Renkioi, life was much easier. 
Hall also expressed his displeasure at this situation although he paid tribute to those of 
whom he had first-hand experience. For example, after the war he wrote in his 
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Observations that he had ‘much satisfaction’ in praising their conduct, but they were not 
‘superior to military surgeons.’379 
The employment of civilian doctors and female nurses was an ‘experiment’, 
which Shepherd considered was a ‘failure both from the point of view of relieving the 
situation in the Crimea [and] promoting a closer liaison between the army medical 
services and the civilian doctors.’ However, he concluded that overall ‘much good came 
out of it’ since the ‘evolution, in time, of the territorial army medical officer and the 
RNVR medical officer who have supported the regular services in times of war may be 





Table 4.1: Number (%) medical staff employed in the Army of the East 
Country* Staff MOs Apothecaries  
and dispensers 
Dressers Support staff† Civilian surgeons‡ 
T 62 (15) 24 (45) 23 (55) 11 (61) 21 (70) 
B 1 (0.2) 0 0 0 0 
C 153 (37) 13 (24.5) 7 (16.5) 6 (33) 5 (16.5) 
T & B 1 (0.2) 1 (2) 0 0 0 
B & C 5 (1) 0 0 0 0 
T & C 130 (31) 14 (26.5) 12 (28.5) 0 4 (13.5%) 
T, B & C 66 (16) 1 (2) 0 1 (6) 0 
Total 418 53 42 18 30 
[Adapted from M&SH, Appendix VIII] 
* T, Turkey; B, Bulgaria; C, Crimea. 
† Storekeepers, bookkeepers, and medical clerks. 
‡ This return does not include civilian surgeons stationed at Smyrna and Renkioi as they were not part of 
the military establishment. 
 
 
                                                 
379  RAMC/397/F/RT/2 and WO/33/3B. 
380  See Shepherd (1991), pp. 412-51. 
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Table 4.2: Monthly abstract of medical officers belonging to the Army serving in Turkey, April 1854-
April 1856 
 1854 1855 
Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. 
Army strength 8047 21507 25644 29035 30924 28977 31322 33775 35948 32111 30903 30069 
Inspectors General of 
Hospitals 
- - 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Deputy IGH 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 6 6 8 9 
Staff Surgeons, 1st 
class 
9 13 13 13 13 13 14 18 20 19 18 21 
Staff Surgeons, 2nd 
class 
6 13 12 14 13 14 18 23 27 32 34 33 
Staff Assistant 
Surgeons 
7 37 40 42 41 45 59 101 83 72 73 73 
Acting Assistant 
Surgeons 
- - - - - - - 17 18 57 62 60 
Regimental Surgeons 8 21 22 31 30 34 39 41 45 49 49 47 
Regimental Assistant 
Surgeons 
18 44 53 85 84 87 99 106 117 126 123 128 
Apothecaries - 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Dispensers - 3 3 3 3 3 5 7 18 27 34 37 
Hospital Dressers - - - - - - - - 18 24 28 36 
Total Medical 
Officers 




- 4 4 4 4 4 7 8 37 52 63 74 
 
Table 4.2: Continued 
 1855 1856 
































2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 
















59 77 78 55 80 81 79 76 77 70 62 64 56 
Regimental 
Surgeons 




120 133 134 161 150 161 168 174 175 173 170 167 169 
Apothecaries 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dispensers 36 36 35 34 36 34 33 36 37 38 46 51 54 
Hospital 
Dressers 










74 74 66 63 60 58 57 54 53 54 60 64 66 
[RAMC/397/F/RT/2 and WO/33/3B] 
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Table 4.3: Summary of the numbers of regimental and staff surgeons employed in the Army of the East, 
April 1854-April 1956 











1854 April 8047 26 26 52 155 
May 21507 66 65 131 164 
June 25644 69 75 144 178 
July 29035 73 116 189 154 
August 30924 71 114 185 167 
September 28977 76 121 197 147 
October 31322 96 138 234 134 
November 33775 166 147 313 108 
December 35948 156 162 318 113 
1855 January 32111 188 175 369 87 
February 30903 197 172 369 84 
March 30069 198 175 373 81 
April 33019 197 173 370 89 
May 37476 216 191 407 92 
June 41128 209 192 401 103 
July 45593 180 223 403 113 
August 49672 189 209 398 125 
September 55262 195 223 418 132 
October 56762 195 226 421 135 
November 58637 186 239 425 138 
December 59141 196 246 442 134 
1856 January 58777 183 243 426 138 
February 59374 174 238 412 144 
March 63207 178 238 416 152 
April 60862 175 238 413 147 
[RAMC/397/F/RT/2 and WO/33/3B] 
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Table 4.4: Answers of regimental surgeons to a question posed by the Hospital Commissioners on the 









One hospital sergeant, one cook, two orderlies. The hospital sergeant is an 
excellent man; the cook is suited to his position; and the orderlies moderately well, 
for a field hospital in standing camp. […] The most delicate men are selected […] 
to assist at the hospital. […] [They should be] […]. when practicable […] strong, 
willing, active, intelligent, trustworthy, and energetic soldiers […] [a] hospital 





One hospital sergeant, two orderlies, in every respect satisfactory. Extra orderlies 





One sergeant, one cook, and one orderly, and in addition, one fatigue man told off 
daily to cut wood and carry water, etc. .... These hospital attendants are in every 





One hospital sergeant and two orderlies. All good. […] Orderlies are given, on 
requisition to the commanding officer, in the ratio of 1 orderly to 10 sick men. 
74 24 
Dec. 




11th Hussars One hospital sergeant-major, two orderlies. Have been so employed for a long 
time; in every way up to their duties and efficient till within a short time ago, when 
both orderlies became knocked up, are now under treatment, and replaced by one 





One hospital sergeant, with two orderlies, are employed at present; their essential 
fitness for their duties being as good as one can expect under our present system. 
76 29 
Dec. 
17th Lancers A sergeant and three orderlies. I consider them fitted for their several duties, as 





The number of orderlies are seven, with a sergeant who acts as an hospital steward, 






One sergeant, one surgery-man, orderlies varying in number according to sick 
(average one to about 10 men), besides two cooks. There is no difficulty in 
obtaining orderlies on application to the commanding officer; they are men of good 





One sergeant, one cook, and five permanent orderlies, [and] a corporal, who […] 
takes charge of all requisitions […] These men are fitted for their capacity, or they 
would not be retained. 
87 1 Jan. SFG Two sergeants, one corporal, one cook, one permanent orderly. Other orderlies 
have been taken from volunteers from the ranks as the number of the sick required. 




1st Bn, 1st The number of orderlies employed [is] insufficient, owing to the amount [of] 
outside work […] procuring water, searching [for] fuel etc. […] at present eight 
attendants […] Fatigue parties can also be had […] as required. The hospital 
sergeant [has] nearly eight years [experience] and I could not have a more efficient 
or deserving man; the orderlies, under proper instructions and surveillance, 
generally perform their duties well, [although there] are men who volunteer […] to 




4th Five orderlies […] also a sergeant and corporal […] employed temporarily in place 
of the hospital sergeant now sick […] Two […] orderlies have long been acting in 
that capacity, [and none are] better in the service. The others have been lately 




7th One hospital orderly, one man to cook, and three men of the band; a number 
insufficient to meet the exigencies and emergencies of the service. 
97 6 Jan. 9th One hospital sergeant, one cook, one orderly […] to cut firewood, and four 
ordinary orderlies. […] we have been furnished, as necessity requires, with two or 
more fatigue orderlies. 
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19th One hospital sergeant and four orderlies. When more orderlies are required […] I 
apply to the officer commanding […] it is difficult to get men to serve willingly in 
hospital who are not remunerated. The hospital sergeant is a most excellent non-




20th One orderly for every ten patients, and in addition; a cook and the hospital sergeant; 
and, so far as lay in their power, they performed their duties zealously. 
108 23 
Dec. 
21st One hospital sergeant, assisted while in the field by the band sergeant; that the hospital 




23rd One hospital sergeant and two orderlies are the only attendants […] whatever may be 
the number of sick. […] [There is] no inducement […] to remain [as] orderlies [as this 
] debars them from promotion, they leave often at the time they can be least spared. 
[…] I have a cook, and on requisition to the colonel, I can obtain extra orderlies or 
fatigue men if necessary. 
116 18 
Dec. 
28th A hospital sergeant, a cook, and four orderlies, all well acquainted with their duties. 
The assistance also of three band boys. 
123 21 
Dec. 
30th One hospital sergeant and two orderlies are allowed ... They understand their duties, 




34th One hospital sergeant, three orderlies permanent, one sergeant and three fatigue men 
required to obtain wood and water and give general assistance, all fit for their duties. 
124 22 
Dec. 
38th The hospital orderlies and other attendants are in number four, and I am satisfied with 
their general fitness for their duties. 
125 21 
Dec. 
41st One hospital sergeant and nine orderlies, viz., one surgery orderly, one cook, and one 
brings water for the sick. The men are exceedingly attentive to the onerous duties .they 




42nd Five orderlies […] under one hospital sergeant, and one hospital corporal, fit for their 
duties in that capacity. Convalescents in hospital made to render to their sick comrades 
such assistance as they are able for. The band is told off to carry the sick, and do 
fatigue duties for the hospital, when fatigue parties are not otherwise furnished. 
128 20 
Dec. 
44th A hospital sergeant, corporal, and cook; an orderly in the proportion to every ten 
patients. The hospital sergeant is most efficient; but most of the others, from sickness, 
have been changed recently, so from their inexperience in hospital matters they are not 
so efficient as could be desired; yet all are willing to do their best. 
130 29 
Dec. 
46th The hospital sergeant and other attendants who came out with the regiment performed 
their duties in an efficient manner; but most of them, including the sergeant, have been 




47th The number of orderlies is regulated by that of the sick, one man being allowed for 




49th One sergeant and two orderlies; by no means sufficient Fatigue men are obliged to be 
obtained, and frequently changed, as they will not work properly without receiving 
pay, and there is only pay allowed for two orderlies. 
133 21 
Dec. 
55th A hospital sergeant and two orderlies; the highest number sanctioned ... Fatigue men 




57th The hospital attendants are one sergeant, one cook and five orderlies, and are perfectly 
sufficient, and able to perform the duties required of them, aided occasionally by 
fatigue parties for the purpose of carrying wood and water. 
136 23 
Dec. 
62nd The number of orderlies were regulated by the number of sick as laid down by the 
rules of the service. They were quite fitted for their duties, most [have] previous 
experience in the regimental hospital at Varna and at Malta. Only two of these 
orderlies […] receive pay as such. 
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63rd The number of orderlies and other hospital attendants employed has been the usual 
number allowed by regulation, and they have been quite fit for their duties, being 
originally men […] employed [as such] at home; […] at present my hospital 
sergeant and several orderlies have been sent […] to Scutari […] and several of the 
latter have died […] Fatigue parties are obtained from the regiment to perform many 
duties [such] as obtaining firewood, water, etc. […] 
139 26 
Dec. 
68th The orderlies have been employed in sufficient numbers, and have shown general 
fitness for their duties […] two have been attached to the hospital prior to the 
regiment leaving Malta. 
140 22 
Dec. 
77th Hospital sergeant, one cook, and four orderlies […] perform their duties 
satisfactorily. When the sick list is great, any number is granted by the commanding 
officer. 
141 ? 79th Besides one hospital sergeant, there is one orderly for every ten men in hospital. 
Being selected from those best suited, (and some of them having had considerable 
experience,) they are generally well fitted for the duties required of them. 
144 ? 88th One sergeant, one acting corporal, three orderlies, and one man who has charge of 
hospital bat horse, and who assists the orderlies. The sergeant and corporal are both 
fit for all their duties. The orderlies as fit as orderlies usually are. 
145 22 
Dec. 
90th One hospital sergeant, two orderlies (receiving pay), and five fatigue men. 
Intelligent, and as well fitted for these offices as can be chosen from the regiment. 
147 7 Jan. 93rd On joining the regiment, on the 15th September 1854, there were one sergeant and 
four orderlies, to look after the hospital property, and to take care of sick […] They 






One hospital sergeant, remarkably efficient. Four orderlies, all strong men and well 
fitted for their duties. Also, fatigue parties for carrying water, and every assistance 






Four; viz., one hospital sergeant, one cook, and two orderlies, and, in addition, a 
batman for the pannier horse, who are generally fitted for their duties in their several 
capacities. 
* BPP (1854-55), No. 1920. 
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Table 4.5: Comments on problems associated with orderlies in general hospitals drawn principally from 
convalescent soldiers and others detached from their regiments 






Sidney Herbert 10 
Dec. 
‘It appears to me […] that as soon as their orderlies begin to get […] 
into something like a state of efficiency the military authorities interfere 
and send the men away to their regiments, substituting in their place a 
fresh dolts, drunkards, and slovens.’ [W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/360] 
Nightingale Lord Raglan 8. Jan Complains about the frequent changes of orderlies and provided some 
advice on how matters may be improved. [NAM-6807-393-9] 
PMO, 
Scutari 
Dr Hall 17 
Feb. 
‘Our wardmasters and orderlies are a most worthless set and not a day 
passes but they are found drunk and irregular. With such materials it is 




Dr Smith 3 Mar. The hospital is full and there is a want of staff. The orderlies are quite 
ignorant, and many of them drunken and worthless characters. [PoL] 




Pointed out the constant receipt of reports about the inefficiency of the 
orderlies provided for hospitals in the East and suggested that some 
remedy needs to be adopted to prevent the evil. [PoL; The Lancet, 28 
July 1855; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 46] 
Dr Hall AG 4 Apr. Wrote to point out the inconvenience to the sick of employing Greeks 
who speak no other language as orderlies in the General Hospital. […] 
they have been engaged at high rates of pay […] they were to be 
employed on board ship but it strikes me they would be equally 
inefficient on board ship as they are on shore for the same cause. 
[RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1760] 





Forwarding a letter from Dr Forrest, sometime PMO at Scutari which 
pointed out that it was ‘utterly impossible to secure the welfare of 
soldiers in hospital unless immediate arrangement is made to secure 
eligible and qualified hospital servants for the care of the sick.’ [PoL] 
Dr Hall AG 29 
Sep. 
Drunkenness and misconduct by Hospital Orderlies should be treated on 
its own merits by the military authorities. [PoL] 
 
 
Table 4.6: Staffing of a company in the Medical Staff Corps comprising 120 NCOs and men 
Department Title Army rank Number 
Surgeon’s Wardmaster Colour sergeant 1 
Assistant wardmaster Corporal 8 
Barber Private 3 
1
st
 class orderly Private 20 
2
nd
 class orderly Private 70 
Purveyor’s Steward Sergeant major 1 
Assistant steward Sergeant 4 
Issuer Private 6 
Washerman Corporal 2 
Cook Sergeant 1 
Assistant cook Private 4 


















































































































Total 188 225 152 565 72 31 64 
Median year 
of birth 
1828 1828 1829 1828 1824.5 1833 130.5 
* Surgeons employed in the cavalry, infantry, and RA. 




Table 4.8: Ranks of medical officers who died while on service in the East, 1 May 1854-30 April 1856 
Rank 1 May 1854- 
30 April 
1855 




(‰) of MOs 
Deputy Inspector General 1 1 2 43 
Staff Surgeon, 1
st
 class 7 - 7 153 
Staff Surgeon, 2
nd
 class 1 2 3 65 
Regimental surgeon 6 1 7 153 
Regimental assistant surgeon 13 2 15 326 
Staff assistant surgeon 3 - 3 65 
Acting assistant surgeon 4 5 9 196 
Apothecary to the Forces 1 - 1  
n/a 
 
Dispenser - 2 2 
[BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, p. 405, Appendix IX] 
 
 
Table 4.9: Location where medical officers and other staff died while serving in the East, 1854-56 






Dressers Total (%) 
Turkey 12 (48) 6 (27) 3 0 21 (40) 
Bulgaria 1(4) 2 (9) 0 0 3 (6)  
Crimea 12 (48) 14 (64) 0 2 28 (54) 
Total 25 22 3 2 52 




Table 4.10: Mortality in the medical officers serving with the Army in the East from 1 May 1854-30 April 
1856 
 Medical officers Apothecaries, dispensers 
and dressers 
1 May 1854- 
30 April 1855 
Average strength 266 28 
Total deaths 35 1 
Deaths per 1,000 131.6 35.7 
1 May 1855- 
30 April 1855 
Average strength 415 75 
Total deaths 11 4 
Deaths per 1,000 26.5 53.3 
[BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, p. 405, Appendix IX] 
 
 
Table 4.11: Injuries received by medical officers in action 






 Regt Killed by a cannonball which struck him on the chest while employed on 






Struck by a cannonball on the shoulder at the battle of the Alma, and, 
though one arm was disabled, he continued to use the other in the service 






 Regt Wounded before Sebastopol,
 
but we have received no particulars of the 
case. 
Surgeon Mason HMS 
Albion 
Wounded while on duty in the 
-
cockpit of his ship in the Naval attack on 
Fort Constantine. 
[MT&G, 11 November 1854] 
 
Table 4.12: Sir John Hall’s recommendations for the medical staff required for an army on active service 
Rank For an army of 40,000* For each of four 
divisions of 10,000† 
For a detached 
brigade of three 
regiments 
Field duty Fixed 
hospitals 
Inspector General of Hospitals 1 1 0 0 
Deputy General of Hospitals 5 4 1 0 
Staff Surgeons, 1st class 6 8 1 1 
Staff Surgeons, 2nd class 6 16 1 0 
Staff Assistant Surgeons 10 70 2 2 
Apothecaries 1 1 0 0 
Accountants 1 1 0 0 
Dispenser’s staff 8 12 1 0 
Regimental Surgeons 44 0 11 3 
Regimental Assistant Surgeons 103 0 25 6 
Regimental Dispensers (NCOs) 59 0 14 1 
Purveyor-in-Chief 0 0 0 0 
Deputy Purveyor-in-Chief 1 1 0 0 
Purveyors 4 6 0 0 
Purveyor’s Clerk 12 29‡ 0 1 
Army Cutler 1 1 0 0 
Total 262 151 56 17 
[PoL, II, p. 493, Appendix 42] 
* Assuming 30 battalions of infantry of 1,000 men, ten regiments of cavalry of 500, 15 batteries of artillery of 200, 
and four battalions of the military train of 500. 
† Assuming seven battalions of infantry of 1,000 men three regiments of cavalry of 500, three batteries of artillery 
of 240, one battalion of the military train of 500, and a commissariat and medical staff corps of 280. In addition, 
two assistant staff surgeons, one purveyor and two purveyor’s clerks should accompany the division if it is 
detached from the main army. 
‡ There would appear to be an error if the total 151 is correct the complement should be 30. 
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Table 4.13: Dr Linton’s recommendations for staffing a base hospital for 3,000 patients 
Department Rank No. Remarks 
Medical Inspector General 1  
Deputy IGs 4 1/1,000 sick + an Inspector of Transports 
Staff surgeons, 1st class 10 1/Division + 2 
Staff surgeons, 2nd class* 18 1/200 sick + 2 
Assistant surgeons 100 1/30 sick 
Dispensers 18 2/Division + 2 
Dressers 18 2/Division + 2 
Medical clerks 4  
Book-keepers 4  
Hospital attendants Wardmasters 8 1/Division 
Assistant wardmasters 16 2/Division 
Orderlies 540 90/500 sick as in Regulation for M. S. Corps 
Orderlies 6  
Surgery men 8 1/Division 
Barbers 16 2/Division 
Stores† Medical storekeeper 1  
Assistant store keeper 3  
Book keepers 1  
Purveyor† Purveyors 2  
Purveyor’s clerks 14  
Stewards 8 1/Division 
Assistant stewards 16 2/Division 
Storemen 10  
Storekeepers 4  
Assistant store keepers 6  
Pack-keepers 6  
Orderlies in pack stores 6  
Sanitary corporal 1 + 4 fatigue men to attend soil pipes etc. 
Cooks 6  
Assistant cooks 12  
Cooks for divisional kitchens 8 1/Division 
NCOs for bathroom 2  
Orderlies for bathroom 2  
NCOs for kitchens 2  
Issuers 8 1/Division 
Dead house 2  
Washing establishment 15  
* Staff Surgeons, 2
nd
 Class, cannot be fairly replaced by civilians. 











Figure 4.2: Numbers of staff and regimental surgeons each month, April 1854-April 1856 
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Figure 4.3: Number of NCOs and men per surgeon each month, April 1854-April 1856 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Relationship between the mortality rate among NCOs and men and the number of surgeons, 




Figure 4.5: Number of dispensers of medicines each month, April 1854-June 1856 
 
 





Figure 4.7: Number of hospital dressers each month, April 1854 to June 1856 
 
 


























Cholera, diarrhoea, and dysentery 
 
Over the centuries armies on active service had been plagued by epidemics of 
gastrointestinal diseases, particularly diarrhoea and dysentery, and in this respect the 
Eastern campaign was no different. However, the situation was complicated by cholera 
which alone accounted for about a quarter of hospital deaths from all causes, although 
comprising only 4.5% of primary admissions (Table 5.1). 
It had been recognized for over 20 years that movement of people was important 
in the spread of cholera
381
 and not surprisingly the disease followed the allied armies 
eastwards; and ‘visited’ Piraeus, Gallipoli, and the Bosphorus. The infection was 
introduced into Bulgaria by the French
382
 with the first fatal case in the British troops 
occurring on 17 June.
383
 The British public was informed by The Times on 17 July 
1854,
384
 and it is the development of the epidemics during the next 18 months that are 
discussed in this chapter,
385
 together with an assessment of how diarrhoea and dysentery 




Clinical features and treatment of cholera 
 
The clinical diagnosis of cholera was dependent on its rapid onset and death associated 
with the characteristic symptoms: 
 
Lassitude, uneasiness of the stomach, frequent evacuations from the bowels without much 
griping; dejections gradually becoming thinner, paler, and of the appearance of rice water; 
sometimes voided easily in large quantities, at other times forcibly ejected; vomiting of 
whitish-looking fluid, devoid of bile; cramps in the hands and feet, accompanied by sinking 
and coldness of the surface; suppression of the urinary secretion. […] It was generally most 




                                                 
381  The Lancet (1831), pp. 241-84. 
382  A naval surgeon suggested that cholera was brought by a French vessel arriving on 14 July; 
MT&G, 30 Sep. 1854. 
383  Hall to Smith, 2 July 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/277 and PoL. 
384  The Times 17, 18 & 21 July include further despatches dated 21 & 22 June and 8 July 1854, 
while a letter dated Malta, 21 July, reported cholera in Gallipoli and Dardanelles; The Times, 28 
June 1854. 
385  See M&SH, II, pp. 45-89 for a contemporary account. 
386  The analyses are based principally on the tabulated data in the regimental histories of the cavalry 
and infantry regiments in the M&SH, I, and the General Hospital Returns in the M&SH, II. 
387  M&SH, II, p. 60. 
 -158- 
It is likely that most fatalities with pronounced pathonomonic symptoms388 would 
have been recorded accurately but the milder form, now known to occur during 
epidemics, may have been returned as non-fatal diarrhoea.
389
 It is unlikely that many of 
the deaths due to diarrhoea represented a misdiagnosis of cholera; however, as the 1854 
epidemic was effectively over when fatalities from diarrhoea were at their worst. 
Similarly, the return of relatively few deaths from diarrhoea during the 1855 cholera 
epidemic suggests that cholera was not confused with other gastrointestinal diseases. 
 
Ignorance of the cause of cholera means that many of the suggestions for risk factors, 
treatment and prophylaxis now appear bizarre. For example, accommodation in bell 
tents, the climate, the vicissitudes of temperature, heavy dews, defective diet, unripe 
fruit, and sour wines, and, only occasionally, the consumption of impure and dirty or 
muddy water. It would seem that not many MOs were ‘impressed […] with the idea that 
the disease was transmissible’ although some were ‘disposed to regard it as possessing 
some power of self-extension’ and that it had an ‘eminently contagious nature under 
certain conditions.’390 
There were several references to the unsanitary nature of camp sites and 
presumably the disregard of basic rules of hygiene ‘helped [cholera] sweep through the 
allied army and navy,’391 a point effectively made by Dr Cattell, 5th Dragoon Guards: 
 
Horses being watered at the fountains (which should have been reserved for other use) made 
a puddle around. […] thirsty men in a blazing sun and already suffering from diarrhoea […] 
would eagerly lap up water from the puddle […] The latrine was a deep trench, but Mosaic 
sanitation or use of dry earth was neglected and the pit was a hot bed of flies innumerable 
which spent their days between ordure of all kinds and our food. In the river men washed, 
washed clothes and bathed, and the butchers found it a convenient place for offal. Yet it still 
formed the chief supply for cooking, and what was of far more consequence it was eagerly 





Another eyewitness, Private Harry Blishen, appreciated these events rather 
differently: 
                                                 
388  M&SH, II, p. 80. 
389  Soldiers were under closer medical supervision than civilians and hence the incidences recorded 
may be a closer approximation to the true incidence than those reported for epidemics in the 
British Isles. 
390  M&SH, II, p. 48. 
391  Royle (1999), p. 176. Royle suggested without providing evidence that there was an outbreak of 
amoebic dysentery at this time. This is unlikely since Entamoeba histolytica is usually associated 
with a tropical climate. 
392  RAMC/391 and quoted by Cantlie (1974), II, p. 26. 
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We have harder work against the cholera, dysentery and lake fever, than we should have had 
against five times our number of the enemy in Russia. The number of deaths [have] been 
fearful […] dear mother, if you can give me a better example of the ‘frailty of life’ than many 
of my comrades have offered me of late; that of being in robust health one hour, and the next 
hour groaning in the agonies of death; one poor fellow invoking the Almighty to forgive him 




A naval MO suggested that the ‘dreadful calamity was attributed to drinking water 
from wells that had been poisoned by throwing in putrid carcasses,’394 while he also 
provided some support to the theory that water is the medium by which ‘cholera poison 
is conveyed’ when he recorded that he had observed ‘soldiers, wearied by marching 
from a focus of cholera infection […] washing their persons and clothing in the streams 
from which all the French ships of war, and the majority of the English fleet, obtained 
their water,’ and following this ‘the disease burst out with great violence among the 
crews of several ships.
’395 The possibility of spread being influenced by the ‘impurity of 
the water’ was also mentioned by Catell although he was probably a miasmatist as he 
noted that there was an ‘offensive odour drafted over the place from some weeds which 
grew in the vicinity.’396 
There are several references in the M&SH suggesting filtering polluted river water 
and water for hospital use but there is no suggestion in this document, or the 52 
recommendations issued by Smith in 1953,
397
 that water should be boiled or filtered as a 
control measure, as suggested by Snow. The value of improving hygienic standards was 
recognized, however, but principally because this reduced the ‘emanation of miasmas’, 
rather than as a means of breaking the cycle of infection. 
The 1854 epidemic lasted longer than might have been expected because of a 
recrudescence following the invasion, possibly exacerbated by the arrival of new 
susceptible regiments and the unsanitary conditions that developed in the trenches and 
camp during the autumn. Nevertheless, there was a definite break of a few weeks 
between the epidemics of 1854 and 1855 when the weather was at its coldest. Vibrio 
cholerae is now known to persist in the environment in a viable but non-culturable state 
and this provides a scientific explanation for what was suggested in the M&SH: 
 
                                                 
393  H.B. (1856), pp. 26-8. 
394  Letter to Dr J.T. Veitch dated Baljik, 23 Aug. 1854; MT&G, 30 Sep. 1854. 
395  MT&G, 30 Sep. 1854 
396  RAMC/391. 
397  MT&G, 1 Oct. & 10 Dec. 1853, pp. 369 & 596-7. 
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No case [of cholera] was returned in March [1855]; it unfortunately, however, soon became 
apparent that the principle of this awful scourge was merely in a dormant state, for in April, 
instances of the disease were again presented […] the pestilence had only slumbered in the 





Calomel, opium, mineral acids, turpentine, quinine, chloroform, arsenic, hydrocyanic 
acid, lead acetate, and stimulants were all prescribed,
399
 while ‘the saline treatment has 
not apparently put to the test of experiment’, a tragedy in retrospect, given that several 
contemporary reports recorded the beneficial effect of this therapy.
400
 This admission 
probably reflected the prevailing attitude of the medical establishment as a whole, rather 
than the hard pressed MOs eschewing what would now be accepted as an early example 
of an approach to treatment that was evidence based. 
Wearing cholera belts was considered beneficial for preventing the onset of 
symptoms. For example, Panmure, through the Military Undersecretary, requested 
Smith on 13 March 1855 to impress on PMOs the necessity of the men wearing 
woollen shirts and cholera belts. Smith concurred and wrote to Hall on the 19 March 
requiring him to direct MOs to ensure that in changeable and bad weather the men wear 
cholera belts, as ‘excellent protection and a comfortable support.’ Hall replied on 5 
April stating that the men wear woollen undergarments but cholera belts ‘are not much 
in repute as they preferred the broad woollen sash worn outside their clothes; Smith then 
ordered a supply of sashes.
401
 A further example of an ineffective approach to 
prophylaxis was provided by a memorandum issued on 1 June 1855: 
 
Salt taken […] with food, to the extent one salt-spoonful night and morning, two salt-
spoonfuls at dinner, is said by Dr Beaman to prevent cholera. This quantity may be doubled 
[…] and the addition of a small quantity of Cayenne pepper is useful. The use of this simple 





In August 1854 the General Board of Health in London convened a Medical 
Council under the chairmanship of J.A. Paris, President of the RCP, to investigate the 
ongoing cholera epidemic and its reports, which were published in 1855, too late to 
influence events in the Crimea, have been reviewed critically by Dean (2016) who 
pointed out that ‘Snow’s empirically plausible explanation’ for the spread of the disease 
                                                 
398  M&SH, II, p. 72. 
399  M&SH, II, pp. 63-4. 
400  For example, MT&G, 21 Aug. 1853. The restoration and maintenance of fluid and electrolyte 
balance remains the treatment of first choice to this day. 
401  PoL. 
402  WO/28/191. 
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was ignored by the Council which concluded that ‘the theory that infection occurred by 
swallowing water and other items contaminated with faeces of choleraic patients as 
having been disproved “beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt”.’ Of the treatments 
that had been prescribed ‘none could be confidently recommended […] a few treatments 
– calomel, castor oil, and sulphuric acid – were associated with higher than expected 
mortality, and others – opium and chalk – […] with lower than expected rates of death,’ 
while Dean also provided evidence that the Council had attempted to suppress the more 
favourable recovery rates recorded at the London Homeopathic Hospital. 
After the war Panmure issued instructions for MOs in the event of cholera being 
either suspected or diagnosed,
403
 and it is clear that thinking on this matter remained 
unresolved since the provision of a clean water supply was not among the 
recommendations. This is surprising perhaps since the MO of the General Board of 
Health concluded in the same year that Londoners drinking dirty water were more likely 
to contract cholera than those receiving a cleaner supply.
404
 
The M&SH was published in 1857 and it difficult to believe that Smith and his 
colleagues were unaware of Snow’s publications,405 and this suggests the report may 
have been completed well before the publication date and that those involved in its 
preparation had either retired or moved on, and there was little enthusiasm for updating 
the document. What ever the reason, it means that from a modern perspective the 
‘concluding observations’ on pages 70-2 and 84-5 of the M&SH are of limited value. 
Similarly, there is no evidence that the Sanitary Commissioners had espoused 
Snow’s hypothesis when they published their report in the same year as they concluded 
that ‘a more striking example of the deadly effects of impure air cannot be imagined’ 
while Burnetts’s official account of cholera in the Royal Navy ‘constantly speaks about 
air, and never about water.’406 
 
                                                 
403  Anon (1856). 
404  BPP (1856), No. 2103. It has been suggested recently that priority should have been given to 
sanitation and providing a clean water supply when tackling the cholera epidemic in Haiti, rather 
than the introducing a vaccination programme; Wampler (2011). 
405  For example, Snow (1855). Dr Buzzard, who served witht the Turkish Contigent was aware of 
Snow’s work when in the Crimea: ‘Whenever possible I refrained from drinking water that had not 
been boiled […] and if not taking tea or coffee’ drank ‘a light ale;’ Buzzard (1915), p. 81. 
406  M&SH, II, p. 56 and Lloyd & Coulter (1963), p. 142. Sir William Burnett was the DG of the 
Naval Medical Department. 
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Gastrointestinal disease in the Army, 1854-1856 
 
Gastrointestinal diseases and cholera accounted for 55,765 (34%) and 7,574 (4.5%) of 
162,673 primary hospital admissions, and 5,950 (33%) and 4,512 (25%) of 18,058 
deaths (Table 5.1), with the proportions being 36.5% and 27.7% respectively if the 
1,761 deaths from wounds and injuries are excluded. 
The primary admissions for the specific gastrointestinal diseases were dominated 
by diarrhoea (70%) followed by dysentery (12.5%) and cholera (12%). Cholera was the 
principal cause of all deaths (43%), with diarrhoea and dysentery accounting for 35% 
and 20.5% respectively (Table 5.2). 
A general summary of the admissions to, and deaths from, cholera, diarrhoea, and 
dysentery in the nine general hospitals is given in Table 5.3, together with the 
comparable figures for the cavalry and infantry regimental hospitals. 
 
The recording of enteric diseases in the cavalry and infantry regiments: 
The table for each regiment in the M&SH lists: (1) the total number of admissions for 
each disease to the regimental hospitals; (2) the total number deaths; and (3) the total 
number of deaths that occurred in general hospitals and elsewhere. The difference 
between No. 2 and 3 gives the number of deaths in the regimental hospitals. 
The records for cholera differ from the other diseases in that the admissions and 
deaths in the regimental and general hospitals are given separately (see Table 5.4 for 
examples for the Guards Brigade). The calculation of the ratio of deaths to admissions 
from these data may be justified for the regimental hospitals but not for the deaths in 
general hospitals and elsewhere, as the number of deaths could exceed admissions, as in 
the Coldstream and Scots Fusilier Guards, presumably because some men died before 
they could be admitted to any hospital. 
Similarly, with the other diseases the number of deaths recorded in general 
hospitals and elsewhere was the total for the campaign and cannot be related to the 
monthly records of the regimental hospitals, for example, chronic dysentery in Table 
5.5. This method of recording necessarily limits the number of possible analyses on 
mortality. 
 
Cholera, diarrhoea and dysentery during the campaign: The epidemics of 
cholera in 1854, which assumed a biphasic form, and 1855 were separated by a short 
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interval when no cases were recorded, while there was no recrudescence of the disease 
in 1856 although a few cases were diagnosed during the first quarter may well represent 
a carry over from 1855 (Figures 5.1 and 5.2, and in an alternative format for cholera in 
Figure 5.3). 
The epidemiological features of diarrhoea and dysentery differed from cholera 
with diarrhoea being more prevalent than dysentery in both 1854 and 1855 with its 
incidence increasing earlier, and persisting for longer. Deaths from both syndromes 
occurred principally between October 1854 and March 1855, with dysentery having a 
higher fatality rate. 
The incidence of all three diseases was considerably reduced after fall of 
Sevastopol and none proved troublesome during 1856. The monthly mortality rates are 
summarized in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.4 and between them they accounted for over half 
the deaths in 15 of the 17 months July 1854-November 1855, with diarrhoea and 
dysentery combined being responsible for >30% of deaths other than those caused by 
cholera during November 1854-March 1855 and July-November 1855 (Table 5.6: col. 
7+col. 9). 
 
Cholera, diarrhoea, and dysentery in the cavalry and 
infantry, Analysis 1: April 1854-June 1856 
 
In the foregoing analyses account has been taken of the month in which each regiment 
joined the Army, with a further sub-division depending on whether the regiments were 
principally involved in siege operations or other duties, such as the Cavalry Division 
and the defence of Balaklava (Highland Brigade). 
The ratio of deaths to admissions in the regimental hospitals of the various 
groups of regiments was calculated for each month for cholera (Table 5.7) and 
diarrhoea and dysentery (Table 5.8) and these data provide the comparisons in Figures 
5.5 to 5.8. As pointed out previously no account could be taken of deaths in general 
hospitals or elsewhere as the monthly numbers were not provided; only the total for the 
whole campaign. 
 
Cholera in the infantry regiments besieging Sevastopol 
1854: The incidence among regiments destined to do duty on the trenches reached a 
peak in August, and, after a decrease it increased again after the siege was joined with a 
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further peak in December, before petering out in the New Year. Regiments going 
directly to the Crimea during November and December suffered more severely than 
those that had spent time in Bulgaria or landed in September with those arriving in 
November being the worst affected. The 1854 epidemic was nearly over by the time 
three regiments arrived in January and only a few cases were recorded in these (Figure 
5.5). 
 
1855: The epidemic in the second year was shorter and proved more serious in the 
regiments arriving after the end of the winter. A few cases were recorded during the 
months after the fall of Sevastopol but cholera ceased to be problem in the Crimea 
thereafter. 
 
Cholera in the Highland Brigade and Cavalry Division 
1854: Both the Highland Brigade and the Cavalry Division were spared duty in trenches 
during the first winter and this may explain why there was no recrudescence of cholera 
following the invasion despite suffering similarly to the other regiments when in 
Bulgaria, (Figures 5.5 and 5.6). 
 
1855: Cholera ‘visited’ both corps during 1855 with the problem being rather greater in 
the four cavalry regiments that arrived in that year. Thirteen of the fourteen cavalry 
regiments relocated to Turkey in the autumn of 1855 and cases of cholera occurred in 
twelve of these after their arrival (Figures 5.5 and 5.6). 
 
Diarrhoea and dysentery 
Deaths from diarrhoea or dysentery were restricted principally to regiments encamped 
before Sevastopol between November 1854 and March 1855, and, apart from the 
regiments arriving in January many suffered severe losses with those arriving in 
November being the worst afflicted (Figure 5.7). In contrast, these enteric diseases 
proved less of a problem in the Highland Brigade and Cavalry Division (Figure 5.8). 
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Cholera, diarrhoea, and dysentery in the cavalry and 
infantry, Analysis 2: July 1854-April 1855 
 
In order to illustrate the nature of the epidemics of gastrointestinal disease, the ratio of 
admissions of NCOs and men to hospitals of the cavalry and infantry regiments for 
cholera, and diarrhoea and dysentery combined, to the regimental strength (‰) was 
calculated for each month from July 1854 to April 1855. 
The regiments were grouped to take account of their exposure to the rigors of the 
campaign and the results for admissions summarized in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 and 
illustrated in Figures 5.9 and 5.10, which include the median figure for each group. The 
comparable data for deaths are given in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, with mortality rates for 
diarrhoea and dysentery between November 1854 and April 1855 in Figure 5.11.
407
 The 
results for cholera are not illustrated as, unlike diarrhoea and dysentery, the ratios of 
deaths to admissions was generally similar in each month. 
The final analysis involved the calculation of the ratio (%) of deaths to admissions 
for cholera and diarrhoea and dysentery in those regiments which reported these 
conditions during those months (Tables 5.13 and 5.14). 
 
Two cases of cholera were diagnosed in the 19
th
 Regiment during June 1854 but by the 
next month it was present in 31 of the 35 regiments in Bulgaria. Being generally more 
serious in the cavalry than the infantry during August it became a lesser problem in the 
cavalry during the succeeding months and disappeared by the end of the year, as it did 
for many the infantry regiments (Figure 5.9). 
Cholera persisted throughout the autumn in the infantry regiments landing from 
Bulgaria but the incidence was never as high as in some of the infantry regiments going 
directly to the Crimea. 
Cholera became less of a problem in the Highland Brigade and Cavalry Division 
following their move from the plateau to closer to Balaklava where the infection was 
less prevalent. 
 
There were considerable differences in the monthly admissions rates of diarrhoea and 
dysentery within each group of regiments. The incidence overall increased during the 
                                                 
407  The data for July-Oct. 1854 have not been presented as the mortality rates for diarrhoea and 
dysentery were low (Table 5.12). 
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summer, and, after a fall in November, increased again until January when the rate of 
admissions to strength decreased (Figure 5.10). The regiments arriving in November 
and December tended to suffer as badly as those already on the plateau, but those 
joining in January were less severely afflicted. 
 
The median ratio of deaths to admissions for cholera was >40% in all months for all 
groups of regiments and there was no obvious change with time (Table 5.13). 
Conversely, the median remained at <10% for diarrhoea and dysentery until December 
1854 when it increased in all groups, and, with the exception of the Highland Brigade 
and those regiments that joined in January 1855, remained high despite an overall 
decrease in the incidence of admissions to strength (Table 5.14). 
 
Cholera in infantry regiments, July 1854-January 1855 
 
This analysis, based on the same data used for Table 5.9 and Figure 5.9, highlights the 
progress of the cholera epidemic at the divisional and brigade level. The median 
admission rates calculated for each month for each division are presented in Table 5.15, 
with the rate for each regiment in each brigade being illustrated in Figure 5.12. 
The Light Division suffered worse overall than the other three infantry divisions 
during July while during the next two months the 2
nd
 Division fared rather better than 
the rest. Six regiments forming the 4
th
 Division landed during September and in four the 
admission rate for cholera at ≥75‰ was greater than that recorded in any of the infantry 
regiments while in Bulgaria. The disease did not persist at this high level in these 
regiments and was subsequently generally lower than in the other divisions, excepting 
the 2
nd
. The Highland Brigade suffered similarly to several other regiments that also 
landed on 14 September. 
The incidence of cholera in the regiments that arrived during November and 
December was higher than in most of those with which they were brigaded, and this 
occurred despite a recrudescence in incidence in several regiments in the Light and 3
rd
 
Divisions during December. 
No cholera was recorded in 24 of 39 regiments during January and involved 
>20‰ in only three, viz. the 46th (48‰) and 89th (22‰), that arrived in the Crimea in 
November and December respectively, and the Grenadier Guards (39‰), which 
received a draft of 411 men on 20 December. 
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Cholera, diarrhoea, and dysentery in general hospitals 
 
It is only justifiable to compare hospitals when patients are admitted at the same time 
and this necessarily limits the scope for detailed analyses (see Table 1.9). Cholera 
accounted for 6.9% and 5.9% of the admissions of the general hospitals in Varna and 
Balaklava respectively with fatality rates of 75.1% and 42.3% (Table 5.3). In contrast, 
the disease was never a major problem at Scutari, there being only 388 (0.9%) cases 
among 36,822 patients admitted between June 1854 and June 1856 (Table 5.3).
408
 
A few patients with cholera were admitted to the Castle Hospital and only one at 
Abydos while none were recorded in the Camp and Monastery Hospitals and those at 
Smyrna and Renkioi. 
 
The data on diarrhoea and dysentery for the various hospitals are summarized in Table 
5.16. Prior to the invasion the mortality was c.15-times greater in the general hospitals 
in Varna than in the camps (7.5% cf. 0.5%), presumably as the more serious cases were 
sent there, while the mortality rate in the camps and the Balaklava General Hospital 
between October and May were similar at c.10%; in contrast at Scutari and Abydos it 
was 35% and 16.4% respectively. 
Despite the considerable difference in the overall fatality rate in the regimental 
hospitals and at Scutari between June 1854 and May 1855 (6.8% cf. 32.2%) the 
cumulative rate of mortality for diarrhoea and dysentery was almost identical (Figure 
5.13), an observation that provides circumstantial evidence that as problems resolved in 
the Crimea matters improved simultaneously at Scutari, and hence the higher mortality 
there was associated principally with the evacuation of patients with a poorer prognosis, 
since it made sense to keep those most likely to recover close to the front. 
 
                                                 
408  The rapid onset of symptoms means that most cholera cases would be primary admissions, not 
referrals. 
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Interval between admission and death from cholera and 
gastrointestinal diseases 
 
General Return C in the M&SH summarizes the ‘duration of diseases, wounds and 
injuries that proved fatal’ among the men in the cavalry and infantry regiments. 
The time to death of patients with cholera was recorded for 3,481 (87%) of 4,012 




The time to death for stomach and bowel diseases, together with comparable data 
for cholera, respiratory diseases, fevers, other diseases, and wounds and injuries are 
listed in Table 5.18. With the exception of cholera half of the deaths in the four disease 
categories were recorded during the second week with c.10-15% of patients lingering 
for ≥6 weeks. 
 
Cholera in the Royal Artillery and Royal Sappers and 
Miners 
 
The M&SH provides few details about disease in the RA and RS&M although the 
records for these Corps combined (the ordnance) for the first and second cholera 
epidemics indicated that the mortality tended to be higher in the ordnance than the 
cavalry and infantry in both years (Table 5.19).
410
 
When the cumulative proportion for admissions were plotted for the two 
epidemics the curves are similar for ordnance and infantry (Figures 5.14 and 5.15), not 
surprising perhaps as the RA and RS&M, like most of the infantry regiments, were 
involved with siege operations. In 1854-55 the epidemic in the cavalry started and 
finished earlier, while in 1855, when they were then located at Kadikoi and not on the 
plateau, it started about a month later. 
 
                                                 
409  It is presumed the returns refer to hospitalized patients, although this is not stated, and hence these 
figures may or may not include those who died on the line of march or in the trenches. 
410  M&SH, II, pp. 86-8. 
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Cholera in military and medical officers 
 
The incidence of cholera in officers was not recorded but the loss of individuals, both 
senior and junior, would have made the management of the Army problematical, 
particularly during 1854. 
An early casualty was Lieutenant Colonel Maule, a brother of Lord Panmure, 
while other senior officers included Brigadier Tylden, Purveyor Ward, Major General 
Estcourt, General Marmora, Sardinian Army, Rear Admiral Boxer, and Lieutenant 
Colonel Vico, the French Commissioner at the British Headquarters.
411
 Several 
contemporary reports, and later commentaries, have suggested that Lord Raglan died of 
cholera, although the evidence of for this is not compelling. 
The Gentleman’s Magazine recorded that cholera caused the death of four 
lieutenant colonels, six majors, ten captains, fourteen lieutenants, and three ensigns, 
while details of surgeons and support staff that died from the disease are summarized in 
Table 5.20. 
 
Cholera in the Royal Navy 
 
The data in the official history for cholera, diarrhoea, and dysentery among sailors in the 
Black Sea fleet during 1854-56 are summarized in Table 5.21. The mortality from 
cholera was not dissimilar to that recorded in infantry regiments but was considerably 
lower for both diarrhoea and dysentery.
412
 
The Royal Naval Brigade received support from the main fleet and was seemingly 
better managed than the Army because the CO, Captain Peel, ensured ‘they had better 
cooking facilities in the trenches, warmer clothing, and tarpaulin shelters to dry their 
clothes. […] By a proper watch bill each man spent part of the night under cover.’ Peel 
also paid particular attention to good sanitation and an uncontaminated water supply.’413 
In addition, the men were able to return to their ships for 24 hours every four days. 
The health benefits derived from Peel’s approach are illustrated by the comparison 
with the Army. Diarrhoea, dysentery, and cholera were all less important reasons for 
                                                 
411  Gentleman’s Magazine, 1854 & 1855: Maule, Oct., p. 390; Tylden, Nov., p. 534; Ward, Mar., p. 
328; Marmora & Boxer, July. pp. 93 & 95; Estcourt, Aug., p. 199; and Vico, Sep., p. 318. 
412  For further details on disease in the Royal Navy see Hinton (2009, 2011a). 
413  Lloyd & Coulter (1963), p. 147. 
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admission to hospital and the ratios of deaths to admissions were lower for diarrhoea 
and dysentery, though not cholera (Table 5.22). 
A detachment of Royal Marines served ashore from the end of September 1854. 
The mean strength of brigade was 1,353 of whom 212 (15.5%) died of disease. 





Cholera during 1856 
 
One incentive for repatriating troops as quickly as possible after hostilities ceased was 
the apprehension of an epidemic of cholera during 1856.
415
 In the event only thirteen 
cases were recorded in the Army during the first six months,
416
 and, as eleven occurred 
during the first quarter they may represent the final cases of the 1855 epidemic. 
There were twenty-three cases in Mediterranean Fleet during the year, with seven 
(30.4%) deaths. Most men became infected at Malta while a ‘few cases were contracted 
at Lisbon, where the malady was prevalent.’417 The comparable number of cases 





The epidemics of cholera in 1854 and 1855 were described at length in the M&SH,
418
 
and this, and other contemporary accounts generally agreed that the British Army and 
Royal Navy were cholera-free when they arrived in Turkey, and later in Bulgaria, and 
that the ‘pestilence’ was brought to the region by French troops.419 It was suggested at 
the time that the infection may have laid dormant following an epidemic in the 
Danubian Principalities some years previously although this is unlikely in view of what 
is now known on the subject, while an unreferenced suggestion made by Miles that it 
                                                 
414  BPP (1857), Session I, No. 71, pp. 63-4. 
415  M&SH, II, p. 45. 
416  M&SH, II, General Return A. 
417  BPP (1857-58), No. 71. 
418  M&SH, II, pp. 45-89. 
419  M&SH, II, pp. 46-7. 
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The epidemic was relatively simple to describe while the Army was in Bulgaria, 
but following the invasion it was more difficult to determine any pattern as the troops 
‘enjoyed too constant intercourse with every part of the camp to favour accurate 
analysis.’ This is a fair conclusion given that the men who manned the trenches were 
exposed to ‘an atmosphere, often unavoidably vitiated by the excretions of the masses 
engaged on such duty,’ and were also employed collecting supplies from Balaklava, a 
place ‘eminently favourable to the development and extension of cholera,’421 and had 
contact with the camps of the French and Turkish armies, and the sutlers’ bazaars. 
It was concluded that once ‘the choleraic poison had nearly exhausted itself on 
those who had been […] exposed to its influence […] it required […] fresh subjects 
upon which to develop its effects,’422 while the ‘most powerful predisposing cause’ was 
considered to be the ‘recent arrival of the soldiers.’423 There is considerable anecdotal 
evidence to support this assertion though multivariate analyses yielded limited statistical 
evidence suggesting a link between outbreaks and the receipt of large drafts of new 
troops, the ‘virgin soil’ model (Appendix 5.1), but this may be more a reflection of the 
inadequacy of the data available for analysis than an accurate assessment of events. 
During the height of the epidemic in Bulgaria an anonymous naval surgeon noted 
that ‘this alarming visitation, which may appear […] quite unprecedented [has] 
conformed to laws already ascertained.’424 This interesting conclusion prompts the 
question as to whether the cholera epidemic was worse in the British forces than might 
be expected in civilian populations and whether the exigencies of campaigning 
influenced the course of the epidemics. The short answer is a qualified ‘No’; for the 
following reasons:  
The role of shipping in the transmission of cholera was well recognised as it 
frequently appeared in ports and then spread inland along trade routes. That this 
                                                 
420  Miles (2009), p. 113. 
421  M&SH, II, pp. 75-6. 
422  M&SH, II, p. 66. This can be explained by the development of immunity in those suffering mild 
symptoms or remaining asymptomic. 
423  M&SH, II, p. 74. 
424  MT&G, 30 Sep. 1854. The correspondent’s view reflected that of Sutherland expressed a few 
years earlier, viz. ‘cholera is by no means so capricious in its attacks as has generally been 
supposed […] on the contrary it is propagated according to certain fixed laws, although the limits 
of these have not yet been precisely defined;’ Sutherland (1850). 
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obtained in Bulgaria was confirmed in the M&SH which noted ‘that the pestilence 
strongly affects the estuaries of sea coasts, the towns built upon them, the courses of 
rivers […] for its extension’ but as the distance from the sea and rivers increased ‘the 
tendency of the disease to spread and commit ravages reduced’, although this did not 
always hold good since the ‘extraordinary fact was noticed’ that the Highland Brigade 
quartered ‘nearest the lake on [ground previously] occupied by the Light Division, 
suffered much less […] than the Brigade of Guards.’425 Cholera subsequently 
accompanied the Army to the Crimea with deaths occurring on board ship and the 
march to Sevastopol. 
Half the patients died within two days of the admission to hospital with only 
c.10% surviving beyond a week. The fatality rates in the regiments, and on naval ships, 
were within the range previously recorded in epidemics though the incidence might 
have been relatively higher as the MOs would have reported a greater proportion of the 




The symptoms were similar to those in previous epidemics and the fatality rates 
were not affected by the troops being located ‘on a dry elevated mountain ridge, in a 
swampy malarious locality, or a filthy overcrowded town’,427 or being managed in an 
efficient, common-sense manner, as was the Naval Brigade (Table 5.23). 
Small outbreaks may last a few days or weeks, but larger epidemics usually 
persist for two or three months before gradually petering out; a situation that occurred in 
the epidemics involving the cavalry and ordnance in Bulgaria, and the whole army in 
the Crimea in 1855. The pestilence followed the Army to the Crimea with the majority 
of the cases being diagnosed in the infantry regiments. However, the course of this 
secondary epidemic, which was in part associated with the arrival of new regiments, 
followed the typical pattern and was over early in 1855. 
Anecdotal opinion suggested that severe diarrhoea made its appearance before 
cholera which implies that a fall in standards of camp hygiene facilitated the spread of 
cholera, although the MOs did not generally accept that contaminated water was the 
source of the ‘pestilence,’ a tragedy indeed, as otherwise many lives would have been 
saved by the simple expedient of boiling water used for drinking. 
                                                 
425  M&SH, II, p. 55. 
426  M&SH, II, p. 80. 
427  M&SH, II, p. 55. 
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Cholera would not be expected to persist year on year in non-endemic regions like 
the Crimea. Thus, the recording of only a few cases during the last months of the 
occupation is not unexpected, while the few cases involving Royal Navy personnel were 
associated with time spent ashore in Malta and Lisbon. 
Despite the hype occasioned at the time, the commentary in the M&SH began 
with the following simple statement: ‘Hitherto […] cholera was entirely an exceptional 
occurrence, the pestilence confining itself to small bodies of troops in camp, or on the 
line of march, appearing only for short periods, and generally in detached positions, but 
seldom constituting itself an agent of a widespread destruction.’428 Although this 
retrospective assessment may not be far from the truth, it would be naïve to suggest that 
cholera is not a devastating disease. What illness that can kill a healthy soldier within 
hours would not have a profound effect on the morale and strike fear into the hearts of 
even the bravest of men? However, to suggest that cholera ‘decimated’, i.e. killed 1 in 
10 of the Army, is an exaggeration,429 especially as several other diseases, particularly 
diarrhoea and dysentery, coupled with the effects of exposure, overwork, and 
malnutrition, exacted a more terrible toll than cholera on the hapless soldiery, 




Diarrhoea and dysentery were were the most common syndromes associated with 
deaths, especially during the winter of 1854-55. The general epidemiological features of 
both were similar, but differed from those of cholera. 
The improvement of living standards in the camps during the spring of 1855 was 
associated with a reduction in mortality and this was reflected in a simultaneous 
improvement in the Scutari hospitals during the weeks before the arrival of the Sanitary 
Commission. This suggests that the local conditions at Scutari were not themselves 
responsible for the high mortality but rather it was the receipt of patients from the 




                                                 
428  M&SH, II, p. 45. 
429  ‘Decimation’ was used by Smallman-Raynor & Cliffe (2004a); while Lloyd & Coulter (1963, p. 
141) concluded ‘cholera, and not malaria, which nearly destroyed the Army and Navy before 
hostilities began.’ 
430  H.B. (1856), pp. 26-8. 




Table 5.1: Principal reasons for the primary admission of NCOs and men to hospital, April 1854-June 
1856, together with rates of mortality for each category 


















(%) of all 
deaths 
Ratio (%) 
of deaths to 
admissions 
I Fever 4 31204 19 3446 19 11 
II Eruptive fever 4 29 - 6 - 20.5 
III Respiratory disease 9 12382 7.5 644 3.5 5 
IV Cardiovascular disease 6 266 - 41 - 15.5 
V Diseases of liver and 
spleen 
4 1138 0.5 40 - 3.5 
VI Gastrointestinal disease 13 55765 34 5950 33 10.5 
VII Nervous disease 7 736 0.5 160 1 21.5 
VIII Cholera 1 7574 4.5 4512 25 59.5 
IX Rheumatic disease 5 5131 3 233 1.5 4.5 
X Boils and ulcers 4 12542 7.5 37 - - 
XI Venereal disease 7 3717 2.5 4 - - 
XII Urogenital disease 9 270 - 6 - 2 
XIII Wounds and injuries 8 18283 11 1761 10 9.5 
XIV Punishment (Punitis) 1 1733 1 0 - - 
XV Frostbite 2 2398 1.5 463 2.5 19.5 
XVI Scurvy 1 2096 1.5 178 1 8.5 
XVII Eye disease 1 3307 2 0 - - 
XVIII Skin disease 1 749 - 1 - - 
XIX Other disease 
conditions 
34 3353 2 576 3 17 
Totals 121 162673  18058  11 
[M&SH, II, General Return A] 
 
 
Table 5.2: Gastrointestinal diseases diagnosed in NCOs and men, April 1854-June 1856 
Gastrointestinal disease 















(%) of all 
deaths 




VI Peritonitis 16 - 9 - 56 
Enteritis 36 - 11 - 30.5 
Dysentery 7882 12.5 2143 20.5 27 
Scorbutic 
dysentery 
396 0.5 116 1 29 
Diarrhoea 44164 70 3651 35 8.5 
Colic 1514 2.5 5 - - 
Gastritis 29 - 8 - 27.5 
Constipation 348 0.5 0 - - 
Haematemesis 15 - 2 - 13 
Haemorrhoids 358 0.5 0 - - 
Hernia 101 - 2 - 2 
Dyspepsia 906 1.5 3 - - 
VIII Cholera 7574 12 4512 43 59.5 
Totals 63339 100 10462 100 16.5 
[M&SH, II, General Return A] 
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Table 5.3: Admissions of NCOs and men with cholera, diarrhoea or dysentery into general hospitals in 








Cholera Diarrhoea Dysentery 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4 
II Varna, 
Bulgaria 




5686 333 5.9 141 42.3 1282 22.5 99 7.7 377 6.6 36 9.6 
IV Castle, 
Crimea 
2554 6 0.2 2 33.3 90 3.5 2 2.2 31 1.2 1 3.2 
V Camp, 
Crimea 




911 0 - 0 - 157 17.2 5 3.2 76 8.3 7 9.2 
I Scutari, 
Turkey 








1887 0 - 0 - 272 14.4 52 19.1 73 3.9 15 20.5 
IX Renkoi, 
Turkey 













142372 5590 3.9 3033 54.2 32698 23.0 1305 4.0 6167 4.3 738 11.9 
[M&SH, II, General Hospital Returns I-IX and General Return A and I, Regimental histories] 
C1: No. of cases; C2: Proportion (%) of admissions; C3: No. of deaths; C4: Proportion (%) of deaths. 
* The total admissions for General Return A is less that all the other hospitals combined (162,673 cf. 221,016) 
presumable because some patients were treated in more than one hospital. 
† The totals excluded admissions and deaths in General Hospitals that were recorded for each regiment. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Admissions for, and deaths from, cholera in the Guards Brigade 
Regiment Regimental hospitals General hospitals and elsewhere 
Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths 
Grenadier Guards 163 107 68 43 
Coldstream Guard 118 75 16 22 
Scots Fusilier Guards 252 141 10 21 




Table 5.5: Admissions for, and deaths from, diarrhoea and acute and chronic dysentery in the Guards 
Brigade 




Deaths in general 
hospitals and 
elsewhere 




Diarrhoea 1237 148 109 39 
Ac 
dysentery 
74 10 3 7 
Ch 
dysentery 
2 60 60 0 
Coldstream 
Guards 
Diarrhoea 1235 196 134 62 
Ac 
dysentery 
52 3 1 2 
Ch 
dysentery  
0 59 59 0 
Scots Fusilier 
Guards 
Diarrhoea 1038 86 84 2 
Ac 
dysentery 
121 56 17 39 
Ch 
dysentery  
0 62 62 0 




Table 5.6: Ratio (%) of the deaths of NCOs and men from cholera, diarrhoea, and dysentery to the total 
number of deaths from disease, April 1854-June 1856 













1854 Apr. 5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
May 21 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
June 17 1 5.9 1 5.9 0 0.0 11.8 
July 380 285 75.0 12 3.2 8 2.1 80.3 
Aug. 855 611 71.5 36 4.2 18 2.1 77.8 
Sep. 857 575 67.1 52 6.1 19 2.2 75.4 
Oct. 630 273 43.3 115 18.3 38 6.0 67.6 
Nov. 947 423 44.7 233 24.6 116 12.2 81.5 
Dec 1852 651 35.2 573 30.9 298 16.1 82.2 
1855 Jan. 3080 71 2.3 1199 38.9 832 27.0 68.2 
Feb. 2478 12 0.5 754 30.4 473 19.1 50.0 
Mar. 1375 0 0.0 326 23.7 185 13.5 37.2 
Apr. 534 5 0.9 74 13.9 60 11.2 26.0 
May 545 261 47.9 46 8.4 30 5.5 61.8 
June 833 625 75.0 38 4.6 9 1.1 80.7 
July 414 205 49.5 45 10.9 19 4.6 65.0 
Aug. 505 287 56.8 55 10.9 33 6.5 74.3 
Sep. 207 40 19.3 32 15.5 46 22.2 57.0 
Oct. 145 44 30.3 21 14.5 24 16.6 61.4 
Nov. 209 110 52.6 19 9.1 13 6.2 67.9 
Dec 118 29 24.6 11 9.3 11 9.3 43.2 
1856 Jan. 90 4 4.4 5 5.6 3 3.3 13.3 
Feb. 42 0 0.0 1 2.4 8 19.0 21.4 
Mar. 47 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 4.3 4.3 
Apr. 38 0 0.0 1 2.6 2 5.3 7.9 
May 27 0 0.0 2 7.4 0 0.0 7.4 
June 5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
[M&SH, II, General Return A] 
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Table 5.7: Deaths from cholera in regimental hospitals of the infantry and cavalry, April 1854-June 1856 
Corps 
(No. of regiments) 
 1854 
Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
Initial besieging 
force; B+ (21)* 
No. of deaths 0 0 20 152 336 265 138 204 281 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
- - 1.0 7.4 17.0 16.1 9.3 14.2 21.6 
Initial besieging 
force; B- (7)* 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA 37 151 38 18 35 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA 9.9 30.3 8.2 4.0 9.6 
Infantry joining 
in Nov. (4)† 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 126 145 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 44.1 59.1 
Infantry joining 
in Dec. (4)‡ 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 113 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 41.3 
Infantry joining 
in Jan. (3)§ 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Infantry joining 
Apr.-Sep. (9)# 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Highland 
Brigade; B+ (3)$ 
No. of deaths 0 0 0 7 32 52 39 41 12 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
- - - 2.4 11.5 18.5 15.9 16.9 4.7 
Cavalry Division; 
B+ (10)¶ 
No. of deaths NA NA 0 0 13 93 42 33 8 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA - - 4.7 35.9 17.9 14.3 3.9 
Cavalry Division; 
1855 (4)¶ 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Corps 
(No. of regiments) 
 1855 
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. 
Initial besieging 
force; B+ (21)* 
No. of deaths 21 5 0 2 68 191 38 90 3 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
1.6 0.4 - 1.3 5.2 13.8 2.7 6.0 0.2 
Initial besieging 
force; B- (7)* 
No. of deaths 1 1 0 0 10 21 10 11 0 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
0.3 0.3 - - 3.3 6.1 2.8 3.3 - 
Infantry joining 
in Nov. (4)† 
No. of deaths 13 1 0 0 10 17 5 13 0 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
7.6 0.5 - - 5.8 9.5 2.9 7.6 - 
Infantry joining 
in Dec. (4)‡ 
No. of deaths 17 2 0 2 17 48 8 14 0 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
5.7 0.7 - 0.7 6.0 17.4 3.0 5.1 - 
Infantry joining 
in Jan. (3)§ 
No. of deaths 10 1 0 0 12 37 9 9 0 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
4.5 0.4 - - 5.4 17.1 4.4 4.1 - 
Infantry joining 
Apr.-Sep. (9)# 
No. of deaths NA NA NA 0 68 95 33 48 18 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA - 22.0 27.1 12.2 9.4 2.8 
Highland 
Brigade; B+ (3)$ 
No. of deaths 5 0 0 0 2 17 4 12 0 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
2.2 - - - 1.3 8.8 1.7 5.7 - 
Cavalry Division; 
B+ (10)¶ 
No. of deaths 3 0 0 0 0 1 24 22 24 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
1.6 - - - - 0.4 8.0 7.1 6.4 
Cavalry Division; 
1855 (4)¶ 
No. of deaths NA NA NA 0 4 17 17 27 14 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 




Table 5.7: Continued 
Corps  1855 1856 
(No. of regiments) Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June 
Initial besieging 
force; B+ (21)* 
No. of deaths 19 23 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength 1.3 1.5 0.2 - - - - - - 
Initial besieging 
force; B- (7)* 
No. of deaths 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength - 0.7 0.25 - - - - - - 
Infantry joining 
in Nov. (4)† 
No. of deaths 1 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength 0.6 1.1 - 2.2 - - - - - 
Infantry joining 
in Dec. (4)‡ 
No. of deaths 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength - 2.5 - - - - - - - 
Infantry joining 
in Jan. (3)§ 
No. of deaths 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength 0.9 1.7 - - - - - - - 
Infantry joining 
Apr.-Sep. (9)# 
No. of deaths 9 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength 1.3 1.0 1.1 - - - - - - 
Highland 
Brigade; B+ (3)$ 
No. of deaths 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength - - 3.9 - - - - - - 
Cavalry Division; 
B+ (10)¶ 
No. of deaths 3 0 32 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength 0.8 - 7.6 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cavalry Division; 
1855 (4)¶ 
No. of deaths 0 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength - 9.8 0.5 - - - - - - 
[Adapted from the tables in the regimental histories in the M&SH, I] 
NA Not applicable. 
* B+, served in Bulgaria: Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Scots Fusilier Guards; 1st bn, 1st Regiment; 7th, 
19th, 23rd, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 38th, 41st, 44th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 55th, 77th, 88th, 95th Regiments, and 2nd bn, Rifle Brigade. 
 B-, from Turkey or direct by sea: 4th 20th, 21st, 57th, 63rd, 68th, and 1st bn Rifle Brigade. 
† The 9th, 46th, 62nd, and 97th Regiments. The hospital admissions of two companies of the 46th Regiment that 
landed in September have been excluded from the analysis. 
‡ The 17th, 18th, 34th, 89th, and 90th Regiments. No hospital admissions were recorded for the 18th Regiment in 
December and so it has been included with the January arrivals. The 71st Regiment, which arrived in December 
1854 and February 1855, has been omitted as it was stationed at Kertch following its occupation by the Allies. 
§ The 14th and 39th Regiments. 
# These regiments comprised the 2nd bn, 1st , 3rd, and 48th (arrived during April), 31st (May), 13th and 72nd (June), 
56th (August), and 82nd and 92nd (September). 
$ Balaklava defences: 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Regiments; all of which landed from Bulgaria. 
¶ B+: Heavy Brigade: 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons; Light Brigade: 4th and 13th Light 
Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars, and 17th Lancers. 
 1855: These regiments comprised the 10th Hussars (arrived during April), 12th Lancers (May), and 1st and 6th 




Table 5.8: Deaths from diarrhoea or dysentery in regimental hospitals of the infantry and cavalry, April 
1854-June 1856 
Corps 
(No. of regiments) 
 1854 
Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
Initial besieging 
force ; B+ (21)* 
No. of deaths 0 0 0 1 19 3 6 48 108 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
- - - <0.1 1.0 0.2 0.4 3.3 8.3 
Initial besieging 
force ; B- (7)* 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA 3 1 1 37 85 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA 0.8 0.2 0.2 8.2 23.4 
Infantry joining 
in Nov. (4)† 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.2 52 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.7 21.2 
Infantry joining 
in Dec. (4)‡ 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 17 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 6.2 
Infantry joining 
in Jan. (3)§ 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Infantry joining 
Apr.-Sep. (9)# 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Highland 
Brigade; B+ (3)$ 
No. of deaths 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 19 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
- - - 0.3 - - - 1.6 7.4 
Cavalry Division; 
B+ (10)¶ 
No. of deaths NA NA 0 0 1 7 0 5 11 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA - - 0.4 2.7 - 2.2 5.3 
Cavalry Division; 
1855 (4)¶ 
No. of deaths NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 





Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. 
Initial besieging 
force ; B+ (21)* 
No. of deaths 403 230 105 17 6 5 8 8 6 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
30.2 18.7 8.9 1.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Initial besieging 
force ; B- (7)* 
No. of deaths 96 45 20 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
32.4 15.2 7.7 0.3 - 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 
Infantry joining 
in Nov. (4)† 
No. of deaths 106 43 18 7 2 3 0 2 2 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
49.3 19.7 10.5 3.9 1.1 1.7 - 1.2 1.1 
Infantry joining 
in Dec. (4)‡ 
No. of deaths 72 40 17 8 6 3 5 3 1 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
24.3 13.1 5.4 2.9 2.1 1.1 1.9 1.1 0.4 
Infantry joining 
in Jan. (3)§ 
No. of deaths 3 6 3 1 1 1 3 3 0 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
1.4 2.4 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.4 - 
Infantry joining 
Apr.-Sep. (9)# 
No. of deaths NA NA NA 1 7 9 9 4 3 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
NA NA NA 0.7 2.3 2.6 2.1 0.8 0.5 
Highland 
Brigade; B+ (3)$ 
No. of deaths 19 13 14 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
8.5 5.9 6.6 - - 1.0 - - - 
Cavalry Division; 
B+ (10)¶ 
No. of deaths 4 11 7 4 1 0 0 6 7 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 
2.1 6.3 4.0 2.6 0.5 - - 1.9 1.9 
Cavalry Division; 
55 (4)¶ 
No. of deaths NA NA NA 1 2 0 2 2 2 
Proportion (‰) of 
strength 





Table 5.8: Continued 
Corps  1855 1856 
(No. of regiments) Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June 
Initial besieging 
force ; B+ (21)* 
No. of deaths 7 7 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 - - <0.1 - 
Initial besieging 
force ; B- (7)* 
No. of deaths 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength - 0.25 - 0.25 - - 0.2 - - 
Infantry joining 
in Nov. (4)† 
No. of deaths 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength - - - 0.6 - - - - - 
Infantry joining 
in Dec. (4)‡ 
No. of deaths 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength - - - - - - - - - 
Infantry joining 
in Jan. (3)§ 
No. of deaths 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength - - - - - - - - - 
Infantry joining 
Apr.-Sep. (9)# 
No. of deaths 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength 0.4 0.6 - - - - - - - 
Highland 
Brigade; B+ (3)$ 
No. of deaths 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength - - - - - - - - - 
Cavalry Division; 
B+ (10)¶ 
No. of deaths 7 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength 1.9 0.8 0.2 0.2 - - - - - 
Cavalry Division; 
1855 (4)¶ 
No. of deaths 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Proportion (‰) of strength 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 - - - - - 
[Adapted from the tables in the regimental histories in the M&SH, I] 
NA Not applicable. 
* B+, served in Bulgaria: Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Scots Fusilier Guards; 1st bn, 1st Regiment; 7th, 
19th, 23rd, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 38th, 41st, 44th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 55th, 77th, 88th, 95th Regiments, and 2nd bn, Rifle Brigade. 
 B-, from Turkey or direct by sea: 4th 20th, 21st, 57th, 63rd, 68th, and 1st bn Rifle Brigade. 
† The 9th, 46th, 62nd, and 97th Regiments. The hospital admissions of two companies of the 46th Regiment that 
landed in September have been excluded from the analysis. 
‡ The 17th, 18th, 34th, 89th, and 90th Regiments. No hospital admissions were recorded for the 18th Regiment in 
December and so it has been included with the January arrivals. The 71st Regiment, which arrived in December 
1854 and February 1855, has been omitted as it was stationed at Kertch following its occupation by the Allies. 
§ The 14th and 39th Regiments. 
# These regiments comprised the 2nd bn, 1st , 3rd, and 48th (arrived during April), 31st (May), 13th and 72nd (June), 
56th (August), and 82nd and 92nd (September). 
$ Balaklava defences: 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Regiments, all of which landed from Bulgaria. 
¶ B+: Heavy Brigade: 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons; Light Brigade: 4th and 13th Light 
Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars, and 17th Lancers. 
 1855: These regiments comprised the 10th Hussars (arrived during April), 12th Lancers (May), and 1st and 6th 




Table 5.9: Median and range of admissions of NCOs and men with cholera to regimental hospitals per 
1,000, July 1854-February 1855 
Army formation joining: 1854 
July August September October 
From Bulgaria Cavalry 11 (0-23) 37 (10-215) 14 (0-132) 25 (3-48) 
Infantry 7 (0-47) 19 (5-69) 28 (9-92) 12 (0-33) 
Highland Brigade* - - - 24 (13-34) 
In September Infantry - 9 (4-68) 79 (24-224) 9 (0-41) 
 1854 1855 
November December January February 
From Bulgaria Cavalry 6 (0-18) 0 (0-10) 0 0 
Infantry 21.5 (1-102) 30.5 (3-63) 0 (0-39) 0 (0-6) 
Highland Brigade 20 (3-42) 6 (6-15) 1 (0-3) 0 
In September Infantry 6 (2-11) 11.5 (0-28) 0 (0-3) 0 (0-4) 
In November 44.5 (33-340) 62.5 (16-232) 2.5 (0-48) 1.5 (0-4) 
In December - 69 (27-81) 0 (0-22) 0 
In January - - 10 (2-10) 0 
[Summarized from M&SH, I, Regimental histories, and illustrated in Figure 5.9] 








Table 5.10: Median and range of admissions of NCOs and men with diarrhoea and dysentery to 
regimental hospitals per 1,000, July 1854-April 1855 
Army formations joining: 1854 









228 (100-389) 188.5 (85-
288) 
Infantry 45 (7-218) 105 (30-
248) 





- - - 83 (72-135) 93 (23-117) 
In 
September 
Infantry - 33.5 (9-137) 46.5 (13-
254) 




- - - - 7 (11-180) 
 1854 1855 






































In December 173 (96-332) 237 (112-
297) 
74 (35-131) 19 (11-44) 20(2-23) 
In January - 122 (100-
158) 
74 (69-136) 75 (43-113) 12 (10-30) 
[Summarized from M&SH, I, Regimental histories, and illustrated in Figure 5.10] 









Table 5.11: Median and range of the deaths of NCOs and men from cholera in regimental hospitals per 
1,000, July 1854-February 1855 
Army formations joining: 1854 
July August September October 
From Bulgaria Cavalry 1.5 (0-14) 18 (0-133) 7 (0-96) 14 (0-33) 
Infantry 4.5 (0-25) 13 (2.5-41) 16 (4-42) 5.5 (0-23) 
Highland Brigade* - - - 16 (8.5-21) 
In September Infantry - 3 (0-27) 29 (14-69) 6.5 (1.5-23) 
 1854 1855 
November December January February 
From Bulgaria Cavalry 4 (0-12) 0 0 0 
Infantry 12 (1.5-55) 17 (4.5-59) 0 (0-12) 0 (0-3) 
Highland Brigade 22 (3-24) 3.5 (2-10) 1.5 (0-2) 0 
In September Infantry 4 (1-7) 8.5 (0-18) 0 (0-1.5) 0 (0-2) 
In November 26 (11-104) 45 (16-176) 2.5 (0-24) 0 
In December - 46 (16-62) 3.5 (1.5-12.5) 0 
In January - - 3 (1-9.5) 0 
[Summarized from M&SH, I, Regimental histories] 









Table 5.12: Median and range of the deaths of NCOs and men from diarrhoea and dysentery in regimental 




July August September October November 
From 
Bulgaria 
Cavalry 0 (0-3.5) 0 (0-11) 0 0 (0-8) 4 (0-21) 
Infantry 0 (0-1) 0 (0-3.5) 0 (0-2) 0 (0-3.5) 2 (0-16) 
Highland Brigade* - - - 0 1.5 (1-3) 
In 
September 
Infantry - 0 (0-3) 0 (0-1) 0 (0-1.5) 3.5 (1.5-10) 
In 
November 
- - - - 0 (0-3.5) 
 1854 1855 
December January February March April 
From 
Bulgaria 
Cavalry 0 (0-13) 6 (0-15) 2.5 (0-13) 0 (0-12) 0 (0-5) 
Infantry 6 (0-20) 28 (3.5-
133) 
18 (0-66) 5 (0-99) 0 (0-8) 
Highland Brigade 9.5 (3.5-10) 7.5 (6-11) 7 (3-7.5) 6 (3-10) 0 
In 
September 
Infantry 15.5 (7-77) 29 (17-523) 12 (0-37) 5.5 (0-23) 0 (0-2) 
In 
November 
18 (8.5-52) 48 (13-108) 18 (13-36) 13 (0-14) 3.5 (0-8.5) 
In December 1.5 (0-17) 26 (3-38) 11 (1-36) 7 (4-9) 3 (0-5) 
In January - 1 (0-3) 0 (0-7) 1 (0-2.5) 0 (0-1.5) 
[Summarized from M&SH, I, Regimental histories and illustrated in Figure 5.11] 








Table 5.13: Median ratio (%) of cholera deaths to admissions to regimental hospitals of NCOs and men in 




July August September October 
From Bulgaria Cavalry 57 67 68 71 
Infantry 59 68 50 64 
Highland Brigade* - - - 67 
In September Infantry - 50 42 64 
 1854 1855 
November December January February 
From Bulgaria Cavalry 50 0 0 0 
Infantry 50 75 50 50 
Highland Brigade 100 60 100 0 
In September Infantry 61 69 50 50 
In November 41 88 75 0 
In December - 64 58 0 
In January - - 50 0 
[Summarized from M&SH, I, Regimental histories] 








Table 5.14: Median ratio (%) of diarrhoea and dysentery deaths to admissions to regimental hospitals of 




July August September October November 
From Bulgaria Cavalry 3.5 5 0 3 3.5 
Infantry 9.5 1.5 2 1 3 
Highland Brigade* - - - 0 3 
In September Infantry - 33 1 1.5 3.5 
In November - - - - 2 
 1854 1855 
December January February March April 
From Bulgaria Cavalry 6 10.5 40 58 50 
Infantry 4.5 16.5 23 33 18 
Highland Brigade 16 10 25 2 0 
In September Infantry 9.5 16.5 30 33 25 
In November 6.5 17 20 35 34 
In December 10 10.5 15 33 21 
In January - 1.5 9.5 3.5 11 
[Summarized from M&SH, I, Regimental histories] 








Table 5.15: Median (range) number of admissions for cholera per 1,000 in the infantry regiments that 
landed in the Crimea during September 1854 
Month 
(1854-55) 











































































[Adapted from M&SH, I, Regimental histories] 
* These regiments went directly to the Crimea. 
 
 
Table 5.16: Admissions to, and deaths from, diarrhoea and dysentery in regimental hospitals and the 
general hospitals in Scutari, Varna, Balaklava, and Abydos, June 1854-May 1855 
 1854 1855 
June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May 
Regimental 
hospitals 
Admissions 214 1698 3152 2011 3630 2872 4777 4658 2045 955 383 688 
Deaths 0 3 27 4 14 86 284 757 405 200 37 15 
Cumulative 
deaths (%) 
- 0.2 1.6 1.9 2.6 7.3 22.8 64.1 86.2 97.2 99.2 100 
Ratio (%) 
Dths:Ads 
34/7075 (0.5) 1141/15973 (7.2) 657/4071 (16.1) 
Scutari Admissions 22 69 85 654 696 946 1650 1458 837 681 303 232 
Deaths 0 4 5 26 55 153 364 841 681 226 85 17 
Cumulative 
deaths (%) 
- 0.2 0.4 1.4 3.7 9.9 24.7 58.9 86.7 95.8 99.3 100 
Ratio (%) 
Dths:Ads 
35/830 (4.2) 1413/4750 (29.7) 1009/2053 (49.1) 
Varna Admissions 11 161 142 395 132 33 10 2 - - - - 
Deaths 1 7 9 36 10 9 0 0 - - - - 
Ratio (%) 
Ads:Dths  
53/709 (7.5) 19/177 (10.7) - 
Balaklava Admissions - - - - 230 230 247 340 100 64 14 35 
Deaths - - - - 16 24 31 19 10 13 3 4 
Ratio (%) 
Ads:Dths  
- 90/ 1047 (8.6) 30/213 (14.1) 
Abydos Admissions - - - - - - 99 4 51 3 51 2 
Deaths - - - - - - 1 4 8 7 9 5 
Ratio (%) 
Ads:Dths  
- 5/103 (4.9) 29/102 (27.1) 
[Summarized from M&SH, I, Regimental histories and II, General Hospital Returns, I-III, & VII] 
 
 -185- 
Table 5.17: Interval between admission to hospital and the death of NCOs and men dying from cholera 
Time to death Number of fatalities (Cumulative %) 
Corps Total 
Cavalry Guards Infantry 
<12 hours 63 (20) 15 (4) 334 (12) 412 (12) 
12-23 hours 62 (41) 17 (9) 422 (27) 502 (27) 
2 days 82 (67) 72 (31) 667 (50) 821 (50) 
3 days 13 (77) 86 (56) 431 (65) 547 (65) 
4 days 17 (82) 43 (69) 248 (74) 308 (74) 
5 days 14 (87) 30 (78) 184 (81) 228 (81) 
6 days 15 (92) 13 (82) 144 (86) 172 (86) 
7 days 6 (94) 11 (85) 102 (89) 119 (89) 
≥8 days 19 (100) 50 (100) 303 (100) 372 (100) 
Total 308 337 2836 3481 
[Adapted from M&SH, II, General Return C] 
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Table 5.18: Number of patients in cavalry, Guards and infantry regiments dying each week during the 
weeks following admission to hospital 
Corps Time to 
death 
(days) 









Cavalry ≤6 289 (94) 19 (11) 21 (13) 9 (31) 18 (38) 10 (50) 
7-13 19 (100) 36 (30) 53 (45) 1 (34) 7 (53) 1 (55) 
14-20 0 19 (41) 26 (60) 3 (45) 2 (57) 1 (60) 
21-27 0 17 (50) 16 (70) 2 (52) 4 (66) 2 (70) 
28-34 0 14 (58) 8 (75) 3 (62) 5 (77) 1 (75) 
35-41 0 19 (69) 9 (80) 1 (66) 3 (83) 1 (80) 
≥42 0 57 (100) 33 (100) 10 (100) 8 (100) 4 (100) 
Total 308 181 166 29 47 20 
Guards ≤6 278 (85) 41 (9) 31 (10) 5 (25) 21 (26) 34 (31) 
7-13 50 (100) 103 (31) 107 (41) 8 (65) 12 (41) 19 (49) 
14-20 0 130 (60) 76 (69) 1 (70) 10 (53) 21 (69) 
21-27 0 62 (73) 41 (82) 2 (80) 10 (65) 7 (75) 
28-34 0 57 (86) 25 (90) 0 12 (80) 11 (85) 
35-41 0 25 (91) 13 (94) 3 (95) 10(93) 4 (89) 
≥42 0 40 (100) 18 (100) 2 (100) 6 (100) 12 (100) 
Total 328 458 311 21 81 108 
Infantry ≤6 2537 (89) 430 (17) 385 (22) 86 (28) 167 (29) 608 (57) 
7-13 303 (100) 551 (40) 488 (51) 57 (47) 74 (42) 197 (75) 
14-20 0 477 (59) 310 (69) 42 (61) 88 (58) 93 (84) 
21-27 0 298 (71) 196 (80) 33 (72) 62 (68) 45 (88) 
28-34 0 220 (80) 117 (87) 28 (81) 41 (76) 49 (93) 
35-41 0 159(87) 69 (91) 15 (86) 49 (84) 21 (94) 
≥42 0 322 (100) 162 (100) 43 (100) 90 (100) 59 (100) 
Total 2840 2467 1727 304 571 1072 
All corps ≤6 3104 (89) 490 (16) 437 (20) 100 (28) 206 (29) 652 (54) 
7-13 372 (100) 690 (38) 648 (49) 66 (47) 93 (43) 217 (72) 
14-20 0 626 (58) 412 (68 ) 46 (60) 100 (57) 115 (82) 
21-27 0 377 (71) 253 (79) 37(70) 76 (68) 54 (86) 
28-34 0 291 (80) 150 (86) 31 (79) 58 (76) 61 (92) 
35-41 0 203(86) 91 (90) 19 (84) 62 (85) 26 (94) 
≥42 0 419 (100) 213 (100) 55 (100) 104 (100) 75 (100) 
Total 3476 3906 2204 354 699 1200 
[Adapted from the M&SH, II, General Return C] 
* >99% would have been due to diarrhoea or dysentery; see M&SH, II, General Return A. 
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Month Admissions* Deaths Deaths/Admissions (%) 
Cav. Ord. Inf. Cav. Ord. Inf. Cav. Ord. Inf. 
1: 1854-55 June 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 - 100 
July 22 13 414 13 9 263 59 69 64 
Aug. 165 62 711 93 45 473 56 73 67 
Sep. 67 51 1114 42 22 511 63 43 46 
Oct. 53 32 360 33 24 216 62 75 60 
Nov 15 21 802 8 17 398 53 81 50 
Dec. 4 32 830 3 33 615 75  
100 
74 
Jan. 0 3 98 0 1 70 - 71 
Feb. 0 0 11 0 1 11 - 100 
Total 326 215 4342 192 152 2558 59 71 59 
2: 1855 Apr. 1 1 5 0 1 4 - 100 80 
May 7 64 355 5 43 213 71 67 60 
Jun 101 237 790 44 158 423 44 67 54 
Jul 63 58 176 36 38 131 57 66 74 
Aug. 91 52 304 51 38 198 56 73 65 
Sep. 19 5 39 17 2 21 89 40 54 
Oct. 2 13 68 0 9 35 - 69 51 
Total 284 430 1737 153 289 1025 54 67 59 
[Summarized from M&SH, II, p. 88] 




Table 5.20: Medical officers and other members of the Army Medical Department who died of cholera 
Year and month 
of death 
Name and rank Abstracts of obituary notices in the Gentleman’s Magazine, and other 
sources 
1854/55 Aug. Assistant Surgeon E. 
A. Jenkin, 23rd Regt 
At Monastir, near Varna. Born in Swansea […] successful in the 
treatment of yellow fever in Jamaica and cholera in Malta and the 
Ionian Islands. 
1st Class Staff 
Surgeon Pitcairn, 
MD 
At Kotlubie, near Varna. Late of the 5th Dragoon Guards. 
Assistant Surgeon F. 
Y. Shegog, MD, 
88th Regt 
At Varna. He had been of the utmost service to the regiment during an 
epidemic of yellow fever in the West Indies, and is described in The 
Lancet, as a ‘most trustworthy and well informed correspondent.’ 
Sep. Surgeon F. C. 
Huthwaite, GG. 
On HMS Apollo, on passage to Balaklava. The cholera was brought on 
by arduous duties after the Alma. Served 30 years on full pay.’ 
Assistant Surgeon J. 
A. Shorrock, 1st Bn, 
Rifle Brigade 
Died in the Crimea. 
R. J. Mackenzie, 
MD 
A civilian surgeon attached to the 79th Regiment. He went with the 
Army to gain experience died shortly after the Alma at which he was 
present. 
Oct. Staff Assistant 
Surgeon A. R. Reid 
At Balaklava on board Cornwall, aged 24. 
Assistant Surgeon H. 
Beckwith, 49th Regt 
On the heights of Sebastopol, aged 30. Eldest son of the late Revd 
Henry Arthur Beckwith, MA, vicar of Collingham, Yorkshire. 
Assistant Surgeon J. 
Thomson, MD, 44th 
Regt 
At Balaklava. He remained behind to tend the wounded after the battle 
of the Alma. A monument to his memory was subsequently erected at 
Cromarty, his birth place. (His name is spelt ‘Thompson’ in some 
documents.) 
Nov. Staff Surgeon G. H. 
Reade 
The Principal Apothecary at Scutari. He served in the Peninsular War 
(1812-14), the American War, including the affair of Plattsburg, and 
Canada during the insurrection. He received the war medal with four 
clasps for San Sebastian, Nivelle, Nive, and others. 
He had medical rank although not medically qualified, having joined 
the Army as an apothecary during 1813. One son, John, served as an 
assistant surgeon in the Crimea, while another, Herbert, was awarded 
the VC when a staff surgeon during the Indian Mutiny. 
June Acting Assistant 
Surgeon A. Sibbald 
Died at Cape Cunekoi, near Constantinople. 
Surgeon R. P. 
Chapman, RN 
Before Sevastopol while serving with the Naval Brigade. 
L Ormerod At Balaklava, aged 23. Son of the late Lawrence Ormerod, Esq., of 
Bankside, Rossendale, Lancashire. A civilian attached to Omar 
Pasha’s Army. 
July Acting Assistant 
Surgeon J. H. White, 
3rd Regt 
Before Sebastopol, of fever after cholera, aged 28. Third son of the late 
Revd Wm. White of Wolverhampton. 
Aug. Acting Assistant 
Surgeon J. 
Longmore, 19th Regt 
At Sebastopol. Third son of Tho. Longmore, Esq., surgeon, London. 
His name is on the regimental memorial in York Minster. His brother, 
Thomas Longmore, served as a surgeon on the same regiment. 
Nov. Acting Assistant 
Staff Surgeon H. W. 
Wood 
In the hospital at Scutari. Second son of R. R. Wood, of Bramford. 
Dispenser J. M. 
Beveridge, MPS 
At Scutari. Previously employed at the Ordnance Hospital, Woolwich. 
Acting Assistant 
Surgeon J. Mayne 
At Scutari. 
Deputy IGH A. 
McGrigor, MD 
Reported to have died of cholera at Scutari, where he was buried. (His 
name is also spelt McGregor) 
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Table 5.21: Ratio of deaths (%) to cases with cholera, diarrhoea, and dysentery in the Black Sea Fleet, 
1854-56 













1854 760 (58.5) 409 (58) 4573 (352) 4 (0.1) 238 (18) 21 (9) 
1855 71 (4.75) 71 (100) 3883 (262) 33 (1) 315 (21) 54 (17) 
1856 23 (2) 7 (30) 1498 (126) 3 (0.2) 56 (5) 8 (14) 
[BPP (1857), Session I, No. 71, pp.7 & 65] 
* Per 1,000 mean strength; † Proportion (%) of cases. 
 
Table 5.22: Comparison of the mortality from gastrointestinal diseases in the Navy Brigade and the 




Cholera Diarrhoea Dysentery 
Admissions 
(% of total 
admissions 
Deaths 
(% of cholera 
admissions) 
Admissions 















1921 44 (2.5) 23 (52.5) 1076 (56) 4 (0.5) 28 (1.5) 0 
Army 39755 5861 (14.5) 3428 (58.5) 33879 (85) 3542 (10.5) 6955 (17.5) 2167 (31) 
 [BPP (1857), Session 1, No. 71, p. 40 and M&SH, II, General Return A] 








Figure 5.1: Primary admissions of NCOs and men with cholera, diarrhoea, and dysentery to hospital, 
April 1854-June 1856 
 
 










Figure 5.4: Proportions of all deaths due to disease which were associated with cholera, diarrhoea, and 
dysentery, April 1854-June 1856 
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Figure 5.5: Deaths from cholera among NCOs and men in infantry regiments engaged in siege operations 












Figure 5.7: Deaths from diarrhoea and dysentery among NCOs and men in infantry regiments engaged in 



































Figure 5.10: Monthly rate of admissions of NCOs and men with diarrhoea and dysentery to regimental 































Figure 5.11: Monthly mortality rate among NCOs and men with diarrhoea and dysentery, in regimental 
















































Figure 5.13: Cumulative mortality (%) among NCOs and men with diarrhoea and dysentery in regimental 





Figure 5.14: Cumulative proportion (%) of admissions for cholera in the cavalry, ordnance, and infantry, 











Appendix 5.1: Multivariate analysis, coupled with 
multidimensional scaling 
 
The description of the cholera epidemic in the M&SH has been evaluated using a multivariate analysis, 
coupled with multidimensional scaling, with the aim of explaining how the infection spread.
432
 This 
sophisticated approach allowed the sequence of events in Bulgaria to be expressed graphically although it 
yielded little more information than could be ascertained by reading the original texts, viz. that the 
occupancy of camps in Varna and secondarily Devna, contributed to the spread of cholera to other 
localities as regiments were relocated, partly for military reasons, and partly with the hope of escaping the 
‘pestilence. The limited detail in the records made it impossible to determine the ‘exact role of non-
British military contingents and local populations […] in the more general diffusion of cholera in 
Bulgaria.’433 
The situation in the Crimea was more complex and proved difficult to explain. The regimental 
histories provided summary information on a monthly basis by and large when information on a weekly 
basis or even daily would appear to be essential for investigating a disease like cholera which has a short 
incubation period so that episodes recorded in the same month could have occurred over three weeks 
apart. 
The authors stated that ‘rapid moving’ cholera outbreaks were found in regiments at Sevastopol 
had previously served in Bulgaria and those the 4th Division, in essence the initial besieging force, and 
which had low draft rates, although what this meant was not defined in the paper. 
One of the conclusions made was that there was an apparent ‘lack of statistical association 
between draft size and epidemic magnitude’ but is not explained how (1) the cumulative cholera case rate 
per 100 mean strength was calculated, and (2) the size of the drafts was determined given that the M&SH 
provided no consistent information about the numbers of men joining each regiment, and, it is almost 
certainly incomplete given the many reports of the arrival in Balaklava of new recruits and convalescents 
scattered through WO/28, particularly the AG’s and QMG’s papers, and no comprehensive information 
on this topic appears to have been published, at least at the regimental level. 
The principal conclusions of the authors were: (1) Rapidly moving cholera outbreaks were found 
in regiments in the static camps before Sevastopol which had (A) been present in Bulgaria, possibly 
because this had had a detrimental effect on the general health of the regiments, (B) received only small 
drafts of reinforcements, and (C) spent time in the camp of the 4
th
 Division, possibly due to a lack of 
acclimatization as this was the last division to arrive in the East, and went directly to the Crimea; and (2) 
Despite the general opinion of the medical staff that cholera was more prevalent in newly arrived troops 
only limited statistical evidence was obtained to suggest a link between large outbreaks and the receipt of 
large drafts of new troops, the ‘virgin soil’ model. It was suggested that other spatially localized factors 
played a part, for example, the nature of the supply of water and its distribution to the various divisional 
encampments. The obvious possibility of contact with the troops of other nationalities, particularly the 
French and the Turks, was not explored, presumably because there was insufficient suitable data to 
analyse. 
                                                 
432  M&SH, II, pp. 44-89 and Smallman-Raynor & Cliffe (2004a). 
433  Smallman-Raynor & Cliff (2004a), p. 52 and Figures 4 & 5. 
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Chapter 6 
Medical conditions encountered during the Eastern 
campaign 
 
This chapter deals with diseases other then those discussed in Chapter 5 though for 
completeness some reference will be made to gastrointestinal diseases and wounds and 
injuries, which are covered in Chapter 7. 
 




 analysed the diseases affecting the Army and concluded, inter alia, that there 
was a ‘persistent pernicious influence of the inactive residence in Bulgaria and that the 
health status of these troops during the first seven months in the Crimea was worse than 
those who went straight to the Crimea.’435 Aitken listed the published sources consulted 
but he did not explain how his tables were compiled. He appreciated that ‘excess duty’ 
and ‘privations’ contributed to the mortality though his use of the average monthly 
strength of each regiment as a denominator failed to provide a reliable estimate of 
numbers of men at risk, and hence his comparisons are open to question, particularly as 
no account was taken of the duties required of the regiments, or the month when they 
arrived in the Crimea. 
That these factors are important can be deduced from Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 in 
which the overall admissions to the regimental hospitals were calculated for the 
regiments grouped according to the service they experienced during the summer and 
autumn of 1854.
436
 The Cavalry Division seemingly suffered more ill health during 
October and November than the infantry while the infantry regiments that landed in 
September and November fared worse than those that spent the summer in Bulgaria. 
The Highland Brigade, which was close to Balaklava and was spared duty in the 
trenches, remained healthier than the infantry before Sevastopol, while the regiments 
landing during January also remained relatively healthy by comparison. The health 
status of the Army had improved during the spring sufficiently for there to be little to 
choose between the various regimental groups by April 1855. 
 
                                                 
434  Dr William Aitken, MD. 
435  Glasgow Medical Journal (1857), April and July. 
436  Calculated from the table of admissions and deaths for each regiment in the M&SH, I. 
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Summary of General Return A 
 
The troops were essentially fit on their arrival in Turkey but their health deteriorated 
after the move to Bulgaria. Sickness increased further following the invasion of the 
Crimea until January 1855. The well-being of the troops improved during the spring 
until May 1855 when primary admissions to hospital increased once again to a summer 
peak. Admissions declined after the fall of Sevastopol to levels which were as good as 
or even better than expected in peace time. In contrast, admissions for wounds or 
injuries were more predictable since the majority occurred during the periods of the 
most intense military activity, viz. September to November 1854 and April to 
September 1855 (Figure 1.3). 
The reasons for admission to hospital and the causes of death for the principal 
diagnostic categories in General Return A are summarized in Table 1.1 with 
gastrointestinal disease, fever, wounds or injuries, respiratory disease, boils and ulcers, 
cholera, and venereal disease accounting for 86% of admissions, viz. 34%, 19%, 11%, 
7.5%, 7.5%, 4.5%, and 2.5% respectively. Conversely, 87% of deaths were associated 
with cholera (25%), gastrointestinal disease (33%), fever (19%), and wounds or injuries 
(10%). 
 
The diseases afflicting the Army changed continually thus presenting the MOs with 
different challenges with time, and this in turn influenced mortality, particularly as the 
facilities in the Crimea improved and less serious illnesses predominated later in the 
campaign. 
The twenty most prevalent medical conditions are listed in Table 6.2, and ranged 
from 44,164 cases of diarrhoea to 828 of typhus, a c.53-fold difference. The results are 
presented for each of the nine three-month quarters with those conditions accounting for 
>15% of the total admissions in any quarter being highlighted by bold type. None of the 
diseases associated with the highest mortality, viz. cholera (27.6%), diarrhoea (22.4%), 
acute and chronic dysentery (13.9%), and continued fever (17%) featured after the fall 
of Sevastopol when less life-threatening conditions such as catarrh, abscesses, ulcers, 
eye diseases, bronchitis, sore throat, and ‘all other diseases’ formed a greater proportion 
of the primary admissions. The comparable figures for wounds and injuries are also 
included in Table 6.2 for comparative purposes. 
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Figures 6.2 to 6.4 illustrate the trends in the primary admission rates for nine of the 
more common diseases.
437
 Gastrointestinal disorders other than cholera dominated the 
sick lists for most months from mid-summer 1854 until the fall of Sevastopol with two 
major peaks in the winter of 1854-55 and the summer of 1855. Fevers were recorded 
principally in Bulgaria and at an increased incidence during the spring and summer of 
1855. As described previously there were epidemics of cholera, in 1854 and 1855, with 
the first being the more serious (Figure 6.2). Scurvy was a feature of the first winter, 
while frostbite was diagnosed during both, although to a much lesser extent during the 
second. In contrast, rheumatic diseases (aches pains in the muscles and joints) occurred 
throughout the campaign though the incidence was higher during the winter of 1854-55 
(Figure 6.3). As expected, respiratory diseases were more prevalent during the two 
winters while ocular disease appeared more frequent in the summer, particularly during 
1856. Finally, venereal diseases were more prevalent in the troops sent to the East early 
in the campaign while there was a slight increase in the spring and summer of 1855 
when several regiments joined the Army (Figure 6.4). 
The ratios of deaths in all locations to primary admissions listed in General Return 
A provides an approximation of mortality rates and these are included in the right hand 
column of Table 1.1. The highest ratio was 59.5% for cholera, and 19.5% and 8.5% for 
two scourges of the first winter, frostbite and scurvy. Over the whole campaign the ratio 
was c.10% for fever, gastrointestinal disease, and wounds or injuries, while several 
uncommon conditions had relatively high ratios, viz. nervous disease (20.5%), eruptive 
fever (20%), and cardiovascular disease (15.5%). 
The monthly mortality rate is plotted in Figure 1.4 using the same scale as in 
Figure 1.3, while the trends in mortality from bowel diseases, fevers, cholera, 
respiratory diseases and scurvy are presented in Figure 6.5. The epidemics of cholera in 
the two years are clearly delineated while all the incidence of all the other diseases 
peaked during the first winter with that for bowel disease preceding the others. 
 
Conditions typically associated with low mortality: This section considers 
conditions in General Return A which accounted for >100 primary admissions but for 
which the ratio of deaths in all locations to primary admissions was <1%. A total of 
26,408 cases (16.2% of 162,673 admissions) satisfied these criteria, and of these 53 died 
                                                 
437  The trends were calculated from the M&SH, General Return B using Minitab Statistical Software. 
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(0.3% of 18,053 deaths) (Table 6.3). The mortality was somewhat higher during the 
first winter (November 1854-March 1855) in several instances (Table 6.3, col. 7 cf. col. 
4), but it is unlikely that this would have prompted any comment as the deaths occurred 
sporadically over several months. This analysis also suggests that the deterioration in 
the living and working conditions did not in themselves render these afflictions more 
particularly life-threatening, which is in contrast to diarrhoea, dysentery and continued 
fever, the comparable results for which are included by way of comparison. 
The comparable analysis for the Scutari hospitals is summarized in Table 6.4. In 
all there were 3,664 cases (8.5% of 43,288 admissions), and of these 19 died (0.35% of 
5,432 deaths); a result which suggests that it this regard the situation in Turkey was not 
dissimilar to that in the Army as a whole. 
 
Deaths recorded in the regimental hospitals and elsewhere: The first volume 
of the M&SH contains tabulated summaries of primary admissions to all regimental 
hospitals together with the numbers of men who died in them. The total number who 
died in the general hospitals or on board ship is also recorded and the proportion of 
deaths in this category ranged from c.20% to 60% (median 42%) of the total deaths for 
the 10 cavalry and 25 infantry regiments that had landed in the Crimea by January 1855 
(Figure 6.6). 
The proportion was lower for regiments joining the Army during the spring and 
summer of 1855 as fewer seriously ill patients were evacuated to Turkey consequent on 
improvements in the health of the troops and medical facilities in the Crimea. 
 
The time to death: General Return C provided a summary of the time between 
admission and death in each cavalry and infantry regiment. The results for cholera, 
fevers, respiratory, gastrointestinal and other diseases, and wounds and injury are 
summarized in Table 6.5. Nearly all cholera cases died within a week while fevers and 
wounds and injuries tended to be more rapidly fatal than respiratory and gastrointestinal 




Scurvy and frostbite 
 
Scurvy develops only after a prolonged period on an inadequate diet, a well recognized 
risk factor,
438
 while frostbite, or gelatio as it was termed, only afflicted the troops in the 
Crimea. Both conditions were most prevalent during the first winter with the peaks for 
primary admissions for frostbite and scurvy being recorded in January and February 
respectively, with the majority of deaths occurring during February (Figures 6.7 and 
6.8). Both conditions recurred during the second winter, but to a much lesser extent, and 
with much lower mortality. 
 
As early as July 1854 Hall informed HQ that the troops were receiving ‘indifferent 
rations owing to a want of vegetables’ with the implication that they should be 
provided,
439
 while shortly afterwards the PMO at Scutari went as far as recommending 
the issue of lime juice for the same reason.
440
 The first cases of scurvy in the Crimea 
were diagnosed in the 1
st
 battalion Rifle Brigade during October 1854
441
 and a summary 
of events during the eight months after the invasion is summarized in Figure 6.9, with a 
more detailed analysis in Figure 6.10. 
Scurvy afflicted many regiments involved in the siege from the start but there 
were considerable differences between them and this may reflect the effectiveness of the 
regimental staff in provisioning the men during the late summer or the failure of some 




Scurvy proved a minor problem in the regiments arriving in December and 
January, presumably as they had an adequate diet during their journey to the East and 
continued to do so after their arrival by which time the level of nutrition for the Army as 
a whole was improving. The incidence in the Highland Brigade was lower than those on 
the plateau as the duties were less arduous and it was easier to obtain supplies as they 
were closer to Balaklava. 
                                                 
438  See M&SH, II, pp. 171-86. 
439  Hall to Military Secretary, 15 July 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/337, PoL, I, Appendix 1 and BPP 
(1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 99-100. 
440  PMO, Scutari to Commandant, 11 Aug. 1854; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 200. 
441  The corps travelled from the Cape of Good Hope arriving on 14 September after two months at 
sea. 
442  Geber (2013). 
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The prophylactic issue of lime juice commenced during February 1855, with an 
obvious beneficial effect, and its continued use during the remainder of the campaign, 
coupled with the provision of a more adequate diet, resulted in only a few cases being 
diagnosed during the winter of 1855/56. 
 
The majority of cases of frostbite were recorded during January, and to a lesser extent 
February, were in the infantry regiments doing duty in the trenches. The incidence was 
lower in both the Highland Brigade and Cavalry Division, which had been withdrawn 
from the plateau before the end of 1854 to a more sheltered valley near Kadikoi (see 
Figures 6.11 and 6.12). 
Frostbite and gangrene were ‘frequently the result of protracted application of 
cold and wet’ rather than ‘the direct or specific effect of an extremely low temperature’ 
and, as the feet and toes were frequently affected,
443
 it was more akin to trench foot 
which proved so troublesome during World War One. 
Improvement in the weather and general living conditions were associated with a 
dramatic fall in the number of admissions during February 1855. Frostbite was also 
diagnosed during the second winter but during this time it was more typical in that it 
commonly affected the exposed parts of the body such as the ears and digits, the tissues 
of which having become frozen.
444
 
It was suggested in several reports in the M&SH that the debility caused by fevers 
and intestinal disease predisposed to the development of gangrene of the toes, 
presumably due to the blood flow to the extremities being compromised. What 
proportion these cases formed of the whole cannot be ascertained from the records that 
survive. 
Scurvy and frostbite proved serious problems for the French Army, especially 
after the November storm as the ‘men had only their miserable tentes d’abri for shelter, 
and their clothing was […] insufficient for the season.’445 
 
                                                 
443  M&SH, II, p. 189. 
444  For further commentary see Shepherd (1991), p. 323. 




The consumption of alcohol was a popular way for obtaining temporary relief from the 
trials and tribulations of life, although delirium tremens was an uncommon reason for 
referral to hospital; 281 (0.17%) cases among 162,163 admissions, with 44 deaths. 
The records of courts martial
446
 confirm that alcoholic beverages must have been 
easily obtainable with the result that drunkenness continued to be ‘a great vice of 
English soldiers which no punishment will put an end to.’447 Romaine’s opinion was 
echoed by Russell who noted that ‘25 lashes, or even 50, are all insufficient to wean the 
British soldier from his favourite vice.’448 
Panmure expressed his concerns about intemperance to Codrington, who 
instituted a survey of the proceedings of courts martial and concluded that drunkenness 
was not so serious as might be supposed and in the final analysis: ‘the Army will bear a 
comparison with many towns, many villages; many populations of Great Britain.’449 
 
Hospitals on the Bosphorus 
 
The influence of Nightingale during and after the campaign has resulted in a tendency 
for the problems in the Barrack Hospital at Scutari to be considered by several 
commentators to be exceptional and unusual. However, it was merely one of the several 
general hospitals utilized during the campaign (Table 1.4), and since the majority of its 
patients came from the Crimea there is justification in considering it as an integral part 
of the Army rather than a special case. 
One approach for testing this hypothesis is to compare the pattern of mortality 
recorded at all locations in General Return A with that observed in the hospitals on the 
Bosphorus in General Hospital Returns I. To this end the cumulative proportion (%) of 
deaths recorded for several diseases in both returns were calculated for the eleven 
months after the invasion, and the results plotted in Figure 6.13. 
A high correlation (r >0.99) between the situation in the Army as a whole and at 
Scutari for diarrhoea, dysentery, continued fever, typhus, pneumonia and pleurisy, and 
rheumatic diseases provides extremely strong circumstantial evidence that the situation 
                                                 
446  WO/28/126. 
447  Romaine to Mulgrave, 28 June 1854; Robins (2005), p. 13. 
448  The Times, 29 Oct. 1855. 
449  Codrington to Panmure, 27 Dec. 1855; WO/1/380 and LG, 9 Jan. 1856, 
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in Turkey merely reflected that which obtained throughout the Army, and hence the 
amelioration of the health problems in the Crimea necessarily led to an improvement at 
Scutari. When the total number of deaths were considered a divergence occurred from 
February suggesting that mortality rate became lower at Scutari some time before the 
Army as a whole, presumably because fewer seriously ill patients were being evacuated 
to there from that time.
450
 
Additional evidence that events in the Crimea had a direct bearing on matters in 
Scutari is provided by a similar comparison of mortality at Scutari with that in the 
hospitals of the cavalry and infantry regiments for the two conditions specific for the 
Crimea, viz. scurvy and frostbite (Figure 6.14). 
 
The admission and deaths in the Scutari and Kuleli hospitals are tabulated separately for 
the months February-June 1855. The cumulative mortality from disease, excluding 
cholera, is plotted, together with that in the army as a whole, in Figure 6.15. There was 
little to choose between them suggesting that irrespective of differences in the nature of 
the cases admitted, the management, and available facilities the mortality reflected the 
situation in the army in both institutions. 
 
Nosocomial (hospital acquired) infections 
 
The Supplies Commissioners drew the following conclusion from their analysis of the 
medical records: 
 
The mortality […] was further increased by the diseases which broke out at Scutari, and 
carried off many men who had entered the hospital with a prospect of speedy recovery, or who 
had actually recovered from the diseases for which they were admitted. Had the sanitary 
condition […] been from the first what it afterwards became, there can be little doubt that the 




This suggestion is not unreasonable given that when things were at their worst the 
men were: ‘put on board in such a frightful state of vermin and filth, and so […] when 
they land […] they carry the filth and vermin into hospitals with them.’452 However, no 
proof was provided for their assertion and it is not now possible to test the hypothesis as 
few records of individual patients survive. However, indirect evidence that nosocomial 
                                                 
450  The difference noted for bronchitis was probably due to the same reason. 
451  BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 37. 
452  Special correspondent, 23 Jan.; The Times, 8 Feb. 1855. 
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infections were not as important as suggested can be obtained by assessing data on 
hospital gangrene and erysipelas, both of which may be associated by poor standards of 
hospital hygiene. 
In the days before the introduction of antisepsis hospital gangrene was a 
potentially fatal complication of surgery, particularly amputations.
453
 It was contagious 
and frequently associated with overcrowding. There were advantages in early 
amputation after injury as this ‘shortened hospital stays, reduced the risk of infection, 
and reduced the trauma of transportation;’454 and this accounts for why McGrigor, 
Smiths’s predecessor, advocated the distribution of the wounded to regimental rather 
than general hospitals, and this was given as one reason for keeping the wounded in the 
Crimea.
455
 The PMO at Scutari adopted this approach when he ‘dispersed the wounded 
as far as circumstances allowed,’ and in the final analysis there were only 67 cases 
specifically diagnosed as gangrene at the hospital, of which 17 (25.4%) were fatal.
456
 
Almost all of the cases were recorded during the three months from November 1854 
(Figure 6.16) and the absence of serious epidemic, which had been predicted by some 
commentators,
457
 was confirmed by a Dr Macleod, a civilian surgeon, though he noted 
that gangrene in a mild form occurred not infrequently: 
 
Hospital gangrene was not common in the East. During the first winter it prevailed a good 
deal in a mild form at Scutari, but it never became either general or severe. It did not appear 
to pass from bed to bed, but rose sporadically over the hospitals. […] Whenever it appeared, 
the patients were […] sent into wards set apart.458 
 
Macleod pointed out that: ‘The French suffered most dreadfully from hospital 
gangrene in its worst form’ and he ascribed this in part to their policy of transferring 
surgical cases to general hospitals. This opinion was confirmed by Milroy, a Sanitary 
Commissioner, who analysed some French medical data: 
 
In February [1855] the state of things was even more dreadful. Beside scorbutic diseases, 
utterly intractable, typhus and hospital gangrene were frequent in the hospitals, and the medical 
officers could do nothing to prevent their spreading. [After the fall of Sevastopol] the huts and 
                                                 
453  Incidentally, the mortality rate following amputation at Scutari was relatively low by the standards 
of the day at 74 (26.8%) of 274 cases’ M&SH, II, General Hospital Returns I. 
454  Murray et al. (2008). 
455  M&SH, II, p. 254. Incidentally, Nightingale suggested that there may be an advantage for doing 
without general hospitals as they may become ‘pest houses’ if improperly managed; McDonald 
(2010a), p. 685 and McDonald (2010b), p. 88 
456  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 87 and M&SH, II, General Hospital Returns I. 
457  For example, C. Kidd and E. Cullen to Editor; The Times, 18 Oct. 1854 & 24 Jan. 1855, and 
incorrectly suggested by Kaufman (2000). 
458  Macleod (1858), pp. 152-3. 
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tents were crowded, and, ere long, hospital gangrene became very prevalent. Scurvy […] 





Erysipelas, now know to be caused by Streptococcus pyogenes, was recognized as a 
potentially fatal complication of wound infections. It was uncommon according to the 
M&SH
460
 while Macleod noted that at Scutari: ‘there were a good many cases of 
erysipelas, at the time the men were most depressed by their hardships; but it was 
seldom virulent.’461 Small numbers of cases of were diagnosed sporadically throughout 
the campaign with 46 cases being recorded at Scutari with ten fatalities (Figure 6.16). 
 
Despite the small number of cases of gangrene and erysipelas it is clear that their 
epidemiological characteristics differed. The majority of admissions for, and deaths 
from, gangrene were recorded between November 1854 and March 1855 while 
erysipelas occurred sporadically throughout the campaign, with the majority of deaths 
recorded during the first half of 1855 (Figures 6.16 and 6.17). 
Incidentally, the ratio of deaths to admissions for both conditions was very similar 
at Scutari as it was for the Army as whole, suggesting that no special factors were 
operating in those hospitals (Table 6.6). 
 
Typhus or ‘jail fever’ was a well recognized hazard in over crowded and unsanitary 




 centuries. It was never an issue in the Scutari hospitals 
with six (0.015%) cases among 42,288 admissions, though after the war Nightingale 
incorrectly suggested otherwise: ‘Scutari buildings were, in their unimproved state, like 
the jails of old, pest houses of typhus fever.’462 
 
Influence of disease on military policy 
 
The high incidence of disease would have hampered the war effort but it is not possible 
to quantify exactly how this influenced decision making. Nevertheless, Raglan and his 
successors would have been able to adjust their plans to take account of the numbers 
                                                 
459  Milroy (1858). 
460  M&SH, II, p. 274. 
461  Macleod (1858), p. 157. 
462  M&SH, II, General Hospital Returns I and McDonald (2010a), p. 146. 
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sick as these were included in the daily state prepared by the AG’s department, though 
only few of these documents have survived. 
A board convened by Raglan on 29 January 1855 with Sir Richard England as 
president calculated that on each day in each division there would be 150-200 cases of 
‘casual sickness’, i.e. out patients considered unfit for duty by the surgeon, 144 told off 
as cooks, c.50 regimental prisoners, and c.150 collecting supplies from Balaklava. This 
meant that each day c.2,000 men in four infantry divisions who would be unavailable 
for duty in the trenches,
463
 of which the equivalent of one infantry regiment would have 
been sick, though not seriously so. 
 
Influence of policy decisions on hospital admissions 
 
In some circumstances policies adopted by the medical or military authorities, or other 
factors, influenced the nature of cases admitted to the general hospitals, for example, 
debility and eye disease. The same also held true for wounded troops (see Chapter 7). 
 
The Russian threat to the British position after the battle of Balaklava, coupled with the 
numbers of men requiring hospital treatment, rendered it expedient to evacuate 
debilitated patients requiring a protracted convalescence, and this is illustrated by an 
obvious increase in the number in this category during November 1854 (Figure 6.18). 
 
Infectious ophthalmia proved troublesome in the infantry during the autumn of 1855 
and the decision taken to utilize the Monastery hospital for the more severe cases was 
reflected in a dramatic increase in admissions. In contrast, the Castle Hospital admitted 
few eye cases during this period until patients from the Monastery were transferred to 
there following its closure on 17 June 1856 (Figure 6.19). 
 
Thirteen of the 14 cavalry regiments were relocated to Turkey during the autumn of 
1855 and as a consequence suffered from the effects of a local cholera epidemic in 
November. Conversely, they avoided the epidemic of eye disease that afflicted the 
infantry during 1856. 
 
                                                 
463  WO/28/199/1. 
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The Camp General Hospital was used principally to treat BFIs from June 1855, and, as 
a result of the final assault on Sevastopol 293 (99%) of 297 admissions during 
September were in that category. The cessation of hostilities resulted in fewer wounded 
admitted during the next month (36) with a corresponding increase in the number of 
medical cases (115), of which 15 (13%) had ophthalmia. 
 
The English and French 
 
Few references to the French have been made in this thesis owing to a paucity of 
published data but a comparison of the British and French Armies published by 
Longmore made the French the winners during the first winter from a medical point of 
view; and the British during the second: 
 
The situation of the French and British armies […] was so similar in respect to soil and 
locality, the climatic influences […] and the nature of the work […] that practically the two 
armies might almost be regarded as parts of […] the same force. […] there was no similarity 
between them in respect to their conditions of health. […] the British [were] remarkably 
unhealthy during the first period of the siege, and as remarkably healthy during the second 
period […] while a precisely opposite state of things existed in the French part […] which 
was in a generally good condition of health during the first period, but in an extremely 




The increased mortality rate in the French Army in 1856 is illustrated in Table 6.7 
and Dr Baudens, a senior French MO, drew the following conclusion about the 
difference between the two armies: 
 
[The British] medical service, directed by the skilful and learned Sir John Hall, left nothing 
to be desired to the end of the campaign. […] The field hospitals of the English were 
extremely clean, which cannot be said of [the French]. The difference was in part due to the 
higher and more independent position of the English military surgeons, who exercise more 




This was an unexpected turn of events perhaps for only a year before several 
prominent critics of the British Army had been fulsome in their praise for the efficiency 
of the French. Longmore, however, did not agree that all the credit for this improvement 
should be accorded to the AMD. He conceded that the MOs knew what was required 
but they had insufficient ‘sanitary influence and authority’ at that time to ‘restore the 
well being and efficiency of the army’ on their own volition, and that the ‘generous 
impulse of the whole nation, from highest to lowest’ had been required to achieve this 
                                                 
464  Longmore (1883), pp. 5-6. 




 Longmore continued by summarizing the reasons that M. Scrive, the 
French PMO, considered the cause of the French ‘tragedy’ in 1855/56, viz. the 
harshness of winter without sufficient shelter – the French were still under canvas; 
excessive work; infection of camps; inadequate rations; decay of the constitutions of the 
older soldiers; and the feebleness of the new contingents. Exactly the reasons 






The pattern of disease changed month by month with the fatal illnesses experienced 
during the first winter being superseded by much less life-threatening maladies during 
the second. The principal diseases diagnosed during the campaign were the ‘traditional 
killers encountered in civil populations’, with the exception of plague and measles 
which were not a problem.
468
 In general the trends in the incidence of these diseases 
followed a predictable pattern (Figures 6.2 to 6.5), rather it was the incidence and the 
fatality rate that made them exceptional, a point made effectively in the M&SH: 
 
Nearly all the diseases […] were of a kind more or less incidental to troops employed on 
active service in the field, and familiar to the conditions of camp life. [The occurrence] of 
fevers and fluxes […] was merely remarkable for the amazing prevalence and mortality 




In like manner J. Bell concluded in a BBC broadcast: ‘Infections are the true 
beneficiaries of war’ as ‘history has repeatedly shown that contagion makes an easy 
bedfellow with human conflict’ and hence ‘war and insurgency provide the ideal 
conditions for bacteria and viruses to take a foothold.’ Some of Bell’s examples of the 
devastating effects of natural infections in these circumstances are listed in Table 6.8.
470
 
On the other hand, Cooter questioned whether a ‘fatal partnership’ between pathogens 
and war should be assumed, and suggested that ‘many, perhaps most, epidemics are not 
rooted in war;’ and certainly from the British perspective diseases such as small pox, 
tuberculosis, and typhus did not become rife during the campaign despite the privations 
endured by the troops, while cholera which had been present in several countries in 
                                                 
466  Longmore (1883), pp. 25-6. 
467  For a recent review see Barham (2006). 
468  Smallman-Raynor & Cliffe (2004b), pp. 176 & 230. 
469  M&SH, II, p. 45. 
470  J. Bell, 7 Dec. 2013; www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-24962331. 
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Europe before war was declared was merely spread to Bulgaria and the Crimea by the 
movement of the troops. In addition, the fact that it petered out during the winter of 
1854/55 when the many problems confronting the Army were at their most serious 
supports Cooter’s proposition that a ‘pathogenic price’ does not necessarily have to be 
‘paid for the devastation caused by military action.’471 
Regiments landing in November and December 1854 suffered less from scurvy, a 
chronic deficiency disease, than those that landed earlier, but the incidence of frostbite 
(gelato), a reflection of harsh environmental conditions, was similar (Figures 6.9 and 
6.11). 
The incidence of some diseases differed considerably between regiments brigaded 
together and which were presumably subjected to a similar management regime at the 
divisional level. It is not possible to determine whether this reflected genuine 
differences between the regiments, or a preference to treat the men as outpatients rather 
than admit them to hospital, or to some other factor, as detailed records for individual 
regiments have not survived.  
The less arduous duties and living conditions of the Cavalry Division and 
Highland Brigade were reflected in a generally better health status than that exhibited 
by the regiments on the plateau (Figure 6.1). 
The significant correlation between the mortality rates recorded during the first 
winter for several diseases in the Army as a whole and at Scutari is remarkable (Figures 
6.13 and 6.14). That the facilities in the hospitals there may have been less than 
adequate is not at issue, but without doubt they were less important in influencing the 
outcome for the evacuees than the seriousness of their condition on arrival from the 
Crimea. Incidentally Nightingale agreed with this explanation at the time when she 
informed Panmure on 19 August 1855: ‘The physically deteriorating effect of Scutari 
has been much discussed, but it may be doubted. The men sent down in the winter died 
because they were not sent down till half dead – the men sent down now live because 
they are sent in time.’472 
The low incidence of hospital gangrene and erysipelas throughout the Army 
suggests that these potential nosocomial infections did not pose a serious threat in the 
Scutari hospitals or elsewhere. Similarly, mortality from gunshot wounds at Scutari was 
                                                 
471  Cooter (2003). 
472  Douglas & Ramsey (1898), I, pp. 356-7. The same point was also appreciated by another nurse, 
Miss Terrot; Cantlie (1974), II, p. 125. 
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not sufficiently great to suggest that there was ever an epidemic of fatal wound 
infections. 
Examples are provided which confirm the importance of comparing hospitals 
with a similar case load, otherwise invalid conclusions will be drawn about their 
performance (e.g. Figure 6.19). An example of this error was pointed out by a reviewer 
of the 3
rd
 edition of Nightingale’s ‘Notes on Hospitals’ in which she suggested a 
comparison of ‘the great mortality of the large Scutari hospital’ with ‘the well-ventilated 
detached huts of the Balaclava Castle Hospital.’473 Clearly this statement is misleading 
because the problems in Scutari occurred principally during the winter of 1854-55, a 
few months before the Castle Hospital opened during March 1855 as a convalescent 
hospital for surgical cases, and when conditions had begun to improve both in the 




Table 6.1: Admissions per 1,000 strength for disease in infantry and cavalry regiments during the eight 
months after the invasion, September 1854-April 1855 
Corps (No. of regiments) 1854 1855 
Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. 
Initial besieging force (B+) (21)* 149 227 181 337 383 277 199 139 
Initial besieging Force (B-) (7)* 207 211 218 566 484 259 203 112 
Infantry joining in November (4)† NA NA 231 434 433 242 236 148 
Infantry joining in December (4)‡ NA NA NA 255 368 175 115 114 
Infantry joining in January (3)§ NA NA NA NA 247 214 255 146 
Highland Brigade (3)# 131 166 148 160 152 126 178 135 
Cavalry Division (10)¶ 228 380 371 296 214 141 115 120 
[Adapted from the regimental histories in the M&SH, I] 
NA Not applicable. 
* B+, served in Bulgaria: Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Scots Fusilier Guards; 1st bn, 1st Regiment; 7th, 
19th, 23rd, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 38th, 41st, 44th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 55th, 77th, 88th, 95th Regiments, and 2nd bn, Rifle Brigade. 
 B-, from Turkey or direct by sea: 4th, 20th, 21st, 57th, 63rd, 68th, and 1st battalion Rifle Brigade. 
† The 9th, 46th, 62nd, and 97th Regiments. The hospital admissions of two companies of the 46th Regiment that 
landed in September have been excluded from the analysis. 
‡ The 17th, 18th, 34th, 89th, and 90th Regiments. No hospital admissions were recorded for the 18th Regiment in 
December and so it has been included with the January arrivals for other analyses. 
§ The 14th and 39th Regiments. 
# Balaklava defences: 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Regiments. 
¶ Heavy Brigade: 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons; Light Brigade: 4th and 13th Light 
Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars, and 17th Lancers. 
 
                                                 
473  The Lancet, 27 Feb. 1864. 
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Table 6.2: Twenty most common reasons for primary admission of NCOs and men into hospital, April 
1854-June 1856 






Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 
Diarrhoea 1 17 26 15 12 19 7 2 1 44164 
Continued fever 3 13 8 19 19 22 8 5 4 25013 
Catarrh 4 3 9 19 6 6 17 26 9 10083 
Dysentery 0 6 27 24 7 24 9 2 1 8278 
Abscesses 7 8 7 11 10 13 15 17 10 7922 
Cholera 0 35 28 1 21 11 4 0 0 7574 
Rheumatism 5 7 22 17 8 11 13 11 6 4906 
Ulcers 5 5 9 12 9 10 16 25 10 4090 
Eye diseases 7 6 4 6 11 13 16 12 25 3307 
Venereal diseases 27 10 7 6 9 14 12 10 6 2959 
Remittent fever 0 17 14 22 25 17 3 1 1 2957 
Intermittent fever 1 20 7 5 18 19 12 8 9 2406 
Frostbite 0 0 1 79 0 0 15 4 0 2398 
Scurvy 0 0 10 68 9 1 4 6 2 2096 
Colic 6 14 6 5 16 26 15 8 5 1514 
Bronchitis 1 1 5 13 4 7 19 37 12 1111 
Sore throat 12 6 3 7 9 10 21 21 10 924 
Dyspesia 2 11 4 6 16 23 12 15 12 906 
Jaundice 0 6 19 11 7 22 23 8 3 878 
Typhus 0 38 11 25 17 4 2 1 1 828 
All other diseases 6 8 8 9 9 13 16 20 12 8307 
Wounds & injuries 2 11 16 3 19 28 8 6 5 18279 
Total admissions for 
disease 
3 13 16 15 13 17 10 10 8 162673 
[Adapted from M&SH, II, General Return A] 
* Q1, Apr.-June 1854; Q2, July-Sep. 1854; Q3, Oct.-Dec. 1854; Q4, Jan.-Mar. 1855; Q5, Apr.-June 
1855; Q6, July-Sep. 1855; Q7, Oct.-Dec. 1855; Q7, Jan.-Mar. 1856; Q9, Apr.-June 1856. 
† Values of <1% are entered as zero. 
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Table 6.3: Conditions typically associated with low mortality listed in the Medical and Surgical History, 
General Return A, April 1854-June 1856 

















Ulcers/abscesses 6679 9 0.15 1243 14 1.1 
Eye diseases 3060 0 - 247 0 - 
VD (6) 2722 0 - 313 3 0.95 
Hernia† 1486 1 <0.1 102 2 2.0 
Punishment 1461 0 - 312 0 - 
Luxations 1395 2 0.15 138 0 - 
Colic 1387 3 0.2 127 2 1.6 
Sore throat 863 3 0.35 81 6 7.4 
Dyspepsia 829 1 0.1 77 2 2.6 
Skin diseases 688 0 - 61 1 1.5 
Paronychia 355 0 - 46 0 - 
Burns 353 0 - 46 0 - 
Haemorrhoids 322 0 - 36 0 - 
Constipation 311 0 - 37 0 - 
Scabies 239 0 - 18 0 - 
Headache/vertigo 119 0 - 9 0 - 
Anal fistula 104 1 0.95 25 2 8.0 
Otitis 101 0 - 6 1 16.7 
Total 22474 20 <0.1 3934 33 1.1 
Diarrhoea 42662 566 1.3 14502 3085 21.3 
Continued fever 19457 1106 5.7 6156 1684 27.4 
Dysentery 4568 343 7.5 3710 1913 51.6 
* The selection depended on there being >100 primary admissions and the ratio of deaths in all locations 
to primary admissions being <1%. 




Table 6.4: Conditions typically associated with low mortality listed in the Medical and Surgical History, 
General Hospital Returns I, April 1854-June 1856 
Condition* Junr-Oct. 1854 and Apr. 1855-June 1856 Nov. 1854-Mar. 1855 
Admissions Deaths Ratio 
Admissions/ 
deaths 
Admissions Deaths Ratio 
Admissions/ 
deaths 
Ulcers/abscesses 270 1 0.4 69 2 2.9 
Eye diseases 474 0 - 68 1 1.5 
VD (6) 1145 1 <0.1 126 2 1.6 
Hernia† 164 0 - 41 1 2.4 
Punishment 57 0 1 11 0 - 
Luxations 90 0 - 29 0 - 
Colic‡ 108 0 - 8 2 25 
Sore throat 89 1 1.1 27 1 3.7 
Dyspepsia 174 1 0.6 46 3 6.5 
Skin diseases 136 0 - 29 2 6.9 
Paronychia 33 0 - 9 0 - 
Burns 30 1 3.3 5 0 - 
Haemorrhoids 46 0 - 7 0 - 
Constipation 25 0 - 12 0 - 
Scabies 170 0 - 0 0 - 
Headache/vertigo 68 0 - 1 0 - 
Anal fistula 48 0 - 17 0 - 
Otitis 30 0 - 2 0 - 
Total 3157 5 0.15 507 14 2.8 
Diarrhoea‡ 5037 207 4.1 3787 1313 34.7 
Continued fever 4394 185 4.2 2822 562 19.9 
Dysentery‡ 1850 163 8.8 1805 952 52.7 
* The conditions selected are those listed in Table 6.3. 
† Entered with both gastrointestinal and venereal diseases. 
‡ Amended totals; see Table 1.3. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Interval between admission to hospital and the death of NCOs and men in cavalry and infantry 
regiments, expressed a proportion (%) of the total number of admissions 
Interval 
(days) 








<7 95* 20 28 16 29 25 
7-13 5 30* 19 22 13 25* 
14-20 0 19 13* 20* 14* 15 
21-27 0 11 10 12 11 11 
28-34 0 7 9 9 8 8 
35-41 0 4 5 7 9 8 
>41 0 10 16 14 15 7 
Total cases 3485 2309 354 3109 699 1200 
[Summarized from M&SH, General Return C] 




Table 6.6: Admissions for, and deaths from erysipelas, gangrene, abscesses, and ulcers 
Condition General Return A Scutari hospitals 
Primary 
admissions 



























































[M&SH, II, General Return A and General Hospital Returns I] 
 
 
Table 6.7: Mortality in the French Army, September 1854-April 1856 
Year Months Average effective strength Deaths Ratio per 1,000 
1854 September-December 49160 1857 38 
1855 January-April 88250 7666 87 
May-August 115750 10545 91 
September-December 137750 6473 47 
1856 January-April 125250 17129 137 
[Longmore (1883), p. 14] 
 
Table 6.8: Chronicles of contagion, AD 165-1918 
Date Campaign Abstract 
165 Parthian war Roman soldiers returning from the war sparked the Antonine Plague (probably 
smallpox) that ravaged the Roman Empire. 
1618-48 Thirty Years war Typhus fever led to the cancellation of some battles. 
1804-15 Napoleonic wars Typhus fever killed more French soldiers than the war effort itself. 
1853-56 Crimean war British forces were decimated by cholera outbreaks. 
1870-71 Franco-Prussian war Smallpox originating in France was introduced into Prussia by French 
prisoners and spread through the civilian population, but not to the Prussian 
soldiers who had been protected. 
1914-18 World War One An influenza pandemic killed millions. In Russia, peace was followed by 
widespread famine with cholera, dysentery, malaria, typhoid and typhus being 
spread by refugees. 














Figure 6.2: Trends in the admissions of NCOs and men into regimental hospitals for bowel disease, fevers 






Figure 6.3: Trends in the admissions of NCOs and men into regimental hospitals for scurvy, rheumatic 




Figure 6.4: Trends in the admissions of NCOs and men into regimental hospitals for respiratory, venereal, 





Figure 6.5: Trends in mortality among NCOs and men for bowel and respiratory diseases, fevers, cholera, 






Figure 6.6: Proportion of deaths recorded in cavalry and infantry regiments that occurred in general 











































































Figure 6.13: Relationship between deaths recorded in the Army as a whole and the hospitals on the 
Bosphorus, September 1854-July 1855 
 




















































Figure 6.14: Deaths of NCOs and men from scurvy and frostbite in regimental hospitals of cavalry and 
































Figure 6.18: Admissions of NCOs and men with debility into regimental hospitals of the cavalry and 















Casualties consequent upon action with the enemy 
 
There has been considerable interest in the battles of the Alma, Balaklava, and 
Inkerman over the years, principally from a military point of view,
474
 while the M&SH 
includes a section on BFI’s and their management.475 Losses from enemy action were 
much lower than those associated with disease, but significant nevertheless because of 
the temporary or permanent loss of manpower, and the resources required to care for the 
wounded, particularly following the principal engagements. 
The conveyance of the seriously wounded from the front line to the rear is almost 
inevitably going to be traumatic for the patient and challenging for the stretcher bearers 
and ambulance personnel; while in the case of a major engagement there is possibility 
that advanced dressing stations may be either overwhelmed by number of patients or 
attacked by the enemy. 
The situation was at its worst after the battle of the Alma
476
 as there had been no 
time to set up even the most rudimentary casualty clearing stations, and it had not been 
possible to requisition sufficient wheeled vehicles locally to substitute for the 
ambulance waggons left behind at Varna. However, as the campaign continued the 
provision for the immediate care of the wounded improved, as summarized in Table 7.1, 
although, as outlined in Chapter 8, the development of a satisfactory ambulance service 
remained elusive throughout the whole campaign. 
This chapter presents analyses of six sources of data, viz. the M&SH, an 
unpublished copy of the AG’s ledger of the daily number of officers and other ranks 
who were killed, wounded in action or reported missing;
477
 Sayer’s ‘Despatches’; a 
return prepared by the AG, Horse Guards in 1855;
478
 and papers presented by W.B. 
Hodge and R.T. Thompson to the Statistical Society of London during 1856. 
 
 
                                                 
474  For example, Pemberton (1968), Barthorp (1991), Adkin (1996), Brighton (2004), Mercer (2004), 
and Fletcher & Ishchenko (2008)  
475  M&SH, II, pp. 253-396. 
476  The carnage would have reminded the older participants of the after math of Waterloo and the 
battles in the Peninsular War. 
477 RAMC/397/F/RM/17/7. The original has not been found in WO/28. 
478  BPP (1854-55), No. 204. 
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The Medical and Surgical History 
 
Volume 1, Regimental histories: The admissions to the regimental hospitals with 
wounds or injuries during the first six months after the invasion were analysed with 
regard to the regiments employment, viz. the Cavalry Division and the infantry 
regiments that took part in the siege that either served in Bulgaria or who landed in the 
Crimea during September, November, December or January, or who defended 
Balaklava (Highland Brigade).
479
 The results are summarized in Figure 7.1 and the 
admissions during the first three months reflected the regiments’ involvements in the 
battles (Alma, Balaklava and Inkerman). The battle casualty rate for all regiments was 





Volume II, General Return A: The numbers of NCOs and men admitted to the 
hospitals each month, and the numbers who died are illustrated in Figures 7.2.and 7.3. 
Of the 162,673 admissions, 10,691 (6.6%) were for gunshot wounds (Vulnus 
sclopitorum),
481
 of which 1,706 (16%) died. By comparison there were only 55 (0.7%) 
deaths among 7,592 patients with incised wounds, contusions, dislocations, and 
fractures. 
 
General hospitals in the Crimea and Turkey: The majority of those injured 
during action were admitted to regimental hospitals but the lack of facilities in the 
Crimea resulted in nearly 3,000 being evacuated to Turkey between September and 
November 1854, and although this was inevitiable many MOs deplored the hurried 
transfer of the severely wounded and favoured undertaking primary surgery before 
evacuation. However, this policy, which reduced the risk of overcrowding in the 
regimental hospitals, was later excused on the grounds that Raglan was determined to 
evacuate all men thought unlikely to return to duty in a short time, or be unable to 
march.
482
 In the event, the Scutari hospitals received three-quarters of all their 
admissions for gunshot wounds during that time. The winter of 1854-55 saw relatively 
                                                 
479  There is no comparable data available for the RA. 
480  This topic is considered in more detail in the analysis of data by Sayer (1857). 
481  The precise cause of the injuries is not give, and presumably included those caused by cannon shot 
and blast. 
482  M&SH, II, p. 254 and Shepherd (1991), p. 237. 
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little direct action and only 89 patients were sent to Turkey between February and May 
1855 while the majority evacuated between April and September were probably 
convalescent as only 8 (1.8%) of 586 patients died.
483
 (see Table 7.2 and Figure 7.4). 
The Camp General Hospital, being close to the front received recently injured 
men,
484
 while the Castle Hospital, set apart from the main centres of population, was 
used to the care for convalescent wounded soldiers. The Balaklava General Hospital 
was principally utilized for treating the sick (Table 7.2). 
The use to which these three hospitals, and two in Turkey, were put is illustrated 
by comparing their responsibilities during the time they were all were in operation, viz. 
April-November 1855 (Figures 7.5.and 7.6). The Camp and Castle Hospitals treated the 
recently wounded and convalescents respectively, while only a very few entered the 
other three, particularly Smyrna, which was considered too far from the Crimea to be 
utilized for wounded troops. Not surprisingly the ratio of deaths to admissions was 
highest for the Camp General Hospital at 23%. 
 
Adjutant General’s ledger 
 
The AG’s ledger covered the affair on the Bulganek on 19 September 1854 until the 
final assault on Sevastopol on 8 September 1855, together with a three additional days 
in September, and the explosion in the magazine of the Right Attack on 25 November 
1855. 
The ledger only notes the losses on any particular day; the number who died 
subsequently of their wounds was not known at the time, but was probably at least 
16%;
485
 while the proportion of those reported missing who were killed or taken 
prisoner was also not known. The total number of individuals in action on each day was 
not recorded and so the casualty rates as a proportion of the number of individuals at 
risk cannot be estimated. 
This document is valuable as it lists the number of casualties among officers, 
sergeants, drummers, and R&F separately for the siege operations, the battles of the 
Alma, Balaklava, Little Inkerman, and Inkerman, and the assaults on the Quarries (7/8 
                                                 
483  M&SH, II, General Hospital Returns I. 
484  Of 1,005 patients admitted between Apr. and Nov. 1855 730 (72.6%) were for gunshot wounds; 
M&SH, II, General Hospital Returns V. 
485  M&SH, II, General Return A. 
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June) and Sevastopol (18 June and 8 September 1855). These records are summarized 




Battle, assaults, and siege operations: The casualties totalled 15,189, viz. 767 
(5%) officers, 840 (5.5%) sergeants, 102 drummers (0.7%), and 13,480 (88.8%) R&F 
(Table 7.3). Of these 2,728 (18%), 12,033 (79.2%), and 428 (2.8%) were killed, 
wounded, or missing respectively with the officers suffering relatively more battlefield 
fatalities than the ORs, viz. 177 (23.1%) of 767 casualties as opposed to 2,551 (17.7%) 
of 14,442 (Table 7.4). 
Overall, nearly two thirds of casualties were sustained during the seven days of 
direct action (battles and assaults) and the remainder during the eleven months of the 
siege (Table 7.3, Part B). Nearly three quarters of the casualties among the officers and 
sergeants occurred during the battles and assaults, suggesting that they may have taken 
greater risks thereby setting an example to the men. The drummers were employed in 
assisting the wounded and c.80% of their casualties were recorded during the battles and 
assaults. In contrast, proportionally more of the casualties suffered by the R&F occurred 
in the trenches (Table 7.3, Part B). 
Overall the chances of a casualty being killed tended to be higher during the three 
battles (21.9% of casualties) than in either siege operations or assaults on the Sevastopol 
garrison when the proportion of casualties killed was 16.7% and 15.5% respectively 
(Table 7.5). 
The fatality rates for officers in the three battles and assaults during the siege were 
respectively 80 (28.5%) of 281 cf. 59 (20.2%) of 292 casualties (Table 7.6). The 
comparable proportions for the other ranks were 1,028 (21.5%) of 4,774 and 716 
(16.4%) of 4,369 respectively (Table 7.7). The chance of both officers and men 
receiving a fatal wound was lower in siege operations than for the assaults: 19.5% cf. 
24.2% for officers and 15.3% cf. 19.1% for the men (Tables 7.5 and 7.6). 
 
The stage of campaign: The Army encamped before Sevastopol at the beginning of 
October 1854 and the AGs ledger covered the siege from 5 October until 8 September 
1855, a period of 333 days of trench warfare if the days of battles of the Balaklava and 
Inkerman and the three main assaults on the Sevastopol garrison on the 8 and 18 June 
                                                 
486  For data of these engagements, and the explosion in the magazine in November 1855, see Hall 
‘Unpublished memoir.’ 
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and 9 September 1855 are excluded. For casualties on a weekly basis see Figures 7.7 
and 7.8. 
The number of casualties remained low until March 1855 (median ≤6 per day for 
each month) although there were four days when the number was ≥50. Thereafter, 
losses increased so that those sustained during six weeks before the fall of Sevastopol 
accounted for a third of all siege casualties (1,879 of 5,451; Table 7.8). 
There were no casualties on 35 (10.5%) of the 333 siege days while the number 
was ≤10 on 150 (45%) with ≥50 recorded on 28 (8.4%); (Table 7.9). No person was 
killed on 119 (35.8%) days while there were ≤4 fatalities on 161 (48.7%) and ≥17 on 5 
(1.5%). 
The maximum number casualties recorded was 141 (19 killed) on the first day of 
the 5
th
 Bombardment on 17 August 1855; the next highest was 116 (21 killed) on the 17 
October 1854 when the 1
st
 bombardment commenced, while other engagements such as 
those involving attacks by the British on 20 November and 14 April and Russian sorties 
on 20 December and 22 March resulted in higher than usual casualties. 
 
Sayer’s Dispatches and Papers 
 
Tables prepared by the AG’s Department at Horse Guards in the appendix of Sayer’s 
monograph list the strength on embarkation of the cavalry and infantry regiments, RA, 
and RS&M, which, with the number of reinforcements received gives the total number 
of men who served in each unit during the campaign.
487
 In addition, the number 




Losses recorded in the cavalry and infantry regiments: Analyses of data in 
Sayer’s endpaper are presented in Figure 7.9. The losses from death (all causes) and 
invaliding were ≥40% (median 46%) of the total strength in 20 of 22 infantry regiments 
landing from Bulgaria and forming the initial besieging force. For the 16 regiments that 
arrived before the turn of the year the losses were ≤40% in nine, while in the 12 joining 
during 1855 the numbers were ≤30%, with a median of 20% (Figure 7.9). 
                                                 
487  This figure was used as the denominator in the calculation of proportions (‰), for example, those 
presented in Figures 7.9-7.13. 
488  Sayer (1857), pp. 420-3, 428-9, & endpaper. Incidentally, there is little information in the M&SH 
on the losses in the RA and RS&M, and nothing in the AG’s ledger. 
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The number of men KIA, dying of wounds, and wounded per 1,000 for each of 
the regiments was calculated and the results plotted in Figures 7.10 to 7.13 taking 
account of time that each spent on active service.
489
 The four figures confirm that within 
each category there were differences, sometimes considerable, between regiments; the 
Light Brigade, as expected, suffered more losses than the Heavy Brigade; the Highland 
Brigade had fewer casualties then the majority of regiments involved with the siege; the 
casualty rate in several of the regiments that arrived during in September to December 
was as high as those that formed the initial invading force; while the regiments arriving 
during the summer of 1855 had a relatively small number of battlefield casualties. 
 
Losses in action: In all, 3,905 officers and 93,959 men served with the Army up to 1 




The proportion of officers lost to the strength for all reasons in each corps was 
close to the proportion of the number who served (Table 7.10, col. 5 cf. col. 9), while 
among NCOs and men the losses were relatively higher in the infantry than in the 
cavalry, RA, and RS&M (Table 7.10). 
Further information on losses sustained in action is summarized in Table 7.11. 
The cavalry officers suffered fewer casualties overall while conversely more RE 
officers were killed or died of wounds than might be expected. Proportionally more 
NCOs and men in the infantry either died or were wounded while the losses were lower 
for the cavalry and RA, and to a lesser extent in the RS&M. 
 
Adjutant General’s return 
 
The AG’s return dated 7 April 1855 presumably included information received up until 
the fall of Sevastopol. Overall nearly a quarter (1,360 of 5,906, 23%) of officers and 
men sustaining a BFI died during engagement, with the proportion of those killed being 
higher in the cavalry and the RA and RS&M combined than the infantry, with the 
exception of the R&F in the RA and RS&M (Table 7.12). 
 
                                                 
489  The 71st Regiment was omitted as it was stationed at Kertch for much of the time, as were the 
82nd and 92nd Regiments that arrived in the Crimea too late to participate in the fighting. 
490  Details on the LTC and the British German and Swiss Legion have not been included as they were 
not engaged in action. 
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W.B. Hodge’s paper 
 
This long paper was read on 21 April 1856 and was based on what published 
information that was then available.
491
 This included a summary of those officers and 
men who were killed and wounded in the battles, when on siege duties and during the 
assaults on Sevastopol. The totals were 4,919, 4565, and 4396 respectively, of whch 297 
(6%), 154 (3.4%), and 290 (6.6%) were officers. 
 
R.T. Thompson’s paper 
 
The analyses were based on data on officers collected from official returns published in 
the LG.
492
 The majority of the 224 who died as a result of action with the enemy were 
killed on the field, rather than dying in hospital; and there was little to choose between 
field officers (Major and above) and the lower ranks (Captains and below), at 70% (32 
of 46 deaths) and 73% (129 of 176) respectively. 
Of the 96 fatal casualties sustained during the battles of the Alma, Balaklava and 
Inkerman 77 (81.2%) died on the field while the comparable proportion for the siege 
was lower at 66.5% (85 of 128). The total deaths as a proportion to strength for the three 
battles were 2.7%, 1.1%, and 4.8%, while the comparable proportions for Waterloo, 
Talavera, Salamanca, and Vittoria were 8.1%, 4.4%, 2.1%, and 1.7%. 
 
Mortality from gunshot wounds 
 
It is only possible to compare the various general hospitals during the period April-
December 1855 when the ratio of deaths to admissions for the Camp General Hospital, 
the Castle Hospital, and those at Scutari were 184:730 (25.2%), 82:1,781 (4.6%), and 
12:708 (1.7%) respectively. 
The comparable figures for Scutari for September 1854 to March 1855 were 
294:3,528 (8.3%), a rate that was not twice that recorded in convalescents in the Castle 
Hospital, viz. 4.6%. An observation that suggests that though many of these men were 
seriously injured and in poor physical condition, there was little evidence that any 
consequences of wound infection and any perceived deficiences in the Scutari hospitals 
                                                 
491  Hodge (1856). 
492  Thompson (1857). 
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were not sufficiently serious to cause the death of an excessively high proportion of 
these patients, though they may have rendered them unfit for service, and this could 
have resulted in their discharge from the Army (See Chapter 9). 
 
Outcome for wounded personnel 
 
Maimed soldiers: A surgeon in 23rd Regiment suggested during January 1856 that 
men rendered unfit ‘for duties of soldiers in the ranks’ by minor wounds or injuries 
should not be discharged but redeployed on other duties, and thus spare men capable of 
‘all duties’. The proposition was seemingly accepted by the GOC of the Light 
Division,
493





The fate of NCOs and soldiers with battlefield injuries: The interval between 
admission and the death from wounds and mechanical injuries of 1,200 NCOs and men 
in the cavalry and infantry is tabulated in General Return C and summarized in Table 
7.13. Over a half died within ≤3 days while nearly a tenth lingered for over a month 
before they did so.
495
 The time taken for 4,015 of 6,359 wounded men to return to duty 
is summarized in Table 7.14. Nearly half (45%) were in hospital for <1 month. A small 
proportion (2.5%) took >3 months to recover, presumably because the majority of 
patients requiring a longer convalescence would have been sent elsewhere by that time 
in order to vacate beds in case they were needed. 
The infantry suffered proportional more BFIs than the other corps (Table 7.11, 
col. 7) and as a consequence gunshot wounds accounted for a high proportion of those 
who were subsequently disabled and discharged (38%). The comparable proportions in 
the RS&M and RA were 30.6% and 22.4%, while for the cavalry, which had the least 
contact with the enemy; it was 11.2% (Table 7.15). 
 
                                                 
493  WO/28/90 & 163. 
494  Hinton (2014). 
495  No distinction is made between BFI and other injuries, but data suggests the majority of deaths 








The lack of facilities during the first three months after the invasion meant that a 
high proportion of casualties with BFIs were evacuated to Scutari. Thereafter, most 
wounded men were treated in the Crimea. During the first winter the mortality rate in 
the Scutari hospitals did not appear excessively high suggesting that fatal complications 
amongst the wounded men admitted was not a serious problem. 
About two thirds of BFIs occurred during the principal battles and assaults on 
Sevastopol, with the remaining third being sustained during the year-long siege. 
Nearly a fifth of the casualties were killed, with the officers suffering relatively 
more fatalities than the ORs. The chances of a casualty being killed tended to be higher 
during the three battles than in either siege operations or assaults on Sevastopol. 
It is a generally accepted fact that officers not infrequently exposed themselves to 
greater risks on the battle field in order to encourage their men. It would seem that this 
trait may also apply to NCO’s. 
There were no casualties on c.1 in 10 of siege days and no deaths on c.1 in 3 days. 
Exclusive of the three principal assaults the number casualties exceeded 100 on only 
two days. 
There were considerable differences in the number of casualties recorded in the 
different regiments. This presumably reflected their involvement in action with the 
enemy; a topic not investigated here. 
c.1 in 6 men admitted to hospital with a gunshot wound died, with over a half 
doing so within three days. About a quarter of those who survived were hospitalized for 
a less than a week with a fifth being discharged within a month.
497
 
About a third of the men discharged from the infantry, RA, and R&SM had a 
gunshot wound; in contrast, only a tenth of the cavalry troopers were in this category. 
 
 
                                                 
496  M&SH, II, General Return A. 




Table 7.1: Management of men suffering battlefield injuries 













9 Sep. 1855 
Location for treatment 
Battlefield/front line ● ● ● ● ● 
Casualty clearing stations - - - ● ● 
Regimental hospitals - ● ● ● ● 
General hospitals - ? ● ● ● 
Transport for casualties 
Stretchers ● ● ● ● ● 
Ambulance waggons - ? ● ● ● 
Railway - - - ● ● 
Evacuation by sea ● ● ● (●) (●) 
●, Utilized; (●), available if required. 
 
 
Table 7.2: Numbers of NCOs and men admitted to hospitals in the Crimea and Turkey with gunshot 













Sep. 1560 - - - - 1013 - 
Oct. 280 9 - - - 444 - 
Nov. 1748 11 - - - 1431 - 
Dec. 192 0 - - - 116 43 
Jan. 118 4 - - - 196 0 
Feb. 48 4 - - - 33 1 
Mar. 113 2 0 - - 34 1 
Apr. 307 1 107 4 - 16 3 
May 313 1 52 4 - 6 0 
June 1778 8 480 279 - 91 0 
July 601 2 194 21 0 31 0 
Aug. 1003 1 388 12 0 259 0 
Sep. 1776 1 392 293 0 183 0 
Total 9936 44 1613 613 0 3853 48 
[Summarized from M&SH, I, Regimental histories, and II: General Hospital Returns 1 and III-VII] 
* Principally convalescent patients. 
 
Table 7.3: The number of casualties resulting from action with the enemy 
Part A 
Action Officers Sergeants Drummers Rank & File All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 288 5.7 305 6.0 53 1.0 4419 87.3 5065 33.3 
Siege ops 185 3.4 213 3.9 20 0.4 5033 92.3 5451 35.9 
Assaults 294 6.3 322 6.9 29 0.6 4028 86.2 4673 30.8 
Total 767 5.0 840 5.5 102 0.7 13480 88.8 15189 100 
 
Part B 
Action Officers Sergeants Drummers Rank & File All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 288 37.6 305 36.3 53 52 4419 32.8 5065 33.3 
Siege ops 185 24.1 213 25.4 20 19.6 5033 37.3 5451 35.9 
Assaults 294 38.3 322 38.3 29 28.4 4028 29.9 4673 30.8 
Total 767 100 840 100 102 100 13480 100 15189 100 




Table 7.4: Casualties according to rank 
Rank Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 177 23.1 574 74.8 16 2.1 767 100 
Sergeants 163 19.4 653 77.7 24 2.9 840 100 
Drummers 20 19.6 82 80.4 0 - 102 100 
Rank and File 2368 17.5 10724 79.6 388 2.9 13480 100 
Total 2728 18.0 12033 79.2 428 2 15189 100 
[Summarized from RAMC/397/F/RM/7/17] 
 
Table 7.5: The proportion of officers and men killed during battles, siege operations, and assaults on 
Sevastopol, September 1854-September 1855 
Month 
(1854/44) 
Battle field casualties (% killed in action) 
Battles Siege ops Assaults Total 
Killed Total % Killed Total % Killed Total % Killed Total % 
Sep. 352 1983 17.8 - - - - - - 352 1983 17.8 
Oct. 124 509 24.4 61 380 16.1 - - - 185 889 20.8 
Nov. 632 2573 24,6 27 151 17.9 - - - 659 2724 24.2 
Dec. - - - 59 250 23.6 - - - 59 250 23.6 
Jan. - - - 23 121 19.0 - - - 23 121 19.0 
Feb. - - - 8 42 19.0 - - - 8 42 19.0 
Mar. - - - 33 187 17.6 - - - 33 187 17.6 
Apr. - - - 106 541 19.6 - - - 106 541 19.6 
May - - - 66 366 18.0 - - - 66 366 18.0 
June - - - 98 691 14.2 391 2226 17.6 489 2917 16.8 
Jul, - - - 105 843 12.5 - - - 105 843 12.5 
Aug. - - - 184 1493 12.3 - - - 184 1493 12.3 
Sep. - - - 73 386 18.9 386 2447 15.8 459 2833 16.2 
Total 1108 5065 21.9 843 5451 15.5 777 4673 16.7 2728 15189 18.0 
[Summarized from RAMC/397/F/RM/7/17] 
 
 
Table 7.6: Casualties sustained by officers during the battles and assaults on Sevastopol 
Affair Killed Wounded Missing Total killed,, 
wounded or missing 
Total in battles 
or assaults No. % No. % No. % 
Battle of the Alma 25 25.5 73 74.5 0 - 98  
281 Battle of Balaklava 12 30.8 25 64.1 2 5.1 39 
Battle of Inkerman 43 29.9 100 69.4 1 0.7 144 
Taking the Quarries 11 23.4 36 76.6 0 - 47  
292 1st assault on Sevastopol 21 22.6 71 76.3 1 1.1 93 
2nd assault on Sevastopol 27 17.8 124 81.6 1 0.6 152 
Total for battles and assaults 139 24.2 429 74.9 5 0.9 573 
Siege ops (From Appendix 7.1: 
Table A7.1.1) 
36 19.5 138 74.6 11 5.9 185 
[Summarized from RAMC/397/F/RM/7/17; see Appendix 7.2, Tables A2.1 & A2.3-8] 
 
Table 7.7: Casualties sustained by the sergeants, drummers, and men during the battles and the assaults on 
Sevastopol 
Affair Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
(100% ) for rows 
Total in battles 
or assaults No. % No. % No. % 
Battle of the Alma 327 17.4 1539 81.7 16 0.9 1882  
4774 Battle of Balaklava 101 27.5 211 57.5 55 15.0 367 
Little Inkerman 11 11.5 85 88.5 0 - 96 
Battle of Inkerman 589 24.2 1778 73.2 62 2.6 2429 
Taking the Quarries 122 18.9 510 78.8 15 2.3 647  
4369 1st assault on Sevastopol 237 16.6 1172 82.0 20 1.4 1429 
2nd assault on Sevastopol 357 15.6 1766 77.0 170 7.4 2293 
Total for battles and assaults 1744 19.1 7061 772 338 3.7 9143 
Siege ops (From Appendix 
7.1: Tables A7.1.2-4) 
807 15.3 4385 83.3 74 1.4 5266 




Table 7.8: Minimum, maximum, and median number of casualties sustained each day during siege 
operations, exclusive of the three principal assaults on Sevastopol, October 1854-September 1855 
Month 
(1854-55) 
Number of casualties/day Total 
casualties 
No. of days  
with ≥50 
casualties 
Minimum Maximum Median 
October 0 116 6 380 2 
November 0 30 2 151 0 
December 0 78 4 250 1 
January 0 22 3 121 0 
February 0 7 1 42 0 
March 0 78 4 187 1 
April 3 72 14.5 541 1 
May 3 43 10 366 0 
June 4 58 23 691 2 
July 9 63 27 843 2 
August 13 141 44 1493 13 
September 37 63 55 386 6 
Total 0 141 8 5451 28 (8.4%)/333 
[Summarized from RAMC/397/F/RM/7/17] 
 
 
Table 7.9: Distribution of casualties among officers and men according the number that were recorded on 
each day of the siege 



















0 35 10.5 10.5 0 119 35.8 35.8 
1-5 98 29.4 39.9 1-2 95 28.5 64.3 
6-10 52 15.6 55.5 3-4 66 19.8 84.1 
11-15 38 11.4 66.9 5-6 19 5.7 89.8 
16-20 18 5.4 72.3 7-8 11 3.3 93.1 
21-25 18 5.4 77.8 9-10 9 2.7 95.8 
26-30 12 3.6 81.4 11-12 5 1.5 97.3 
31-40 22 6.6 88.0 13-14 3 0.9 98.2 
41-50 12 3.6 91.6 15-16 1 0.3 98.5 
51-85 26 7.8 99.4 17-18 1 0.3 98.8 
116 1 0.3 99.7 19-20 3 0.9 99.7 
141 1 0.3 100 21 1 0.3 100 
Total 333 100  Total 333 100  





Table 7.10: The strength and losses in the principal corps of the Army of the East 
Rank Corps Strength Losses* 
Embarked Reinforcements Total (%) Deaths Invalided Deserters† 
& POW 
Total (%) 
Officers Cavalry 287 140 427 
(10.9) 
37 144 2 183 
(10.2) 
Infantry‡ 1497 1498 2995 
(76.7) 
306 1072 8 1386 
(77.5) 
RA 120 268 388 
(9.9) 
23 145 0 168 
(9.4) 
RS&M 3 92 95 
(2.4) 
20 31 0 51 
(2.9) 
Total 1907 1998 3905 
(100) 




Cavalry 4868 3425 8293 
(8.8) 
1172 920 96 2188 
(6.2) 
Infantry† 43639 29660 73399 
(78.1) 
17302 11464 494 29260 
(82.5) 
RA 3095 7628 10723 
(11.4) 
1483 2117 0 3600 
(10.2) 
RS&M 403 1241 1644 
(1.8) 
241 157 4 402 
(1.1) 
Total 52005 41954 93959 
(100) 
20198 14658 594 35450 
(100) 
[Summarized from Sayer (1857), endpaper] 
* The total includes those killed in action and dying of wounds and disease. 
† No officer deserted. 
‡ The three Guards and 49 line regiments are itemized separately in the original table. 
 
Table 7.11: Number of officers and NCOs and men that served in the cavalry, infantry, Royal Artillery, 
and RS&M during the Crimean campaign, together with the numbers who were killed and wounded 
Rank Corps Total served 
(%) 
Proportion (%) of the total who served 
Killed in action Died of wounds Wounded* Total casualties 






































































































The ratio of officers to men 
(‰) 
42 59 43 45 47 
[Summarized from Sayer (1857), pp. 420-3, 428-9 and the endpaper. A similar table was published in the M&SH, II, 
p. 388, though it differs in some details] 




Table 7.12: Battle field injuries recorded in a return provided by the Adjutant General, Horse Guards, 
April 1855 
Corps Officers NCOs Men (R&F) 
Killed Wounded* Total 
(% 
killed) 
Killed Wounded Total 
(% 
killed) 
Killed Wounded Total 
(% 
killed) 
Cavalry 11 21 32 (34) 14 21 35 (40) 146 181 327 (45) 
RA and 
RS&M† 
7 12 19 (37) 5 11 16 (33) 36 158 194 (19) 
Infantry 64 186 250 (26) 62 236 298 (21) 1006 3698 4704 
(21) 
Staff 9 22 33 (29) Not applicable Not applicable 
Total 91 241 332 (27) 81 268 349 (23) 1188 4037 5225 
(23) 
[Adapted from BPP (1854-55), No. 204: Adjutant General Officer, Horse Guards, 7 April 1855] 
* The numbers who died of wounds was given for officers only, and this data has been omitted. 




Table 7.13: Time to death from fatal wounds and mechanical injuries 
Days to death Corps Total 
Cavalry Guards Infantry Number % 
<1 4 1 160 165 13.7 
1-3 6 23 306 335 27.9 
4-6 0 10 142 152 12.7 
7-13 1 19 197 217 18.1 
14-20 1 21 93 115 9.6 
21-27 2 7 45 54 4.5 
28-34 1 11 49 61 5.1 
35-41 1 4 21 26 2.2 
≥42 4 12 59 75 6.2 
Total 20 108 1072 1200 100 
[M&SH, II, General Return C] 
 
Table 7.14: Length of time taken of NCOs and men to return to duty after treatment for wounds 




















1476 1408 709 263 101 40 11 7 2344 
Proportion 
(%) 
23.2 22.1 11.1 4.1 1.6 0.6 0.2 0.1 36.9 
[Adapted from the M&SH, II, p. 388] 
* This figure was obtained by difference; by making the assumption that patients not returning to duty would been 
repatriated or sent elsewhere to convalesce. 
 
Table 7.15: Proportion of NCOs and men disabled and discharged the service for gunshot and incised 
wounds 
Reason for disablement 
or discharge 
Cavalry Infantry Royal Artillery RS&M 
Total % Total % Total % Total % 
Gunshot wound 56 11.2 1942 38.0 101 22.4 9 30.6 
Incised wound 19 3.8 11 0.2 0 - 0 - 
Other reasons 426 85.0 3164 61.8 350 77.6 43 69.4 
Total 501 100 5117 100 451 100 62 100 



















Figure 7.3: Number of NCOs and men admitted to hospital with, or died from, wounds and injuries, other 
than those caused by gunshots, April 1854-June 1856 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Admission of NCOs and men to hospitals in the Crimea and Turkey with gunshot wounds, 














Figure 7.7: Casualties sustained during action with the enemy each week during the Crimean campaign 
 
 




Figure 7.9: Losses of NCOs and men in infantry regiments during the Crimean campaign from all causes 
of death or by invaliding as a proportion (%) of the total number who served 
 
Figure 7.10: Number of NCOs and men killed in action per 1,000 men who served with the regiment 




Figure 7.11: Number of NCOs and men dying of wounds per 1,000 men who served with the regiment 
during the Crimean campaign 
 
 
Figure 7.12: Number of NCOs and men killed in action and dying of wounds per 1,000 men who served 












Appendix 7.1: Casualties sustained by officers, sergeants, drummers, and rank and file 
sustained during the principal battles, siege operations, and assault on Sevastopol 
 
The data were summarized from a copy of the daily returns of battlefield casualties prepared by the AG 
department and preserved among Hall’s papers.498 
 
Table A7.1.1: Casualties among officers 
Part A 
Action Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 80 45.2 205 35.7 3 18.75 288 37.6 
Siege ops 36 20.3 138 24 11 68.75 185 24.1 
Assaults 61 34.5 231 40.3 2 12.5 294 38.3 
Total 177 100 574 100 16 100 767 100 
 
Part B 
Action Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 80 27.8 205 71.2 3 1.0 288 100 
Siege ops 36 19.5 138 74.6 11 5.9 185 100 
Assaults 61 20.7 231 78.6 2 0.7 294 100 
Total 177 23.1 574 74.8 16 2.1 767 100 
 
 
Table A7.1.2: Casualties among sergeants 
Part A 
Action Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 66 40.5 231 35.4 8 33.3 305 36.3 
Siege ops 36 22 173 26.5 4 16.7 213 25.4 
Assaults 61 37.5 249 38.1 12 20 322 38.3 
Total 163 100 653 100 24 100 840 100 
 
Table A7.1.2: Continued 
Part B 
Action Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 66 21.6 231 75.8 8 2.6 305 100 
Siege ops 36 16.9 173 81.2 4 1.9 213 100 
Assaults 61 19.0 249 77.3 12 3.7 322 100 
Total 163 19.4 653 77.7 24 2.9 840 100 
 
 
                                                 
498  RAMC/397/F/RM/7/17. 
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Table A7.1.3: Casualties among drummers 
Part A 
Action Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 10 50 43 52.4 0 - 53 52 
Siege ops 3 15 17 20.8 0 - 20 19.6 
Assaults 7 35 22 26.8 0 - 29 28.4 
Total 20 100 82 100 0 - 102 100 
 
Part B 
Action Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 10 18.9 43 81.1 0 - 53 100 
Siege ops 3 15 17 85 0 - 20 100 
Assaults 7 24.1 22 75.9 0 - 29 100 
Total 20 19.6 82 80.4 0 - 102 100 
 
Table A7.1.4: Casualties among rank and file 
Part A 
Action Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 952 40.2 3342 31.2 125 32.2 4419 32.8 
Siege ops 768 32.4 4195 39.1 70 18 5033 37.3 
Assaults 648 27.4 3187 29.7 193 49.8 4028 29.9 
Total 2368 100 10724 100 388 100 13480 100 
 
Table A7.1.4: Continued 
Part B 
Action Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Battles 952 21.5 3342 75.6 125 2.8 4419 100 
Siege ops 768 15.3 4195 83.3 70 1.4 5033 100 
Assaults 648 16.1 3187 79.1 193 4.8 4028 100 
Total 2368 17.5 10724 79.6 388 2.9 13480 100 
 
 
Appendix 7.2: Numbers of officers and men who were killed, wounded, or reported 
missing during the principal engagements with the enemy 
 
The tables were transcribed from Hall’s unpublished memoirs,499 which themselves are based on data in 
the AG’s Ledger. 
 
Table A7.2.1: Casualties sustained during the battle of the Alma, 20 September 1854 
Personnel Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 25 25.5 73 74.5 0 - 98 100 
Men 327 17.4 1539 81.7 16 0.9 1882 100 
Total 352 17.8 1612 81.4 16 0.8 1980 100 
 
 
Table A7.2.2: Casualties sustained during the opening of the bombardment of Sebastopol, 17 October 1854 
Personnel Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 1 50 1 50 0 - 2 100 
Men 20 17.5 94 82.5 0 - 114 100 
Total 21 18.1 95 81.9 0 - 116 100 
 
                                                 
499  RAMC/397/F/RT/2 and WO/33/3B. 
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Table A7.2.3: Casualties sustained during the battle of Balaklava, 25 October 1854 
Personnel Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 12 30.8 25 64.1 2 5.1 39 100 
Men 101 27.5 211 57.5 55 15.0 367 100 
Total 113 27.8 236 58.2 57 14.0 406 100 
 
Table A7.2.4: Casualties sustained during the sortie from Sebastopol (Little Inkerman), 26 October 1854 
Personnel Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 0 - 7 100 0 - 7 100 
Men 11 11.5 85 88.5 0 - 96 100 
Total 11 10.7 92 89.3 0 - 103 100 
 
 
Table A7.2.5: Casualties sustained during the battle of Inkerman, 5 November 1854 
Personnel Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 43 29.9 100 69.4 1 0.7 144 100 
Men 589 24.2 1778 73.2 62 2.6 2429 100 
Total 632 24.6 1878 73.0 63 2.4 2573 100 
 
Table A7.2.6: Casualties sustained during the taking of the Quarries, 7/8 June 1855 
Personnel Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 11 23.4 36 76.6 0 - 47 100 
Men 122 18.9 510 78.8 15 2.3 647 100 
Total 133 19.2 546 78.7 15 2.1 694 100 
 
 
Table A7.2.7: Casualties sustained during the first assault of the Redan, 18 June 1855 
Personnel Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 21 22.6 71 76.3 1 1.1 93 100 
Men 237* 16.6 1172† 82.0 20 1.4 1429 100 
Total 258 17.0 1243 81.7 21 1.3 1522 100 
* & † Includes 7 and 42 additional casualties at night. 
 
Table A7.2.8: Casualties sustained during the second assault of the Redan, 8 September 1855 
Personnel Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 27 17.8 124 81.6 1 0.6 152 100 
Men 357 15.6 1766 77.0 170 7.4 2293 100 
Total 384 15.7 1890 77.3 171 7.0 2445 100 
 
 
Table A7.2.9: Casualties sustained during the explosion of the Right Attack magazine, 15 November 1855 
Personnel Killed Wounded Missing All casualties 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Officers 1 16.7 5 83.3 0 - 6 100 
Men 19 13.6 114 81.4 7 5.0 140 100 




Evacuation of sick and wounded from the Crimea to 
Turkey 
 
The conveyance of the wounded from the front line and the evacuation of the sick and 
wounded from the Crimea to Turkey and further afield posed a challenging logistical 
problem that was not addressed adequately by the government and military authorities 
either before the invasion or during the weeks that followed, despite timely warnings 
from the DG of the AMD.  
The consequences of this oversight soon became apparent when details of the 
management of the wounded after the battle of the Alma, and the voyages to Turkey 
involving the Kangaroo, Dunbar, Colombo, Trent, and Avon were publicised by the 
press. Much unwarranted criticism for these catastrophes was laid at the door of the 
AMD; a matter that naturally annoyed Smith, Hall and their colleagues and which 
serves to illustrate a general lack of understanding of how an army on campaign 
functioned. The ultimate authority resided with C.-in-C., with administration being 
undertaken by the AG, QMG, GOC Divisions, CRA, and CRE, and their respective 
staff officers. The AMD, on the other hand, had no executive authority and was 
dependent on cooperation from the military authorities to achieve many of its 
objectives, whether these were the movement of patients, the provision of hospitals and 
orderlies to serve in them, or the evacuation of patients by sea. 
 
Initial planning and further developments 
 
Smith intimated to the War Office as early as 18 February 1854 the need for an 
Ambulance Corps (AC), but comprising fit men and not pensioners given his experience 
of invaliding 20,000 men when at Chatham.
500
 In contrast, Raglan’s Military Secretary 
(Lieutenant Colonel Steele) asked the Deputy Secretary on 30 March to enlist 
pensioners for an AC.
501
 The next month Smith proposed 800 able-bodied men should 
be recruited to serve as ambulance drivers, stretcher-bearers, and hospital orderlies thus 
                                                 
500  BPP (1854-55), No. 156, pp. 411-2. It was referred to as the Hospital Conveyance Corps in other 
documents. 
501  Presumably based on advice given by Tulloch, 30 Mar. 1854; BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 194. 
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relieving bandsmen and fighting men from these duties,
502
 but Hardinge was not 
prepared to reduce the strength of regiments and Smith’s advice was ignored. 
A scheme to form a corps in Bulgaria employing native personnel came to nothing 
and a unit of c.370 pensioners was subsequently raised along the lines suggested in 
Steele’s letter. The men arrived in Bulgaria in July 1854 but proved unsatisfactory from 
the start because they were ill-equipped and most were considered too old and unfit for 
heavy duties. In addition, disease, particularly cholera, soon thinned their ranks.
503
 
Before the invasion Hall recommended to Raglan that each infantry regiment 
should have one spring ambulance waggon and 32 stretcher bearers, the Cavalry 
Division four waggons and 48 bearers, and the Artillery four waggons (one per battery) 
and 48 bearers.
504
 In the event these requirements were not met and the Army landed 
without a single functional ambulance waggon,
505
 an omission that had serious 
consequences during the first weeks thereafter. 
Raglan subsequently admitted that the ‘Ambulance Corps, hastily raised on a 
limited scale, had proved a failure,’506 while the Roebuck Committee acknowledged that 
Smith’s recommendations for its constitution had been ignored, and concluded that the 
‘entire failure of this corps and the consequent sufferings of the army are abundantly 
proved.’507 
The design of the ambulance waggons used initially proved unsatisfactory and the 
conveyance of invalids continued a serious problem throughout the first winter, 
especially as the deterioration of the roads from November precluded the use of 
wheeled transport. Matters began to improve when the railway came into use during 
                                                 
502  Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 33-4 and Shepherd (1991), pp. 37-8 & 79. The Hospital Commissioners 
subsequently recommended the Corps should comprise ‘carefully selected men in the prime of 
life’ and […] should include ‘wheelwrights, farriers, harness-makers, and other artisans;’ BPP 
(1854-55), No. 1920, p. 5. 
503  For summaries on the development and performance of the AC see a memorandum by Tulloch 
BPP (1856), No. 2007, pp. 194-6 and Longmore (1869), pp. 36-40. 
504  For the text see The Times, 20 Sep. 1854; BPP 1854-55, No. 1920, pp. 55-7, and Cantlie 
(1974), II, pp. 37-42 & 46-67. 
505  An army staff officer ordered the vehicles etc. to be disembarked to make room for troops; BPP 
(1857-58), No. 2318, p. xlviii and M&SH, II, p. 253 
506  Raglan to Panmure, 30 Jan. 1855; WO/33/1/17/55. 
507  BBP (1854-55), No. 318, p. 18. 
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There was no provision for a field ambulance section in the MSC (See Chapter 4), 
much to Smith’s disappointment,509 and, after plans to reorganize Corps were 
formulated during 1885 it was finally integrated into the LTC as an Ambulance Service 
on 31 December,
510
 with a proportion of the ambulance waggons forming part of the 




Smith also appreciated the need for hospital transports and on 10 February 1854
512
 and 
again on 4 April 1854 he proposed formally to the Military Secretary that: 
 
The welfare of sufferers and of the Army will require those disabled by wounds or sickness 
should be removed from the vicinity of the conflicting forces. Ships, therefore, should be 
liberally provided, some for carrying to England, or elsewhere, men not likely to be soon 
available for further service; others in use in harbour, as floating hospitals. The ships […] 










 although Newcastle did forward a copy of the letter to Raglan, but 
not until 13 July, with the suggestion that he should confer with Admiral Boxer on the 
subject.
 516
 It is probable that Smith’s intial request was not passed to the Admiralty 
since the Roebuck Committee was informed on 27 April 1855 that no requisition had 
been received from the military authorities, but if it had been, ‘steps would have been 
taken to have had hospital ships fitted up.’517 Cantlie suggested that fault on this 
                                                 
508  Cacolets comprise two chairs attached on each side of a pack saddle which is placed on the back of 
a mule or horse in order to carry the sick and wounded across rough terrain. See ILN, 27 Jan. 
1855. 
509  Smith pointed out to the Military Undersecretary on 16 Mar. 1855 that ‘many of the wounded are 
carried off the field by bandsman and drummers’ and that this ‘arrangement has proved woefully 
deficient;’ PoL. 
510  General Order, 28 Dec. 1855. 
511  For discussion see Cantlie(1974), II, pp. 71-2 & 146-7 and Shepherd (1991), p. 79 
512  PoL. 
513  Smith to Military Secretary, 4 Apr. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO2/7 (Manuscript) and 
RAMC/524/14/2 (Typescript). 
514  PoL. Full text in BPP (1854-55), No. 156, pp. 415-6 and The Lancet, 28 July 1855. The 
annotation ‘pressing’ was included by The Lancet, but not in the official report. 
515  BPP (1854-55), No. 156, p. 416. 
516  WO/6/69-118-9. 
517  BPP (1854-55), No. 218, p. 279. 
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occasion must have resided with the Military Secretary, Hardinge, or Newcastle.
518
 
Newcastle, however, claimed that he knew nothing of Smith’s letters of 4 April and 11 
May,
519
 while Smith later received support from Kinglake: 
 
When as early as the 11
th
 May 1854 the Director General submitted to Horse Guards in 
writing a well considered plan for removing sick and wounded by appropriating 
beforehand due means of sea transport, and showed need of stationing in convenient 
ports ships prepared for reception of patients, his appeals were unanswered and 




The need for hospital ships was appreciated by the Royal Navy and HMS Belleisle 
was equipped for service with the Baltic Fleet at the beginning of March 1854.
521
 In 
view of this initiative it is surprising that the military authorities and the government 
failed to heed Smith’s timely advice, and this inevitably contributed to the terrible 




In the event vessels were ‘told off’ to evacuate invalids from the Crimea on an ad 
hoc basis until mid-December when a number of steamers were selected to provided a 
shuttle service across the Black Sea, a policy which remained in place until the end of 
the campaign. 
 
Transfer of patients from camp to Balaklava 
 
Management systems for transferring patients from the camps to Balaklava, a distance 
of six miles or more along poorly constructed roads, were inadequately developed 
during the early months. Not surprisingly things did not always run smoothly, and 
Raglan choose to admonish the AMD for some of the problems that arose, rather than 
the military authorities who rightly should have shouldered most of the blame, as 
correspondence summarized in Table 8.1 attests. 
Shortly after the invasion Dumbreck, who was deputizing for Hall while at 
Scutari, was severely reprimanded by way of a General Order on 11 October,
523, 
without any properly constituted inquiry having taken place. Briefly, a verbal order 
                                                 
518  Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 54-5. 
519  BPP (1854-55), No. 218, pp. 136-7. 
520  Kinglake (1891), p. 49. 
521  The Times, 4 Mar. 1854 and The Lancet, 13 May 1854. 
522  The topic was addressed by Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 21 & 54-5. 
523  WO/28/49 and The Times, 28 Oct. 1854. 
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from Dumbreck did not reach the PMO, Balaklava
524
 with the consequence that nothing 
had been prepared for invalids when they arrived during inclement weather. Raglan 
accused the PMO of ‘gross neglect’, which was hardly fair given he had not received 
the message, and not surprisingly Dumbreck, who was enjoined to give written orders in 
future ‘was affronted’ as he argued with justice, ‘that it was customary to give verbal 
orders in the army, even at the highest level.’525, 526 
The decision to publish this Order was taken without consulting Hall, which was a 
gross breach of etiquette if nothing else, revealed that Raglan ‘appeared to show scant 
appreciation of the transport conditions.’ It was, however, erroneous of Shepherd to 
suggest ‘there was nothing to suggest that […] Raglan saw fit to investigate the reasons 
for the defects of the system’527 since he ordered that future conveys of sick should be 
accompanied by an MO and a DAQMG, who was to ensure arrangements were made 
for the reception of the invalids, and that the ‘ticket’ that should accompany each 
invalid was given to the MO on the ship.
528
 
The authorities in Balaklava were required to inform headquarters of the 
accommodation available for invalids by the evening of each day so that the AG and 
QMG could arrange for Divisions to send down the appropriate number the next day, 
and for MOs to be selected by Hall. This system was not foolproof, however, and on 
occasions invalids arrived without notice, or too late in the day to be dealt with before 
nightfall, or when there was no ship available on which for them to embark (see Table 
8.1). 
Panmure subsequently asked Raglan why these problems had not been addressed, 
and, inter alia, he held the QMG responsible for neglecting to construct a suitable road 
between the camp and port.
529
 It is inconceivable that the AG and QMG were unaware 
of their responsibilities but the following exchange made in July 1855 indicate that 
matters were not entirely resolved even by that time: 
 
                                                 
524  Dr Tice, although he was not named in the Order. 
525  Shepherd (1991), pp. 160-1. 
526  The incident was reported in The Times, 28 Oct. and this provoked a strong reaction in support of 
the AMD from the editor of The Lancet, 4 Nov. 1854. 
527  Shepherd (1991), p. 160. 
528  General Order, 11 Oct. 1854 and AG to Commandant, Balaklava, 17 Feb. 1855; WO/28/108. A 
General Order of 8 Jan. 1855 instructed that patients sent to hospital should be issued with a 
prescribed form of admission ticket available from the Purveyors. 
529  Panmure to Raglan, 12 Feb. 1855; WO/33/1/13/55. 
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QMG: We must come to some arrangement and notification about sick going down. Some 
day, if I am not before hand informed, that boats etc. are required, there will be some disaster. 
The boats, fatigue parties etc. are told off for duty over night. Sick coming unexpectedly 
down is very embarrassing. 
 
AG’s response: As soon as vessels have been reported our sick may be expected daily so long 
as there are vessels to receive them. It is a daily business. […] The numbers carried down by 
the cavalry vary certainly but not very much. 70 or 80 are the most they convey. We now 
know precisely how many horses the cavalry will send up. The other modes of conveyance 
have increased of late […] Some 20 men per diem may be counted in by those individual 
exertions of divisions. In cases the cacolets for men, being extra conveyance, we always give 
ample notice. The daily duty of the ordinary cavalry description is one which never ceases so 




The twelve ambulance waggons employed at Inkerman proved of the ‘greatest use’ but 
they were insufficient to convey the wounded to Balaklava,
531
 and assistance had to be 
sought from the French,
532




Clearly the AC did not come up to expectations for several reasons, one of which 
was that many of the men were former infantry soldiers who knew little about handling 
horses, while the lack of smiths, farriers, and wheelwrights meant that damaged vehicles 
could not be repaired readily.
534
 The animals also became ‘knocked up’,535 and many 
perished,
536
 while the theft of transport cattle rendered the ambulance arabas at 
Headquarters inoperable as they could not be immediately replaced.
537
 Surprisingly, 




After Inkerman, Hall requested that spare Commissariat waggons should be used 
to convey the sick,
539
 and, although Raglan was in favour it proved unworkable because 
of the need to supply rations with the limited transport the Commissariat had 
                                                 
530  QMG to AG, 9 July 1855 and reply; WO/28/195. 
531  Hall expressed regret of not having the forty originally brought from England; Cantlie (1974), II, 
p. 77. 
532  Hall to Smith, 7 Nov. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/876; PoL; W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/317 
(Copy). 
533  Special Correspondent, 12 Nov. 1954; ILN, 9 Dec. 1854. 
534  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 5. 
535  Hall to QMG, 19 Nov. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/934; WO/28/196; BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 
161; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 103. 
536  M&SH, I, p. 301. 
537  Hall to QMG, 29 Nov. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/4/975 and WO/28/196. Another problem in this 
regard was the slaughter for human consumption of bullocks used to tow the hospital waggon; 
Williams, ‘Letters’, 1 Oct. 1854. 
538  Hall to QMG, 3 Feb. 1855; WO/28/140 and 176. 




 In December RA waggons and horses were employed to assist with 
relieving the sick list,
541
 but this was not sufficient, and Hall was placed in the 
humiliating position of having to ‘get a loan of the French ambulance’ because he had 
no alternative ‘as relief is now of the most vital importance [and] we shall be glad to 
avail ourselves of it.’542 And just as well perhaps, as one surgeon opined on 12 
December that if it had not been for the ‘French Ambulance not a single man could be 
moved from the camp. The famous ambulance carriages [having] long since stopped 
work.’543 In addition, some sick were carried to the port by regimental bât horses, 
officers’ chargers, and cavalry horses,544 with the involvement of the Cavalry Division 
being authorized officially when it was ordered early in 1855 to ‘furnish horses daily 
until further orders to carry sick to Balaklava.’545 
The roads became generally impassable to wheeled transport when the weather 
deteriorated during November, and it is then that the cacolets of the French came into 
their own. Hall informed Smith that mules fitted with packsaddles, chairs and reclining 
litters, were needed,
546
 and this was also recommended by the Hospital Commissioners 
with the additional proviso that ‘light vehicles like Irish jaunting cars to transport 
invalids’ and ambulance waggons ‘lighter than those sent out’ should also be 
provided.
547
 When Smith appreciated the circumstances he placed an order for ‘200 
litters, 200 chairs, and 210 pack saddles be sent as soon as possible,’ with the caveat: 
‘they should be sent when half the order is filled.’548 Hall informed the QMG when he 
heard of this,
549
 although this equipment did not arrive until the summer. 
On receipt of a request from Smith dated 22 December Hall convened a 
committee comprising himself and three Divisional PMOs to consider the performance 
of the available ambulance conveyance. They were generally in favour of the French 
                                                 
540  Medical Department Memorandum, 25 Nov. and PMO, 4th Division to Hall, 26 Nov. 1854; BPP 
(1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 162-3. 
541  Medical Department Memorandum, 9 Dec. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3. 
542  Hall to PMO, Light Division, 5 Dec. 1854; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 107 & 148.  
543  Bostock (1897), pp. 213-4. 
544  Evidence to the Supplies Commissioners; BPP (1856), No. 2007, pp. 115, 145 & 383. 
545  AG to GOC, Cavalry Division, 19 Jan. 1855; WO/28/108. 
546  Hall to Smith, 20 Dec. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1148; PoL; BPP (1856), No. 2007, pp. 169-
70. 
547  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, pp. 5-6. 
548  A totoal of 122 pairs of litters, 74 pairs of chairs, and 55 cars were sent to the East in 10 vessels 
between 7 Apr. and 25 Aug. 1855; Store Department, Pall Mall to Smith, 7 Sep. 1855, PoL. 
549  Smith to Ordnance Office, 16 Jan. 1855; PoL and Hall to QMG, 5 Feb. 1855; 
RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1396. 
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mule cacolets, although there was a tendency for them to sway, and there was risk of the 
animals stumbling or falling. The wheeled waggons available were considered too 
heavy, especially on poor roads after rain, and they recommended the ample provision 
of lighter waggons drawn by two horses for two men reclining, and Bianconi cars for 
patients who can sit.
550
 They also stressed that men operating the service should have 
knowledge of horses as there were few effective drivers and not one who could shoe a 
horse or repair a damaged waggon.
551
 
When military activity increased during the spring Hall found it necessary to call 
the QMG’s attention to: 
 
the state of the ambulance wagons […] In the event of an engagement with the enemy we 
have not a single ambulance wagon efficient, and beyond canvas bearers no means of 





It is understandable that Hall should have taken such a pessimistic view given that 
at the end of May the AC could only muster transport for 308 patients, and then only if 
unsuitable waggons or those out of repair were included (Table 8.2). The French Army, 
in contrast, provided 250 mule seats and five vans for each 10,000 men.
553
 
Following a request from Panmure
554
 a Committee comprising Hall and an officer 
from the RA and LTC was convened and their recommendations included, inter alia, an 
‘extension of the mule litter and chair and Irish car conveyance’ and the provision of a 
‘lighter […] spring carriage on four wheels for […] four wounded men in recumbent 
posture.’ The Committee also concluded that ‘mixed conveyance for reclining and 
sitting patients [was] objectionable’ and that the limit for any conveyance should be two 
to four.’555 This report, and associated documents, was forwarded to London together 
with a summary by Raglan: 
 
It is difficult to fix on the most eligible form of hospital carriage, so many different opinions 
existing on it. The carriage should be light with four wheels, with a canopy and curtain 
overhead. It should only contain four men, and there should be a space underneath for their 
accoutrements and packs. It should be drawn by two horses abreast.
556
 
                                                 
550  The passengers were seated on benches arranged along the side of the carriage with them looking 
outwards. 
551  Hall to Smith, 20 Jan. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1350 and WO/1/374/313 (Copy). 
552  Hall to QMG, 11 Feb. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO1/1/1424. 
553  North Wales Chronicle, 4 Nov. 1854, quoting the Spectator. 
554  Panmure to Raglan, 7 May 1855; WO/6/70/111. 
555  Hall to AG, 25 May 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2177 and WO/1/374/313 (Copy). 
556  Raglan to Panmure, 4 June 1855; WO/1/374/313. 
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Fortunately the British forces had no further major contact with the Russian field 
army,
557
 and just as well perhaps, because even after the fall of Sevastopol Hall 
concluded that the Corps was still ‘imperfectly organized and would not work well if 
the Army was to take the field.’ The AC was eventually subsumed into the LTC on 31 
December 1855, and from then on it was involved essentially on garrison duty. 
 
The AC was under the control of the QMG initially and MOs had to apply to his staff 
for transport to be provided. Inevitably this layer of bureaucracy was considered 
unsatisfactory by Smith who considered that divisional PMOs were the best judge of an 




Panmure subsequently instructed that this policy should be adopted,
559
 and when 
Hall heard he also stressed that ‘the demands made by the Inspectors of Hospitals on the 
Ambulance branch […] should be attended to without reference to any other 
authority.’560 The matter was finally concluded when the AG ordered that requisitions 
for medical conveyance signed by a ‘superior’ MO could be sent direct to the Divisional 
Transport Officer without reference to the AQMG.
561
 
Hall also considered that it ‘would be advantageous to have a due proportion of 
the ambulance attached to each Division, such an arrangement will have to be made if 
the Army takes to the field, and perhaps it will be as well to have it carried into effect at 





It was the responsibility of regimental surgeons to ensure that ‘no men unable to bear 
removal are sent away,’564 while Raglan desired that ‘great care be taken that the whole 
of this service be well performed.’565 The PMOs were enjoined to ascertain that there 
                                                 
557  The British Army was not involved in the battle of the Tchernaya. 
558  Smith to Military Secretary, 17 & 31 July 1855; PoL. 
559  Panmure to Simpson, 11 Aug. 1855; WO/6/71/88. 
560  Hall to Military Secretary, 26 Aug. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/3000. 
561  AG, Memorandum, 3 Sep. 1855; WO/28/175. 
562  Hall to Military Secretary, 26 Aug. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/3000. 
563  Memorandum prepared by the DG, LTC, 31 Aug. 1855; WO/28/175. 
564  PMO, 4th Division to Regimental Surgeons; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 170. 
565  AG to Sir J. Campbell, 13 Dec. 1854; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 166. 
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was room for patients in the Hospital before applying for transport from camp,
566
 while 
the Commandant at Balaklava made the important, and seemingly obvious request: 
‘Unless a distinction is made […] between the sick and wounded it is impossible to 
make the necessary arrangements for the conveyance of the wounded to the sanatorium, 
each wounded man requiring five men to carry him up to the hospital.’567 
The ever practical Hall ordered that the men should have breakfast before 
departure and take their blanket and great coat with them. The accompanying MO was 
to carry restoratives (spirits and wine) and a small cup,
568
 while the AG specified that 
three fatigue men were required to place a man on a mule, one to hold the opposite side 
of the litter, and two to lift the sick man.
569
 Incidentally, some months later an MO 
commented on his role in this duty: 
 
Our […] wounded [are sent] to Balaclava in […] ambulance carts [with] an assistant surgeon 
[…] We rather like the job as it saves us trench duty. [...] It is drawn by four mules and the 
surgeon rides alongside clears the road of Turkish donkey carts and uses his authority in 




Towards the end of 1854 the men evacuated to Scutari were ‘ragged and destitute 
of clothing’ despite there being ‘a quantity of warm clothing in Balaklava.’571 This was 
confirmed by the Commandant there who noted that the patients were ‘lousy and 
naked.’572 In order to rectify this problem the AG instructed that the sick should take 
their knapsacks with them, and if they lacked warm clothing it should be issued.
573
 A 
few weeks later Paulet reported that though the ‘sick came down better than they did’ 
there was still room for improvement as some still were without clothing,
574
 a situation 
that was confirmed by Nightingale.
575
 The subsequent arrival of sufficient clothes for 
the troops lead to a resolution of the problem and the QMG was informed that clothing 
                                                 
566  AG to OC, Cavalry Division, 11 May 1855; WO/28/109 
567  Commandant, Balaklava to AG, 10 Apr. 1855; WO/28/194. 
568  Medical Department Memorandum, 10 Dec. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3 and BPP (1857-58), 
No. 2379. pp. 108 & 165. 
569  AG’s Memorandum, 10 Dec. 1854; WO/28/122 and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 165. 
570  AS D. Greig, letter, 15 June 1855; Hill (2010), p. 93. 
571  Nightingale to Raglan, 29 Dec. 1854; NAM-1968-07-293-9. 
572  Paulet to Romaine, 7 Jan. 1855; Robins (2005), p. 66. 
573  AG’s Memorandum, 3 Jan. 1855; WO/28/122. 
574  Paulet to Raglan, 20 Jan. 1855; NAM-1968-07-393-8. 
575  Raglan to QMG, 14 Feb. 1855; WO/28/192. 
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Officers went on board ship for the ‘recruitment of the health’ but it was not until the 
summer of 1855 that Panmure desired ‘that arrangements should be made with the naval 
authorities that […] accommodation may be prepared on board ship […] as floating 
hospitals for 500 to 600 men.’ The Port Admiral was requested to ‘name vessels for this 
service,’ and to take care there was sufficient room allowed between cots for MOs to 
attend the patients. In the event, several vessels were fitted up within a few days despite 
a shortage of carpenters, and provided for 921 patients, together with 426 additional 
beds in the hospitals.
577
 It has not been established how much use was made of these 
vessels though some were later employed on the shuttle service to Turkey. 
 
A monograph on the construction and operation of the railway has been published,
578
 
and its first use for invalids was recorded by Russell on 2 April: 
 
The first human cargo […] was sent down to Balaklava to-day […] in less than half an hour. 
The men were propped up on their knapsacks, and seemed very comfortable. What a change 
from the ghastly processions […] some weeks ago, formed of dead or dying men, hanging 




The railway was used regularly up to twice a day for this purpose if ships were in 
harbour,
580
 while it was also used to convey convalescents from Balaklava back to 
camp.
581
 There is no evidence that waggons were adapted as ambulances though this 
was probably unnecessary as the opening of the Camp General Hospital in April 1855 
and improvements in the regimental hospitals meant seriously injured patients could be 
treated in camp and not transferred to Balaklava and beyond. 
                                                 
576  DAQMG, Balaklava to QMG, 14 Feb. 1855; WO/28/192. 
577  QMG to Lyons, 30 Mar., QMG to Boxer, 30 Mar. & 1 Apr, DAQMG to QMG, 4 Apr., and 
AQMG to QMG, 10 Apr. 1855 WO/28/192. The vessels included Ottawa (100 evacuees), Severn 
(140), Australian (100 if not full of platforms), St Hilda (91), Wm Jackson (110), Orient (110), 
Robert Lowe (100), Poietiers (100), HMS Leander (50), HMS Wasp (20), Ottawa (100), Severn 
(140), and Australian (100). 
578  Cooke (1997), pp. 64-84. 
579  The Times, 18 Apr. 1855. 
580  DAQMG to QMG, 8 June 1855; WO/28/192. 
581  For example AG to GOC, Balaklava defences, 3 Apr. 1855; WO28/108. 
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Incidentally, Hall was also pleased that it meant that more malt liquor could be 
delivered to the camp, and this ‘would be better for the men than spirits,’582 while 
conversely McMurdo noted that the conveyance of the sick retarded the transport of 
ammunition to the front,
583
 though if this became a pressing issue they could be 
transported by road so that the turn round of the trucks was not delayed by the loading 




Evacuation of patients to Turkey 
 
When the allied armies landed in Bulgaria during June the troops were reasonably 
healthy but as the sick list increased Raglan requested that the hospital accommodation 
ashore should be supplemented by the use of Monarchy that could accommodate 90 
men in comfort,
585
 while the evacuation of the sick to Scutari commenced at about the 
same time, for example on Teignmouth.
586
 The increasing numbers reporting sick 
necessitated an urgent request to the Royal Navy by the QMG on 30 August for 
‘sufficient boats to convey 300 sick on board […] Bombay587 and Cornwall,’588 while a 
few days later Hall informed the PMO, Scutari that ‘Bombay and Mercia will bring 400 
and 250 convalescents.’589 He continued by emphasizing that ‘We have had an 
enormous number of sick thrown on our hands all at once, and have been much pressed 
to provide for them in any way’ and pointing out that ‘it is Lord Raglan’s wish to 
gradually get the sick away from this and they will be sent down when they become 
convalescent, and opportunities for transport present.’590 
During early August Hall had recommended to Raglan the necessity for two or 
three ships being set apart for the sick and wounded
591
 and on the 26 August he was 
                                                 
582  Hall to AG, 21 Mar. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1672. 
583  DG, LTC to QMG, 10 June 1855; WO/28/175. 
584  See for example DG, LTC to QMQ, 10 June 1855, with an annotation by Raglan; WO/28/175. 
585  Major Wellesley, AQMG, to Captain Rawstone, RN, 30 July 1854; WO/28/196 and 
RAMC/397/F/CO/5. The employment of Monarchy in this capacity proved a temporary measure. 
586  Wellesley to Rawstone; 30 July 1854; WO/28/196. 
587  A fine Indiaman of upwards 1,300 tons burthen; The Times, 21 Sep. 1854. 
588  Lord de Ros, QMG, to Admiral Lyons, 30 Aug. 1854; WO/28/196. 
589  Hall to Smith, 4 Sep. 1854; PoL. Mercia was substituted for Cornwall. Hall estimated c.2,000 
sick were left behind in Bulgaria. 
590  Hall to Menzies, 2 Sep. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/682. Incidentally, Cantlie (1974) p. 42 
implied that Hall ordered these vessels to Scutari. This is incorrect as the Royal Navy controlled 
the movement of all transport vessels. 
591  Hall to Smith, 5 Aug. 1854; PoL and Mitra (1911), p. 315. 
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notified by Sir George Brown that Andes and Cambria had been selected,
592
 though 
neither was available until after the invasion as they had been ‘filled and overcrowded 
with troops by the authorities.’593 Hall, who considered that neither vessel was very 
desirable,
594
 found Andes very dirty and badly ventilated,
595
 and the captain a ‘drunken 
ill-conditioned man.’596 
 
Hall’s preparation for the invasion was severely compromised because he was not 
informed of the plans in advance though he suggested to the QMG on 11 August that it 
would be convenient if medical stores and equipment could be shipped on vessels to be 
employed as hospital ships;
597
 needless to say the request went unheeded. He was only 
told officially on the 26 August that the fleet was due to sail on 1 September and this 
short notice led him to complain formally about his exclusion from the planning 
process in his evidence to the Hospital Commission and the Royal Commission on 
16 January 1855 and 19 June 1857 respectively,
598
 while in his draft memoirs he 
wrote: 
 
No intimation was given to me by the QMG of the precise date, and order of embarkation of 
the Army from Varna; and the consequence was that some ships had several medical officers 
on board, others none, some had medicines and stores, others none, and every effort to 
remedy these defects during the few hours the vessels remained in the bay after the men were 




Incidentally, Hall was not alone in making this point; for example, on 4 Septenber 
1854 Lieutenant Colonel A.H. Gordon told his father, the Prime Minister, that ‘Lord 
Raglan very wisely keeps his plans very close and few people really know what he 
intends to do.’600 
 
                                                 
592  RAMC/397/F/CO/10/1. Hall informed the PMO, Scutari, and Smith of this development on 26 and 
29 Aug. respectively, RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/642 & 665. 
593  RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1. Andes and Cambria transported part the 33rd and 50th Regiments to the 
Crimea; The Times, 21 Sep. 1854. 
594  Hall, on John Masterman, to Smith, 15 Sep. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/695. 
595  Hall, diary entry, 15 Sep. 1854; RAMC/397/PC1/6. 
596  RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1. 
597  RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/533. The text is reproduced in BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 57, and was 
referred to by Mitra (1911), pp. 316-7. 
598  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 339 and BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, p. 178. 
599  RAMC/397/F/RT/2. 
600  BL Add. MSS 43225. 
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Prior to the invasion Hall issued a memorandum for the guidance of MOs and this was 
well received by Russell who wrote: ‘Great care has been taken by the medical 
authorities to make the department as efficient as possible, and Hall has issued a circular 
containing directions and suggestions as to surgical practice, which is highly spoken 
of.’601 It did not contain specific advice on the evacuation of invalids though it was 
obviously going to be necessary to remove as many as possible so the advance towards 
Sevastopol was not hindered. The matter had not been overlooked entirely, however, as 
evinced by a memorandum issued to each Division: 
 
When the troops disembark all soldiers […] unfit to land will be left on board. […] A 
steamer will […] collect all these […] and convey them to Scutari. Medical Officers will be 
placed on board […] A return of the probable number of non efficient men is to be sent as 
soon as possible to the Principal Medical Officer on board the ‘Tyrone’ […] Orderlies in 




Hall was aware of this memorandum, but he received no information on the 
numbers involved from the divisional commanders.
603
 On the 15 September the AoT 
instructed that ‘all sick troops and sick women remaining on board the transports be sent 
by tomorrow noon to the Kangaroo.’604 The net result was the vessel was overwhelmed 
and chaos ensued. A second vessel, Dunbar, was employed to carry some of the sick 
and both vessels arrived at Scutari on 22 September. The British public was made 
aware of the Kangaroo affair when reports were published in The Times on 2 and 9 
October 1854. The first from the Russell and the second from Thomas Chenery were 
dated 16 and 25 September respectively. There is no doubt that both the reports were 
exaggerated though the conditions on both transports must have been horrendous, 
although for reasons outwith the direct control of the AMD. 
Cantlie provided a brief description of the incident and concluded that despite 
Hall’s denials ‘the transports were most inadequately staffed, and it is a distressing fact 
that the conditions on Kangaroo were the precursors of those on many similar voyages.’ 
He considered that neither Hall nor Dumbreck had attempted ‘to provide the sick with 
[the palliases] on board John Masterman, or to supply soldiers as orderlies.’605 
                                                 
601  The Times, 21 Sep. 1854 and other newspapers. For a locally version printed see 
RAMC/397/F/CO/6/13. 
602  QMG to GOC, Divisions, 10 Sep. 1854; WO/18/199/2. 
603  Hall, ‘Unpublished memoir’. 
604  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 48. 
605  Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 48-9. It was not until the New Year that the MSC replaced some military 
orderlies (AG to Hall, 21 Feb. 1854; WO/28/125) or civilians (QMG to GOC, Malta, 1 Mar. 
1855; WO/28/137). 
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Cantlie’s points may have been well intended but in Hall’s defence it may have 
proved impractical to obtain bedding if it had been stowed under other items of 
equipment or the Navy was unable or unwilling to arrange the transfer between the 
ships. In addition, the prospect of an imminent engagement with the enemy would 
have reduced the opportunity for detailing MOs for service afloat while Hall could 
take no responsibility for the provision of orderlies as this rested solely with the 
military authorities. 
 
The M&SH includes a return of 187 voyages made by 66 vessels in which the sick and 
wounded were evacuated from the Crimea to Turkey following the landing of the allied 
armies on 14 September 1854.
606
 All were merchant ships except HMS Vulcan
607
 and 
the details provided for each voyage included the vessel’s name and tonnage; the 
number of officers and men who embarked and died during the voyage; the dates of 
departure and arrival; and the names of the MOs on board. No distinction was made 
between sick and wounded patients until the 92
nd
 voyage departing on 31 March 1855 
while, the time taken for disembarkation was not provided for all voyages until much 
the same the time. Each hospital transport was required to carry a regulation number of 
orderlies, usually under the command of a sergeant;
608
 the number comprising this detail 
was given regularly from the 6 March (83
rd
 departure). 
The first vessels (Kangaroo towing Dunbar)
609
 left the Crimea on 17 September 
while the last departed on 4 June 1856. The majority of patients were disembarked at 
Scutari, though from December 1854 to February 1885 hospitals at Abydos and Smyrna 
were utilized respectively with the hospital at Renkioi receiving patients from October 
1855. In all 887 officers and 28,904 NCOs and men were evacuated on sailing vessels 
                                                 
606  M&SH, II, pp. 465-477. Pages 478-80 provide details of vessels transporting patients to Abydos 
(5 voyages), Smyrna (10) and Renkioi (10). Twenty of the 25 were from the Crimea and were 
included within the listings on pp. 469-477. The other five departed from Varna (1) or Turkey (4) 
and have not been considered in foregoing analyses. 
607  Shepherd (1991), p. 137 pointed out that HMS Vulcan, being a naval vessel, would have been 
better stocked with stores and medical equipment than the civilian transports. 
608  The ratio 1 orderly to 25 patients was set by the military authorities; AG to Lieutenant Colonel 
Daveney, 15 Dec. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/6/17 and WO/28/122. 
609  A report from Scutari recorded Kangaroo and Dunbar had 600 and 500 sick on board respectively; 
The Times, 9 Oct. 1854. The official numbers given in the M&SH were 452 and 357 respectively 
with 23 (5.1%) and 22 (6.2%) men dying during the voyage. 
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(44 voyages) and steamers (143), and of these 12 (1.4%) and 1,292 (4.5%) respectively 
died during the voyage (Table 8.3).
610
 
The primary admissions into Army hospitals and the number of evacuees each 
month are compared in Figure 8.1. The augmentation in hospital capacity in the Crimea 
during 1855 was reflected in only a slight increase in the numbers evacuated during the 
summer months, and the low mortality amongst these men suggests that those in a 
critical condition were not sent to Turkey (Table 8.3 columns 6 & 8 and Figure 8.1). 
 
Expressing the results on a monthly basis as in Table 8.3 takes no account of military 
situation and accordingly further analyses will consider the voyages in the following 
categories: Phase I: after landing in the Crimea (3 voyages); Phase II: after the battle of 
the Alma (8); Phase III: Before Sevastopol, October 1854 (2); Phase IV: after the battle 
of Balaklava (7); Phase V: after the battle of Inkerman (6); Phase VI: winter Period 1, 
mid-November to mid-December when the formal survey of hospital transports was 
ordered (9); Phase VII: winter Period 2, mid-December to the mid-February 1855 when 
a General Order authorized the issuing of lime juice to all troops (34);
611
 Phase VIII: 
spring and summer campaign, February to 17 September 1855 (84); and Phase IX: 
occupation of Sevastopol until the final evacuation (34). 
 
Preparation of vessels as hospital transports 
 
Hospital ships were a source of considerable vexation for Hall during the first four 
months of the campaign,
612
 presumably as most were employed on an ad hoc basis and, 
the time between their selection by the AoT and sailing was frequently too short for 
them be suitably modified, especially with the inadequate resources in Balaklava given 
that the Roebuck Committee was informed that it took 10-14 days to fit a ship with 
standing berths or cots.
613
 In addition, supplying transports placed a strain on AMD’s 
                                                 
610  The total mortality among those embarked would be higher than this figure as those dying after 
arrival would have been included in the hospital returns. 
611  It is not implied that lime juice caused the reduced mortality, rather it provides evidence that the 
standard of living of the troops had definitely improved by that time and worst of the privations of 
the winter were over. 
612  Mitra (1911), p. 349. Mitra continued ‘for in Dr Hall’s diary repeated mention is made of his 
fruitless applications for the speedy fitting up of such vessels.’ 








The QMG requested the AoT to nominate the hospital ships as the need arose. He 
also asked that at least 24 hours notice be given of the intended departure time;
616
 
conversely, the AoT stressed the desirability of the early appointment of MOs, with the 
required medicines, comforts, etc.
617
 
Early in December Hall stressed once again the absolute necessity of having ‘two 
large and commodious steamers’ to ‘run regularly between Balaklava and Scutari.’618 
The issue was obviously appreciated at HQ since the AG privately informed the AG in 
London that: 
 
We must have two or three vessels fitted up, steamers as hospital ships, on board which 
should be officers, purveyors, and orderlies always living. […] We are continually sending 
sick men to Scutari. Work as hard as they will the Medical Officers cannot keep things 
decent, much less clean as they ought to be. The sick are laid on the deck […] often without a 
bed. [In addition there is a need for] a corps of orderlies at a rate of 1 to 10, the regulation rate 
[…] and surgeons.619 
 
Fortunately Raglan agreed, and after negotiations with the AoT Hall was 
requested to nominate permanent MOs to serve on Australia, Brandon, Melbourne, and 
Sydney.
620
 The vessels were fitted up in Constantinople, including provision of standing 
beds and a surgery.
621
 Three were ready by 12 February,
622
 while Severn was also 
adapted for hospital use in England.
623
 Nearly a month later Russell noted that there 
were more patients requiring evacuation than these vessels could carry, despite c.1,200 
being transported in the previous three weeks, but things must have eased thereafter as 




                                                 
614  Hall to Smith, 23 Feb. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1519. 
615  Dumbreck to PMO, Scutari, 22 Oct. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/802. 
616  QMG to Christie, 4 Dec. 1854; WO/28/137. 
617  Christie to QMG, 7 Oct. 1854; WO/28/196. 
618  Hall to QMQ, 4 Dec. 1854, RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1017; also in WO/28/196 and BPP, (1857-58) 
No. 2379, pp. 107-8. Incidentally, on 1 Dec. Paulet recommended to Raglan that ‘it would be 
advisable to fit up and provide with bedding 3 or 4 ships and retain them solely for moving the 
sick and taking back those fit for duty; NAM-1968-07-293-8. 
619  Estcourt to Wetherall, 3 Dec. 1854; NAM-1962-10-95. 
620  QMG to Hall, 23 Dec. and Hall to QMG, 24 Dec. 1854; WO/28/137 and 
RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1166. 
621  AoT to QMG. 21 Dec. 1854; WO/28/196 and Boxer to QMG, 27 Feb. 1855; WO/28/183. 
622  Russell, 12 Feb.; The Times, 24 Feb. 1855. 
623  The Times, 21 Jan. 1855. 
624  Russell, 19 Mar.; The Times, 3 Apr. 1855 and M&SH, II, pp. 470-1. 
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Soon after the invasion written instructions were issued to MOs employed on hospital 
ships,
625
 while it appeared that the PMO at Balaklava was solely responsible for 
inspecting vessels for invalids until 12 December 1854 when a General Order directed 
that inspections were to be undertaken by a Board comprising the Commandant of 
Balaklava, the DAQMG and PMO doing duty there, an Assistant Commissary General, 
and the Transport Agent or his deputy. With the exception of the last mentioned, ‘this 
Board is constituted in conformity with the regulations of the service.’626 The Board was 
required to obtain the following information during an inspection, viz. the number of 
invalids and MOs, and their rank; the state of the bedding accommodation of the sick; 
conveniences for the sick, including utensils, drinking cups, mess tins, etc.; cooking 
facilities; the number of WCs, and their state of repair; ventilation; and the supply of 




It is possible that the General Order of 12 December was issued when HQ 
appreciated that the Queen’s Regulations had been overlooked for several months,628 
although this did not inhibit Raglan from unfairly admonishing Hall and Lawson in a 
General Order of the 13 December (see an summary of the Avon affair below), or from 
informing Paulet of these developments thus: 
 
The state of the Avon was too shocking and here I had a Court of Enquiry upon it. The report 
of the Court has rendered it necessary for me to give a strong order for the examination of 
them previously to them being used […] for the sick and this I hope will ensure the poor 




The General Order of the 12 December was supplemented by a more specific 
Medical Department Order which enjoined MOs on hospital transports to: 
 
pay […] attention to the cleanliness, ventilation and fumigation […] see the sick are as 
comfortably accommodated as circumstances will permit […] the food is of good quality and 
properly cooked […] the men [should] receive any medical comforts used […] make out a 
nominal roll of men embarked with details of disease etc. which will be handed over to the 





                                                 
625  Dumbreck to Tice, 19 Oct. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/795. (The text was not reproduced.) 
626  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, pp. 16 & 335. The requirement for a Commissary Officer was 
rescinded in a General Order of 18 Oct. 1855. 
627  QMG to Major Mackenzie, 7 Dec. 1854; WO/28/196 
628  Queen’s Regulations (1844), p. 325.  
629  Raglan to Paulet, 15 Dec. 1854; NAM/6807/393/8. 
630  RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3. 
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Problems encountered on hospital ships included insufficient notice being given to the 
AMD;
631
 a change in the vessel after embarkation had commenced which resulted in 
‘added discomfort for the sick as it [was] almost impossible to fit up [alternative] ships 
at a few hours notice;’632 a shortage of available MOs; insufficient orderlies and sea 
sickness or illness amongst them while en route; a lack of cooperation from the civilian 
crew, for example, drawing of water or assistance with the invalids;
633
 and delays in the 




Embarkation of patients at Balaklava 
 
When Dumbreck forwarded his reaction to the General Order of 14 October 1854 to 
Smith he pointed out that embarking patients in a poorly equipped and cramped harbour 
was a ‘vexatious [task] that has brought considerable obloquy on the department, 
deservedly, or not,’635 and he was not alone in finding the task ‘a most troublesome 
business.’636 
The extremely unsatisfactory state in the port and town of Balaklava was 
described graphically by Mrs Henry Duberly on 28 November and 3 December
637
 and 
The Times correspondent on 1 December.
638
 At this time Lawson informed Hall that the 
increased number of vessels in the harbour made it difficult to embark the sick from the 
place then in use, and suggested developing a location on the West side that would 
allow the patients to be embarked directly if a small jetty was built and the approach 
roads were improved.
639
 He also requested that notice should be given at least the 
evening before of the expected arrival of patients so that arrangements can be made for 
their reception, and that they should be despatched to arrive before sunset. Hall 
subsequently ordered that ‘Sick […] must not be sent off until Dr Lawson […] has been 
                                                 
631  Hall to Smith, 16 Dec. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1095 and PoL. 
632  Hall to QMG, 29 Jan. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1358. 
633  MOs evidence to the Hospital Commissioners, 8 & 12 Dec. 1854; BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, pp. 
302 & 201. 
634  Despatch, 12 Oct.; The Times, 26 Oct. 1854. 
635  Dumbreck to Smith, 12 Oct. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/753 and PoL. 
636  Assistant Surgeon Taylor, letter, 11 Dec. 1854; JRUSI (1957), pp. 234-5. 
637  Kelly (2007), pp. 109-10 & 118. 
638  The Times, 18 Dec. 1854. 
639  Lawson to Hall, 27 Nov. 1854; WO/28/196. Hall referred this to the QMG who did not object to 
the proposal; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/947 and WO/28/975. 
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warned […] for the number is too great for any ordinary means to meet.’640 The 
difficulty in embarking patients under these circumstances was also outlined by the 
Hospital Commissioners: 
 
The sick and wounded [are] taken to the wharf, where a medical officer [sees] to their 
embarkation, and to afford medical assistance when necessary. The men are embarked in 
boats, under the orders of a naval officer, and put on board the vessels […] Except in [one] 
instance (involving Dr Tice), we did not hear of any delay having arisen, beyond that 
incidental to the necessarily slow process of embarking a large number of helpless men in a 




William Simpson’s water colour of the embarkation of invalids directly from the 
beach at Balaklava has resulted in the assumption by some commentators that the 
procedure was always thus. However, the port facilities were improved gradually and by 
the end of January ‘a pier had been constructed for the embarkation of the sick and 
wounded,’642 ‘planks were set across the road […] so patients and orderlies did not have 
to walk through mud,’ and an application was made for a hut on the wharf for the 
accommodation of the sick,
643
 a very necessary development in the view of Russell and 
the PMO, Balaklava:  
 
Russell: There they lie just as they were let gently down on the ground by […] their 
comrades, who brought them on their backs from camp with the greatest tenderness, but who 





PMO: […] a little more comfort to the sick [who are] brought down [on] mules, from which 
they are very hurriedly dismounted [and the] poor creatures are left sitting either in the mud 
or on any convenient plank. The tent on the other side of the road is much too far off […] and 
I […] suggest the immediate erection of one or two wooden huts close to the wharf, to be 
provided with benches, stove, etc. so that the more exhausted might have shelter, till they 




Improvements obviously continued to be made and by the time the Sanitary 
Commissioners arrived at the beginning of April 1855 they found:  
 
there was a jetty [which was] nearly on the same level as the side of the boat into which the 
sick were placed [and this] was always done with great care. […] the boat was rowed [to] the 
‘sick ship’. […] The sick who were able […] walked up the ladder [while] those on stretchers 
were lifted on board by a simple contrivance, [which was] hoisted […] by means of a pulley, 
                                                 
640  Hall to PMO, Cavalry Division, 1 Dec. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/989. 
641  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 16. It would appear that the Commissioners may have been 
misinformed on this point. 
642  Elphinstone (1859), pp. 79-81. 
643  AG to Commandant, Balaklava, 25 Jan. 1855; WO/28/108 and Hall to QMG, 3 Feb. 1855; 
RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1379. 
644  Despatch, 1 Dec.; The Times, 18 Dec. 1855. 
645  PMO, Balaklava to Commandant, 23 Jan. 1855; BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 203. 
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and kept in a horizontal position. […] the stretcher was carried below, by two men, and the 
patient transferred to a swing cot. […] this method [could be] simplified by bringing the 
ambulances down to the shore under the stern of the ‘sick ship’, and by having, a brow 
constructed by which the sick might be carried directly on board. [Raglan] authorized the 
construction of the works on the 21
st
 April, 1855, but the pressure of the siege operations 
[meant it was not completed until] the end of the year. 
During the whole period the Commissioners had every reason to be satisfied with the 
careful and considerate manner with which the duty of embarking the sick was performed by 




Employment of hospital transports 
 
Of the 187 voyages 143 (76.5%) were made by 41 steamers and 44 (23.5%) by 25 
sailing vessels (Table 8.4, bottom row). Up until mid-December sailing vessels and 
steamers were used almost equally (19 and 16 respectively) but thereafter steamers 
predominated, and thus provided a more reliable service (Figure 8.2). Only one sailing 
vessel (Gomelza) departed between 13 January and 13 June 1855, while none were 
used after 3 December 1855, presumably because bad weather could be expected. 
New vessels were engaged during all phases of the campaign with 23 (92%) of the 
25 sailing vessels and 32 (78%) of the 41 steamers being employed for the first time by 
the end of Phase VII in mid-February (Table 8.4, columns 7 & 8 and Figure 8.3). 
Fifty-five (83%) the 66 hospital vessels had been engaged by the end of phase VII 
(Table 8.4, column 9) although only 77 (41%) of the 187 voyages had been completed. 
Conversely, only eleven new vessels were employed during the remaining 16 months, 
presumably to replace those in need of repair or whose contract had terminated (Table 
8.4, column 9 and Figure 8.3). 
Data on the voyages completed by hospital transports are presented in two ways in 
Tables 8.5 and 8.6. Almost half (93 of 187) of the voyages involved vessels used only 
once or twice (Table 8.5, columns 4 & 5), while nearly a third (57 of 187) made ≥6 
trips, with a maximum of 22 (Table 8.5, columns 9-12 and Figure 8.4). 
A total of 39 (59%) and 13 (19.7%) of the 66 ships were used only once or twice 
respectively with 44 (84.6%) of vessels in these categories having sailed by mid-
February 1855 (Phase VII) with five of the remainder being engaged after the siege was 
over (Table 8.6, columns 3 & 4). Only three of the 25 sailing vessels completed >3 
voyages while 9 (22%) of the 41 steamers were employed between six and 22 times 
(Figure 8.6). 
 
                                                 
646  BPP (1857), No. 2196, pp. 145-7. 
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Hall maintained a hand-written ledger that covered the campaign but omitted three of 
the 187 voyages listed in the M&SH, namely, Nos. 82, 84, and 142.
647
 Less 
comprehensive are two published reports. Smith supplied figures on 50 voyages 
departing between 18 September 1854 and 8 January 1855
648
 while the Hospital 
Commission report gave details of 55 voyages up to 9 February 1855.
649
  
Discrepancies can be found between the different sources but over all it is possible 
to draw similar conclusions to those made from the returns in the M&SH, and hence 
these data have not been analysed. 
 
Mortality among evacuees 
 
Mortality was high after the Alma (13.2% of 2,582 evacuees; Table 8.7); not surprising 
given that the transfer of the wounded to the shore was undertaken with considerable 
difficulty and unnecessary suffering as the British position was several miles from the 
coast and there were no ambulance waggons. Personnel from the Royal Navy assisted 
with the task
650
 and superintended the embarkation of the wounded,
651
 and hence Hall, 
who would have been fully employed on the battlefield, concluded that ‘it was the 
Naval Authorities’ fault that the vessels were overcrowded.’ 
The mortality increased during the first part of the winter when the health of the 
Army had deteriorated considerably (Phase VI: 14.9% of 1,527 evacuees; Table 8.7). 
However, mortality was lower during the second winter period at 6.2% (Phase VII) 
despite the rate increasing among the troops in camp until January (see Figure 1.4), 
which suggests that, inter alia, there had been selection for less critically ill patients 
coupled with improved conditions on the ships following the issuing of the General 
Order of 12 December. 
Overall, nearly a third of 1,292 ship-board deaths occurred on 13 vessels 
departing before mid-October 1854 (Phases I-III) while the evacuation of invalids 
following the battles of the Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman was completed by 11 
November 1854 (26
th
 voyage). By that time 6,597 (23%) of the invalids had been 
                                                 
647  RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1. 
648  MT&G, 27 Jan. 1856. This includes voyages on which only Russian prisoners were 
evacuated. 
649  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, pp. 18-19. 
650  Dr J. Rea to Dundas, 8 Nov. 1854; W&SHC/2057/F8/IV/D/1h: The naval personnel sent ashore 
comprised 30 MOs and 1,000 seamen and marines. 
651  Hall to Spence, 10 Nov. 1854; PoL, I, Appendix 2, pp. 689-701. 
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evacuated with nearly half (3,200, 48.5%) being conveyed in sailing vessels, compared 
to 13.5% (3,047) for the remainder of the campaign. 
All but c.5% of deaths had been recorded by mid-February, viz. the end of Phase 
VII, although by that time only 77 (41.6%) of voyages had been completed and 7,826 
(55.2%) of the patients had been evacuated (Table 8.7, columns  11 & 12 and Figure 
8.5). 
 
In order to take account of the length of the voyage the number of man-days at sea was 
calculated for each vessel and from this the number of deaths/1000 man-days was 
obtained for each Phase (Table 8.8A, columns 7 & 8). In general, mortality tended to be 
higher on the sailing vessels, although, apart from Phase II the difference was not very 
great (Figure 8.6). Not unexpectedly the rates were higher during the first winter, 
particularly Phase VI. The situation improved during Phase VII, even though mortality 
in the camps continued to increase until January 1855 (see Figure 1.12). 
 
Hall was responsible for nominating MOs though sickness and deaths reduced the 
numbers available and the difficulty in meeting the demand delayed the departure of 
some vessels, for example, the Andes and Colombo. 
At least one MO was present on board each transport, with two, and 3-5 
respectively, being employed on 95 (51%) and 20 (10.5%) of the 187 voyages. For the 
majority of voyages the names of the MOs are listed although on 19 voyages from April 
1855 the second member of the medical team was either a hospital dresser or a 
dispenser, viz. Brandon (7 voyages), Imperador (5), Severn (3), Clifton (1), and 
Melbourne (3). 
The mortality with respect to the number of MOs was highest on sailing vessels 
that departed by the end of September 1854. Thereafter the difference between the 
sailing vessels and steamers was less; though mortality tended to be lower on the 
steamers (Table 8.9B and Figure 8.7). 
Overall the ratio of Men:MO was c.88:1 with the ratio tending to be wider during 
Phases I-V of the campaign, a period during which there was a shortage of MOs who 
could be spared for this service (Table 8.9B, columns 2 & 3). 
The mortality exceeded 30/1000 man-days at sea and/or 4/MO-days at sea on 15 
(8%) of the voyages (Table 8.10). Seven sailed during Phases I and II, when cholera 
was rife, particularly on Caduceus, and many of the evacuees would have been severely 
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wounded, and eight during the winter period when the health of the troops in the camps 
had deteriorated considerably (Phases VI and VII). 
 
The sick and wounded were entered separately in the returns from 31 March 1855. Of 
11,113 men evacuated thereafter only 719 (6.5%) were wounded, and it is unlikely they 
were in a critical condition as only one died (0.14%; Table 8.11). 
Of 7,341 NCOs and men evacuated during the spring and summer campaign 
(Phase VIII) 512 (7.0%) were wounded and of these 483 (94.3%) were conveyed on 
only 4 (5.3%) of the 76 vessels employed during the Phase (see Table 8.5), viz. 
Imperador (300 wounded), Ottawa (102), Orient (51), and Severn (30). 
 
Disembarkation of patients at Scutari 
 
The port facilities at Scutari were rudimentary initially and could only be used in calm 
weather as the comparatively shallow water precluded ships coming along side the pier, 
and open boats and small steamers had to be employed to convey patients ashore.
652
 
In addition to stormy weather delays in disembarkation were caused by swell and 
heavy seas resulting in waves breaking over the landing place, strong currents, late 
arrival in the day or after dark, the unavailability or late arrival of vessels for 
transferring patients to the shore, and the want of hospital accommodation owing to 
crowding. The Sanitary Commissioners appeared generally satisfied with the care with 
which the invalids were disembarked
653
 while the Revd S.G. Osborne provided a 
succinct summary of the problems encountered at the pier head: 
 
The nearest entrance to the Barrack Hospital is [about] a quarter of a mile from the so called 
pier […] Passing […] down a broad paved road for all passengers […] for the stores […] for 
the sick and wounded, in short for everything […] so utterly inconvenient, and inadequate 
[…] If the wind blew [the surf] made landing next to impossible; in the ordinary breezes […] 
the approach in anything but a large boat was dangerous […] I have seen the bodies of the 
dead, stores for the living, munitions of war, sick men staggering from weakness, wounded 
men helpless on stretchers, invalid orderlies waiting to act as bearers, oxen yoked in arabas, 
officials [crowded] on this narrow inconvenient pier, exposed to drenching rain, and so 
bewildered […] that the transaction of any one duty, was quite out of the question.654 
 
                                                 
652  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 23. 
653  BPP (1857), Session 1, No. 2196, pp. 26-7. 
654  Osborne (1855), p. 7. Osborne referred to the unsatisfactory condition of the pier in his evidence 
to the Roebuck Committee; BPP (1854-55), No. 156. 
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Once ashore there as an uphill climb up to the Barrack, although Menzies 
considered the distance trifling,
655
 with the stretcher cases being carried by fatigue 
parties or Turkish labourers.
656
 The Hospital Commissioners were clearly sufficiently 
concerned about the situation that they recommended that alternate hospital 
accommodation should be sought where ‘embarkation and disembarkation […] can at 
all times be effected without difficulty or danger.’657 The pier nearest to the General 
Hospital was a little more sheltered but the route to the hospital was longer and steeper 
while the Kuleli hospital was the best served as it was on the shore of the Bosphorus 
and larger vessel could tie up along side. 
The pier at Scutari had been extended by early December 1854
658
 while Paulet 
was authorized by the government lengthened the pier to enable landing in nearly all 
weathers,
659
 and that boats must be purchased and retained, with proper crews, for the 
use of the hospital.
660
 The improvements involved the sinking of 9ft wooded piles to 
give a depth of water of 14ft
661






The voyages of several hospital ships received more prominence than others and a 
summary involving three of them follows: 
 
Colombo: The vessel sailed for Scutari on 22 September 1854 with one staff surgeon 
and three assistant naval surgeons to attend 27 officers and 453 men and,
663
 though 
conditions on board were extremely harrowing, the reports in the English newspapers 
were an exaggeration.
664
 When Hall heard of these accounts he asked the surgeons for 
details and reported to Raglan on 11 November that: 
 
                                                 
655  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 303. 
656  The barrack was 130ft above sea level. 
657  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 51. 
658  Own Correspondent, 5 Dec.; The Times, 21 Dec. 1855. 
659  For a plan see MPH/1/1133. 
660  Newcastle to Paulet (Cabinet paper), 5 Jan. 1855; WO/33/1/8/55, W&SHC/2057/F8/III/C/65, and 
WO/6/70. 
661  Elphinstone (1859), p. 292. 
662  MPH/1/1133. 
663  M&SH, II, p. 465. 
664  For example, despatches dated 27 & 28 Sep.; Daily News and The Times, 10 & 13 Oct. 1854. 
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the medical officers […] in charge of wounded [on Colombo] repudiate with indignation and 
scorn the statement in The Times of their inhumanity to the unfortunate people on board, and 




On 21 November, Hall received a further report from a naval surgeon which seemingly 
provided an account of the voyage, somewhere between the apparent overstatements in 
the press, and terse response that Hall made to Raglan: 
 
The scene on board [was] terrible. The […] suffering […] scarcely exaggerated. Such a 
lamentable state is […] attributed mainly to the following perhaps unavoidable 
circumstances: (1) the ship being over crowded and the wounded kept a long time on board; 
(2) [insufficient] medical men […] and (3) the want of medical stores. […] The wounds 
having ‘bred maggots’ was owing […] to the wounded having being exposed to the burning 
sun [and] the wounds not having been attended to for many hours […] it was impossible from 
the paucity of assistance that [proper] attention could have been bestowed on each.  
There are some errors in the newspaper statement […] there were a total of 591 souls, 
30 of whom died. It is therefore absurd the state that ‘the surgeons had to pick their way 
through the heaps of dying and dead.’[…] I consider the article [was written] to call the 
public attention to the system of conveying the wounded and the want of adequate surgical 




Hall was, nevertheless, sufficiently impressed with the ship’s company in these 
circumstances that he subsequently informed Raglan that: ‘It is a justice I owe to Dr 
Bourne, Captain Methuen, the officers and crew of the Colombo to bring under the 





Trent: Raglan admonished Hall in an ‘angry memorandum’ in which he inferred that 
the AMD ‘cared little [of] what became of [the invalids]’ because the Trent sailed for 
Scutari on 25 November 1854 with only two assistant surgeons on board and no staff 
surgeon. Hall subsequently pointed out that Trent was well founded and that the two 
‘intelligent and talented young men’ were quite capable of ‘taking medical charge’ but 
owing to a shortage of MOs ‘not sending [a staff surgeon] was a matter of necessity, not 
choice on the part of Dr Lawson’ and ‘it would be desirable if this [deficiency in 
staffing] could be remedied.’668 
 
                                                 
665  RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/901 and W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/324 (copy). 
666  AS Wright, HMS Leander, to Hall, 21 Nov. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO10/4. 
667  Hall to Military Secretary, 11 Feb. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO1/1/1423. Incidentally, there is a snuff 
box in the London Museum presented by Colonel Frederick Horn and officers of the 20th 
Regiment to James Smith of Colombo in appreciation of his services during the voyage to the East. 
668  Hall, diary, 17 Dec. 1854; RAMC/524/15/6. 
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Avon: Raglan received a complaint about the condition of a soldier in board Avon on 28 
November 1854 and he instructed Estcourt and Hall to investigate. A committee of 
enquiry then placed the blame on the PMO at Balaklava (Lawson), although he had not 
been on trial, merely being called as a witness. Raglan then issued a General Order on 
13 December, in which Lawson and Hall were castigated. They were never granted the 
right to reply to the allegations although Hall was later able to refute the suggestion that 
the vessel had not been properly equipped. 
Lawson was replaced and transferred to Scutari by a General Order on 15 January 
1855,
669
 but he was never brought to trial or allowed to see a copy of the proceedings by 
which he was condemned. No reason for this was given for but it may have been that 
Raglan let the matter drop when he realized that the headquarters staff had disregarded 
the Queen’s Regulation which stipulated that any ship used to transport troops should be 
inspected by both a staff officer and a MO;
670 
a matter regularized by a General Order 
dated 12 December and to which reference has been made. 
 
Return to duty 
 
It was imperative that convalescents should return to duty as soon as possible and 
shortly after the invasion men were returned to the Crimea in surprisingly large 
numbers. For example, Himalaya and HMS Valorous sailed from Scutari to Balaklava 
with 600 and 530 men on 16 October and 9 November 1854,
671
 while Hall, who sailed 
on Himalaya, reported that c.1,700 had already rejoined since the beginning of the 
month.
672
 Similarly, Stratford informed Clarendon that Boxer ‘had sent up about [1,000 
men] with the expectation of adding five or six hundred in two or three days,’673 with a 
further 150 sailing on Medina the next month.
674
 
When the regular shuttle service to Scutari was instituted it was agreed with the 
naval authorities that the hospital ships should return empty to the Crimea. However, on 
occasions they were employed to convey healthy troops, an unsatisfactory policy as 
Hall sensibly pointed out: 
                                                 
669  Several commentators have suggested incorrectly that Hall appointed Lawson to this post. It was 
confirmed by a General Order and thus had the approval of Raglan. 
670   Queen’s Regulations (1844), p. 325 
671  ADM/7/576. 
672  Hall to Smith, 20 Oct; PoL and Hall to Raglan, 27 Oct. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/819. 
673  Stratford to Clarendon, 25 Oct. 1854; FO/78/1004. 
674  Paulet to AG, 8 & 14 Jan. 1855; WO/28/186. 
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If duty men are embarked on board ships that have conveyed sick, the vessels should be well 
cleaned and fumigated before they go on board, and on no account should they be permitted 
to use the same equipment as the sick. This would detain the vessel two or more days at 
Constantinople and it would require as many at Balaklava before she would be in a fit state 




Many of the problems associated with the transport of the sick and wounded, either on 
land or at sea, resulted from the failure of the government and the military authorities to 
develop a comprehensive plan for this crucial activity.
676
 In consequence, no advanced 
provision was made for either a suitably equipped and manned Ambulance Corps
677
 or 
dedicated ships for use as hospital transports or floating hospitals. 
The transfer of patients from camp to Balaklava took place almost daily and on 
occasions the lack of suitable transport caused considerable difficulties for the AMD 
who had to rely on assistance from the French on occasions. Inevitably there were some 
local failures in communications which resulted in hardship for the patients. Matters got 
better during the spring with improvements in the regimental hospitals, the opening of 
the railway, and the repairing of the roads. 
Vessels employed for evacuating patients were selected on an ad hoc basis during 
the first three months of the campaign and inevitably many would have been 
unsatisfactory in terms of on-board facilities, equipment, and personnel. The service 
became more regular from mid-December when dedicated steamers began to provide a 
shuttle service across the Black Sea. This arrangement proved generally satisfactory as 
there was little adverse comment, apart from occasional problems associated with either 
embarkation or disembarkation. 
Mortality on the voyage to Turkey was greatest during the first weeks of the 
campaign, when many of the invalids were either severely wounded or suffering from 
cholera, or both. The death rate started to decrease by the turn of the year suggesting 
improvements in the management of patients on shore and afloat, and the need to send 
patients with a poor prognosis to Scutari becoming less pressing. 
                                                 
675  QMG to Military Secretary, with a comment by Hall, 13 Apr. 1855; WO/28/192. 
676  For a discussion see Shepherd (1991), pp. 386-7. 
677  It was near the end of 1855 before the AC was fully equipped with vehicles etc.; see Shepherd 









7 Dec. About 600 sick will be brought by the French Ambulance tomorrow, weather permitting. […].apply for 
the boats to be in readiness and ensure comforts are placed on board […] and soup and some 
nourishment is ready for them on arrival. Application must be made tonight for orderlies. [Hall to PMO, 
Balaklava; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1040] 
11 Dec. There are near 785 sick men sent from [camp] but nearly 300 have yet to be embarked at 3 p.m.. 
Everything has been done to get them on board but it is almost impossible to manage satisfactorily with 
so large a number in one day. [with] many […] on stretchers it causes great delay, and in future I think 
it would be very desirable if a smaller number were sent down at the same time. It would also add much 
to the comfort of the sick if the orderlies […] were detailed and on board ship the previous evening. 
[DAQMG, Balaklava to QMG; WO/28/192] 
12 Dec. The French will lend 300 ambulance mules on the 14 December that steps should be taken immediately 
to accommodate 350 sick. [Hall to PMO, Balaklava; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1072] 
21 Dec. Today when in Balaklava I received a note at half past one from the AG to provide for the reception of 
600 sick to be taken down in the morning by the French ambulance. The ships are not even appointed. 
How is it possible to make them comfortable? [Hall, dairy; RAMC/524/15] 
26 Dec. In consequence of nobody knowing the sick were coming and there was a delay in embarking them 
before dark. [DAQMG, Balaklava to QMG; WO/28/196] 
28 Dec. The sick did not arrive at Balaklava until ½ past 3. It was near 5 until they were all embarked. There 
was no delay in the boats. [Balaklava report to QMG; WO/28/196] 
30 Dec. Great inconvenience from ships ready for sick not being reported, it is impossible to send sick, which is 
daily necessary, unless it is known that accommodation is provided for them. Inform if there is a vessel 
is now disposable, answer by bearer. [QMG to AoT; WO/28/137] 
25 Jan. A large number of sick came down today without warning after intimation had been given to the AG 
that there was no accommodation. They appear to have come down independently [having been sent by] 
the PMOs of Divisions. [PMO, Balaklava to Hall; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 204] 
14 Feb. A great irregularity has taken place in the arrival of the sick at the General Hospital for Balaklava and 
[…] the sick have been detained for some considerable time in the cold. [Memorandum issued by PMO, 
Light Division; RAMC/1139/LP10/12] 
15 Feb. Great inconvenience having been felt […] at Balaklava from sick being sent down without any previous 
notice being given […] due notice shall be given to them when there is accommodation for their sick on 
board ship, they must not be sent down there being no room for them at the hospital. [AG, 
Memorandum to Divisions; WO/28/122] 
14 Mar. Thirty sick men from the front are now waiting at the hospital for admission into which we can receive 
only three. There is here a marquee but fatigue men are not to be had for its erection.  
(The letter was annotated at HQ that the men were sent from the 4th Division without authority and 
without notification and there was no ship available to receive them.) [MO, General Hospital to 
Commandant, Balaklava; WO/28/161] 
5 Apr. Ten men of the RA were sent down for embarkation but there was no ship ready to receive them. They 
have been admitted to the General Hospital on a temporary basis. This is of great inconvenience as the 
hospital is already full and they were laid on the floors of wards already overcrowded. [MO, General 
Hospital to PMO, Balaklava; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 190-1] 
9 Apr. There are 12 waggons [drawn by] cattle in total. 8 in use carrying 80 invalids and 4 in camp daily for a 
rest or if needed while the others are away. [Adjutant, AC to AG; WO/28/175] 
22 Apr. Inconvenience arises from overloading ambulance waggons. In addition to arms, accoutrements, and 
knapsacks there now blankets, sheepskin coats, long bobs, and extra winter clothing. Suggest using a 
bât horse for the extra clothing etc. [OC, AC, Memorandum; WO/28/175] 
11 May. The PMO should ascertain that there is room for patients in the Hospital before he applies for transport 
from camp. [AG to OC, Cavalry Division; WO/28/109] 
26 May Wounded men are frequently sent to Balaklava without due notice being given to the Commandant 
consequently no parties with stretchers are ready to carry them to the hospitals causing great suffering 
to the patients. [AG, Memorandum to Divisions; WO/28/123] 
26 May Six wounded men were sent down to Balaklava without notice on the 24th inst to the great 
inconvenience of all concerned. [AG to GOC, 3rd Division; WO/28/109] 
20 June Major Grant will furnish ambulance waggons, mule chairs and litters to convey 225 sick and wounded 
to Balaklava. Seven teams of artillery horses have been ordered at the ambulance camp. [AG to OC, 
AC, WO/28/123] 
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Table 8.1: Continued 
29 Aug. The prompt removal of sick and wounded from camp to better quarters is obviously of the first 
important, time cannot always be given for the preparation of documents, and a delay in proper 
settlements will be the result. Notifications of the removals of soldiers […] are made to assist […] COs 
and others and it is hoped that although delay may sometimes occur in the balancing of accounts the 
interests of the soldiers will not ultimately suffer. [AG to GOC, 2nd Division; WO/28/110] 
1 Sep. The wounded will go in waggons from the front; mules will be sent to carry some of these from 
Balaklava to the Castle. A small fatigue party only will be required. [AG to Commandant, Balaklava; 
WO/28/110] 
4 Sep. To make arrange for additional carriage for the kit of the sick when they are removed from the cavalry 
camp. [AG to Captain Piggott, AC; WO/28/124] 
 
 
Table 8.2: Ambulance conveyance available in the British Army, May 1855 
Location Description Capacity 
Crimea 12 four-wheeled waggons are ‘too heavy for ordinary use […] on good roads, 
during the winter […] ten artillery horses were unable to drag one to 
Balaklava and back again.’ 
4 recumbent 
and 6 sitting 
120 
4 waggons  4 recumbent 
and 3 sitting 
28 
2 waggons out of repair with one to be converted for 4 patients. 4 recumbent 
and 6 sitting 
14 
2 Flanders store waggons on vulcanised springs. These can be ‘fitted up for 
[…] sick or slightly wounded’ but ‘are much too heavy for general use.’ 
12 each 24 
2 store waggons 10 each 20 
6 Irish cars, one out of repair, ‘are lighter’ 6 slight 
cases 
36 
33 mule chairs, 10 reclining 2 each 66 
Total patients 308 
Expected 18 Irish cars 6 each 108 
43 long Bianconi cars 12 each 516 
167 mule chairs 2 each 334 
Total patients 978 
[Summarized from tables in WO/1/374/313/No. 2, 24 May, & No. 3, 31 May 1855] 
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Table 8.3: Number of officers and men evacuated from the Crimea to hospitals in Turkey, September 
1854-June 1856, together with the number of individuals who died during the voyage 
Year Month Number of departures Number of individuals 
embarked 
Number of individuals 





Officers NCOs and 
men 
Officers NCOs and 
men 
1854 September 6 5 113 3706 6 (5.3) 411 (11.1) 
October 6 3 65 1574 0 77 (4.9) 
November 3 6 108 1850 3 (2.8) 108 (5.8) 
December 7 15 54 4075 2 (3.7) 364 (8.9) 
1855 January 5 13 31 3411 0 260 (7.6) 
February 0 12 84 1860 0 22 (1.2) 
March 0 11 18 1409 0 7 (0.5) 
April 0 9 8 996 0 7 (0.7) 
May 0 7 17 822 0 0 
June 3 7 24 1042 0 7 (0.7) 
July 3 10 98 1668 0 5 (0.3) 
August 4 9 76 1651 1 (1.3) 8 (0.5) 
September 4 8 58 1435 0 7 (0.5) 
October 2 6 50 929 0 2 (0.2) 
November 0 4 14 327 0 1 (0.3) 
December 1 4 19 495 0 2 (0.4) 
1856 January 0 4 29 468 0 3 (0.6) 
February 0 2 6 234 0 0 
March 0 4 9 501 0 0 
April 0 2 4 236 0 1 (0.4) 
May 0 1 2 114 0 0 
June 0 1 0 101 0 0 
Totals 
(%) 




[Summarized from M&SH, II, pp. 465-77] 
 
Table 8.4: Number of hospital ships departing from the Crimea during different phases of the campaign, 
September 1854-June 1856 
Phase of the campaign No. of departures No. of 1st 
(and only) voyages 
Event Dates No. of days 
(inclusive) 
Sail Steam Total Sail Steam Total 
I After landing 17-20 Sept. 1854 4 1 2 3 1 (1) 2 3 (1) 
II After the Alma 21-30 Sept. 10 5 3 8 5 (3) 3 (1) 8 (4) 
III Before Sevastopol 1-13 Oct. 13 2 0 2 2 (2) 0 
 
2 (2) 
IV After Balaklava 14-31 Oct.a 18 4 3 7 4 (2) 2 6 (2) 
V After Inkerman 1-11 Nov.a 11 2 4 6 2 (2) 2 (1) 4 (3) 
VI Winter Period 1* 12 Nov.-11 Dec. 30 5 4 9 4 (4) 4 (3) 8 (7) 
VII Winter Period 2† 12 Dec.-16 Feb. 1855 67 8 34 42 5 (3) 19 (12) 24 (15) 
VIII Spring and summer campaign 17 Feb.-17 Sep. 213 13 63 76 2 5 (3) 7 (3) 
IX After the siege 18 Sep.-4 June 1856a 260 4 30 34 0 4 (2) 4 (2) 






[Summarized from M&SH, II, pp. 465-77] 
* Until the General Order, 12 December 1854 regulated inspection of hospital transports. 
† Up to General Order, 16 February 1855 that authorized the issued of lime juice to all troops. (This date was 
chosen arbitrarily as evidence that conditions for the troops were improving in the Crimea; clearly the issuing of 
lime juice would not in itself have been responsible for reducing the mortality on the hospital ships.) 
a. There were no departures between 13-26 October, 1-6 November 1854, and 18-26 September 1855 respectively. 
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Table 8.5: Number of voyages completed by hospital ships during the different phases of the campaign, 
September 1854-June 1856 




No of voyages completed by the vessels departing during the period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7-8 9-12 13-22 Total 
I-III After 







Sail 8  8 








Sail 10 1  11 







Sail 5 3 0  8 







Sail 2 3 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 13 
Steam 5 4 4 7 7 7 8 12 9 63 






Sail 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 





























































[Summarized from M&SH, II, pp. 465-77] 
* Until the General Order, 12 December 1854 regulated inspection of hospital transports. 
† Up to General Order, 16 February 1855 that authorized the issued of lime juice to all troops. (This date 
was chosen arbitrarily as evidence that conditions for the troops were improving in the Crimea; clearly 




Table 8.6: Number of voyages completed by sixty-six hospital ships during the different phases of the 
campaign, September 1854-June 1856 
Phase of campaign Vessel 
type 
Total number of voyages undertaken by each vessel 
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 10 15 18 22 Total 
I After landing Sail 1  1 
Steam 0 0 
II After the Alma Sail 3 3 
Steam 1 1 
III Before Sevastopol Sail 2 2 
Steam 0 0 
IV After Balaklava Sail 2 0  2 
Steam 0 1 1 
V After Inkerman Sail 2 0 2 
Steam 1 0 1 
VI Winter Period 1* Sail 4 1 5 
Steam 3 0 3 
VII Winter Period 2† Sail 3 3 0  6 
Steam 12 5 2 19 
VIII Spring and summer campaign Sail 0 0 0 1 0 0  1 
Steam 3 0 0 0 1 1 5 
IX After the siege Sail 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Steam 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 
Whole campaign Sail 17 5 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 25 
Steam 22 8 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 41 
All vessels 39 13 2 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 66 
[Summarized from M&SH, II, pp. 465-77] 
* Until the General Order, 12 December 1854 regulated inspection of hospital transports. 
† Up to General Order, 16 February 1855 that authorized the issued of lime juice to all troops. (This date 
was chosen arbitrarily as evidence that conditions for the troops were improving in the Crimea; clearly 
the issuing of lime juice would not in itself have been responsible for reducing the mortality on the 
hospital ships.) 
 
Table 8.7: Mortality among sick and wounded NCOs and men during the voyage from the Crimea to 
Turkey, September 1854-June 1856 
Phase of the campaign Sailing vessels Steamers All vessels Cumulative 
proportion (%) 
Evacuees Dths % Evacuees Dths % Evacuees Dths % Evacuees (c8) Dths 
(c9) 
I After landing 350 22 6.3 774 48 6.2 1124 70 6.2 3.9 5.4 
II After the Alma 1388 278 20.0 1194 63 5.3 2582 341 13.2 12.8 31.8 
III Before Sevastopol 462 14 3.0 - - - 462 14 3.0 14.4 32.9 
IV After Balaklava 588 45 7.7 524 18 3.4 1112 63 5.7 18.3 37.8 
V After Inkerman 412 14 3.4 905 26 2.9 1317 40 3.0 22.8 40.9 
VI Winter period 1* 650 126 19.4 887 102 11.5 1527 228 14.9 28.1 58.5 
VII Winter period 2† 1105 182 16.5 6721 301 4.5 7826 483 6.2 55.2 94.4 
VIII Spring & summer campaign  1076 14 1.3 8086 27 0.3 9162 41 0.4 86.9 99.1 
IX After the siege 217 3 1.4 3575 9 0.25 3792 12 0.3 100 100 
Whole campaign 6248 698 11.2 22656 594 2.6 28904 1292 4.5   
[Summarized from M&SH, II, pp. 465-77] 
* Until the General Order, 12 December 1854 regulated inspection of hospital transports. 
† Up to General Order, 16 February 1855 that authorized the issued of lime juice to all troops (This date 
was chosen arbitrarily as evidence that conditions for the troops were improving in the Crimea; clearly 




Table 8.8: Mortality among sick and wounded NCOs and men during the voyage from the Crimea to 
Turkey during different phases of the campaign, September 1854-June 1856 
Part A: 
Phase of the campaign No. of men Lengths of phase 
in days  
(inclusive) 
Man-days at seaa 
evacuated men dying 
Sail Steam Sail Steam Sail Steam 
I After landing 350 744 22 48 4 1400 3166 
II After the Alma 1388 1194 278 63 10 5162 4911 
III Before Sevastopol 462 0 14 0 13 1386 - 
IV After Balaklava 588 524 45 18 18 3656 1791 
V After Inkerman 412 905 14 26 11 1810 2715 
VI Winter Period 1* 650 877 126 102 30 5299 4812 
VII Winter Period 2† 1105 6721 182 301 67 9288 22038 
VIII Spring and summer campaign 1076 8086 14 27 213 3546 23541 
IX After the siege 217 3575 3 9 260 679 10908 
Whole campaign 6248 22656 698 594 626 32226 73882 
 
Part B: 
Phase of the campaign Calculations using Part A, columns 2-8 









I After landing 88 186 15.7 15.2 
II After the Alma 138 119 54.0 12.8 
III Before Sevastopol 36 0 10.1 - 
IV After Balaklava 33 29 12.3 10.1 
V After Inkerman 37 82 7.7 9.6 
VI Winter Period 1* 22 29 23.8 21.2 
VII Winter Period 2† 16 100 19.6 13.7 
VIII Spring and summer campaign 5 38 2.9 1.1 
IX After the siege 1 14 4.4 0.8 
Whole campaign 10 36 21.6 8.0 
[Summarized from M&SH, II, pp. 465-77] 
* Until the General General Order, 12 December 1854 regulated inspection of hospital transports. 
† Up to General Order, 16 February 1855 that authorized the issued of lime juice to all troops. (This date 
was chosen arbitrarily as evidence that conditions for the troops were improving in the Crimea; clearly 
the issuing of lime juice would not in itself have been responsible for reducing the mortality on the 
hospital ships.) 




Table 8.9: Mortality among sick and wounded NCOs and men during the voyage from the Crimea to 
Turkey during different phases of the campaign with respect to the number of Medical Officers 
employed, September 1854-June 1856 
Part A: 
Phase of the campaign No. of men MOs employed 
during Phase 
MO-days at seaa 
evacuated dying 
Sail Steam Sail Steam Sail Steam Sail Steam 
I After landing 350 744 22 48 1 4 4 16 
II After the Alma 1388 1194 278 63 14 10 54 42 
III Before Sevastopol 462 - 14 - 3 - 9 - 
IV After Balaklava 588 524 45 18 5 4 27 13 
V After Inkerman 412 905 14 26 5 9 22 27 
VI Winter Period 1* 650 877 126 102 8 12 61 53 
VII Winter Period 2† 1105 6721 182 301 12 63 110 204 
VIII Spring and summer campaign 1076 8086 14 27 16 114 55 330 
IX After the siege 217 3575 3 9 6 43 25 131 
Whole campaign 6248 22656 698 594 70 259 367 816 
 
Part B: 
Phase of the campaign Calculations using Part A, columns 2-9 













I After landing 350 186 22.0 12.0 5.5 3.0 
II After the Alma 99 119 19.9 6.3 5.1 1.5 
III Before Sevastopol 154 - 4.7 - 1.6 - 
IV After Balaklava 118 131 9.0 4.5 1.7 1.4 
V After Inkerman 82 101 2.8 2.9 0.6 1.0 
VI Winter Period 1* 81 73 15.8 8.5 2.1 1.9 
VII Winter Period 2† 92 107 15.2 4.8 1.7 1.5 
VIII Spring and summer campaign 67 71 0.9 0.2 0.3 <0.1 
IX After the siege 36 83 0.5 0.2 0.1 <0.1 
Whole campaign 89 87 10.0 2.3 1.6 0.72 
[Summarized from M&SH, II, pp. 465-77] 
* Until the General Order, 11 December 1854 regulated inspection of hospital transports. 
† Up to General Order, 16 February 1855 that authorized the issued of lime juice to all troops. (This date 
was chosen arbitrarily as evidence that conditions for the troops were improving in the Crimea; clearly 
the issuing of lime juice would not in itself have been responsible for reducing the mortality on the 
hospital ships.) 





Table 8.10: Voyages of fifteen hospital transports on which the mortality rate among sick and wounded 
NCOs and men exceeded 30/1000 man-days at sea and/or 4/MO-days at sea 
Phase of 
campaign 


























20 Sep.  3 352 25 
(7.1) 
23.7 4.2 




















































































10. Jan. 4 210 27 
(12.9) 
32.1 3.4 
[Summarized from M&SH, II, pp. 465-77] 
* Until the General Order, 12 December 1854 regulated inspection of hospital transports. 
† Up to General Order, 16 February 1855 that authorized the issued of lime juice to all troops. (This date 
was chosen arbitrarily as evidence that conditions for the troops were improving in the Crimea; clearly 
the issuing of lime juice would not in itself have been responsible for reducing the mortality on the 
hospital ships.) 
a. These sailing vessels were towed across the Black Sea hence the time of two days in the return must be 
incorrect, and three days has been substituted in the calculations. 
b. Cholera was reported to be very prevalent on Caduceus. 
c. Edendale, a fine large ship, St Hilda, and Caduceus were initially contracted to transport horses to the 
East; The Times, 29 & 30 March and 17 May 1854. 
d. The unsatisfactory conditions on board Avon while in Balaklava harbour were reported to Lord Raglan 
who blamed the AMD for this, although the responsibility for them lay principally with the military 
and naval authorities. One of the outcomes was the regularizing of the inspection of hospital transports 
promulgated by a General Order issued on 12 December 1854 (see footnote * above). 
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Table 8.11: Number of sick and wounded NCOs and men evacuated to Turkey from mid-February 1855 
until the end of the campaign 
Vessel No. of 
voyages 
Phase VIII 
(17 Feb.-17 Sep. 1855) 
Phase IX 

























































94 0 0 - - - 94 0 0 
Andes 4 - - - 502 0 6 
(1.2) 
502 0 6 
(1.2) 


































Cliftona 6 346 3 
(0.9) 




















































[Summarized from M&SH, II, pp. 470-7] 
a. Sailing vessels 
b. One man died. 






Figure 8.1: Number of NCOs and men comprising primary admissions to Army hospitals and evacuees 
from the Crimea to Turkey, September 1854-June 1856 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Number of sailing vessels and steamers employed to convey sick and wounded from the 




Figure 8.3: Number of sailing vessels and steamers employed to convey sick and wounded for the first 








Figure 8.5: Cumulative proportion (%) in the number of sick and wounded men evacuated from the 




Figure 8.6: Mortality among NCOs and men with respect to the time spent at sea on the voyage from the 




Figure 8.7: Mortality among NCOs and men with respect to the number of Medical Officers in attendance 





Provision for convalescents and the repatriation of 
invalids 
 
Shortly after war was declared Smith suggested that consideration should be given to 
the development of hospital accommodation on healthy islands in the Black Sea or 
Greek archipelago
678
 in addition to the provision of dedicated hospital transports 
referred to in Chapter 8.679 In the event no action was taken at that time and as has been 
pointed out Cantlie suggested that the responsibility for these omissions in forward 
planning must rest with either the Military Secretary, the Commander-in-Chief, 
Viscount Hardinge, or the Secretary for War, the Duke of Newcastle.
680
 
It became obvious after hostilities commenced that there was a need for hospitals 
near the front for men likely to ‘recruit their health’ in reasonable time and Hall 
recommended that only invalids should be sent to England with convalescents going to 
Malta ‘for a change of air.’681 This policy was authorized by Raglan682 thus releasing 
space in the general hospitals for acute cases,
683
 although the early development of 
sanatoria was hampered by a shortage of manpower, as ‘medical staff must be provided, 
as also hospital orderlies, and a military commander, and a detachment capable of 
bearing arms to enforce order […] but I [Raglan] have not a notion whence the officers 
could be taken [as] there is a great want of them at Scutari.’684 This dilemma was 
echoed a year later by the PMO, Scutari who informed Smith that the ‘hospital at 
Smyrna will require a large staff; none can be spared from here.’685 
Similarly, the need to provide military and medical staff on hospital transports 
exacerbated the shortage of manpower.
686
 In addition, the piecemeal movement of 
                                                 
678  Smith to Military Secretary, 11 May 1854; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 7 with an 
extract in The Lancet, 21 Apr. 1855. Smith mentioned that the French had arranged for hospital 
facilities at Candia (now Iráklion). 
679  Smith to Military Secretary, 4 Apr. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/2/7 (Manuscript), 
RAMC/397/524/14/2 (Typescript). 
680  Cantlie (1974), II, pp. 54-5. 
681  Hall to Raglan and QMG, 27 Oct. and Hall to Menzies, 28 Oct. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/819, 
820 & 842, and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379. 
682  Hall to Cumming, 10 Nov. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/892. 
683  PMO, Scutari to Hall, 10 Nov. 1854; PoL. In the event Emeu, HMS Arethusa, Blake, Trent, Jura, 
and Ripon disembarked invalids at Malta between 17 Nov. and 31 Dec. 1854; WO/15/1187. 
684  Raglan to Newcastle, 10 Jan. 1855; WO/1/370/747-752. 
685  PMO, Scutari to Smith, 25 Jan. 1855; PoL. 
686  Estcourt to Wetherall, 3 Feb. 1855; NAM-1962-10-95-2. 
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patients presented the Army authorities with administrative problems, particularly in the 
early stages, as it proved difficult to keep track of their whereabouts, despite a General 
Order of 18 December 1854 stipulating that Purveyors were ‘strictly ordered to 
communicate to regiments […] the death, or removal to England, of any soldier.’687 
In the event Gozo appeared to be the only hospital developed specifically for 
convalescents while Corfu, Rhodes, and Sinope were considered as potential locations, 
but none were utilized. Additional accommodation for convalescents was subsequently 
provided in the general hospitals at Scutari and Kuleli while civilian hospitals at Smyrna 
and Renkioi only came into use when the health of the Army had much improved, and 





Convalescent facilities in the Mediterranean, 
Ottoman Empire, and the Crimea 
 
The Mediterranean 
The British Army maintained a number of garrisons in the Mediterranean and these 
provided scope for accommodating convalescents. Malta was an obvious place to send 
convalescent soldiers and for disembarking invalids too ill to proceed to England, for 
example, patients with sloughing wounds on Talavera and Sultana.
689
 
The medical facilities on the island were poorly developed initially as there were 
only 120-150 beds for the sick in the summer of 1854,
690
 and they probably remained in 
a rudimentary state during the campaign since Captain Galton and Dr Sutherland 
reported in 1861 that there was no single good military hospital on the island.
691
 
Nevertheless, by October, Hall felt able to ‘apply officially for lighter cases of disease 
to be sent to Malta, rather then England’, although the proposal had to be ‘put […] in 
official shape for the naval authorities to act.’692 A few weeks later Hall told the PMO, 
                                                 
687  WO/28/130. The order was restated on 8 Jan. 1855 as it had not been fully implemented. 
688  See Hall to QMG, 15 Oct. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/3412. 
689  PMO, Malta to Smith. 9 Jan. 1855; PoL. 
690  PMO to Smith, 12 July 1854; PoL and Hall ‘Unpublished memoirs’.  
691  BPP (1863), No. 3207, p. 21.  
692  Hall to Smith, 27 Oct. 1854; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 103. For example, a 
disembarkation return in WO/25/1187 indicated that HMS Arethusa left Scutari for Malta on 9 
Nov. with 146 convalescents arriving there on 20 Nov. The health of the invalids was ‘tolerably 
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Scutari that Raglan was anxious that invalids should be sent to England and 
convalescents to Malta as expeditiously as you can manage,’693 thus releasing space at 
Scutari for more casualties.
694
 
A month later the GOC, Malta reported ample accommodation for convalescents 
on the island,
695
 and inevitably the increased number of both invalids and healthy 
troops
696
 prompted a request for ‘additional medical officers’ together with ‘a purveyor, 
a steward, and wardmasters.’697 By April 1855, however, the ‘want of accommodation.’ 
necessitated Raglan suspending sending sick to Malta,
698
 although by this time plans 
were afoot for developing a convalescent hospital on Gozo. 
 
It was planned to send a draft of the ‘not very sick’ from Scutari to Corfu in Dunbar in 
January 1855,
699
 although in the event some patients were wounded and others were in a 
‘disgraceful state […] suffering from dysentery, debility after fever, chest complaints 
and rheumatism.’700 Not surprisingly the arrival of these patients prompted a request for 
additional medical staff.
701
 The returns for these 463 invalids from February to 
November 1855 are summarized in Table 9.1
702
 and it is probable that over two thirds 
returned to their regiments although after four months some patients were not fit enough 
to return to duty or be repatriated to England.
703
 
Panmure’s plan to establish a depot there for invalids was abandoned in favour of 
a hospital for 500-1,000 men at Gozo,
704
 possibly because it was on the direct route to 
the Black Sea, unlike Corfu. Smith was also against the plan because ‘during the hot 
                                                                                                                                               
good under the circmustances’ and there were no deaths. Similarly, Jura sailed from Scutari on 15 
Dec. with 283 invailds arriving at Malta on 21 Dec. 
693  Hall to Cumming, 10 Nov. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/892. 
694  Cumming to Smith, 10 Nov. 1854; PoL. 
695  Hall to Cumming, 27 Nov. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/961. 
696  Smith informed the PMO, Malta on 9 Jan. 1855 to expect 10,000 men to be quartered on the 
island; PoL. 
697  PMO, Malta to Smith, 9 Jan. 1855; PoL. 
698  PMO, Malta, to Smith, 18 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
699  Paulet to AG, 8 & 14 Jan. 1855; WO/28/186. 
700  PMO, Corfu to Smith, 3 Feb. 1855; PoL. 
701  Smith to Deputy Secretary, 2 Feb. 1855; PoL. 
702  WO/28/185. 
703  AG to QMG, 15 June 1855; WO/28/197. 
704  Undersecretary to Smith, 10 Apr. 1855; PoL.  
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season fever of a severe type often appears, and invalids would be less able to resist 
than healthy troops.’705 
 
In March 1855 Panmure instructed the GOC, Malta to ‘take measures for the 
establishment of a convalescent depot for a 1,000 men on Gozo’ but it is possible their 
letters crossed as earlier in the month he informed Panmure of difficulties encountered 
in obtaining accommodation for the Army as relationships between the military and 
civil authorities and private property owners was ill defined, though Ford Chambray, on 
Gozo, was in the process of being refurbished as a hospital or convalescent depot, and it 
would be ready in about five weeks.
706
 
Smith was apparently not consulted officially about the plan,
707
 though he had ‘no 
doubt that [Gozo] would prove a most eligible locality;’708 and took matters forward by 
requesting the appointment staff for a 300-bed hospital,
709
 only to be informed that the 
plan was for 500 convalescents,
710
 later increased to 1,000-1,500. The barrack could 
accommodate 500
711
 and hence the Commissary-General was instructed to provide 40 
huts for 25 men, although Panmure favoured tents rather than new buildings.
712
 In the 
event huts provided by Messrs Weikersheim of Vienna
713
 proved unsatisfactory and the 




Smith suggested 15 MOs of various grades for 500-1000 men
715
 and shortly 
afterwards his request for passage to Gozo for three medical officers was confirmed,
716
 
while 14 wardmasters and orderlies passed the Isle of Wight en route for Gozo on 17 
                                                 
705  Smith to Military Undersecretary, 13 Mar. 1855; PoL. 
706  Panmure to GOC, Malta, 12 Mar. and GOC, Malta to Panmure, 7 Mar. 1855; WO/6/70 & 
WO/1/513. 
707  Referred to in Deputy Secretary to Smith, 10 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
708  Staff Surgeon Armstrong to Smith, 6 Mar. 1855; PoL and Smith to Armstrong, 13 Mar. 1955; 
PoL. 
709  Smith to Military Undersecretary, 30 Mar. 1855; PoL. 
710  Undersecretary, to Smith, 7 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
711  PMO, Malta to Smith, 18 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
712  Panmure to GOC, Malta, 24 Apr. 1855; WO/6/70. 
713  Following the loss of Prince the ambassador in Vienna (Earl of Westmorland) arranged a contract 
with the House of Weikersheim to supply warm clothing; Morning Post, 10 Jan. 1855. 
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715  Smith to Military Secretary, 18 Apr. 1855; PoL. 









 These arrived on Earl of Mulgrave on 15 May,
720
 while 
equipment prepared in England by early May
721
 was not dispatched until over two 
months later.
722
 In the mean time, Panmure ordered that any stores duplicating those 
supplied by Weikersheim should be forwarded to other hospitals.
723
 
Panmure informed Simpson and Paulet on 18 July that the GOC, Malta would 
notify them when Gozo was ready, viz. 500 beds in Fort Chambray and 500 in huts.
724
 
In August 1855 the hospital could accommodate 250-300 and the medical staff 
comprised 1 DIGH (Dr J.B. Gibson), 4 surgeons, and 16 assistant surgeons.
725
 There are 
no records of this hospital in the M&SH,
726
 though Smith recommended its use when he 
counselled against repatriating patients to England during the winter,
727
 while during the 
evacuation of the Crimea invalids and convalescents from the ‘late seat of war’ were 
quartered there, as was the 31
st
 Regiment that landed there on 16 June 1855;
728
 and lost 




Panmure informed Paulet that he could ‘avail’ himself of accommodation for 400 
convalescents in Gibraltar ‘for relieving the hospitals in the East.’730 However, Hall, 
who had lived there for four years, considered it unsuitable for convalescents during the 
summer and recommended they should be sent to England;
731
 an opinion which was 
                                                 
717  The Times, 20 Aug. 1855. 
718  Deputy Secretary to Smith, 19 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
719  Military Secretary to Smith, 8 May 1988; PoL. 
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726  The monthly reports of the AG in Malta recorded a total of only 280 deaths during during the 27 
month period, Apr. 1854-June 1856; WO/17/2160-2. 
727  Smith to Undersecretary, 5 Nov. 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 77. 
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the register for invalids evacuated to there from the Crimea. 
730  Panmure to Paulet, 2 Apr. & 6 May 1855; WO/6/70. 
731  Hall to QMG, 12 May 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/2974. 
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reinforced by a board of MOs.
732
 Authority was, however, given for transports returning 
to England to embark any invalids from regiments serving in the Crimea if required.
733
 
Paulet was subsequently instructed not to send patients there in summer,
734
 though 
some invalids unfit to proceed to England were landed at Gibraltar and attached to a 
regiment in the garrison while under treatment.
735
 They then continued to England 




At the end of June 1855 the King Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies gave consent to Sir 
William Temple for a military convalescent hospital to be established on Ischia, though 





Stratford informed Raglan on 31 August 1854 that the General Hospital and the 
barracks at Scutari and Kuleli would be cleared by the Turkish authorities and made 
available for the British Army.
738
 The buildings were subsequently used as hospitals for 
patients from the Crimea and the local military depots though with time some facilities 
were developed for convalescent soldiers. 
 
In Bulgaria ‘light cases’ and convalescents were encamped at the south side of Varna 
bay,
739
 while nearly two weeks before the invasion Hall informed the PMO, Scutari that 
‘Bombay and Mercia will bring 400 and 250 convalescents.’740 He continued: ‘We have 
had an enormous number of sick thrown on our hands […] and have been much pressed 
to provide for them’ and by pointing out that Raglan wished to ‘gradually get the sick 
                                                 
732  Smith to the Undersecretary, 20 June 1855; PoL. 
733  Newcastle to GOC, Malta, 24 Jan. 1855; WO/6/70. 
734  Military Undersecretary to Smith, 5 July 1855; PoL and Panmure to Paulet, 7 July 1855; 
WO/6/71. 
735  For example, Gibraltar Garrison Orders, 6 Mar., 10 June, 11 July, 9 Aug., 25 Sep., & 24 Oct., 
1855 & 14 Jan. & 7 July 1856; WO/284/71 & 72. 
736  Gibraltar Garrison Orders, 1 Jan.; WO/284/71 and The Times, 12 Jan. 1855 
737  Essex Standard, 11 July, Daily News, 12 July, and The Lancet, 14 July 1855. 
738  WO/28/197. 
739  Hall to Smith, 29 Aug. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/665. 
740  Hall to Smith, 4 Sep. 1854; PoL. Hall estimated that c.2,000 sick remained in Bulgaria. 
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away’ and ‘they will be sent down when […] convalescent, and opportunities for 
transport present.’741 
In order to reduce pressure on hospital accommodation men sufficiently recovered 
were returned to the front from the beginning of November 1854, while effective men 
and convalescents would be moved to Kuleli from the Barrack Hospital if large 
numbers of sick and wounded arrived.
742
 Convalescents were also employed as hospital 
orderlies while others guarded wounded Russians,
743
 or were sent to the depot, located 
initially in the Barrack complex, or to vessels moored at the mouth of the Golden Horn. 
Huts were erected in the quadrangle of the Barrack Hospital and, although 
Cumming did not ‘approve of their situation’, he intended to ‘occupy them with 
convalescents […] which will thin the wards and corridors,’744 and thus allow the walls 
of the wards to be whitewashed.
745
 However, one of the perceived ‘evils’ of housing 
convalescents adjacent to a town was the men had access to grog shops and some 
relapsed and had to be ‘sent back to their wards.’746 Other hospital buildings utilized 
included the Pavilion which formed part of the Barrack Hospital and housed officers; it 
was closed towards the end of 1855 to reduce expense, while the Harem at Haidar Pasha 




Some weeks after the invasion a Turkish frigate, and Bombay, a fine Indiaman, were 
moored in the Golden Horn and fitted up for convalescents,
748
 as reported by Hall and 
Sillery: 
 
Hall: Today we […] move 500 convalescents onto an old line of battle ship […] fitted up and 
moored within the Seraglio point, and in a day or two we shall be able to despatch 170 
invalids to England […] and 50 women whose husbands have either died or been killed in 




                                                 
741  Hall to PMO, Scutari, 2 Sep. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/682. Incidentally, Cantlie (1974), II, p. 
42 implied incorrectly that Hall ordered these vessels to Scutari; the Royal Navy controlled the 
movement of transport vessels. 
742  Sillery to AG, 9 & 15 Nov. 1854; WO/28/186 
743  Paulet in answer to letter from the AG, 24 Dec. 1854; WO/278/186. 
744  Cumming to Smith 22 Feb. 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 36 and BPP, 1854-55, 
No. 449, p. 26. 
745  Cumming to Hall, 2 Mar. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/19/9. 
746  MT&G, 26 May 1855. 
747  PMO, Scutari to Smith, 29 Nov. 1855 & 7 Feb. 1856; PoL. 
748  ILN, 11 Nov. 1854 includes an engraving of the Turkish hulk used as the hospital ship. 
749  Hall to Raglan, 5 Oct. 1854; original in NAM-1968-07-293 but no copy in RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1. 
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Sillery: We sent about 400 men on board the hospital ship yesterday, all convalescents, all 
improving. I sent 1 officer, 3 sergeants, 3 cooks, and 10 orderlies. […] a naval assistant 





Some weeks later the Hospital Commissioners considered it ‘inexpedient to send 
convalescents on board ship’ as the confinement was ‘prejudicial both their health and 
spirits.’ Although initially intended for convalescents the two hulks had effectively 
become floating hospitals by the time they were inspected by the Sanitary 
Commissioners, who likewise found them unsatisfactory,
751
 and they had ceased to be 




Permission to utilize the barracks at Kuleli was obtained from the Porte in December 




 while the ‘fine 
riding-school’ was subsequently used as a convalescent hospital for 180 men.’ ‘It was 
‘contiguous to the Bosphorus [and] proved very healthy’.755 It was seemingly ‘much 
admired’ and ‘kept in beautiful order’’756 It was later retained for the British Army 
during November 1855 when the principal buildings were handed over to the British 
German Legion. 
 
Abydos: Calvert, the Consul on the Dardanelles, organized hospital facilities at Abydos 
with 400 beds to cater for the troops when they first arrived in 1854.
757
 Hall advised 
Raglan in June that a lazaretto there would make a suitable hospital,
758
 and Dr Jameson 
                                                 
750  Sillery to AG, 4 Oct. 1854; WO/28/186. Hall and Sillery were referring the Turkish vessel as 
Bombay did not arrive until later with ‘460 sick, mostly convalescents who would soon be fit for 
duty’; Sillery to AG, 11 Oct. 1854. 
751  For the Commissioners report to Admiral Gray and his response dated 17 & 18 Mar. 1855 
respectively, see FO/195/452 (longhand copy) and WO/33/1/24/55 (Cabinet paper), with a 
summary in BPP (1857), Session 1, No. 2196, pp. 27-8. 
752  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 47. On 23 Mar. 1855 Cumming informed Hall that ‘Bombay has 
been emptied […] The Turkish hulk will also if possible be vacated;’ RAMC/397/F/CO/19/14. 
Paulet also informed Panmure that he had ‘caused the Turkish hulk […] to be cleared […] Bombay 
convalescent transport-ship has also been cleared […]’; BPP, 1854-55, No. 449, pp. 22-3. 
753  Paulet to AG, 20 Dec. 1854; WO/28/186. 
754  Incidentally, the demand for accommodation near the Bosphorus resulted in few suitable buildings 
remaining available for hospitals or stables; Stratford to Clarendon, 17 Jan. 1855; FO/78/1070. 
755  Paulet to Panmure, 25 Apr. 1855; BPP (1854-55), No. 449, p. 22. 
756  A Lady Volunteer (1856), II, pp. 273-5. 
757  Evidence given on 31 May 1858; BPP (1857-58), No. 482, p. 220. 
758  Hall to Smith, 23 June 1854; PoL. A lazaretto is a reception centre for those in quarantine. 
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was instructed to form a general hospital there during October.
759
 Kangaroo and Emeu 
arrived on the 6 and 25 December with 207 and 142 patients respectively with the 




The hospital proved ‘an out of the way place, very inconvenient,’761 and it became 
used more for convalescents,
762
 although by August it was ‘almost empty and scarcely 
required’, with only 32 men remaining to be repatriated.763 By October 1855 it was no 
longer needed by the Army
764
 and Panmure approved that military medical personnel 
could be replaced by civilians from the hospital at Renkioi, though with Captain 
Segrave in military command.
765
 
Storks, Paulet’s replacement, favoured transferring convalescents awaiting 
discharge to Abydos as they could be ‘kept under closer discipline’ than ‘they are likely 
to be at Renkoy (sic).’766 On the other hand, Hall recommended sending them to Scutari 
‘where facilities for their reception already exist.’ In Hall’s opinion Renkioi was ‘little 
more than a convalescent station’ because ‘its distance from the Crimea rendered it 
unfeasible to send acute cases,’767 and ‘with the exception of the Land Transport Corps, 
which had been most injudiciously recruited, no serious disease prevailed.’768 Hall’s 
opinion appears to have prevailed and Storks was instructed to send convalescents from 
Renkioi to Scutari and not Abydos.
769
 The hospital was subsequently turned over to the 
French,
770
 although a wharf was retained for the use of a LTC depot. 
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769  QMG to Storks, 22 Oct. 1855; WO/28/192 
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Sinope: In the spring of 1855 Hall informed the QMG that if there was the need for 




 and this 
opinion was echoed by PMO, Scutari who considered it ‘would answer well enough.’773 
The Sanitary Commissioners subsequently reported that Sinope was ‘as good a place for 
a large hospital as could be desired’ although temporary buildings were required, and 
further expense would be incurred in providing storage for water.
774
 Hall accepted that a 
deficiency of water would render the location ‘ineligible,’775 and no further action was 
taken. After the war Hall opined that the ‘the want of water could not have been a well-
founded objection, from the number of animals belonging to the Commissariat and LTC 
that were subsequently collected and kept there.’776 A reasonable conclusion given there 
were 3,994 mules, 1,215 camels, 948 horses, and 105 donkeys there in January 1856,
777
 





Smyrna: There was a small British hospital in Smyrna which provided for expatriates 
and sailors using the port but it was not in such satisfactory state as the French 
equivalent,
779
 and was obviously too small for military purposes. Clarendon ordered 
Stratford to procure additional hospital accommodation
780
 and accordingly a Staff 
Surgeon and a Commissariat officer were ordered to Smyrna to seek suitable facilities 
for a convalescent hospital.
781
 They recommended a Turkish barrack located near the 
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shore, and close to an ‘abundant market’.782, 783 The building comprised a casement, 
which was deemed unsuitable for patients, and two upper stories which could 
accommodate 520 patients with safety,
784
 as well as a large number of attendants. 
Quarters were available nearby for the medical staff.
785
 
The hospital opened on 15 February 1855 and was staffed by military MOs until 
replaced by civilians during the course of March. Six hospital transports sailed there 
from Balaklava between 3 and 16 February, and, although all called at Scutari to 
disembark the worst cases,
786
 it soon became over crowded,
787
 necessitating a request 
for additional accommodation in a nearby barracks and lazaretto.
788
 
It was suggested before the hospital opened that, notwithstanding the shortage of 
medical staff, it should not be used solely for convalescents as they were relatively few 
patients in this category compared to the number of sick needing treatment.
789
 Initially 
there was a bias towards the less seriously ill, since during the first 2½ months to the 
end of April the ratio of deaths to admissions was 12% as compared to 28% in the 
Scutari hospitals.
790
 Thereafter the ratio was much reduced to 2.2%,
791
 thus confirming 
that Smyrna became a ‘convalescent station’, as was originally envisaged.792 A sensible 
policy given that the long voyage from the Crimea ‘should not be thought of’ both for 
those in ‘the trying state of a severe disease [or] severe surgical cases.’793, 794 
                                                 
782  FO/195/456. Staff Surgeon Moorhead’s report is reproduced in PoL, I, Appendix No. 3. 
783  Illustrated in ILN, 1855, I, p. 472. 
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eighteen hours to Smyrna’; MT&G, 30 June 1855. 
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Paulet visited Smyrna in June and told Raglan privately that ‘a civil hospital [was 
in no way] advantageous; it is very expensive, and it certainly does not improve the 
discipline of our soldiers.’ He continued by saying that both Smyrna and Abydos 
‘required many things doing for [the soldiers’] comfort’ and ‘we have comfortable 
accommodation for nearly 3,000 sick [at Scutari]’ though he suggested that ‘the distant 
hospitals should be kept in case of [increased demand, although it involved] a great deal 
of trouble when men are at a distance, and Smyrna lays quite out of the regular line of 
ships from and to England.’795 
Incidentally, Panmure informed Paulet during March that the high summer 
temperatures at Smyrna may hinder recovery
796
 and that this may account in part why 
there were no further sailings from Balaklava after Sydney and Brandon departed at the 
end of April until Severn and Imperador left on 26 October 1855, although both called 
first at Scutari.
797
 This would appear to be in response to an instruction from the Deputy 
Secretary since Hall informed Storks that: 
 
His Lordship’s [Panmure] orders will be complied with, when the hospital ships now fitting 
are ready for the reception of sick but the distance of Smyrna and Renkioi is a drawback to 





Hall also suggested to Smith that the reasons the Deputy Secretary gave for 
sending patients to Smyrna ‘would amuse you […] It was not that they were requiring 
accommodation, but the expensive civil establishment employed by government might 
have occupation.’799 
At the end of October Storks informed the QMG that the Secretary of State’s 
instructions had been put into effect and the transfer of 377 and 215 patients to Smyrna 
and Renkioi had resulted in 2,228 beds being available at Scutari.
800
 Smith was 
subsequently informed of these developments,
801
 and there the matter rested as the 
                                                 
795  Paulet to Raglan, 22 June 1855; WO/28/186. 
796  Panmure to Paulet, 5 Mar. 1855; WO/6/70. Incidentally, Nightingale considered it would be 
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797  M&SH, II, p. 479. 
798  Hall to Storks, 9 Oct. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/3340. There is no despatch from Panmure on 
this matter in WO/6/71. 
799  Hall to Smith, 10 Nov. 1855; Mitra (1911), pp. 401-2. Hall suggested that the Deputy Secretary 
had intervened to avoid awkward questions in Parliament; though there is no record any were 
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800  Storks to QMG, 30 Oct. 1855; WO/28/186. 
801  Undersecretary to Smith, 5 Nov. 1855; PoL. 
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hospital closed at the end of the month and was handed over to the British Swiss Legion 
which was based in Smyrna from the beginning of December until the end of the war. 
 
Renkioi: The decision to construct a prefabricated hospital designed by I.K. Brunel was 
taken in London during February 1855 and, Dr E. Parkes, the nominated civilian 
superintendent, was informed that it was Panmure’s wish that he should be wholly 
‘responsible for the efficiency of the hospital […] to be established on the shores of the 
Bosphorus [at] a site chosen by you,’ after taking into account the information collected 
by Paulet.
802
 In the event, neither Raglan nor Hall heard of this plan officially though 
Hall assured Parkes of his support on 23 April: ‘If there is anything I can do to assist 
you, or forward the object you are sent out to accomplish, I shall be very happy, and you 
may command my services.’803 Hall wrote again to Parkes a few months later and made 
the following, frank, but not unfriendly comment: ‘I regret its distance from us will 
militate against your usefulness, but with my good wish for the success of your 
undertaking.’804, 805 
Parkes failed to find a suitable site on the Bosphorus and decided on Renkioi, 
apparently on the recommendation of the Consul on the Dardanelles.
806
 The first 
prefabricated components arrived on 17 May and by 14 July, when Newcastle passed 
by, it was ready for 300 patients, although the design was for 3,000. The number had 
increased to 500 by mid-August at which time Panmure made it clear that the hospital 
should not receive Sardinian patients but should be ‘kept as a reserve for the sick and 
wounded of the British Army.’ He also recommended that patients should be sent there 
from Scutari, even if there was surplus accommodation, as this would keep the 
‘establishment in working order and so prepare it for the heavier labours which may be 
anticipated in the ensuing winter.’807 Neither suggestion was unreasonable given that the 
siege was still in progress, although it was October before the first of 1,300 admitted 
                                                 
802  War Office to Parkes, 4 Apr. 1855; WO/43/991. 
803  Hall to Parkes, 23 Apr. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1894. 
804  Hall to Parkes, 13 Aug. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2925. 
805  For accounts see Toppin (1991) and Silver (2007), and WO/43/99 for contemporary letters and 
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806  BPP (1857-58), No. 482, pp. 22. 
807  Panmure to Storks, 25 Aug. 1855; FO/6/71. 
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during the first five months of operation arrived; thereafter only 30 new patients arrived 
before closing at the end of June 1856.
808
 
Newcastle considered locating a hospital at Renkioi was a ‘very questionable 
experiment [as] its distance from any town of any importance almost fatal for a hospital 
of such magnitude.’ He considered that its ‘only special advantage is an abundant 
supply of good water’ and that the whole ‘affair looks to me like a crochet. […] I am 
sure it will be expensive,’ and on this Hall agreed when he wrote after the war: 
 
The personal pay of the medical and purveying departments amounted to 15,3781., and of the 
whole establishment to 24,9301. per annum, exclusive of the pay of the military staff, the 
diets and store expenses of the patients to say nothing of the heavy expense of erecting this 
magnificent establishment, which was placed at too great a distance from the seat of active 





Other locations: Newcastle suggested to Raglan during November 1854 that Rhodes 
might prove suitable for convalescents and HM’s consul was making enquiries,810 and 
Stratford confirmed that the Porte had agreed to the establishment of a sanatorium 
there.
811
 Early in January Herbert, noted that he had heard that ‘Rhodes is best for 
climate and buildings’ but it would be difficult to supply as it is ‘without much trade or 
market,’812 and this, coupled with a lack of suitable public buildings,813 meant that 
Smyrna was considered a better option, although Nightingale preferred Rhodes.
814
 
Panmure instructed Paulet on 16 February to ascertain whether Mitylene would 
make a suitable venue for a hospital but an inspection indicated it ‘ineligible.’815 
Finally, a Dr J.B. Thompson proposed to the military authorities that Sueida (now 
Samnadağ) at the mouth of the Orontes as a location for a convalescent station but it 
was too far away and there were no suitable port facilities.
816
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RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/1872 and PoL. Dr Thompson, MD, was ‘well known in connection with the 
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Smith recommended that Prince’s Islands in the Sea of Marmora would prove a 
convenient location for convalescents rather than erecting temporary hospital 
accommodation at Scutari, and Panmure instructed Paulet to make the necessary 
enquiries.
817
 Smith planned to provide sufficient marquees to permit the formation of a 
‘breezy and salubrious camping ground’ which could be moved if the ‘site became 
objectionable.’818 Smith also considered Proti as an alternative venue, but nothing came 
of either initiative.
819
 Paulet was informed that permission had been obtained from the 
Turkish authorities to build a ‘wooden hospital’ to the north of Scutari at Selvi Bournou 





As the facilities developed in the Crimea convalescents and ‘light cases’, such as 
ophthalmia, could be cared for locally and were thus spared the ‘evils of the voyage to 
Scutari, or the longer passages to Abydos and Smyrna.’821  
 
It was anticipated that wounded men would recover better in the Castle Hospital than at 
Scutari,
822
 and within a few weeks of its opening on 3 March 1855 Russell noted that it 
was ‘becoming a great curative establishment, and promises to afford great benefits to 
our sick and wounded men.’823 Men with disease were admitted during the first month 
but the policy changed in early April and between then and the end of October wounded 
soldiers accounted for 1,805 (92%) of 1,966 admissions, of whom 80 (4.4%) died, as 
compared with 25% in the Camp General Hospital which received casualties direct from 
the front. Thereafter, men with disease predominated providing 317 (93.2%) of 340 
admissions. None of these died which suggests the hospital was being used for 
convalescents, as originally intended.
824
 
                                                                                                                                               
proposed overland route to India via Snediah and valley of the Orontes.’ He died of fever at 
Constantinople on 5 Aug. 1855; GM, Oct. 1855, p. 441. 
817  Smith to Undersecretary, 1 Mar. 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 38, and Panmure 
to Paulet, 5 & 12 Mar. 1855; WO/6/70. 
818  Smith to Cumming, 9 May 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 40-1. 
819  Smith to Dr Bryce, 11 Dec. 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 82. Proti, an island in 
the Sea of Marmora, was used to accommodate Russian prisoners. 
820  Odo Russell to Paulet, 26 Apr. 1855; FO/352/41A 
821  News item, 2 Apr.; The Times, 18 Apr. 1855. 
822  Hall to Smith, 10 Mar. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/1605 and PoL. 
823  Despatch, 2 Apr., The Times, 18 Apr. 1855. 
824  M&SH, II, General Hospital Returns IV. 
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In March 1855 Cossack Bay, which is near the entrance to Balaklava harbour, was 
inspected as a potential site for a convalescent hospital though Hall recommended 
expansion at the Castle as it was a good site with an abundant supply of water and it 
would ‘economize our resources’.825 The need for additional hospital accommodation 
was considered further the next month when Hall expressed his preference for 
‘uncontaminated sites’ such as the plateau to the west of the entrance of Balaklava 
harbour or the neighbourhood of the Monastery,
826
 which was eventually chosen. 
Cossack Bay was reconsidered in May, and Hall pointed out that landing would be 
difficult if a southerly wind caused a swell, though he conceded that there would be less 
trouble in transporting stores there than to the Monastery.
827
 The Monastery never 
became a convalescent hospital in the strict sense although during the first five months 
from July 1855 the ratio of deaths to admissions was 25 (4.9%):508 suggesting a 
selection in favour of the less seriously ill. After this time the policy changed and 
ophthalmia accounted for a nearly three-quarters of the admissions although there were 




When in Bulgaria the PMO of the 1
st
 Division recommended that MOs dischargeing 
hospital patients who could attend daily or do light duty, and it is probable that this 
practical policy was adopted by other divisions.
829
 For example, in the Coldstream 
Guards camp ‘One tent per company was apportioned [in January 1855] for the use of 
convalescents […] usually men recently dismissed from hospital with trivial affections 
(sic: afflictions) […] it was often thought desirable to afford such men […] a few days 
rest from the unceasing toil […]’830 When the railway became operational it was used to 
convey convalescents from Balaklava to the camps
831
 while there are other references to 
convalescents being treated as outpatients or employed on light duties, including 
                                                 
825  Hall to QMG, 7 Mar. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/1591 and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 117. 
826  Hall to QMG, 25 Apr. 1855; 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/1923, RAMC/397/M1/15, and BPP 
(1857-58), No. 2379, p. 121. 
827  Hall to QMG, 5 May 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2008. 
828  M&SH, II, General Hospital Returns VI. 
829  Memorandum, 2 Aug. 854; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 154. 
830  M&SH, I, p. 113. 
831  AG to Sir Colin Campbell, 3 Apr. 1855; WO28/108. 
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working in hospitals and even some constructional work, although some of those 
‘attending at stables’ in hot weather often ‘re-appeared on the sick list.’832  
 
Repatriation of invalids to England 
 
Invalids were repatriated prior to the invasion using several vessels, viz, HMS Simoom, 





 but this would have been more for convenience than necessity, and it 
was not until the departure of Libertas from Scutari on 16 October 1854
835
 that matters 
became more pressing and hospital transports from the East began to arrive regularly in 
English ports, principally Portsmouth, from the beginning of 1855. These events were 
reported in The Times and other newspapers; varying from one liners to accounts giving 
details of the voyage, the passengers, particularly officers,
836
 and the various hospitals 
to which the invalids were distributed. 
In February 1855 Smith suggested to the War Office that the sick and wounded 
should only be brought back to England in ‘streamers with appropriate fittings’ and they 
could not be transported at that time of year ‘without risk of serious suffering from 
inclement or severe weather.’837 The need to repatriate invalids during the second winter 
was less urgent though he advised once again that it would ‘not be expedient to 
transport the sick and wounded back to this country […] from the beginning of 
December to the following April,’ and they should be treated at Scutari, Gozo, and 
Gibraltar.
838
 Initially Panmure was ‘unwilling to accede to this request as he wished 
they should return to England as usual,’839 although he subsequently changed his mind. 
The electric telegraph became available during the campaign, and although there 
is no evidence it was employed routinely by the AMD, its use allowed advanced 
                                                 
832  M&SH, II, p. 136. 
833  The Times, 17 Apr., 5 & 30 May, 5 & 23 June, 2 & 9 Aug., and 6 Oct. 1854. Incidentally, 
invalids brought home on HMS Vulcan and Tonning travelled to Dublin from Portsmouth in Ajax; 
IoWO, 17 June 1854; and a disembarkation return in WO/25/1187 recorded the arrival of 
Mangerton at Gravesend from Malta on 14 Sep. with 63 NCOs and men from 12 regiments 
together with 82 women and 127 children. 
834  Morning Post, 20 July 1854. 
835  ADM/7/576. 
836  Incidentally, the names of officers leaving the Crimea with a medical certigicate for Turkey, 
England, or elsewhere were published in General Orders. 
837  Smith to Military Undersecretary, 27 Feb. 1855; BPP (1857-58), No.  2318, p. 469. 
838  Smith to Undersecretary, 5 Nov. 1855 PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 77 
839  Military Undersecretary to Smith, 9 Nov. 1855; PoL. 
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warning if invalids needed hospitalization on arrival. For example, Smith informed the 
PMO, Plymouth that four ships from Scutari would touch there and that he should 
disembark up to 150 before they proceeded to Portsmouth,
840
 while Codrington 
telegraphed that 60 of 244 invalids embarked on Thames on 17 June 1856 would 
require medical treatment,
841




Provision of hospital transports 
Smith addressed the problem of evacuation the sick and wounded ‘from the vicinity of 
conflict’ in May 1854 and he emphasized the need for ‘a liberal supply of ships, some to 
convey periodically to England men never likely to become available for further 
service.’ This advice was not heeded and in the following January he found it necessary 
to recommend that two good steamers would prove sufficient for transporting medical 
stores to the East and that the public would be ‘ensured against any unnecessary loss’ if 
they were used to carry home invalids when returning.
843
 Similarly, Dr Mapleton, 
sometime Raglan’s physician, advocated the employment of dedicated vessels for the 
purpose, especially during the summer as the heat in Turkey and Malta ‘would impair 
recovery.’ He calculated that four steamers of 2,000 tons could convey 2-3,000 men 
every six weeks. These ships would require a permanent staff of MOs, orderlies, cooks, 
washermen, etc. but despite this outlay the policy would obviate the vast expense of 




Panmure informed the House of Lords that: 
 
As soon as we can obtain a sufficiency of transports it is [intended] to establish a 
communication every week to 10 days direct between Scutari and England by means of 
steamers fitted up as hospital ships, which will bring home […] 300 or 400, or perhaps 500 
[…] who will be far sooner restored to health […] in this country, than […] in the place 




                                                 
840  Smith to PMO, Plymouth, 28 Apr. 1856; PoL. 
841  Undersecretary to Smith, 24 June 1856; PoL. A later message reported 24 French nurses were on 
board. 
842  PMO, Portsmouth to Smith, 9 July 1856; PoL. 
843  Smith to Deputy Secretary, 23 Jan. 1855; The Lancet, 28 July 1855. 
844  Report by Mapleton, 5 Feb. 1855; BPP (1857-58), No. 425. See also BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, 
p. 196-7. 
845  The Times, 17 Feb. 1855. 
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He then told Paulet that he was hoping to secure the services of six steamers not 
required by the Navy to provide a weekly service between Scutari and England,
846
 and, 
though Palmerston told MPs on 19 February 1855 that the War Department intended to 
make arrangements for a ‘periodical service’ between Constantinople and England for 
‘bringing home such invalids as [can] be transported by sea,’847 nothing come of it, and 
two sailing transports, the Great Tasmania and Saldanha, were engaged instead on 29 
March. 
Mapleton was sent to Liverpool to superintend their modification,
848
 but found 
them being fitted for troops in health and not invalids. The number of berths was then 
reduced, the bunks widened from 22 to 26ins., and additional patent air tubes installed 
to improve ventilation.
849
 Smith was requested to advise on dietary matters as the 
owners were to victual for the troops both out and home,
850
 and then to nominate 
MOs.
851
 Smith’s suggestion to appoint permanent medical staff852 was approved,853 as 
was the appointment of two hospital serjeants and one steward to each vessel, while the 
orderlies, in the ratio of 1:20 sick,
854
 were to be volunteers from line regiments.
855
 
Two sets of apparatus for hoisting the wounded on board were ordered,
856
 and on 
19 April the vessels were ready for sea.
857
 Mapleton also recommended that (1) the 
boxes for the horses should be cleared away before the return journey as they were a 
source of filth and an obstruction to ventilation;
858
 (2) only 12 sick officers should be 
sent back so that each had a separate cabin; and (3) every mess should be answerable for 
                                                 
846  Panmure to Paulet, 9 Mar. 1855; WO/6/70. 
847  The Times, 20 Feb. 1855  
848  Smith to Mapleton, 31 Mar. 1855; PoL. 
849  Mapleton to Smith. 2 Apr. 1855; PoL For details of the fittings see Morning Chronicle, 27 Apr. 
1855. Following their return to England it was decided to install rotary ventilation machines and 
Smith suggested that a person acquainted with the apparatus should travel with the vessels; Smith 
to Undersecretary, 14 Sep. 1855; PoL. 
850  Director of Transport Services to Smith, 23 Mar. 1855; PoL. 
851  AG to Smith, 9 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
852  Smith to Undersecretary, 13 Apr. 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 47. 
853  Military Undersecretary to Smith, 17 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
854  Military Undersecretary to Smith, 25 Apr. 1855; PoL. See also Memorandum No. 942, 2 May 
1855; WO/123/151. 
855  Military Secretary to Smith, 1 May 1855; PoL. Smith issued a list of 15 regulations for display on 
the vessels; Smith to Undersecretary, 8 May 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379. 
856  Smith to Director of Transport Services, 14 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
857  Mapleton to Smith, 19 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
858  The horse stalls were removed before departure. PMO, Portsmouth to Smith, 5 May 1855; PoL. 
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all equipment to prevent its illegal disposal as this would leave the vessel under 
equipped for the return voyage.
859
  
In September Smith and Dr Forrest inspected Great Tasmania, Saldanha, the 
three-decker Britannia, and the General Military Hospital in the Portsmouth Garrison. 
They expressed their satisfaction in the state of the ships for invalids, the condition of 
the hospital, and the treatment and progress of the patients.
860
 
Smith hoped that the two vessels would convey invalids from the Crimea to 
England without calling at the hospitals of the Bosphorus,
861
 while he suggested that the 
vessels should be towed by a steamer when ‘calmness prevailed.’862 The naval 
authorities in Gibraltar, Malta and Turkey were requested to assist in this regard,
863
 and 
Assistance, Charity and Prompt were used for this purpose.
864
 In the event Great 
Tasmania and Saldanha only completed two round trips and were paid off 22 March 




Several steamers equipped as permanent hospital transports operated a shuttle service 
between Balaklava and the Bosphorus from January 1855 but none was told off 
permanently for the voyage to England, and judging by the number of different vessels 
employed during the campaign, their selection must have been frequently on an ad hoc 
basis.
866
 The military authorities had no official role in the selection of these vessels, as 
this was a Naval responsibility, but to minimize the risk of adverse criticism Smith 
enjoined Hall to ensure that all transports conveying sick to England should be minutely 




No comprehensive list of the transports involved in this service was published but 
a summary of the dates of arrival in British waters of 160 voyages involving 115 vessels 
                                                 
859  Smith to Undersecretary, forwarding Mapleton’s letter, 20 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
860  The Times, 19 Sep. 1855. Saldanha and Great Tasmania arrived in Portsmouth on 5 Aug. and by 
1 Sep. respectively. 
861  Smith to Military Undersecretary, 16 June 1855; PoL. 
862  Smith to Military Undersecretary, 31 July 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 70. 
863  Military Undersecretary to Smith, 10 Aug. 1855; PoL and Smith to Undersecretary, 10 Sep. 
1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 74. 
864  BPP (1856), No. 345 and The Times 22 Feb. & 8 Mar. 1856. 
865  BPP (1856), No. 345. 
866  Conache (1987), implied incorrectly that a regular transport service to England was established 
(p.81). 
867  Smith to Hall, 30 Nov. 1855; PoL. 
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reported in The Times and elsewhere are listed in Appendix 9.1. Thirty-eight (33%) 
were sailing vessels, which undertook a quarter of the voyages, while 61 (53%) were 
screw steamers, and 16 (14%) paddle wheel steamers, which were utilized for 87 
(54.4%) and 32 (20%) of the voyages respectively (Table 9.2). 
Hall maintained a ledger recording the departure of hospital transports and those 
destined for England from April 1855 until mid-June 1856 are listed in Table 9.3. 
 
There are several reports in The Times of quarantine regulations being imposed at 
Corfu, Gibraltar and Malta, particularly with respect to cholera or smallpox, while more 
specifically, the need for allied transports and civilian trading vessels to obtain Turkish 
Bills of Health became the topic of a correspondence between the British consul at 
Smyrna, J.W. Brant, Stratford and Clarendon following the opening of the hospital at 
Smyrna. 
Brant thought that vessels involved in the war effort were exempted from 
quarantine and that it would be reasonable for other traders to be similarly privileged. 
However, it transpired that the Turkish authorities had not relaxed the regulations and 
Stratford considered there was no chance of the official policy being changed.
868
 
Clarendon responded to this robustly by stating that HM’s government was surprised 
that: 
 
the Turkish authorities are not only not disposed to relax […] quarantine as regards merchant 
vessels, but […] impose it against transports engaged in the service of the Sultan’s allies. The 
importance of avoiding the delays […] of quarantine systems, as regards vessels employed in 
the service of the Allied forces, is so evident, that […] that the Porte will […] see the 
necessity […] for the exemption of all transports from the quarantine regulations.869 
 
It has not been established if this matter was resolved but sympathy for the 
Turkish authorities should be entertained since many invalids arriving at Smyrna during 
the first four months suffered from infectious disease; with fevers, diarrhoea, and 
dysentery accounting for 689 (53%) of the 1,311 patients. 
 
Voyage to England 
Smith reminded Hall that all transports conveying sick to England should be inspected 
to ensure that ‘all the specifications for provisions, medical comforts, etc. should be 
                                                 
868  Brant to Stratford, 4 Oct. and Stratford to Clarendon, 2 Oct. 1855; FO/78/1090. 
869  Clarendon to Stratford, 16 Nov. 1855; FO/78/1068. 
 -335- 
exact.’870 Hall subsequently issued a Medical Department Order on the subject on 11 
December 1855.
871
 The Queen’s Regulations also required that vessels should be 
appropriately inspected before departure, although, in view of the many employed to 
transport invalids it is probable that the facilities on board were not always ideal. For 
example, Hall considered Libertas was ‘not well calculated for the purpose;’872, 873 and 
his misgivings were confirmed by Staff Surgeon Baxter who travelled on the ship.
874
 
Raglan sanctioned that the Emeu could transport ‘ineffective men to Malta’875 and, 
though Dr Tice reported that she was ‘too filthy’ to receive invalids while at 
Balaklava,
876
 she subsequently sailed from Scutari for England with c.400 invalids, 
together with ‘perhaps 100 women’, so relieving ‘the barracks and hospital very 
much.’877 
When Himalaya arrived at Portsmouth early in 1855 she was ‘not very cleanly 
[…] on the lower deck where the troops and the women and children were berthed 8-10 
horses were also stalled with the result the stench was almost sickening.’878 Smith 
complained officially only to be informed by the Admiralty, via the Military Secretary, 
that although fitted for horses she had been used for invalids at the urgent request of the 
military authorities in Malta.
879
 
Some months later the PMO, Portsmouth reported that when Lady Eglington 
arrived she appeared ‘short-handed and not very clean.’880  
 
Mapleton considered that the men’s health would ‘tend to improve on the voyage 
especially as they knew they are going home,’881 and this was indeed the case on 
                                                 
870  Smith to Hall, 30 Nov. 1855; PoL. 
871  RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3. 
872  Hall, Diary, 7 Oct. 1854; RAMC/397/PC1/6-8. Libertas arrived at Devonport on 24 Dec., where 
some invalids were disembarked, before sailing on to Chatham; HT&SC, 30 Dec. 1854. 
873  Libertas also conveyed naval invalids; Hall, Diary, 20 Oct. 1854; RAMC/397/PC/1/6-8. 
874  Smith to Military Secretary, 2 Jan. 1855 PoL. 
875  Hall to Smith, 2 Nov. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/855 and PoL. 
876  AoT to QMG, 3 Nov., with an annotation by Hall, 4 Nov. 1854; WO/28/196. 
877  Sillery to AG, 9 Nov.; WO/28/186 and PMO, Scutari to Smith, 14 Nov. 1854; PoL. A return in 
WO/25/1187 recorded that Emeu left Scutari 11 Nov. and disembarked 115 wounded 
convalescents and others at Malta on 17 Nov. 
878  The Times, 3 & 4 Jan. and HT&SC, 6 Jan. 1855. 
879  Smith to Military Secretary 8 Jan. and his reply of 24 Jan. 1855; PoL. 
880  PMO, Portsmouth to Smith, 17 May 1855; PoL. 
881  Report by Mapleton, 5 Feb. 1855; BPP (1857-58), No. 425. See also BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, 
p. 196-7. 
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Arabia, Croesus, Julia, Lord Raglan, Hydaspes, Alma, Orinoco, Niagara, and Robert 
Lowe,
882
 while some men on Great Britain, Great Tasmania, Arabia, and Niagara were 
fit enough to be granted furlough on arrival.
883
  
The manner in which the invalids were catered for on Orinoco and Sultana 
attracted praise,
884
 while Staff Surgeon Saunders reported that invalids on Arabia 
enjoyed ‘every possible comfort’ when on voyage from Malta.885 Letters of appreciation 
addressed to the MO and the master and crew on HMS Neptune, Orinoco, Sultana, 
Great Britain, Imperatriz, and Euxine were published,
886
 while other comments are 
summarized in Table 9.5. 
 
On occasions military priorities influenced the management of transports conveying 
invalids. Passengers on Ripon were disembarked at Malta as the vessel was required to 
transport French troops.
887
 Cambria then conveyed the invalids to Liverpool where 
some were retained in the parish hospital until convalescent.
888
 The remainder travelled 
to Strood by train via Coventry and London,
889
 despite Smith considering it preferable 
to send them to Chatham by sea as they would remain ‘lodged in comparative comfort, 
in a splendid roomy vessel [and] would be sheltered from […] the weather,’ rather than 
be transported overland by rail; a journey ‘too long for men in delicate health to sit in an 
erect posture’ and during which time they may have up to twelve ‘removals […] into 
and out of vehicles.’890 The Admiralty agreed with this suggestion but Horse Guards 
‘desired that the men might be landed at once,’ an instruction that was followed such 




                                                 
882  The Times, 5 & 8 Mar., 16 May, 5 & 21 July, 12, 15, & 29 Oct., & 12 Nov. 1855. 
883  The Times, 13 Aug., 3 & 13 Sep. & 2 Nov. 1855 
884  The Times, 12 & 28 Feb. 1855. 
885  MT&G, 15 Mar. 1856. 
886  The Times, 12 & 28 Feb. and 20 Aug. 1855; MT&G, 6 Oct. 1855; The Times, 14 May 1856. 
887  HT&SC, 13 Jan. 1855. Disembarkation return in WO/28/1187: Ripon left Scutari on 25 Dec. with 
132 NCOs and men who were wounded convalescents in whom bowel complaints were prevalent. 
Two died on the voyage and she arrived at Malta on 31 Dec. 1954. 
888  Disembarkation return inWO/25/1187: Cambria left Malta on 3 Jan. and arrived at Liverpool on 
15 Jan. with 139 invalids from 15 regiments together with 24 women and two children. There was 
one death. 
889  The Times, 20 Jan. 1855. 
890  Memorandum from Smith to Secretary at War, 20 Jan. 1855; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 29. 
891  The QMG informed Smith on 24 Jan. that Hardinge appreciated the ‘measures so handsomely 
adopted by the authorities in Liverpool’ but he was ‘desirous not to trench upon their hospitality 
longer the necessary;’ PoL. 
 -337- 
The weather and sea conditions also influenced the progress of vessels. Embarkation on 
Great Tasmania was delayed at Balaklava because of bad weather,
892
 and she made 
three unsuccessful attempts to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar.
893
 Gales or contrary 
winds slowed the progress of HMS Arethusa, Harbinger, HMS Malacca, which was 
unable to make headway with her steam, HMS Bellerophon, Dunbar, Golden Fleece, 
Germania, Hope, Alma, and Cape of Good Hope.
894
 The invalids on Talavera ‘suffered 
much’ during severe weather on the voyage before she became ‘wind bound’ in 
Plymouth Sound for some days; Ripon put into Coruna to the ‘great relief of the invalids 
[and] officers and crew who were much exhausted’; while disembarkation from HMS 
Arethusa and Thames was delayed due to the weather.
895
 Burmah ran into difficulties 
off the French coast near Granville when en route for Deptford only to be declared a 
wreck. The crew was saved but no mention was made of the passengers.
896
 A low tide 
delayed Candia’s progress from Southampton to Portsmouth,897 and the tide presumably 
affected other vessels from time to time, although, being a common occurance, this 
would rarely merit comment. 
 
Equipment failures and navigational errors caused delays on occasions. Newspaper 
reports noted the voyages of the Golden Fleece and Himalaya were prolonged due 
mechanical failure; the speed of Simla was reduced to six or seven knots when her 
screw broke about 100 miles from Ushant; both hawsers parted in a heavy gale when 
Thames was towing Columba about 30 miles off Cape Finisterre; Drawback (sic: 
Drobak) broke adrift from Severn off Cape Bon; Adelaide experienced ‘a heavy gale 
[…] the sick suffered severely […] and several temporary berths […] on the troop deck 
[…] were broken;’ and HMS Highflier had to return to Malta to repair the expansion 
valve.
898
 Perseverance ran aground on Isola Point after leaving Corradino, Malta with 
410 invalids. The ‘united power’ of Dragon, Magicienne, Shearwater, and Argo failed 
to extricate her and all men, together with cargo and ballast, had to be disembarked 
                                                 
892  AG to GOC Divisions, 14 Jan. 1856; WO/28/124. 
893  The Times, 1 Mar. 1856. 
894  The Times, 4 Jan., 8 Feb., 28 Mar., 2 & 11 Apr., 24 May, 6 June, 20 Sep., and 12 Oct. 1855. 
895  The Times, 7 & 12 Feb. 1855; The Times, 21 Jan. 1856; PMO, Chatham to Smith, 25 Feb. 
1855, PoL; PMO, Portsmouth to Smith, 6 July 1856; PoL. 
896  The Times, 5 & 12 Mar., Newcastle Courant 23 Mar., and Examiner 7 Apr. 1855. 
897  Daily News, 8 Jan. 1855. 
898  Morning Post, 20 July 1854 and The Times, 3 Jan, 14 May, 15 Sep. 1855; 3 July 1856; 18 
Apr. 1855, & 26 May 1856. 
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before she was refloated.
899
 Gibraltar, the last hospital ship to leave Balaklava, broke 
down in the Sea of Marmora and was towed to Gallipoli by Cumberland, and then to 




When evacuation of the Crimea became imminent instructions were reissued which 
required the inspection by an MO and an army and naval officer of vessels carrying 
troops or horses,
901
 and the whole operation was effected in a relatively short time and 
between 1 May and 1 August 1856 125 vessels disembarked 2,183 officers, 57,888 
men and 3,931 horses at Portsmouth (Table 9.4). These numbers are exclusive of those 
conveyed to Liverpool, Plymouth, Woolwich, and destinations overseas, but 
presumably included invalids who travelled with their regiments although no 
information on the point was published. 
The scale of this operation had implications for the hospitals at home and in this 
context the Invalid Depot at St Mary’s Barrack, Chatham was informed in early May 
1856 that 3,500 invalids were en route from the East, thus prompting preparations for 
their arrival, including the provision of 450 extra beds.
902
 
Severn left Balaklava on 12 June with 350 invalids while ‘Thames will embark 
234 more today.’903 Severn towed the Norwegian bark Drobak with invalids from 
Scutari,
904
 and following her arrival at Devonport some invalids were admitted to the 
military hospital while others were sent to their depots in Ireland, with the remainder 
being transferred to Britannia, located at Spithead from 4 July.
905
 The last hospital ship 
to leave Balaklava was Gibraltar (see above), the sick having been placed on board on 




                                                 
899  The Times, 29 July 1856. 
900  The Times and Caledonian Mercury, 18 & 19 Aug. 1856. 
901  QMG to the Commandant and AQMG, Balaklava, 14 Apr. 1856; WO/28/134. 
902  The Times, 3 May 1856. 
903  Hall to Smith, 5 July 1856; PoL. Severn also transported soldiers’ wives not allowed to embark 
with their husbands and a large proportion of the female nursing establishment. 
904  Several men with ophthalmia joined Drobek at Gibraltar on 10 July 1856; WO/284/72. 
905  PMO, Devonport to Smith, 3 July; PoL and The Times, 5 July; HT&SC, 5 July, in which vessel 
is named Drawback; & IoWO, 12 July 1856. 
906  PMO, Balaklava to Smith; 11 July 1856; PoL 
 -339- 
Arrival in England 
In January 1855 instructions were issued requiring a return of invalids admitted to 
hospital, or otherwise disposed of, being sent to the Invalid Depot at Chatham,
907
 while 
from February 1855 ships touched at Plymouth to ascertain what accommodation was 
available at Chatham and elsewhere, and to disembark patients if it was insufficient.
908
 
Officers in charge of invalids were required to report to the AQMG on arrival, and 




The date and port of arrival of vessels conveying invalids from the East are listed 
in Appendix 9.1. Himalaya was the first steamer to arrive in Portsmouth with ‘wounded 
and invalided officers from both services [and] men […] from 42 different regiments 
[and with others] a total of 845 souls.’ She had been ordered from Malta by Admiral 
Stewart when seemingly unfit for sea and mechanical failures prolonged her voyage, 
while bad weather ‘caused a great deal of discomfort to the invalids’ although 
‘everything that could be done to make them as comfortable as the circumstances would 
admit.’ Some invalids were brought ashore aboard a tug while disembarkation was 
delayed owing to a want of ‘organization’ due to the presence of ‘small officials’ but no 
‘head’. There were no ambulances, or men at hand to assist those who ‘were wholly or 
partially footless, legless, armless, or eye-less’, although the severely wounded were 
subsequently carried to hospital in Portsea on stretchers or went by omnibus, while 
those in a fit state were sent to Chatham by rail. A further problem was the ransacking 
of luggage ‘on the open jetty, before a single officer or man was allowed to leave for 
home or hospital.’ This ‘disgraceful exhibition’ was ‘as painful to the few Custom 
house officers […] compelled to perform the duty as it was to a bystander to witness.’910 
Smith requested the PMO, Portsmouth for a full account of events in order to 
‘exonerate’ the MOs from blame,911 and fortunately procedures had improved by the 
time Candia arrived a week later. The ‘unprotected gang board […] to the jetty’ was 
replaced by ‘well-stepped and substantial double-railed landing stages’ made ‘quite 
                                                 
907  Simpson, AAG, to GOC, Portsmouth, 26 Jan. 1855; WO/3/117. 
908  See PoL, I, pp. 371, 380, & 393. 
909  Circular issued by the AG, 15 Oct. 1855; WO/123/151, WO/28/193 and reproduced in The 
Times, 1 Nov. 1855. 
910  The Times, 4-6 Jan. 1855 and HT&SC, 6 Jan. 1855. 
911  Smith to PMO, Portsmouth, 9 Jan. 1855; PoL. 
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secure’ by carpenters,912 while the regulations requiring ‘rigid examination’ of baggage 
by customs officials, and which had resulted in ‘great dissatisfaction’, were relaxed to 
cover only ‘doubtful cases’.913 
When Hardinge heard of these events the GOC at Portsmouth was informed that 
the Purveyor should supply ‘such articles as are considered essential for the comfort and 
cleanliness’ of the ‘gallant soldiers’; and expenditure that this incurred was 
subsequently approved by the Deputy Secretary.
914
 
When HMS Retribution docked on 24 January 1855 ‘Admiral Cochrane 
himself was present on the jetty’ and ‘nothing could exceed the careful attention 
paid to the landing of the stretcher cases, the more urgent of whom were taken to the 
garrison hospital and the rest to a new auxiliary hospital […] established near the 
Milldam. Some ‘cases walked ashore’ while others were ‘helped by blue jackets to a 
waiting omnibus.’915 Similarly, the report of the arrival of Mauritius noted that ‘since 
the first unfortunate cargo (of the Himalaya)’ the sick have ‘received a progressive 
amount of attention and consideration from all the government authorities.’916 
Several subsequent reports also contained additional comments and these are 
summarized in Table 9.6, while for a depiction of the arrival of invalids see Figure 
9.1. 
 
Himalaya hoisted a yellow (Q) flag on arrival at Spithead indicating illness on board, 
although she soon obtained pratique,
917
 while the troopship Conrad was quarantined in 
Plymouth Sound, because of ‘an informality about her bill of health,’ as was HMS 
Cressy on arrival at Spithead from the Baltic, although no reason was recorded.
918
 On 







 and HMS Firebrand
922
 arrived with cases of cholera on 
board. 
                                                 
912  The Times, 9 Jan. 1855. 
913  The Times, 20 Jan. 1855. 
914  Wetherall to General Smith, 25 Jan. 1855; WO/3/117. 
915  Hoad & Patterson (1973) and The Times, 26 Jan. 1855. 
916  The Times, 5 Feb. 1855. 
917  A licence to enter port. 
918  The Times, 18 Sep. 1854 & 28 July 1856. 
919  The Times, 13 June 1855 
920  Military Secretary to Smith, 17 July and Staff Surgeon Teevan to Smith, 19 July 1855; PoL. 
921  PMO, Portsmouth, to Smith, 11 Sep.; PoL and The Times, 15 Sep. 1855 
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In some cases tugs or tenders landed the sick when disembarkation was delayed, 
although this was not without risk or discomfort. For example, ‘one Guardsman died of 
exposure while being transferred in a open boat [from Libertas] to the hospital in Stoke 
during inclement weather; a tragedy that would have been avoided if arrangements hade 
been made for disembarkation at Plymouth,
923
 while invalids landed in Sprightly from 




Sprightly also assisted disembarkation from Himalaya as did Pygmy from HMS 
Neptune, an unnamed tug from Victoria, Comet from Camperdown and Lancashire, and 
Echo from Gibraltar.
925
 Similarly, Confeance landed invalids from War Cloud at 
Devonport while a few who had ‘lost their passage on Australian’ at Gibraltar were 






Examples of kindness shown to the invalids were acknowledged by the press (Table 
9.7), although on one occasion this was considered excessive and banned by the military 
authorities, except under the direction of the MO.
928
 Incidentally, the plight of the troops 
at the front resulted in a number of important organized charitable initiatives; see 
Appendix 9.2 for a brief summary. 
 
The transports chartered by the government were manned by civilians not subjected to 
martial law and there were reports of mutinous behaviour on arrival, seemingly on 
account of disagreements of over conditions of employment (Table 9.8). An officer in 
the 39
th
 Regiment, who arrived in Cork with invalids from Malta, was arrested by the 
QMG for a ‘breach in military discipline’. He absconded and has ‘not been heard of 
since.’929 
 
                                                                                                                                               
922  Admiralty to Smith, 17 July 1855; PoL. 
923  The Times, 27 Dec. 1854. 
924  IoWO, 17 Feb. 1855. 
925  The Times, 12 Feb, 2 & 9 May, 20 Aug. 1855, and 26 May & 16 July 1856. 
926  HT&SC, 3 Mar. and The Times, 5 & 6 June 1855. 
927  A General Order issued in Gibraltar on 25 May named two serjeants, one corporal and five 
privates assigned to the 66th Regiment until their passage home was arranged; WO/284/71. 
928  MT&G, 14 Apr. 1855. 
929  Daily News, 16 July 1856, reporting a Cork newspaper item. 
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Transportation from the port to other destinations 
 
The arrival of large numbers of incapacitated invalids posed logistical problems as 
bearers would be required for stretcher cases and wheeled transport for longer 
journeys.
930
 Smith considered that properly fitted wagons were preferable to 
omnibuses,
931
 if they could be ‘hired and rendered available at one hour’s notice, 932 
and, although he voiced no objection to omnibuses if men could be moved ‘quickly and 
with without risk of injury,’933 there was one adverse report of their use for ‘those 
wounded in the legs, or suffering from diarrhoea.’934  





 with the others being sent to several destinations following 
disembarkation. For example, of 109 patients arriving in March 1856 seventeen were 
admitted to hospital, 44 were ordered to Chatham or Chichester, and 37 to their 
depots,
937
 while, of those landing in the next month 40 remained in hospital in 
Portsmouth, with the remainder going to Chichester (38) Chatham (37), depots (20), 
London (15), and Woolwich (14).
938
 
There are reports that the men received a hearty breakfast before departure for 
Chatham and were given cooked rations for the journey,
939
 although there were ‘grave 
medical objections in sending patients [to Chatham] by rail during winter’940 as they 
‘suffered much discomfort from the cold and the state of their wounds deteriorated 
thereby’,941 particularly ‘unhealed stumps and gun shot wounds.’942 A partial solution 
was to issue each man with ‘two blankets or rugs to wrap round their legs as they 
                                                 
930  Deputy Secretary to Smith, 5 May 1955; PoL. 
931  Smith to Deputy Secretary, 5 May 1855; PoL. 
932  Smith to Military Secretary, 11 Jan. 1855; PoL. 
933  Smith to Surgeon Gibb, 6 June 1856; PoL. 
934  MT&G, 6 Oct. 1855, p. 356. 
935  Smith to Military Secretary and PMO, Portsmouth, 21 & 30 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
936  For example, 50-60 of 200 on HMS Neptune and 33 of 242 on Arabia required ‘immediate care;’ 
PMO, Portsmouth, 8 Mar. & 4 Apr. 1855, PoL. 
937  PMO, Portsmouth to Smith, 30 Mar. 1856; PoL. 
938  PMO, Portsmouth to Smith, 18 Apr. 1856; PoL. 
939  For example, men from Mauritius, Neptune, Orinoco, Sultana, and Arabia; The Times, 5, 12 & 28 
Feb. & 6 Mar. 1855. 
940  Smith to Military Secretary, 16 Feb. 1855; PoL. Incidently, Smith proffered similar advice to the 
PMO, Portsmouth on 14 Jan. 1856; PoL. The journey necessitated a journey via London and then 
by road from Strood to Chatham as the line did not then cross the Medway. 
941  PMO, Fort Pitt, to Smith, 13 Feb. 1855; PoL. 
942  PMO, Fort Pitt, to Smith, 21 Dec. 1855; PoL. 
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acquire no advantage from their great coats.’943 This advice was not always heeded, 
however, as invalids were moved to other locations without blankets,
944
 and Smith 
found it necessary to reiterate that ‘cases of phthisis and bowel complaint’ should not be 
moved to Chatham ‘unless the journey can be made without inconvenience or 
suffering.,’ although he was anxious men who were fit enough for discharge should be 
sent to Chatham for disposal.
945
 
Some patients that landed at Plymouth travelled to Chatham by train and on one 
occasion at least Hardinge requested the Mayor of Bath during March 1855 if the town 
could accommodate 136 wounded men overnight as it was a two day journey. This was 
achieved by housing them in the United Hospital, General Hospital and Guildhall 
Banqueting Room, while eight women and fifteen children travelling with them stayed 
in the Council Chamber. A collection was made locally and each man was given half a 
guinea with the balance defraying the cost of the Crimean Memorial in Bath Abbey 




Hospital facilities in England 
 
Several hospitals in England treated invalids from the East but unlike the nine general 
hospitals in the Crimea and Turkey no details about their performance were included in 
the M&SH, although general tables giving the reasons for repatriation and the causes of 
death were published (see below).
947
 
Many of the barracks in 46 towns in England and Wales had hospitals,
948
 and, 
although several were located near a major port, it was only those at Chatham, 
Devonport, and Portsmouth that were used on a regular basis, while those at Dover and 
Walmer were not utilized as the Admiralty considered it ‘inexpedient to land invalids 
eastwards of Portsmouth.’949 Not surprisingly Smith enquired of the Military Secretary 
how it was proposed to supply further accommodation, as, if ‘the influx may be so 
great’, the hospitals at Chatham, Plymouth and Portsmouth would prove inadequate,950 
                                                 
943  Smith to Undersecretary, 15 Nov. 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 78. 
944  PMO, Portsmouth to Smith, 21 Jan. 1856; PoL. 
945  Smith to PMOs at Portsmouth and Chichester, 23 Aug. 1856; PoL. 
946  Hanna (2000). 
947  M&SH, II, pp. 229-30 & 290. 
948  BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, pp. 440-1. 
949  QMG to Smith, 1 Mar. 1855; PoL. 
950  Smith to Military Secretary, 31 Oct. 1855; PoL. 
 -344- 
and at the same time suggested that the Admiralty be asked to assist with the provision 
of accommodation at Haslar and Chatham if required.
951
 In addition to developments at 
Chatham additional rooms were fitted up in Plymouth and Portsmouth for 226 and 80 
respectively, with those at Portsmouth being ready at ‘an hours notice.’952 Further 
developments at Plymouth and Portsmouth, the modification of barracks at Chichester 
and the adaptation of two naval ships for hospital use eventually resulted in there being 
1,300 beds available in all locations by the end of July 1855.
953
 
The barracks at Deptford and Woolwich, and the Liverpool area were considered 
for possible use,
954, 955
 but nothing came of these initiatives, although invalids from the 
RA and RS&M were sent to the Ordnance Hospital at Woolwich. 
 
Chatham 
Fort Pitt was built as a defensive stronghold on the high ground over looking Chatham 
and the Medway. The original barracks had been converted into hospital wards, offices, 
etc
956
 and was the only general hospital used for invalids returning from overseas, 
though there was accommodation for only 170 invalids at the end of October 1854.
957
 
Resources at Chatham were increased by utilizing the Brompton (from February 1855) 
and St Mary’s Barracks for accommodating invalides, and building new hospital 
accommodation behind Fort Pitt.
958
 
Newspaper reports confirmed the pressure on space, particularly at Fort Pitt, and 
on occasions this could be exacerbated by the arrival of invalids from other places,
959
 
although the situation was ameliorated somewhat when a lunatic asylum opened at Fort 
Pitt in the spring of 1856.
960
 
                                                 
951  The Melville hospital at Chatham served the Royal Navy. The muster book for 1854 is 
ADM/102157. 
952  Smith to PMO Portsmouth and Military Secretary, 24 & 31 Oct. 1854; PoL. 
953  Smith to Undersecretary, 28 July 1855; PoL. 
954  Smith to Military Secretary, 16 Jan. 1855; PoL. 
955  Military Undersecretary to Smith, 7 Mar. 1855; PoL. 
956  Miles (2009), p. 85 
957  PMO, Chatham to Smith, 25 Oct. 1854; PoL. 
958  The Times, 22 Mar. 1855 
959  The Times, 17 July 1855. 
960  The Times, 16 Nov. 1855 and 18 Jan., 5 & 25 Mar. & 17 May 1856. 
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Palmerston subsequently informed MPs that arrangements would be made to treat 
invalids ‘in proper and suitable hospitals’961 but despite this assurance the facilities at 
Chatham were generally considered both inadequate and antiquated, and this occasioned 
the publication of a number of critical comments. For example, the barracks at St 
Mary’s, housing men awaiting discharge, was considered a ‘dungeon’ by a ‘medical 
officer’,962 while the Garrison Hospital was still regarded as inadequate in 1856 and Fort 
Pitt had to be used to accommodate the sick.
963
 The generally unsatisfactory state of the 
facilities was confirmed by the reminiscences of DIGH Dartnell who noted that: 
 
The Queen and party walked across to see the Casemate Barracks […] She went into one or 
two of the upper rooms and was quite horrified at them. ‘Are these really the barrack rooms 
of these invalids?’ she said to me: I said, ‘Yes indeed they are your Majesty’ and Prince 
Albert, looking over towards the splendid Convict Prison recently built [completed 1850] 
said ‘Well it seems very extraordinary that there should be no difficulty in obtaining money 
to erect a magnificent building like this for convicts, and that it should be impossible to find 
the means of building a commonly comfortable Barrack for convalescent soldiers.’964 
 
An outbreak of erysipelas resulted in the postponement of the Queen’s third visit 
(see below) and this prompted the editor of the MT&G to state his views in no uncertain 
terms: 
 
We hope that this measure [to build a new military hospital at Netley] is taken in order to 
supersede the necessity of retaining the present Military Hospital at Fort Pitt, an 
establishment which […] is a disgrace to a great nation. Originally intended only for 
barracks, this building is wholly unsuited for the reception of sick and wounded troops, its 
wards are low, close, and ill-ventilated; the beds, owing to deficiency of space, are too close 




The first patients from the East were admitted on 4 January 1855. A few vessels sailed 
direct to the Thames (Table 9.9) while the majority of invalids travelled by train from 
Portsmouth via London to Strood were they were assisted by a fatigue party to waiting 
ambulances, spring vans, or omnibuses for the journey across the Medway to Chatham. 
Following a medical examination, the men were sent to either the supplemental hospital 
at Brompton Barracks for further treatment, the Casemate Barracks, the invalid depot at 
St Mary’s Barracks, to await discharge, or, if deemed insane, to Fort Pitt.966 
                                                 
961  The Times, 20 Feb. 1855. 
962  The Times, 11 Aug. 1855. 
963  The Times, 18 Jan. 1856. 
964  JRAMC (1904), III, p. 92. 
965  MT&G, 9 Feb. 1856. 
966  The Times, 20 Jan, 28 July, 11 & 27 Aug., 3, 8, 10 & 13 Sep., 2 Nov., 22 & 25 Dec. 1855, & 3 
Mar. 1856. 
 -346- 
In all 15,707 invalids were received during the 27 months up to March 1857 and 
of these 9,899 (63%) were discharged, 5,054 (32.3%) returned to duty, 283 (1.8%) died, 
23 (0.15%) deserted, and 14 (<0.1%) transferred. Of those discharged 2695 (27.2%) 
were unfit as a result of disease, wound, or injury while the remainder were discharged 
‘on reduction’ as merely ‘undesirable to retain.’967 
 
It was reported that on arrival at Chatham the patients were given gratis from the 
government two shirts, two pairs of socks, two towels, one belt, one pair of boots, two 
brushes, one pot of blacking, one kerchief, one shell jacket, one pair of trousers, one 
forage cap, one knife, fork, and spoon. Two flannel guernseys and two pairs of flannel 




MOs were given authority to requisition for clothing if it was ‘absolutely 
necessary [for] the securing [an invalid’s] health and comfort whilst under treatment or 
when about to leave hospital.’969 The general appearance of convalescents can be 
judged from an engraving of the reading room at St Mary’s,970 while a group 
photograph of patients at the Brompton Barracks in hospital denim coats was 
reproduced in the ILN. A diagram based on the photograph identifying several of the 
men by Dartnell is preserved in the Royal Archives at Windsor.
971
 
Smith informed the Deputy Secretary on 28 February 1855 that he had no 
objection to tobacco being issued to invalids if regulated by the MOs. The Secretary of 
War sanctioned its issue ‘when considered desirable by the MO, to the extent of 2 oz 
per week per patient’ on 19 April and the PMO, Chatham instructed staff surgeons to 
record its issue in the diet rolls.
972
 
The library at St Mary’s has been referred to while a coffee shop was established 
there early in 1856 although at the time offices in the Invalid Depot were found too 




                                                 
967  M&SH, II, pp. 237-8. 
968  An Assistant Surgeon, Fort Pitt, 19 May; The Times, 22 May 1855. 
969  PoL and Fort Pitt General Orders Book, 31 Jan. 1855. 
970  ILN, 8 Mar. 1856. 
971  Fisher (2013a). 
972  Fort Pitt General Orders Book, 24 Apr. 1855. 
973  The Times, 7 Jan. 1856 
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Distribution of medals: Fourteen men at the Invalid Depot were presented with the 




Women and children: A large number of women and children were sent home 
during the course of war and some were transferred to Chatham where there was a 
Female Hospital in Fort Pitt with a MO in charge. 
Incidentally, a War Office Memorandum issued before the war set out the 
expenses which legally married women and legitimate children aged 14 or less could 
claim when returning home.
975
 They would be transported by steam vessel or railway, if 
available, and when walking the women and children would receive 1½d and 1d a mile, 
plus 2d and 1d subsistence for every eight miles travelled. An allowance was also paid 
if they were delayed waiting at port for transportation. 
 
Brompton Barracks: A supplementary hospital at the barracks was in operation from 
the beginning of 1855. In 1856 a Board recommended that buildings constructed as a 
temporary hospital in 1855 should be used for the sick of the garrison with a part being 





Medical Staff Corps: The MSC was embodied by an Order in Council on 30 June 
1855 and confirmed by a Royal Warrant on 20 September 1855. The headquarters were 
at Chatham and literate men aged 25 to 35 were recruited so they could execute orders 
from MOs. The staffing of the hospitals at Chatham is summarized in Table 9.10, while 
drafts of men were sent out to the East on several occasions before the depot was broken 





Portsmouth was the principal port where invalids were landed and the numbers that 
arrived during the first two months of 1855 are given in Table 9.11. The sick and 
                                                 
974  ILN, 10 Nov. 1855. 
975  Memorandum No. 1155, 12 Mar. 1855; WO/123/181. (1d was worth approximately 31p at 
today’s prices.) 
976  The Times, 21 Jan. and 26 Mar. 1856. 
977  The MSC was subsequently replaced by the Army Hospital Corps authorized by a Royal Warrant 
on 1 Aug. 1857. 
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wounded were doing well in the new Garrison Hospital in February 1855 while ‘state of 
the patients [there was] highly satisfactory’ in February 1856, though there is great 
room for improvement in the details of supervision and the system of dieting the 
patients.
978
 The hospital in Portsea was located close to the docks in the Milldam 
Barracks
979
 and the following summer the PMO reported that there was ‘a most 
poisonous miasma still emanating from the rampart ditch and milldam pond’ and it was 
‘a great pity these reservoirs cannot be entirely filled up, they are frightful sources of 
malignant disease.’980 
Inevitably Smith was concerned about the possibility of large numbers of invalids 
arriving within a short time and he recommended that only the seriously ill should be 
hospitalized at Portsmouth, while in November 1855 he requested additional 




No detailed medical records have survived but Dr Leitch reported that ‘scorbutic 
taint’ was a complicating factor in the illnesses of many patients and that most of the 21 
deaths among 34 men with phthisis pulmonaris were associated with a ‘bowel complaint 
of a dysenteric character.’982 
 
The Clarence Barracks provided temporary accommodation for invalids from Neptune, 
Croesus, Indiana, and Niagara,
983
 and possibly City of Norwich, Golden Fleece, 
Australian, Rockliffe, Hydaspes, Melbourne, and Hansa when the name of the barrack 
utilized was not recorded.
984
 Clarence Barracks also housed troops in transit; such as the 
Royal Wiltshire Militia. Commanded by Lord Methuen, they assisted with 
disembarkation of invalids from Himalaya, Avon, and Neptune, and also offered succour 
for women and children brought home in Himalaya before they departed for Ireland 
aboard the Duke of Cornwall.
985
 
                                                 
978  MT&G, 3 Mar. 1855 and The Times, 21 Feb. 1856. 
979  A ward in the hospital is illustrated in ILN, 10 Feb. 1855. The buildings form part of the 
University of Portsmouth while Milldam House is now the Registry Office. 
980  AG to Smith, 12 June 1855; PoL. 
981  Smith to QMG, 6 Nov. 1855; PoL. 
982  M&SH, II, p. 229. 
983  The Times, 12 Feb., 8 Mar., 3 Oct., & 2 Nov. 1855. 
984  The Times, 24 May, 2 & 6 Jun, & 23, 27 & 30 July 1855. 
985  The Times, 4, 12, 13 Jan. & 12 Feb., and Daily News, 13 Jan. 1855 
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Women and children were housed in the Camber Hospital temporarily after 
disembarking from Mauritius, as were the patients from Arabia in March 1855.
986
 Early 
in 1856 militia invalids were moved there from the Garrison Hospital so that it could be 
reserved only for regulars.
987
 
Invalids from HMS Transit were removed in omnibuses provided by Mr Nance, 
the government contractor, to quarters in the Foreshore barracks.
988
 The barracks were 




London and Woolwich 
Men in the Guards arriving on Mauritius, Talavera, Cornwall, and Arabia were sent by 
train to London,
990
 while those in the RA or RS&M on Mauritius, Tynemouth, 
Canterbury, Arabia and other vessels went into barracks in Portsmouth or Woolwich, 
rather than Chatham.
991
 By the end of June 1855 the accommodation at the Ordnance 






The possibility of appropriating barracks at Chichester for hospital use was discussed 
during February 1855.
993
 Panmure authorized vacating the buildings in early April and 
Hardinge subsequently approved arrangements for sending invalids there from 
Portsmouth.
994
 The barracks were in a healthy location and provided accommodation for 
150 convalescents with a hospital for 60 sick and a canteen building that could be used 
as a surgical hospital.
995
 Smith was anxious to transfer men there as soon as practicable 
in order to release space at Portsmouth,
996
 and early in May 1855 invalids from 
                                                 
986  The Times, 5 Feb. & 7 Mar. 1855. 
987  The Times, 8 Feb. 1856. 
988  The Times, 20 Oct. 1855. 
989  The Times, 3 Dec. 1855. 
990  The Times, 5 & 12 Feb., 10 May, & 13 Sep. 1855. 
991  The Times, 5 Feb., 7 & 14 May, 13 Sep. 1855, and 22 Jan. 1856. 
992  HT&SC, 30 June 1855. 
993  A water colour sketch indicated that the barracks comprised a double row of buildings with a grass 
parade ground in front; NAM-1992-05-41. 
994  Military Secretary to Smith, 9 & 24 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
995  Dr Forrest to Smith, 15 & 27 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
996  Smith to QMG, 25 Apr., and the reply from the Military Secretary, 3 May 1855; PoL and The 
Times, 14 May 1855. 
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Chapman and Canterbury were transported there from Portsmouth by train. The report 
continued by stating that ‘nothing had been spared to render the barracks in every 
respect fit for the important purpose of a hospital.’997, 998 A draft of the MSC 60-strong 
joined the hospital from Chatham in May 1856.
999
 
As at Portsmouth no medical records have been preserved though it was reported 
that invalids in a ‘very bad state’ were admitted as late as 6 December 1855.1000 
‘Scorbutic taint’ was a common complication of other diseases, a fact that was 
confirmed by the beneficial effect of a ‘generous diet with a liberal share of fresh 
succulent vegetables, and the use of malt liquor and wine.’ A ‘dietetic regimen, 




The hospital was still in use towards the end of 1856 as a medical staff attendant 
was punished by flogging and imprisonment for stealing the money (17s) of an invalid 





The hospital at Stoke was on the north side of Stonehouse Creek was completed in 1797 
and had accommodation for 300-400 patients.
1003
 However, on 25 April 1856 Smith 
was informed that there was accommodation for 183 at Devonport, but this could be 
increased by 160 with three additional MOs.
1004
 Panmure subsequently approved the 
proposal to occupy the vacant accommodation and Storks was requested to order the 
next four vessels to touch there on their voyage to England.
1005 
 
                                                 
997  HT&SC, 19 May 1855 
998  The Purveyor’s opening stock comprised: port wine, 400 dozen; brandy, 50 dozen; stout, 200 
dozen; vinegar, 18 gallons; Scotch barley 5,000 lb; sugar, 6,000 lb; tea, arrowroot, and oatmeal, 
1,000 lb each; rice, 10 cwt; flesh, washing, and soft soap, 5 cwt each; sago, 500 lb; HT&SC, 14 
Apr. 1855. 
999  The Times, 14 May 1856. 
1000  HT&SC, 8 Dec. 1855. 
1001  M&SH, II, pp. 227-8. 
1002  Daily News, 6 Nov. 1856. 
1003  MT&G, 11 Nov. 1854 and Smith and QMG, 24 July 1855; PoL. 
1004  PMO, Devonport to Smith, 25 Apr. 1856; PoL. 
1005  Undersecretary to Smith, 30 Apr. 1856; PoL. 
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Naval facilities 
Vessels: Smith was informed in early April 1855 that HMS Britannia and Caledonia 
were to be appropriated as hospital ships in Portsmouth and Plymouth respectively.
1006
 
Britannia was ready by mid-July
1007
 and provided accommodation for 350 
convalescents and a hospital for 50.
1008
 Smith considered it would be undesirable to use 
her for invalids during winter if she was ‘exposed to every wind that blows’1009 and so 




Smith requested an inspection of Caledonia during April 1855
1011
 and by mid-




 He was against augmenting the 
number of hospitals and asked for her to be moved to Portsmouth so that she and 
Britannia could accommodate convalescents not requiring hospitalization before being 
dispersed.
1014
 After the war Caledonia was towed to Greenwich where she replaced 




Hospitals: Major General Breton was against moving severely wounded men to 
Chichester and suggested they should go to Haslar instead.
1016
 Early in May 1855 Smith 
was informed that 100 beds could be made available there
1017
 and he subsequently 
directed that when there were 10 beds or fewer at Portsea, and transportation to 
                                                 
1006  Military Secretary to Smith, 4 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
1007  Smith to Adjutant General, 13 July 1855; PoL. 
1008  PMO, Portsmouth to Smith, 9 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
1009  Smith to QMG, 9 Feb. 1855; PoL and 9 Nov. 1855; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 73. 
1010  Dr Odell to Smith, 10 June 1855; PoL. 
1011  Smith to PMO, Liverpool, 9 Apr. 1855; PoL. 
1012  PMO, Devonport, 16 July 1855; PoL. 
1013  The items required to equip Caledonia included bedsteads (350), blankets (700), cases, bed, hair 
(350), cases, bolster, hair (35), slip cases, bolster (400), slip cases, pillow (400), covers, waterproof 
(100), pillows, feather (350), rugs (350), sheets (1,200), spare sackings, bed (100), spare cords, bed 
(100), towels (200), caps (450), gowns (450), trowsers (450), waistcoats (450), slippers, pairs 
(450), baths, shower (400), baths, slipper (2), close stools (20), urinals (20), crutches, pairs (100), 
plus some domestic equipment; PMO, Devonport, to Smith, 16 July 1855; PoL, II, Appendix 2. 
1014  Smith to QMG, 24 July 1855; PoL. Incidentally, it would appear that Britannia was used for this 
purpose as 200 men of the 39th Regiment arriving on 21 June 1856 were transferred to her before 
being sent to Limerick; ILN, 28 June 1956. 
1015  The Times, 19 July 1856. 
1016  QMG to Smith, 19 Apr. 1855; PoL. The Haslar Hospital was opened on 1753 and could 
accommodate 1,800 patients; see Tait (1906). 
1017  Military Secretary to Smith, 3 May 1855; PoL. 
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Chichester was not an option, patients should be sent to Haslar together with an MO,
1018
 
as the Admiralty favoured army surgeons caring for the soldiers.
1019
 
Smith had been unwilling to utilize hospitals at Deal and Yarmouth as they were 
well placed for invalids from the Baltic Fleet, and in case of emergency it might have 
proved difficult to relocate sick soldiers in safety.
1020
 However, in 1856 a formal request 
was made to the Admiralty to ‘appropriate’ 700 beds for invalids returning from the 
East and these were made available at Plymouth (150), Deal (200) and Yarmouth 
(350),
1021
 where ‘the men will be provided with everything necessary for their care and 
comfort,’1022 while Smith agreed to use Deal during the final evacuation of the Crimea 





Suggestions were made for accommodating invalids at the Sussex Country Hospital, 
Brighton,
1024





London Fever Hospital, ‘apart from the fever wards,’1027 and on 26 February 1855 the 
Undersecretary informed the House of Commons that the government would avail 
themselves of offers from London and other hospitals should they have occasion to do 
so, although at the time there was accommodation for 1,600 in military hospitals.
1028
 
Offers were also made privately for civilian hospitals in England to be used but these 




                                                 
1018  Smith to PMO, Portsmouth, 4 May 1855; PoL. 
1019  Smith to Military Secretary, 7 Mar. with the response on 12 Mar. 1855; PoL. Incidentally, a 
picture of an amputee in the Haslar hospital was published in the ILN, 3 Feb. 1855. 
1020  Smith to Military Secretary, 16 Feb. 1855; PoL. Cantlie stated that the naval hospitals at 
Plymouth, Deal, and Yarmouth were used but he gave no reference; Cantlie (1974), II, p. 184. 
1021  Undersecretary to Smith, 14 & 19 Apr. 1856; PoL,. 
1022  DG, Naval Medical Department, to Smith, 22 Apr. 1856; PoL. 
1023  Smith to QMG, 6 June 1856; PoL. 
1024  Military Undersecretary to Smith, 14 Dec. 1854; PoL. 
1025  Letter from the Revd J. Hodgson of Peter’s, Margate, 10 Feb. 1855; PoL. 
1026  Letter from H.L. Smith; AMJ, 23 Feb, and 9 Mar. 1855. 
1027  The Times, 1 Feb. 1855. 
1028  The number of vacant beds averaged 834 during that week in the hospitals in Portsmouth, 
Plymouth, Chatham and Chichester; PoL, II, Appendix 45. 
1029  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 136. 
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Following the arrival of invalids at Liverpool on Cambria the Hon. Lady Cust 
informed Smith that 200 beds were available in the Emigrants’ Home in the city.1030 
Smith ordered its inspection but it proved too small and too low to be a hospital.
1031
 
Land suitable for a new hospital was identified although this initiative was not pursued. 
Enmore Castle, Bridgwater was suggested for convalescent officers
1032
 while 
Appuldercombe House on the Isle of Wight was surveyed as a potential hospital for 
naval and army invalids,
1033
 but neither was apparently used. 
 
Royal visits to military hospitals 
In January 1855 Queen Victoria wrote that she felt ‘much interested in [the invalids] 
comfort and welfare’1034 and her visits to Chatham on 3 March,1035 19 June, 28 
November 1855, and 16 April 1856 were reported in The Times,
1036
 illustrated in Pen 
and Pencil and Illustrated Times (Figures 9.2 and 9.3), while the PMO, G.R. Dartnell, 
subsequently published an account of the visits.
1037
 A General Order for Fort Pitt was 
published day after the visit on 3 March: 
 
The PMO has much pleasure in communicating […] the expression of Her Majesty’s ‘high 
satisfaction at the interesting scenes she witnessed yesterday, at the general healthy 
appearance of the wounded men, and the cleanliness, regularity and good ventilation of the 
wards of both hospitals.’ 
 
The PMO begs […] to return his thanks to the staff surgeons in charge of Divisions of the 
General Hospital, Staff Surgeon Reade in charge of the Brompton Hospital, and the officers 
of both establishments for their excellent arrangements, and for the aid they afforded him in 
preparing for the reception of Her Most Gracious Majesty. 
 
Prior to the Queen’s second visit a General Order of 19 June restricted the 
movement of personnel within the hospital and prevented strangers from entering the 
premises. The wounded men in the upper wards of the General Hospital and Casemates 
will be: 
                                                 
1030  Lady Cust to Smith, 1 Feb. 1855; PoL. 
1031  Dr Robertson to Smith, 10 & 15 Mar. 1855; PoL. 
1032  Military Undersecretary to Smith, 15 May 1855; PoL. 
1033  IoWO, The Lancet, and MT&G, 23 June 1855. 
1034  Smith to PMO, Fort Pitt, 27 Jan. 1855; Fort Pitt General Orders Book. 
1035  The visit is depicted in a painting by Jerry Barrett in the National Portrait Gallery, with a 
companion picture of Florence Nightingale receiving patients at Scutari. The Queen travelled to 
Strood by train and visited Fort Pitt and Brompton Barracks, but not the Garrison and Melville 
hospitals; ILN, 10 Mar. 1855. 
1036  The Times, 3 & 6 Mar., 20 June, 28 & 29 Nov. 1855, and 17 Apr. 1856. 
1037  JRAMC, III (1904), pp. 88-92 & 191-6 and reproduced in TWC, XV: iii (1997) and XV: iv, & 
XV1: i (1998). 
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transferred to one of the surgical wards and all the medical convalescents will be paraded 
[…] the Crimean men being on the right and the other (sic) on the left. Every man […] is to 
be furnished with a board, which he will hold in his hand, and on which will legibly written 
his name and regiment, wound, etc.’ 
 
Onward journeys from hospital 
 
A General Order issued at Fort Pitt of 22 March 1855 confirmed the policy of 
discharging men from hospital on Tuesday and Thursday, and several reports in The 
Times during the first eight months of 1856 record that some men returned to their 
depots while others were sent home with a daily pension of 6d to 2/6d together with 
clothing issued from the Crimean Fund in cases of need. 
Several pensioners in the AC returning to Woolwich were sufficiently strong to 
proceed to their respective local districts by rail although the Quartermaster Sergeant of 
the Woolwich Pensioner Corps went with them to London, to see them ‘safe on the train 
going nearest their destination.’1038 Similarly, NCOs from the depots in Chatham were 
selected to accompany the ‘helpless sick and wounded’ on their journey home,1039 
although not all were so lucky; for example, invalids sent from Chatham to Dublin on 
Oudine did so as deck passengers ‘in pursuance of government regulation’ and ‘were 
obliged to sleep on straw in the forehold.
1040
 
Men were able to travel by train from Chatham to Gravesend by train if their 
onward journey involved a sea voyage
1041
 while the War Office entered into contracts 
with shipping companies for passengers travelling between ports such as London and 
Edinburgh and Fleetwood and Belfast. 
With regard to the longer term it was suggested that many declared unfit for 
military service would be ‘capable of duties where steady habits of discipline, 
trustworthiness, and obedience are required [would be] well suited to act as private 
watchmen, gate-keepers, porters, warehouse-keepers, and as porters in attendance upon 
passengers at railways.’1042 
 
                                                 
1038  Morning Post, 13 Jan. 1855. 
1039  The Times, 17 Jan. & 23 Apr. 1856. 
1040  Daily News, 27 Apr. 1855. 
1041  Commandant, Chatham to QMG, 3 Oct. 1855; WO/28/192. 
1042  Preston Guardian, 3 Mar. 1855. 
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Numbers of invalids transported 
 
The reports of the vessels returning from the East only occasionally included the 
number of invalids but an indication of the numbers that could be involved can be 
gauged from the passenger lists of the first six vessels that arrived at Portsmouth in 
1855 (Table 9.11). 
On Christmas Eve 1854 Hall noted that 650 patients were on passage to 
England,
1043
 and this increased to 2,000 by the next month.
1044
 In March 1855 Smith 
was notified that ‘Indiana is to embark 266 tomorrow; Adelaide 170 today or tomorrow; 
Rockliffe to go to Abydos to collect 120 for England; Tynemouth will leave soon with 
120; Chapman and Julia, sailing vessels, are to be fitted to receive invalids,’1045 with a 
further 813 being evacuated from Scutari during the next month.
1046
  
This selection of reports made during the first few months of 1855 would suggest 
that the official total of 9,541 men in the cavalry, infantry, and ordnance
1047
 is almost 
certainly an underestimate as it probably does not include those sent directly to their 
regimental depot, or were granted leave, or travelled with their regiments when finally 
evacuated from the East. 
 
Reasons for repatriation and discharge 
 
Men evacuated from the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55 were ‘lousy and 
naked’1048 and not unexpectedly many were in a ‘very filthy state, many without shirts, 
and the shirts of the rest not in a fit state to use’ when they arrived in England.1049 Many 
invalids were debilitated with matters being complicated by the coexistence of either 
‘scorbutic taint’ or ‘phthisis pulmonaris’; while rheumatism, principally of the 
‘muscular or nervous variety’, was usually a sequel to other illnesses.1050 
                                                 
1043  Hall to QMG, 24 Dec. 1854; RAMC/397/F/CO/6/43a. 
1044  IoWO, 20 Jan. 1855. 
1045  PMO, Scutari, 22 Mar. 1855; PoL. 
1046  Cumming to Smith, 28 Apr. 1855; BPP (1854-55), No. 449, p. 46. The vessels employed were 
Adelaide (173 cases), Indiana (268), Tynemouth (213), Chapman (134), and Julia (184). 
1047  M&SH, II, p. 229. 
1048  Paulet to Romaine, 7 Jan. 1855; Robins (2005), p. 66. 
1049  Smith to Military Secretary, 6 Jan. 1866; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 26. 
1050  M&SH, II, p. 227. 
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The nature of the invalids changed with time, however, as noted by the PMO, 
Chatham: 
 
The great majority of the first arrivals of invalids were fine young men, in the prime of life, 
though sadly reduced by disease and privation. But how different were the invalids who 
arrived at a later date, some of them old and worn out, though of only a few months’ service, 
others half grown, sickly looking men, who should never have been enlisted; but they were 
more to be pitied than condemned for having undertaken duties, the nature of which they 




Two sections in the M&SH were devoted to the reasons for repatriation and discharge 
for disease and wounds.
1052
 Several sources were used to compile the tables and 
inconsistencies can be found in the totals quoted, and hence references to the page 
numbers are given in the foregoing sections. 
 
Official returns in the Medical and Surgical History 
The reasons for admission to regimental and general hospitals were divided into 19 
classes (I-XIX) and the number of men assigned to these in four situations, namely: (1) 
primary admission to hospitals, principally in the Crimea; (2) admissions to the Scutari 
hospitals; and (3) and (4) men selected for repatriation to England (pages 231-5) and 
eventual discharge from the Army (pages 241-5) are given Table 9 12. 
The classes listed in this table are in the order of importance for selecting patients 
for repatriation, with five accounting for nearly four-fifths of cases, viz. wounds (26%), 
gastrointestinal, respiratory and rheumatic diseases (20.4%, 10.4%, 9.2%), and fever 
(13.8%). In contrast, wounds accounted for nearly half the men discharged, with 
respiratory, cardiovascular, and rheumatic disease being responsible for 10.6%, 6.8%, 
and 5.2% respectively. 
 
Repatriation for disease 
Pages 229-30: Of 9,544 individuals from the cavalry (718), guards and infantry 
(7,818), and ordnance corps (1,008) repatriated for disease 27.5%, 18.7%, 14%, and 
12.4% had respectively gastrointestinal disease, fever and respiratory and rheumatic 
disease while each of the other classes accounted for <3.5% (Table 9.13). 
 
                                                 
1051  M&SH, II, p. 229. 
1052  M&SH, II, pp. 223-45 & 388-9 respectively. 
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Pages 231-5 and 241-5: The most notable feature of the men discharged with 
gastrointestinal disease was the high incidence of hernias as opposed to diarrhoea and 
dysentery which where important reasons for repatriation and admission to both 
regimental and general hospitals in the East (Table 9.14). 
Nearly 80% of patients repatriated with respiratory disease suffered from catarrh, 
phthisis, or bronchitis while among those discharged from the service non-specified 
lung disease and phthisis accounted for 45.7% and 39% of cases respectively. By 
comparison, catarrh was the most important reason for primary admissions during the 
campaign at 81.4% with catarrh and bronchitis being prevalent in patients evacuated to 
Scutari at 57% and 20.7% (Table 9.15). 
 
Repatriation for wounds 
Page 259: Of 11,515 NCOs and men wounded in action 1,758 (15.3%) died in 
hospital, 3,318 (28.8%) were invalided to England,
1053
 and 6,439 (55.9%) returned to 
duty (Table 9.15). The mortality rate was greater during the first six months of the 
campaign (17.9% cf. 13.7%) and the ‘general state of cachexia’ resulting from 
‘insufficient or improper food, want of clothing, want of rest and sleep, and exposure to 
cold, damp, and other agencies’ would have contributed to this as there would have 
been a ‘want of vital power to withstand the shock […] of a severe injury’ and to resist 
the development of complications such as sloughing and gangrene 
Over the campaign proportional more injured officers than ORs were invalided to 
England (44% cf. 29%) than returned to duty (42% cf. 56%). 
 
Pages 231-5 and 241-4: Primary admissions to hospital were dominated by gunshot 
wounds (58.5%) and contusions (21.9%) and there was evidence of selection of men 
with gunshot wounds for evacuation to Scutari, and these patients also formed a 
majority of those repatriated to England and subsequently discharged. Amputees 
accounted for about a fifth of those repatriated and discharged for injuries while 
contusions and incised wounds formed a smaller proportion of patients as time 
progressed, presumably because the men recovered from these injuries and returned to 
duty (Table 9.16). 
                                                 




Deaths during the voyage and following arrival in England 
Pages 229-30: Up to the end of 1856 there were 182 deaths on passage to England 
and 270 after landing (Table 9.13). The principal causes were gastrointestinal disease 
(175, 38.7% of deaths); respiratory disease (138, 30.5%, with 96 due to phthisis), and 
fever (51, 11.3%). Apart from phthisis the causes of death was not specified but 
inspection of other data indicates that these were likely to be dysentery, diarrhoea, and 
continued fever. 
 
Page 239: Of 283 deaths in England up until March 1857 146 (51.6%) and 46 (16.3%) 
were due to diseases of the thoracic and abdominal viscera and 23 (8.1%) for fever. 
 
Discharge from the Army 
The reasons for repatriation and discharge have to be considered separately since a man 
may recover from the disease or wound for which he was sent home only to be 
discharged for another reason. 
 
Page 236: Respiratory, cardiovascular, rheumatic, and eye diseases accounted for 650 
(20.8%), 416 (13.3%), 317 (10.2%), and 227 (7.3%) respectively of 3,120 men 
discharged for disease (Table 9.13). 
 
Page 237: More specific reasons listed for 1,282 men discharged included debility and 
impaired health (446, 34.8%), phthisis (234, 18.2%), varicose veins (183, 14.3%), 
rupture (152, 11.9%), epilepsy (79, 6.2%), ulcers and cicatrices (70, 5.5%), impaired 
intellect (61, 4.7%), and paralysis (57, 4.4%). 
 
Pages 237-9: A total of 15,272 men arrived at Chatham between January 1855 and 
March 1857 and of these 5,054 (33.1%) returned to duty and 9,899 (64.8%) were 
discharged (Table 9.17). This proportion was inflated by 2,695, however, because the 
criteria for retaining men become more stringent from September 1856, and men were 
discharged who were not ‘totally unfit.’ 
The reason for discharge of the 9,899 were BFIs: 2,296 (23.2%); diseases of the 
thoracic viscera: 1,880 (19%); chronic rheumatism and infirmity: 1,306 (13.2%); 
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weakly constitution, scrofula, dropsy, deafness, stammering, ulcers, and varicose veins: 
1,720 (17.4%); eye disease: 663 (6.7%); non-BFIs: 633 (6.4%); and rupture: 330 
(3.3%). 
 
Pages 241-5 and 390: Of 3,011 men discharged on account of injuries 2,118 (70.2%) 




Political interference in hospital management: The development of the hospital 
at Smyrna was essentially a political initiative, first mooted quite reasonably when 
matters were pressing, and Newcastle, the minister at the time, seemingly intending that 
it should be used for convalescents.
1054
 His successor, Panmure, took a different view as 
he considered that the civilian medical staff should obtain worthwhile practical 
experience, particularly as they had become his responsibility following Smith’s refusal 
to be involved on the grounds that it was a civilian and not a military undertaking.
1055
 
Panmure’s aspirations for success resulted in a tendency for him to interfere in the 
day to day running of the Army; a style of management that was generally unwelcome. 
For example, Brevet Major G.L. Goodlake wrote home on 10 January 1856: ‘Panmure 
sends out insulting rubbishing idiotic messages, which are ludicrous and ridiculous. I 
don’t believe Codrington could send 500 men anywhere without being obliged to 
telegraph home to know if he might do so.’1056 
The Medical Department was not spared similar interference as evinced by a letter 
sent to Hall by the Deputy Secretary on 30 March, which suggested Panmure adopted a 





[In] organizing the civil hospital at Smyrna it was expressly stated that the successful 
realization of the plan will very much depend upon the class of patients to be admitted. If the 
hospital were […] for chronic cases and convalescents the best men would be deterred from 
undertaking the duties of physicians and surgeons. [It is] essential that the civil hospital 
                                                 
1054  Diary entry following a visit, 13 July 1855; University of Nottingham, Ne/2F/10/1. 
1055  For example, Smith to Military Undersecretary, 23 Mar 1855; BPP (1857-58), No 2379, p. 45 
and Smith to Deputy Secretary, 16 June 1855; PoL. 
1056  Springman (2005), p. 166. 
1057  WO/28/176. The letter was probably a response to a complaint from Meyer who ‘considered it 
essential’ that they should receive a ‘fair proportion of all cases included wounded directly from 
the Army;’ see Cantlie (1974), II, p. 169. 
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should […] receive its fair proportion of all cases including wounded directly from the Army. 
[…] Lord Panmure [instructs] you to charter ships direct to Smyrna which will carry the sick 
thither without [stopping] in the Bosphorus,
1058
 […] Colonel Storks, the commandant at 





Hall forwarded the letter to the QMG and informed him that he had been directed 
to charter ships to convey sick direct from the Crimea to Smyrna. He continued: 
 
at present we are not particularly pressed for hospital accommodation,
1060
 but if we were I 
neither know the number of beds they have in the hospital at Smyrna, not if I did could I 
obtain the tonnage for the sick. I submit this letter, therefore, for consideration in case a 




The AoT also pointed out that ‘the vessels would have to be steamers of which 
there are none at present available for charter in this part of the world.’ He continued: 
 
Between 1 and 18 April about 600 sick have been sent […] to Scutari.1062 The six hospital 
steamers can convey rather more than 700 in each 10 consecutive daily period;
1063
 […] as 
every individual sent to Smyrna will be a deduction from the number for Scutari […] I would 
propose that […] the two smaller steamers should be appropriate to that service. There would 
then remain sufficient transport for 500 patients every ten days to Scutari [and] about 100 




Heath’s letter was referred to Hall who reiterated that he ‘did not know what 
number of spare beds there are at Smyrna, and he would not wish to recommend sick 
men to be sent there until this was ascertained.’ He clearly considered the policy was 
unnecessary as there were ‘747 spare beds at Scutari.’1065 Hall subsequently replied to 
the Deputy Secretary on 24 April and informed him that he was not: 
 
aware that the Smyrna Hospital had been established for the treatment of acute cases of 
disease, as it is rather too distant […] for that purpose, […] my impression was that it was 
[for] those […] not improving. […] I am of the opinion Smyrna will not be found a desirable 
                                                 
1058  Hall’s authority did not extend to chartering transport vessels, and hence it is perplexing why this 
was suggested. 
1059  The last paragraph on the original document was marked in pencil in the margin: ‘!!!’. See PoL, I, 
Appendix 15 for the text. 
1060  It should have known in London by the third week of March that 1,300 beds were available at 
Scutari; Paulet to Panmure, 8 Mar. 1855; BPP (1854-55), No. 449, p. 1. Incidentally, on 13 
May Cumming informed Hall that there were 1,900 beds spare; NAM-2007-07-16-27. 
1061  Hall to QMG, 15 Apr. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/1839 and WO/28/176. 
1062  During this period Sydney (98 patients), Brandon (111), Ottawa (120), and Severn (180) sailed to 
Scutari; M&SH, II, p. 471. 
1063  These vessels comprised Australian, Brandon, Melbourne, Ottawa, Severn, and Sydney; PoL, I, 
Appendix 15. 
1064  Heath to QMG, 19 Apr. 1855; WO/28/176. 
1065 Hall to QMG, 20 Apr. 1855; WO/28/176. Cantlie (1974), p. 170 considered that Hall’s logic 
‘was unanswerable’ but Mayer was ‘annoyed, and made the invidious suggestion that Smyrna was 
not used because the Army medical officers were envious of its high standard compared with their 
own military hospitals.’ 
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locality either for fever cases or wounded men in the summer and autumn. With respect [to] 
me chartering ships for the conveyance of the sick direct from Balaklava to Smyrna […] I 





In the event the authorities in the Crimea responded in a limited manner to 
Panmure’s instructions by sending Brandon and Severn to Smyrna on the 26 and 29 
April with 99 and 97 patients respectively.
1067
 
When Smith received copies of this correspondence he informed the Deputy 
Secretary that ordering ships for Smyrna not to stop on the Bosphorus was ‘most 
objectionable’ as if done regularly ‘individuals will have to encounter […] suffering 
which would not fall their lot if the vessels touch at Scutari […] This measure […] is 
alike required for the cause of humanity and for the good of the public,’ although he did 
concede that the hospital should not be solely for ‘slight or chronic cases.’1068 The issue 
did not end there, however, because a month later the Deputy Secretary requested Smith 
‘to give an opinion whether the ships should stop at Scutari while quarantine laws still 
operate and as the hospital arrangements at Balaklava are now intended to provide for 
all acute and urgent cases and so it would seem less necessary for the vessels to stop at 
Scutari where probably only convalescents will be sent.’1069 To this Smith stated that he 
was unaware that vessels touching at Scutari would be subject to quarantine at Smyrna, 
but he thought that ‘even that would be a less evil than passing Scutari without calling 
there.’1070 
Shortly after the war ended the Deputy Secretary appeared to do a U-turn when he 
conceded that though the selection of the patients for the civil hospital was in ‘the hands 
of the medical men’ in the Crimea ‘special direction had been given on the type of 
patient selected’ but the ‘altered state of things that ensued quite prevented that being 
acted upon, and the large extension of hospital accommodation in the Crimea has 
prevented so a large a number being sent to either of the civil hospitals as was originally 
                                                 
1066  Hall to Deputy Secretary, 24 Apr. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/1832 and PoL, I, Appendix 15. 
The back of the Deputy Secretary’s letter was annotated by the QMQ ‘Refer this correspondence 
to Dr Hall, who will now have the means of reply to the Deputy Secretary at War.’ 
1067  Hall to Deputy Secretary, 4 May 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/1832. It was not recorded whether 
the vessels called at Scutari or not. 
1068  Smith to the Deputy Secretary, 5 May 1855; PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 52-3. 
Incidentally, Smith had already recommended to the Deputy Secretary on 23 May that vessels for 
Smyrna should touch at Scutari; PoL. 
1069  Deputy Secretary to Smith, 6 June 1855; PoL. 
1070  Smith to Deputy Secretary, 11 June 1855; PoL. 
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contemplated,’1071 thus vindicating Hall’s objection to the instructions from London 
which he made on both practical and humane grounds. 
 
Homeopathy: A deputation of noblemen and gentleman presented a memorial to 
Panmure ‘praying that a civil hospital at Smyrna, or elsewhere, might be appropriated 
for the treatment of our soldiers and sailors according to the homoeopathic system.’1072 
Panmure pointed out that, though ‘deserving every attention’, ‘the subject presented 
numerous difficulties’,1073 and in the event nothing appears to have come of the 
suggestion. 
 
Possible settlement of invalids in Turkey: In reply to a despatch from Clarendon 
Stratford replied that he thought that ‘disabled British soldiers, would of all persons be 
the least qualified to succeed’ as settlers in Turkey as proposed by the Reverend Francis 






 In any event, 
any settler will ‘stand in need of protection’ as they will ‘never be cordially or even 






The need to repatriate large numbers of ineffective troops became apparent soon after 
the invasion. Four MOs who served in the East met in London on 8 March 1855 and 
concluded that the repatriation was ‘most desirable, for reasons too obvious to dwell on’ 
and that ‘the beneficial effects of the voyage’ and the ‘escape from the crowded and 
polluted hospital’ were ‘strong arguments in favour of this measure.’1077 In addition, the 




                                                 
1071  Paraphrased from the Deputy Secretary’s evidence to the Select Committee on the AMD, 18 June 
1856; BPP (1856), No. 331. 
1072  Incidentally, the London Homoeothic Hospital had been founded as a charity in 1849 by ‘many 
well-connected aristocratic patrons of homoepathy;’ Dean (2016). 
1073  IoWO, 7 Apr.1855. 
1074  Clarendon to Stratford, 16 June 1855; FO/78/1064. 
1075  Cannon, a Presbyterian chaplain, was granted leave of absence to Scutari with a medical certificate 
on 6 Oct, later extended to 15 Nov. 1855. 
1076  Stratford to Clarendon, 6 July 1855; FO/78/1082. 
1077  Smith to Military Undersecretary, 16 Mar. 1855; BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, p. 44. 
1078  Smith to Military Undersecretary, 16 May 1855; BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 54. 
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The selection of transports was undertaken by the Royal Navy while the military and 
medical authorities had responsibility for discipline and providing for the patients. 
There was no shuttle service of steamers to England though 10 (8.7%) of 115 vessels 
employed undertook 36 (22.5%) of 160 voyages (Table 9.2). Two dedicated sailing 
transports used from the spring of 1855 only made two round trips. Given that 
transports were selected on an ad hoc basis it is gratifying that there were relatively few 
reports of serious problems apart from the usual difficulties that may be encountered 
during a long sea voyage. 
 
The military authorities made no specific plans for the management of invalids and 
convalescents during the run up to the campaign although several potential sites for 
convalescent hospitals were considered after the invasion. Gozo was seemingly the only 
military hospital developed specifically for this purpose although no medical records 
have survived. 
Smyrna hospital was planned originally for convalescents although this was not 
the case for about half the time it was in use. Smyrna, like Renkioi, came into operation 
too late to make a significant contribution to the war effort, especially as parts of the 
hospitals at Scutari and Kuleli were given over to convalescents as the campaign 
progressed, with the Castle Hospital at Balaklava accommodating men recovering from 
wounds. The hospitals at Smyrna and Renkioi were underutilized and the staff 
underemployed, although this could not have been foreseen when the decisions to 
develop them were taken. It is not possible to determine whether the initiative was 
worthwhile as no comparisons can be made with the testing times of the first winter, and 
no official assessment of their performance was published. 
 
There was only one specific comment about providing respite in the camps in the 
Crimea but it is certain convalescents would have been kept in camp, especially after 
the fall of Sevastopol when fewer men required hospitalization.  
 
The majority of the invalids landed at Portsmouth, rather than Chatham, which meant 
that vessels could be turned round quicker as the voyage was shorter. There were 
relatively few reports of difficulties at the port apart from some teething problems in 
early 1855 (Table 9.6) and hence Smith was able to inform the Roebuck Committee on 
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22 March 1855 that ‘full provision’ was being made for the reception of invalids on 
their arrival in England.
1079
 The journey to Chatham by train could prove arduous and 
there were complaints that some patients suffered unnecessarily, particularly during the 
cold weather. 
 
Little information about the hospitals in England has survived. Provision for returning 
invalids was limited at the start of the campaign, but this increased with time. There was 
some reasonable criticism of the quality of the facilities but there was apparently no 
serious shortage of beds. 
 
It was suggested after the war that the number of men repatriated was lower than 
expected as a proportion of those who would have been sent home under normal 
circumstances either died or were ‘detained at the seat of war’ as a consequence of the 
manpower shortage.
1080
 There were differences in the reasons for the primary 
admissions to the regimental hospitals and the discharge of invalids from the Army. The 
former being dominated by acute illness and recent wounds while the latter were for 
chronic disabilities; particularly those associated with gunshot wounds, pulmonary 
tuberculosis, rheumatism, and varicose veins. 
 
                                                 
1079  BPP (1854-55), No. 156, p. 449. 




Table 9.1: Number of sick and wounded men treated in Corfu, February-November 1855 
Month No. at start of 
the month 
Reductions No. at end of 
the month Deaths Repatriations Returns to 
duty 
February 463* 13 0 0 450 
March 450 7 0 0 443 
April 443 99 344 
May 344 2 0 215 127 
June 127 0 62 1 64 
July 64 0 12 0 53 
August 53 0 0 49 4 
September 4 0 2 0 2 
October 2 0 0 0 2 
November 2 0 0 0 2 
[Summarized from WO/28/185, with minor corrections. The patients arrived during February and the 
return for April are wanting] 
* A disembarkation return in WO/25/1187 recorded that Dunbar left Scutari 22 January and arrived at 
Corfu on 1 February with a Staff Surgeon and two assistant surgeons in attendance. A total of 462 
patients were disembarked with four dying on the voyage. The surgeon noted that ‘The health of about 
50 of them was indifferent. The health of the remainder, taking into account they were “convalescents” 
[was] good.’ The Dunbar then sailed for England on 12 February with 148 invalids together with 157 
women and 259 children, arriving at Spithead on 10 April. A civilan surgeon travelled with them and 
reported that the health of the men was good while it was indifferent for the women and children; 
overall there were 14 deaths.  
 
Table 9.2: Number of voyages made by 115 vessels employed in conveying invalids to England from the 
East, 1855-1856 
Means of propulsion Number of voyages/vessel Total 
(%) 1 2 3 4 5 
Sail 35 3 0 0 0 38 (33) 
Screw 42 15 2 1 1 61 (53) 
Paddle 9 1 4 1 1 16 (14) 
Total vessels (%) 86 (74.8) 19 (16.5) 6 (5.2) 2 (1.7) 2 (1.7) 115 (100) 
 
Means of propulsion Number of voyages Total 
(%) 1 2 3 4 5 
Sail 35 6 0 0 0 41 (25.6) 
Screw 42 30 6 4 5 87 (54.4) 
Paddle 9 2 12 4 5 32 (20) 




Table 9.3: Vessels that sailed to England with invalids from Balaklava, April 1855-June 1856 
Vessel Departure date No. of officers No. of men 
Indian 16 April 1855 0 80 
Saldanha 10 June 1855 10 270 
Great Tasmania 10 July 55 13 396 
Alma 15 September 1855 26 4 
Oronaco (sic) 22 September 1855 20 81 
Robt Lowe 29 September 1855 29 88 
Bahiana 20 October 1855 12 0 
Poitiers 27 October 1855 5 85 
Clifton 20 October 1855 1 100 
Brandon 1 November 1855 7 99 
Thames 24 November 1855 0 26 
Severn 30 November 1855 10 180 
Orient 30 November 1855 0 98 
Great Tasmania 19 January 1856 2 434 
Thames 27 January 1856 3 225 
Andes 24 February 1856 9 135 
Thames 29 March 1856 2 175 
Severn 19 April 1856 18 196 
Melbourne 10 May 1856 0 246 
Severn 12 June 1856 0 344 
Thames 17 June 1856 0 244 
[RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1] 
 
Table 9.4: Number of officers, men, and horses landed at Portsmouth, 1 May-19 August 1856 
Month Number of 
vessels 
Number landed 
Officers Men Horses 
May 9 76 2539 742 
June 34 465 11463 1808 
July 63 1292 35757 1016 
August 19 350 8129 365 
Total 125 2183 57888 3931 
[HT&SC, 23 August 1856] 
 
Table 9.5: Additional comments on medical treatment during the voyage 
Vessel Comment Reference 
Calpurnia The state of the invalid’s berths […] the cleanliness and quality of their bedding, 
and the order and comfort of the invalids should be seen to be appreciated. 
Nothing has yet arrived at Portsmouth from the Crimea to equal it. Dr Mackay 
deserves the credit of this. 




Assistant Surgeon Cusack noted, in answer to an ill-founded complaint, that the 
accommodation for invalids on Robert Lowe was everything that could be 
desired and they were well provided with beds, bedding, blankets etc. and were 
supplied with fresh meat every day except three when preserved meat was 
issued 
Cusack to Smith, 
19 Nov. 1855; PoL. 
Sydney The invalids objected to ship biscuit although soft bread was issued to the most 
sick. 
Staff Surgeon 
Barrett to Smith, 5 
Dec. 1855; PoL. 
Saldanha The vessel was ‘in wholesome condition since men who had lost limbs are fit to 
return to military duty.’ 




The PMO at Portsmouth complained that although the men generally looked 
well the civilian surgeons in charge knew nothing of them and made no 
arrangements for their disembarkation. 
PMO, Portsmouth 




Table 9.6: Press reports published following the arrival in British waters of ships conveying invalids 




Avon Dense fog found the authorities unprepared for her arrival, although matters were soon 
rectified. ‘Dr. Robinson […] superintended the removal of the worst cases’ although the ‘the 
bulk will not be disembarked until the morning’ allowing suitable arrangements to be made 
while ‘Mr. Hoddes, the collector of Customs at Portsmouth, with an efficient staff, was 




Avon The Avon shared in the destructive effects of the great hurricane […] In other respects she is 







On 15 January invalids arrived at Gravesend on the Cork steamer from Plymouth. ‘The whole 
were in a very sickly state; they were very cold, complained that they had nothing to eat since 
Sunday evening, and they had to stand on the deck during the passage. […] Ten men were 
admitted into hospital and 68 sent to the Invalid Depot for further examination.’ 
16 
Jan. 
Harbinger These cases were all doing well […] and will leave for Chatham this morning without being 
disturbed. But why could not the ship have been despatched from Malta to Chatham direct, 
instead of first going to Southampton on Monday, waiting there all night, then going to 
Portsmouth yesterday, and staying there all night, finally leaving for Chatham this the third 
day after their arrival in England? 
Disembarkation return in WO/25/1187: Left Scutari on 10 January and arrived at Chatham on 
12 February with 81 invalids from 34 regiments; their health was indifferent, but there was 
was only one death. 
7 
Feb. 
Arabia No medical officer or other official was sent off to the Arabia while at Spithead to see what 
was the nature of the cases and which the most urgent to be got to hospital. 
5 
Mar. 
Dunbar Anchored at 8 a.m. off Portsmouth, but up to 6 o’clock at night no military authority […] had 
been off to her [although] Major-General Breton […] asserted that ‘as soon as a vessel is 
notified Surgeon Odell and Major Dalgetty [went to] make the necessary arrangements for 
landing the men.’ (In the event Dunbar sailed on to Chatham; see Table 9.9.) 
11 
Apr. 
Medway […] not taken into harbour yesterday – upwards of 50 hours after reporting herself. The 
captain could get no one to authorize their coming in on Saturday morning. The Port-Admiral 
had gone […] with a squadron of honour for the Emperor of the French; the Admiral-
Superintendent of the Dockyard […] was sitting as president of the court-martial […] and he 
does not appear to have deputed anybody to do the duties of the port […] 
16 
Apr. 
Victoria ‘two days and a-half having lapsed since her arrival! The poor fellows […] complained of the 
unnecessary confinement to which they had been subjected. The delay […] is another of the 
many flagrant cases which have at various times been recorded. […] no blame can be 
attached to the Admiralty officials at Southampton, for [her arrival] was forwarded by 
telegraph to London. […] and it was not until too late on Monday night to send the 
passengers ashore that any knowledge existed of the wishes at head-quarters.’ 
2 
May 
Cornwall ‘went into Portsmouth harbour yesterday to land invalid soldiers […] but no arrangements 
were made for their removal until 11 o'clock. Thus the invalids lost the train by which such 
unfortunates are usually forwarded to Chatham invalid depot (8.30 a.m.), and will not be 
landed until this morning. […] there was no general commanding the garrison or any staff 
surgeon to see to the landing and removal of these poor fellows.’ 
10 
May 
Germania ‘arrived at Spithead yesterday […]The [invalids] will not be disembarked until this day, there 
being no accommodation for them in barrack quarters.’ 
6 
June 
Ripon ‘arrived at Southampton yesterday […] The distressed British seamen, however, remained on 
board the transport during the night, and will be despatched to their various destinations by 





Table 9.7: Generosity extended to invalids following their arrival in England 
Vessel/donor Abstract Reference 
(all 1855) 
Himalaya The Relief Association ‘expended a considerable sum […] assisting the poor 
women and children’ brought home on the vessel. 
HT&SC, 
6 Jan. 
Candia Refreshments of all kinds were spontaneously tendered to [the invalids] […] 
but the commanding officer declined to accept it.’ 
ILN, 
17 Jan 
Candia Messrs J. and G. Cokesby, merchants of Southampton, with great kindness 
and consideration, sent porter as a present to the invalided soldiers […] The 






Major-General Sir Frederick Smith, RE […] has been constant in his visits to 
the poor sick and wounded soldiers […] and they were on Thursday also 
visited by Lady Smith who distributed among the suffers comforts and 
delicacies in the shape of jellies, blancmange etc. […] Mr Emmanuel and 
several other townsmen have collected newspapers and other things, and 





Sir Frederick Smith reported that he had ‘received nearly 100 volumes of 
books of interesting biography, etc., which I intend depositing in the hospital 
[…] in a book case I am having made for them […]’ Pocket handkerchiefs, 
neck comforters, muffatees, etc., were added to the confections dispensed by 




Talavera ‘The report that the soldiers were in a personal state of uncleanliness is 
without foundation’ but they were ‘unprepared for the prevailing inclement 
weather, especially as they would have to encounter a cold passage [to] 
Chatham’ and ‘General Eden […] sent warm clothing from his private store 
to some of the poor fellows, a large portion of whom left Scutari with a 
single suit.’ […] ‘Earl of Mount Edgecumbe has afforded them constant 
supplies of vegetables from his own gardens’ and before departure of the 
men expressed themselves in most grateful terms for the warm clothing, 





Neptune Quartermaster Paton was indefatigable in seeing to their evening meal and 
breakfast on Saturday morning. Their rations being drawn, Mr Chamney, 
purveyor to the Queen, gratuitously, though late at night, undertook to cook 
the gallant sufferers’ provisions at his bakery. Mr Paton was at his post next 
morning to see each man get his allowance before leaving for Chatham 
invalid depot. [The men] expressed their warmest gratitude to Lord Methuen, 
commanding the Wilts Militia, his officers and men, whom they loudly 




Arabia […] the bounty of the Princess Mary of Cambridge was manifested towards 
these poor invalids by the distribution of warm and comforting clothing, 






The invalids […] shared the bounties distributed by Major General and Lady 
Smith […] consisting of clothing, personal comforts, and nourishing 
confections. Major General and Mrs Bentinck have also forwarded a quantity 




The Queen Her Majesty has [sent to the General Hospital, Portsmouth] silk pocket and 
neck handkerchief and neck ties, hemmed by herself and ladies of the Court, 





Table 9.8: Mutinous behaviour by civilian crew members 
Vessel Abstract Reference 
(all 1855) 
Avon The vessel was ordered to Chatham after the disembarkation of serious cases 
at Portsmouth but the crew refused to work the ship despite being offered £4. 
They ‘left the ship and dockyard on a very disgraceful manner, some the 
worse for drink.’ The commentator concluded that it was ‘a barbarous state 
of things, and shows a very rotten bargain to have been made, either by the 
owners with their crew, or by the government with their contractors. But how 
did the poor sick and wounded soldiers behave on board all this time will 
probably be asked. Why, as gallantly as they had behaved in battle [and they] 
bore their situation patiently.’ The men were eventually sent to Chatham by 
train. 
The Times 
15 Jan. and 
HT&SC, 20 
Jan. 
Mauritius Following arrival in Portsmouth the crew refused to work when ordered to 
Chatham. The majority absconded, thus putting the ‘lives of all the invalids 
on board in danger.’ This event and destruction of the vessel by fire while dry 
dock were reported in extenso. 
The Times, 
5, 6, 10, 13, 
and 17 Feb. 
Harbinger […] the weather having moderated […] she again left Spithead for her 
destination, without the slightest symptoms of ‘mutiny’ having been exhibited 
by her crew, as has been reported. 
The Times 
12 Feb. 
Arabia ‘the crew, on hearing the ship was ordered to Chatham, refused to work her.’ 
[…]. ‘the articles they had signed were read by the captain, whereby it 
clearly appeared that the men had fully discharged their obligations.’ In the 
event the sick were to landed at Portsmouth and those fit enough sent to 






Table 9.9: Vessels conveying invalids directly to the Thames 
Vessel Abstract The 
Times 
(1855) 
Culloden ‘arrived at Sheerness […] with wounded and invalids […] assisted to the […] 
Nore by a private steam tug-vessel, where she was met by the Admiral’s steam 
tender Wildfire, and, towed to Chatham. The wounded and invalids were with 
every care and attention landed, and sent to Melville Hospital.’ 
1 Jan. 
Libertas After disembarking some patients at Devonport she ‘arrived at Gravesend […] 
Several died […] on their passage home. The rest were landed and conveyed to 
Chatham, where proper places have been prepared for their reception.’ 
Disembarkation return in WO/25/1187*: Libertas left Scutari on 14 October with 
85 NCOs and men, of whom nine died on the voyage;13 were disembarked at 
Plymouth; and the rest at Chatham on 31 December. 
3 Jan. 
Candia Following arrival at Chatham […] Seventy-two were hospitalized while those 
able ‘to bear the journey’ were sent to the invalid depot at St Mary’s Barracks, 
although all were ‘in a sad condition, many of them were without shoes, and their 
clothing was wretched in the extreme and they appeared half starved; indeed, 
such a number of invalids has never been witnessed before at the hospital.’ 
10 Jan. 
Sultana The sick and wounded ‘were landed at the Terrace-pier [Gravesend] with the 
tenderest care, and with every precaution regarding their comfort and 
convenience. A special train had been in readiness, and, after partaking of a 
hearty breakfast, they proceeded to Fort Pitt, Chatham.’ 
Disembarkation return in WO/25/1187: Sultana left Scutari with 154 
convalescents from 36 regiments on 20 Dec. 1854 and arrived at Gravesend on 
27 Feb. 1855; there were five deaths. 
28 Feb. 
Dunbar Sailed from Portsmouth to Chatham. (See Table 9.6 for reference Dunbar’s 
arrival at Portsmouth) 
Disembarkation return in WO/25/1187: Dunbar conveyed 144 invalids and 152 
women and 277 childen under the care of a civilian surgeon. Seventeen deaths 
occurred during the voyage which commenced at Corfu on 12 February. 
General Order of 12 April for Fort Pitt: The invalids were landed at the Gun 
Wharf at Chatham and were conveyed to Fort Pitt or St Mary’s Barracks. 
11 Apr.  
* WO/25/1187 comprises an incomplete set of disembarkation returns. 
 
Table 9.10: Complement of the Medical Staff Corps located at Chatham 
Rank General Hospital 
Fort Pitt 




Steward 2 1 1 4 
Assistant Steward 2 1 1 4 
Ward Master 2 1 1 4 
Assistant Ward 
Master 
2 1 1 4 
Cook 2 2 2 6 
Orderlies 19 11 19 49 
Barber 1 1 1 3 
Total 30 18 26 74 




Table 9.11: Number of passengers, including invalids, landed at Portsmouth during January and February 
1855 
Vessel Passengers listed in The Times, 21 February 1855 Total Reported 
date of 
arrival 
Himalaya 2 field officers, 3 captains; 2 subalterns, 2 staff, 18 sergeants, 





Candia 1 captain, 1 staff, 14 sergeants, 181 privates, 8 soldiers’ wives 205 9 Jan. 
Avon 1 staff, 20 sergeants, 1 trumpeter; 180 privates 202 12 Jan. 
HMS 
Retribution 
4 sergeants; 44 privates 48 26 Jan. 
Mauritius 1 captain, 1 staff, 8 sergeants, 123 privates, 70 soldiers’ wives, 
93 children 
296 3 Feb. 
HMS Neptune 10 sergeants, 1 trumpeter, 188 privates 199 9 Feb. 
Orinoco 1 subaltern, 8 sergeants, 101 privates, 9 soldiers’ wives, 1 
child 
120 12 Feb. 




Table 9.12: Proportion (%) of men invalided to England or discharged from the Army, or were admitted 
to hospital during the campaign, classified according to the 19 categories used in the Medical and 
Surgical History 
















(M&SH, II, pp. 
231-5 and 
General Return 
E, No. 3)* 
Discharged from 
the service 
(M&SH, II, pp. 
241-5 and 
General Return E, 
No. 4)* 
XIII Wounds or 
injuries 
11.2† 11.4 26.0 49.1 
VI Gastrointestinal 
disease 
34.3 30.1 20.4 3.1 
I Fever 
 
19.2 19.4 13.8 - 
III Respiratory 
disease 
7.6 7.1 10.4 10.6 
IX Rheumatic 
disease 
3.2 8.6 9.2 5.2 
XVII Eye disease 2.0 1.3 3.7 3.7 
IV Cardiovascular 
disease 
0.2 0.8 2.5 6.8 
XV Frostbite 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.8 
X Abscesses or 
ulcers 
7.7 2.0 1.7 1.7 
VII Neurological 
disease 
0.5 0.6 1.6 3.2 
V Hepatosplenic 
disease 
0.7 0.6 1.0 0.7 
XVI Scurvy 1.3 1.1 1.0 - 
XI Venereal disease 2.3 3.3 0.9 0.9 
XII Urogenital 
disease 
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 
XVIII Skin disease 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 
II Eruptive fever 
 
<0.1 0.1 - - 
VIII Cholera 4.7 0.9 - - 
XIV Punishment 1.1 0.2 - - 
XIX All other diseases 2.0 10.2 5.1 11.6 
Total cases 162673 43288 12893 6131 
* In some classes the proportions listed in General Return E differs slightly from those given in the table. 
† Proportions of >5% are highlighted in bold type. 
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Table 9.13: Number of men with disease who were invalided, died either during transit to England, or 
after arrival, or were discharged from the Army 
Class Cause of 
disease 
Number of men 
invalided 
(M&SH, II, p. 
229)* 
Men dying on 
passage 
(M&SH, II, p. 
229)* 
Dying after arrival 
to end of 1856 
(M&SH, II, p. 
230)* 
Discharged from the 
service to March 
1857 













I Fever 1784 18.7 29 15.9 22 8.1 0 - 
1III Respiratory 
disease 
1338 14.0 36 19.8 102 37.8 650 20.8 
IV Cardiovascular 
disease 
316 3.3 5 2.7 9 3.3 416 13.3 
V Hepatosplenic 
disease 
133 1.4 1 0.5 8 2.9 44 1.4 
VI Gastrointestinal 
disease 
2624 27.5 72 39.6 103 38.1 189 6.1 
VII Nervous 
disease 
206 2.2 2 1.1 4 1.5 197 6.3 
IX Rheumatic 
disease 
1188 12.4 12 6.6 1 0.4 317 10.2 
X Ulcers etc. 214 2.2 2 1.1 2 0.7 104 3.3 
XI Syphilis 115 1.2 1 0.5 2 0.7 54 1.7 
XII UG disease 67 0.7 3 1.6 0 - 31 1.0 
XIV Frostbite 266 2.8 3 1.6 0 - 171 5.5 
XVI Scurvy 135 1.4 2 1.1 0 - 0 - 
XVII Eye disease 483 5.1 0 - 0 - 227 7.3 
XVIII Skin disease 19 0.2 0 - 0 - 8 0.3 
XIX All other 
diseases 
656 6.9 14 6.2 17 6.3 712 22.8 
 Total 9544†  182‡  270§  3120║  
[Adapted from M&SH, II, pp. 229-230 and 336] 
* These table also include separate totals for the Cavalry, Ordnance, Guards, and Infantry. 
† Cavalry, 718 (7.5%); Ordnance, 1008 (10.6 %); Guards, 621(6.5%); and Infantry, 7197 (75.4%). 
‡ Cavalry, 14 (7.7%); Ordnance, 22 (12.1%); and Guards and Infantry, 146 (80.2%). 
§ Cavalry, 19 (7%); Ordnance 31 (11.5%); and Guards and Infantry 220 (81.5%). 




Table 9.14: Number of men with gastrointestinal and respiratory disease who were admitted to hospital, 
repatriated to England, and discharged from the Army 


























Diarrhoea 44164 (79.2) 8571 (65.7) 1533 (58.4) 14 (7.4) 
Dysentery 8278 (14.8) 3381 (25.9) 945 (36.0) 20 (10.6) 
Hernia 101 (0.2) 45 (0.4) 55 (2.1) 152 (80.4) 
Other diseases 3222 (5.8) 1044 (8.0) 91 (3.5) 3 (1.6) 
Total 55765 (100) 13041 (100) 2624 (100) 189 (100) 
Respiratory 
disease 
Phthisis 185 (1.5) 197 (6.4) 275 (20.5) 234 (39.0) 
Catarrh 10083 (81.4) 1742 (57.0) 555 (41.5) 32 (5.3) 
Bronchitis 1111 (9.0) 634 (20.7) 235 (17.6) 32 (5.3) 
Lung disease Not recorded Not recorded Not recorded 274 (45.7) 
Other diseases 1003 (8.1) 485 (15.9) 273 (20.4) 28 (4.7) 
Total 12382 (100) 3058 (100) 1338 (100) 600 (100) 
 
 
Table 9.15: Outcome for officers, NCOs, and men wounded in action 





1 April 1855 to 
end of campaign 
Whole campaign Whole campaign 
Died in hospital 777 (17.9) 981 (13.7) 1758 (15.3) 82 (14.2) 
Returned to duty 1930 (43.3) 4509 (63.0) 6439 (55.9) 242 (41.8) 
Invalided to 
England 
1647 (37.8) 1671 (23.3) 3318 (28.8)* 255 (44) † 
Total cases 4354‡, § 7081 + 80 11515 579 
[Adapted from M&SH, II, p. 259] 
* Thirteen (0.4%) of 3,318 died on the voyage to England and that this provided ‘evidence of the general 
sufficiency of the arrangements’; M&SH, II, p. 388. 
† According the commentary a ‘very large proportion’ of officers ‘invalided’ returned to duty after 
arrival in England. 
‡ 80 cases remained and were carried forward into the second period. 
§ Of these men, 3,516 (79.3%) were transferred to Scutari with 82 (1.8%) and 389 (8.8%) dying during 
the voyage or in the secondary hospitals. Of the survivors, 1,398 (31.5%) and 1,647 (37.1%) were 




Table 9.16: Number of men with wounds who were admitted to hospital, repatriated to England, and 
discharged from the Army 

















(M&SH, II, pp. 
241-5) 
Luxations 1533 (8.4) 119 (2.4) 31 (0.9) 6 (0.2) 
Gunshot wounds 10691(58.5) 3690 (74.7) 2405 (71.8) 2118 (70.3) 
Incised wounds 1270 (6.9) 200 (4.0) 35 (1.0) 31 (1.0) 
Contusions 4006 (21.9) 494 (10) 89 (2.7) 54(1.8 ) 
Fracture 380 (2.1) 121 (2.4) 124 (3.7) 86 (2.9) 
Burns 399 (2.2) 42 (0.8) 7 (0.2) 5 (0.2) 
Amputations No data† 268 (5.4) 639 (19.1) 671 (22.3) 
Resections No data† 9 (0.2) 19 (0.6) 11 (0.4) 
Other injuries 4 (<0.1) 0 0 29 (0.4) 
Total 18283 4943 3349* 3011 
* The total was given as 3,318 on Pages 259 and 388. 
† These are treatments and not a reason for admission to the field hospitals. 
 
 
Table 9.17: Outcome for NCOs and men who were repatriated to England 
Outcome January 1855-March 1857 (27 months) Average for 27 months during the 
previous 10 years 
Number Proportion (%) of 
total 
Number Proportion (%) of 
total 
Discharged 9899* 64.8 4669 73.4 
Returned to duty 5054 33.1 1350 21.2 
Died 283 1.9 165 2.6 
Deserted 22 0.1 135 2.1 
Transferred 14 0.1 45 0.7 
Total 15272 100 6364 100 
[Adapted from M&SH, II, pp. 238-9] 




Figure 9.1: Arrival of invalids from the East (Lady’s Newspaper, 13 January 1855) 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Her Majesty at Brompton hospital (Pen and Pencil, 10 March 1855) 
 
 
Figure 9.3: Queen Victoria inspecting the Crimean invalids as Fort Pitt 





Appendix 9.1: Date of arrival in British waters of vessels conveying invalids from the East, 
December 1854-September 1856 
Date1   Vessel’s name Number Means of 
propulsion2 
Port of arrival3  
1854 Dec. 1 British Queen4 None Sc/St Falmouth/Liverpool 
24 Libertas 95 Sl Devonport/Chatham 
1855 Jan. 1 Culloden 35 Sl Sheerness 
3 HMS Himalaya (Troopship) 104 Sc/St  
4 HMS Arethusia (Troopship) None Sl Plymouth 
9 Candia 213 Sc/St  
12 Avon None P/St  
16 Cambria 101 P/St Liverpool 
26 HMS Retribution None P/St  
Feb. 3 Mauritius 129 Sc/St  
6 Harbinger 86 Sc/St  
7 Talavera  98 Sl Plymouth 
9 HMS Neptune None Sl  
10 Orinoco 218 P/St  
26 Sultana  32 Sl Plymouth/Gravesend 
Mar. 3 War Cloud5 56 Sl Devonport 
5 Arabia 95 P/St  
8 Croesus 191 Sc/St  
12 Burmah6 85 Sl Wrecked en route to 
Deptford 
24 Alps 82 Sc/St  
28 HMS Malacca None Sc/St  
Apr. 6 HMS Bellerophon (Troopship) None Sl  
6 Great Britain 187 Sc/St  
7 Sea Nymph  113 P/St Plymouth/Deptford 
11 Dunbar  23 Sl Spithead/Chatham 
16 Indiana 147 Sc/St  
16 Medway 226 P/St  
20 Adelaide 238 Sc/St Plymouth/Portsmouth 
30 Victoria 72 Sc/St  
May 7 Tynemouth 102 Sc/St  
8 Gottenburg 133 Sc/St  
9 Camperdown 99 Sl  
9 Cornwall 25 Sl  
11 Canterbury 80 Sl  
11 Chapman 118 Sl  
14 Simla 118 Sc/St  
16 Julia 111 Sl  
17 Lady Eglinton 165 Sc/St  
23 City of Norwich None Sc/St  
24 Golden Fleece 75 Sc/St  
28 Sydney 76 Sc/St  
June 2 Australian 102 Sc/St  
5 Rockliff 130 Sl  
6 Cambria 101 P/St  
6 Germania 207 Sc/St  
6 HMS Centaur None P/St  
12 Black Prince 161 Sc/St  
25 Arabia7 95 P/St  
27 Cambria 101 P/St  
July 2 Candia 213 Sc/St  
2 Indiana 147 Sc/St  
5 Lord Raglan 89 Sl  
6 Calphurnia 125 Sl  
6 Herefordshire8 108 Sl  
7 Harkaway 39 Sl  
11 Nimrod9 112 Sl  
17 Tamar 191 P/St  
18 Indian 197 Sc/St  
21 Hydaspes. 87 Sc/St  
21 Colombo10 61 Sc/St  
27 Melbourne 73 Sc/St  
30 Europa 92 Sl  
30 Hansa 206 P/St  
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Appendix 9.1: Continued 
1855 Aug. 2 Timandra 51 Sl  
4 HMS Simoom (Troopship) None Sc/St  
6 Lord Dalhousie 116 Sl  
6 Mercia 2 Sl  
6 Saldanha 209 Sl  
6 Germania 207 Sc/St  
8 Tonning 65 Sc/St  
9 Great Britain 187 Sc/St  
16 Clyde 145 Sc/St  
20 Gibraltar 183 Sc/St  
≤31 Great Tasmania11 210 Sl  
1855 Sep. 2 Colombo 61 Sc/St  
3 Jura 14 Sc/St  
5 Ripon 25 P/St  
7 Emeu 74 Sc/St  
8 Arabia 95 P/St  
12 City of Aberdeen 202 Sc/St  
15 Thames 92 P/St  
19 Columba 110 Sl  
20 Hope 64 Sc/St  
25 Faith 131 Sc/St  
Oct. 2 Imperatriz 150 Sc/St  
2 Indiana 147 Sc/St  
2 Sir George Pollock 79 Sl  
4 Edwin Fox 109 Sl  
6 Walmer Castle 117 Sl  
6 William Jackson 93 Sl  
8 Lady M'Naughton 36 Sl  
8 St Vincent  18 Sl  
12 Alma 1 Sc/St  
12 Cape of Good Hope 229 Sc/St  
15 Orinoco 218 P/St  
20 HMS Transit (Troopship) None Sc/St  
27 Earl of Aberdeen 20 P/St  
29 Niagara 48 Sc/St  
Nov. 5 Sultana 32 Sl  
6 Ripon 25 P/St  
8 Great Britain 187 Sc/St  
12 Robert Lowe 134 Sc/St  
12 Bahiana9 160 Sc/St  
15 Arabia 95 P/St  
15 Ottawa 137 Sc/St  
22 HMS Urgent (Troopship) None Sc/St  
Dec. 3 Brandon 139 Sc/St  
3 Germania 207 Sc/St  
3 Sydney 76 Sc/St  
8 Calcutta 195 Sc/St  
8 Queen of the South 135 Sc/St  
18 Thames 92 P/St  
20 Canadian 196 Sc/St  
20 Indiana 147 Sc/St  
22 Hydaspes 87 Sc/St  
25 Earl of Aberdeen 20 P/St  
28 Severn 194 P/St  
1856 Jan. 1 Great Britain 187 Sc/St  
4 Indian 197 Sc/St  
7 Candia 213 Sc/St  
18 Orinoco 218 P/St  
21 Ripon 25 P/St  
Feb. 2 Bahiana12 160 Sc/St  
11 Oneida13 222 Sc/St Liverpool 
15 Thames 92 P/St  
21 Alps 82 Sc/St  
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Appendix 9.1: Continued 
1856 Mar. 1 Jason 84 Sc/St  
3 HMS Transit (Troopship) None Sc/St  
9 Simla, 118 Sc/St  
14 Chanticleer 88 Sc/St  
21 Great Tasmania 210 Sl  
17/26 Andes 100 Sc/St Plymouth/Portsmouth 
24 HMS Resolute (Troopship) None Sc/St  
25 Balbec 89 Sc/St  
30 Borussia 33 Sc/St  
Apr 6 Saldanha 209 Sl  
18 Indiana 147 Sc/St  
21 Thames 92 P/St  
May. 5 Great Western12 6 P/St  
12 Severn 194 P/St  
16 Minden 122 Sl Deptford 
16 Victoria 72 Sc/St  
26 HMS Highflyer None Sc/St  
June 16 Melbourne 73 Sc/St Plymouth/Portsmouth 
28 Harbinger 86 Sc/St  
1856 July 1 Mauritius 129 Sc/St  
3 Severn 194 P/St Plymouth/ Portsmouth 
7 Thames 92 P/St  
9 Queen Victoria12 1 Sc/St  
16 Lancashire13 None Sl  
17 Empress Eugenie14 104 Sl  
24 Ottawa 137 Sc/St  
24 Lady Eglinton 165 Sc/St  
Aug. 6 Euxine  None P/St  
8 HMS Perseverance 
(Troopship) 
- Sc/St  
18 Gibraltar15 183 Sc/St  
Sep. 2 Ava16 None Sc/St  
8 White Eagle None Sc/St  
15 Crest of the Wave 37 Sl  
22 Prince Arthur 85 Sc/St  
1. As the date of disembarkation was not always recorded the date of arrival in English waters reported in The Times is 
given, unless stated otherwise. 
2. P/St, paddle wheel steamer; Sc/St, screw steamer, and assumed to be so in the few cases when it was not stated; Sl, sail. 
3. The vessels arrived at Southampton, Spithead, or Portsmouth unless stated otherwise. 
4 No departure of this vessel from Constantinople was recorded in ADM/7/576 although Major Sillery informed the AG on 
24 October that five officers had embarked on the vessel at Scutari; WO/28/186. 
5. HT&SC, 3 March. There was no mention of invalids in TheTimes, 27 February 1855. 
6. Burmah was wrecked on the French coast; what happened to any invalids has not been ascertained. 
7. PoL and IoWO, 30 June 1855. 
8. Hertfordshire in the Morning Post, 10 July 1855. 
9. From PoL. 
10. From IoWO. 
11. The date of arrival at Portsmouth was not reported but invalids arrived at Chatham from the vessel on 1 September; The 
Times, 3 September. 1855. 
12. The presence of invalids was noted in PoL, but not The Times. 
13. Lancashire and Alice Jackson left Renkioi on 29 May 1856; WO/28/186. 
14. The expected arrival was reported on this date; no further details were published. 
15. The last hospital ship to leave Balaklava. 
16. Ava sailed from Malta with invalids on 28 August; the date of arrival in England has not been ascertained but she sailed 
for India on 1 October 1856. 
17. White Eagle embarked some invalids at Gibraltar on 22 Aug, 1856; WO/284/72. 
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Appendix 9.2: Royal Patriotic Fund 
 
One of the legacies of the Crimean War which persists to this day is the Royal Patriotic Fund.
1081
 It has 
the distinction of being the ‘first Service charity to be created as a result of national demand’ and its 
objectives were set out in a Royal Warrant dated 7 October 1854. Its principal aim was to provide a ‘just 
and generous benevolence towards widows and orphans of those of our soldiers, sailors, and marines who 
have been so killed, or who may hereafter die amidst the ravages and casualties of war.’1082 The original 
members of the commission, which first met on 18 December 1854 under the chairmanship of Prince 
Albert, included several who had a high profile during the war, viz. the Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of 
Aberdeen, Viscount Palmerston, Lord Hardinge, Lord Raglan, Sir John Burgoyne, Lord Rokeby, Lord 
Panmure, Sidney Herbert, Sir James Graham, and Samuel Peto. ‘Commissioners in Aid’ were soon 
appointed and a ‘formidable network’ was set up in order to ‘tap the generous flow of public 
contributions to the Fund.’ This eventually amounted to an impressive £1,471,375 and by the 1990s the 
Fund had assisted almost 135,000 widows and about 150,000 orphans.  
 
Incidentally, the Royal Patriotic Fund should not be confused with either the ‘Central Association for the 
benefit of widows and orphans of the Army in the East’, which seemingly did not prosper, or the Crimea 
Army Fund, whose impressive committee was chaired by the Earl of Ellesmere,
1083
 and The Times ‘Sick 
and Wounded Fund’, whose local agent John MacDonald was an employee of the paper. Both charities 
made a valuable contribution to the welfare or the troops in the Crimea and at Scutari but whose activities 
seemingly came to an end with the cessation of the conflict. 
 
                                                 
1081  For the history and development of the Royal Patriotic Fund, upon which this paragraph is based, 
see Blomfield-Smith (1992). 
1082   The orphans of Army and Navy personnel supported by the Fund up to 1859 are listed in a 69 
page return BPP (1860), No. 51. 
1083  See Crimean Army Fund (1855) for details of the Fund’s activities and a list of the subscribers. 
The honorary agents in the Crimea were the Hon. Algernon Egerton, St Leger Glyn, Jervoise 
Smith, and Thomas Tower, and the principal depot was located in Kadikoi. 
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Chapter 10 
Supplying the needs of the Army 
 
The supply of campaigning armies over the ages has been the subject of several detailed 
monographs,
1084
 but in the final analysis the whole highly complex topic can be 
summarized succinctly by the axiom ‘an army marches on its stomach;’1085 or put 
another way the Commissariat is ‘the stomach of the Army. Without it, or an inefficient 
one, the line and the artillery (the limbs) are worthless.’1086 
The benefits of an effective commissariat were appreciated by Wellington after 
the battle of Talavera in 1809; and ‘by recognizing it [he] assured himself of ultimate 
success.’1087 However, this hard learnt lesson did not result in any worthwhile reforms 
at the time, or in the years before 1854, and consequently the administrative 
shortcomings in the Commissariat, a civilian department initially administered by the 
Treasury, soon became apparent after active warfare commenced in 1854; and these 
problems were compounded further by the late start of the campaign and the absence of 
well made roads and facilities in and around Balaklava. 
Sweetman analysed the administration of the Army at the time
 
and concluded that 
in the long term the ‘real British success of 1855’ was not attained in the operational 
theatres, but in London where the ‘reorganisation of army administration’ was 
achieved;
1088
 a topic that will be considered further in Chapter 12. It is unlikely, 
however, that strategic changes in governmental organization, for example the transfer 
of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War Department during December 1854, 
would have had an immediate impact at the front given that improvements in the troops’ 
well-being commenced during early 1855; and well before any reforms introduced in 
London could have taken effect. 
The supply of the Army during the first winter was investigated by the Supplies 
Commissioners, Sir John McNeill and Colonel Alexander Tulloch, and their findings 
were published in a 728 page Blue Book which pointed out several obvious 
                                                 
1084  For example, Sinclair (1992), Christopher (1998), and van Crefeld (2004), although there no 
specific references to the Crimean campaign.  
1085  Knowles (2005). It is not certain whether this phase should be attributed to Napoleon or Frederick 
the Great. 
1086  Sterling (1895), pp. ix-x. 
1087  Fortescue, History of the British Army, quoted by Cantlie (1974), I, p. 319. 




 For example, it was impossible for the troops themselves to obtain 
fuel and vegetables and until such that these items were supplied by the Commissariat 
the men suffered unnecessarily as they could not keep warm and cook their food, and 
the unbalanced diet led to the onset of the effects of malnutrition including scurvy. The 
Commissioners also criticised the delay in providing facilities for baking bread locally 
and obtaining sufficient cattle of good quality to provide fresh meat. 
The discussion hereunder focuses principally on some of the problems 
encountered in supplying the Army during the winter of 1854-55, and how matters were 




Land transport in the Crimea proved the ultimate Achilles heel, as was expressed 
succinctly by P.B. Maxwell, a civilian barrister and one of the hospital commissioners, 
when he wrote privately to Herbert from the Crimea on 8 January 1855: 
 
Everybody says that the government and the public have met all the wants except one. They 
have sent plenty to Balaklava, but have taken no steps to bring that plenty to camp. In short, 
Sir, you have sent everything 3,000 miles, but the whole distance is 3,006, and the last six are 




This opinion should not have been a surprise to Herbert, however, as the ‘crux of 
the supply problem […] the inadequate road’ had been ‘identified in London long 
before the winter weather arrived and made the road almost unusable;’1091 and it was 
Newcastle, one of the ‘political victims of the Crimean winter,’ who had been 
responsible for introducing ‘the measures which improved the position by the spring’ 
such as the ‘railway, huts, sanitary officers and Land Transport Corps […] thereby 
benefiting Palmerston.’1092 In the event the railway helped keep ‘the Army operational 
and demonstrated how important modern supply systems would be in warfare’ though 
the ‘effective organization of the LTC was not achieved until the autumn of 1855.’1093 
                                                 
1089  BPP (1856), No. 2007.  
1090  W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/363. 
1091  Ponting (2004), pp. 188-9 
1092  Lambert (2011), p. 201. 
1093  Ponting (2004), pp. 335-6 & 190. 
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The Commissariat was empowered to pay for provisions obtained locally, and for 
land and water transport. It could also enter into contracts for ordnance stores, building 
materials, etc., and was responsible for superintending the issue of provisions, forage, 
fuel and light, and these ‘duties were blended with the Army, Ordnance, Navy, and 
many other branches of the public service.’1094 In the context of the Crimean campaign 
the Commissariat relied heavily on the cooperation of the Navy for sea transport as 
without its ‘zealous cooperation’ it would prove ‘impracticable to keep the Army 
properly provided; Constantinople being the principal depot from which we draw our 
supplies.’1095 Fortunately, the British merchant fleet was the largest in the world and the 
relatively high proportion of steam powered vessels meant that they could operate in 
most weathers, and critically during the stormy winter months. Overall there was no 
serious shortage of shipping though on occasions there were short term problems 
associated with hold-ups in the harbours, the inability to charter ships locally at short 
notice, delays in obtaining coal for steamers, and adverse weather conditions hampering 
the progress of sailing vessels. 
Correspondence and reports on land transport matters are summarized in Table 
10.1 and these reveal that the roads deteriorated from early November 1854, while after 
the hurricane of the 14 November
 
the CG appreciated the long-term problem posed by 




the Army in a critical condition with respect to the supply of provisions and forage. More food may 
arrive but the loss of forage is irreparable as only pressed hay of which none can be obtained from 
Turkey can be conveyed in sufficient quantity to meet the consumption of the Army.1096 
 
An officer from the QMG’s department was ordered to Constantinople with wide 
discretionary powers on 16 November to obtain large quantities of clothing and other 
items.
1097
 The Ambassador in Vienna was also instructed by Clarendon to procure both 
clothing and huts for the Army, 
1098
 while the GOC in Corfu took the initiative and 
forwarded 500 blankets, 1,500 flannel shirts, 1,115 pairs of trousers, and 200 gregos to 
                                                 
1094  See Hart (1856), p. 386. 
1095  CG to Military Secretary, 14 Dec. 1854; WO/62/13. 
1096  WO/62/13. Incidentally, Russell reported that 20 days supply of hay and corn were lost; The 
Times, 14 Dec. 1854. 
1097  The list included 22,000 blankets or rugs, 4,000 Guernsey frocks, 7,600 woollen drawers, 36,000 
socks, 26,000 stockings and mitts, 24,000 gregos, 2,000 Turkish boots, stove, and tarpaulins for 
tent floors, and 4,700 camp kettles; WO/28/28/196.  




 Supplies from England were also en route, for example, Alster 




The poor condition of the roads limited the weight carried by carts and pack 
animals and when these became impassable for wheeled transport the effect of the 
losses of pack animals due to malnutrition and exposure became increasingly evident. It 
proved impracticable to replace them, however, because any new arrivals could not be 
fed for want of forage.
1101
 Incidentally, the Supplies Commissioners concluded that this 
factor had a greater effect on limiting the supply of the Army than the shortage of 
wheeled transport and animals.
1102
 
The net result was the almost complete collapse of the Commissariat transport, 
which was already inadequate at the beginning of the campaign,
1103
 and this prompted 
the formation of an independent LTC which took place during the spring of 1855. This 
seemingly sensible development was not entirely successful and Sweetman suggested 
that if the ‘conditions in the second winter had been similar to the first, it is doubtful it 
would have provided a better service than the civilian Commissariat.’1104 Nevertheless, 
by 1 April 1856 it had developed into a substantial organization with c.7,400 officers 
and men,
1105
 and thousands of horses and mules. 
In order to keep the Army supplied during the winter of 1854-55 increasing 
reliance was placed on resources available in divisions and regiments, and on the over-
worked troops for whom the round trip to Balaklava frequently took ‘twelve hours, 
during the whole of which time they were without food, shelter, or rest;’1106 and there 
can be little doubt that this additional excessive labour contributed to the size of the sick 
list. 
It was decided at the turn of the year to form a depot near the British HQ where 
supplies for two weeks could be stored, though bad weather and the state of the roads 
                                                 
1099  GOC, Corfu to Raglan, 18 Dec. 1854; WO/28/197. 
1100  Malta Times, 2 Jan.  1855. 
1101  Raglan to Newcastle, 30 Jan. and 10 Feb. 1855; WO/33/1/17/55 & WO28/199/1. 
1102  BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 18. 
1103  Sweetman (1984), pp. 45-6. 
1104  Sweetman (1984), p. 55. When the Army landed the Commissariat had sufficient carts and pack 
animals to convey only 80 tons and the appropriation of carts locally increased capacity to 140 
tons; CG’s memorandum for HQ, 16 Feb. 1855; WO/28/199. 
1105  Sayer (1857), end paper. 
1106  BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 16. 
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meant that this objective took longer to achieve than hoped. In the first instant artillery 




 Regiments, assisted 
with this initiative,
1107
 as did Sir Colin Campbell who provided 1,300 men from the 
Highland Brigade, Marines, and Rifles together with 400 Turks and some horses.
1108
 
The net result of these concerted efforts was that the living conditions of the troops 
began to improve during January as food, clothing (Table 10.2), and fuel (Table 10.3) 
were delivered to the camps in increasing quantities, the sick list began to decrease, and 
by May ‘wood [was] supplied for the most part by the Commissariat [and] forage is 
obtained without delay at the top of the hill where the rail road terminated.’1109 
Questions were asked by Russell and others, including Panmure, as to why the 
roads had not been upgraded in advance of winter. In the event, this was probably a 
reflection of manpower shortages and the operational priorities of the siege rather than 
either an error of judgement or intentional negligence on the part of the QMG’s 
department, given the colossal effort that was subsequently required for the construction 
of roads after the ending of the siege. A point of view, which highlighted one of the 
fundamental problems facing the Raglan and his successors, namely the shortage of 
manpower, was supported by Commander Gordon, RN, of HMS Sanspareil in his 
response to the Roebuck Committee report made in December 1855: 
 
A great deal of senseless clamour has been raised because Lord Raglan did not employ his 
army in making roads. To this Sir de Lacy Evans states that ‘No road was attempted because 
all men, and more than could or ought to have been spared, were in the trenches [and] until 
the siege was over, no road could be attempted and even then it has taken 10,000 for more 
than six weeks to complete only from Kadikoi.’1110 
 
The Engineers reported that improvements in the main roads had been made 
during January 1855 and wheeled transport could be used increasingly once again, 
while construction of the railway commenced a short while later. Progress was rapid 
and it became possible to transport supplies as far as Kadikoi on 23 February, and by 26 
March they could be delivered to the depot at headquarters. The track was extended to 
                                                 
1107  Notes for Colonel Wetherall’s history of the war which remained unpublished; WO/28/199. 
1108  Campbell to QMG, 6 & 8 Jan. 1855; WO/28/196. 
1109  GOC, 2nd Division to AG, 5 May 1855; WO/28/195. 




 Division camp and the Woronzov Road by May (Figure 10.1) and to the 
Sardinian position in January 1856, by which time it was 19 miles in length.
1111
 
A General Order of 28 March 1855 required that applications for the transport of 
military stores had to be made to the DG of the LTC by the heads of the ‘several 
Departments of the Army’ and that an officer of the LTC would be stationed at each 
terminus to oversee the loading and discharge of the waggons. However, no ledger 
detailing the railway’s activities has been found in TNA and Cooke made no reference 
to one. A surviving return dated 17 April 1855 indicated that the commissariat was 
allocated 32+10 half waggons, the engineers 6+6 half waggons, and the artillery 22 
waggons,
1112
 while Beatty noted that up to 12 May 1855 the railway had conveyed shot 
and shell (1,000 tons), small arms (300), commissariat stores (3,600), and miscellaneous 
items (upwards of 1,000).
1113
 
The railway ultimately had a beneficial influence on the British war effort and by 
the time Sevastopol was occupied it had conveyed to the front 219,723 (92%) of 
238,610 projectiles, ranging from 8-inch shells to 68-pounder shot.
1114
 
The experiences of the first winter remained in the minds of Simpson and his 
successor Codrington and the AWC and the troops spent much time during the autumn 
of 1855 in constructing roads, which, together with the railway, ensured the ‘plenty’ 
referred to by Maxwell was transported to the camps, and the Army remained well 




The port at Balaklava was inadequate for the needs of the British Army when first 
occupied. Its small size presented problems of organization and the lack of storage 




                                                 
1111  The map by Captain F. Brine, RE, dated 1857 shows the final layout of the railway system; 
MPH/1/427. 
1112  WO/28/175. 
1113  Cooke (1997), p. 167. 
1114  Cooke (1997), pp. 90 & 171-2. 
1115  For correspondence about the management of the harbour when Admiral Boxer was the port 
admiral see BPP (1854-55), No. 512. 
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The development and management of the harbour was the responsibility of the 
Royal Navy and wharves were constructed, initially on the east side and later on the 
west. They were used where possible for specific purposes, for example, landing 
ordnance stores, huts and cattle, disembarking troops and embarking the sick and 
wounded, while others were reserved for the Engineers, Commissariat, and railway 
(Figure 10.2). These developments commenced soon after occupation of the town and 
by January 1855 the Engineers recorded that: 
 
Much had been done to improve Balaklava. The existing wharves, built during, the previous 
month, had been considerably enlarged, and new ones had been commenced; at the entrance 
of the town a pier had been constructed for the embarkation of the sick and wounded, and 




while on 5 May 1855 Captain Barnston, a DAQMG, noted that: 
 
A very nice pier is now being made across the north end of Balaklava harbour, and we hope, 
with the help of Admiral Boxer, who is wonderfully energetic and particularly civil when 
properly managed, to make a continuous straight quay all along the east side. Boxer made all 
the west side himself without any military assistance, and from the great help he has been to 




and, on 18 May 1855, Russell reported: 
 
Balaklava presents an aspect of extraordinary activity, and the amount of stores of all kinds is 
beyond conception. When an army has to be fed from beyond the sea, one sees what an all-
consuming creature it is. […] It is to be remarked that much time and labour is lost now and 
then in consequence of forage being received in bulk instead of bales or sacks. Can anything 
be imagined more difficult to discharge but straw in bulk? […] The harbour is, however, now 
scarcely recognizable […] vast improvements in the wharfs and quays.1118  
 
The management of the harbour was criticised by several individuals who gave 
evidence to the Roebuck Committee, and these accounts were justifiably refuted 
robustly by Commander Gordon, RN; who made it clear in a detailed account of the 
development and management of the harbour facilities that effective use had been made 




                                                 
1116  Elphinstone (1859), pp. 79-80. 
1117  Trevor-Barnston (1998), p. 81. 
1118  The Times, 31 May 1855. 
1119  Gordon (1855). 
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Provisioning the Army 
 
The CG suggested to HQ that planning for the winter should be considered in August 
1854; but the advice was seemingly ignored,
1120
 perhaps because it was intended that 
the attack on the Russians was to be more of a raid than an act of conquest. Clearly 
Raglan had not anticipated a winter campaign given that Clarendon advised Stratford 
that he [Raglan] had expressed:  
 
the most decided opinion against wintering in the Crimea under any circumstances, but how 
will he get away from it? How [to] embark the two armies with all their guns, stores etc., 
probably in stormy weather, and with 50 or 60,000 Russians coming upon them like droves 
of famished wolves? It seems to me […] that we are on the verge of a monster catastrophe, 
the only event at all like it [was] the embarkation at Coruna but there our numbers were 
small and encumbrances light and we had the Spaniards to hold the walls for us.
1121 
 
A Council of War held after Inkerman on 6 November committed the troops to staying 
in the Crimea, and the next day Burgoyne wrote to the Assistant Inspector-General of 
Fortifications: ‘There is every prospect of our wintering in […] the Crimea, without 
towns or villages […] or any resources but what can be drawn from the sea.’1122 No 
official announcement of this decision was issued though Raglan informed Lucan 
privately on 8 November that he ‘might prepare for winter,’1123 while by the 22 
November, an assistant surgeon in the RA recorded that: ‘We have orders to winter in 
our present camp.’1124 
Calthorpe, Raglan’s junior ADC, recorded that Sir de Lacy Evans had: ‘urged 
upon [Raglan] the utter uselessness, and indeed impracticability, of attempting to 
hold our present position […] there was nothing to be done but […] raise the siege, 
embark the troops […] and evacuate the Crimea,’1125 while the Prime Minister was 
informed by his son, who was on the QMG’s staff, that he thought that: ‘the same 
advice would be given by every general and officer of experience in this Army, if 
his opinion were asked.’1126 
Raglan had little option, however, as: ‘he could not abandon his guns, that he had 
not transport for half of his army, that he could not leave the French to shift for 
                                                 
1120  CG to Military Secretary, 1 Aug. 1854; WO/62/13. 
1121  Clarendon to Stratford, 13 Nov. 1854; FO/352/37A. 
1122  Quoted by Sweetman (1993), p. 260. 
1123  BPP (1854-55), No. 156, p. 302. 
1124  JRUSI, CII (1957), p. 83. 
1125  Calthorpe (1979), p. 104. 
1126  A. Gordon to Aberdeen, 17 Nov. 1854; BL Add. MSS 42335. 
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themselves, and that he could not take such a step without positive orders from 
home.’1127 And then came hurricane of 14 November, and the fate of the Army was 
sealed; and the ‘monster catastrophe’ predicted by Clarendon came to pass, and all in 
the Crimea were forced to extemporize the best way they could to cope with the 
situation. 
 
The destruction of Prince and other transports anchored outside Balaklava harbour on 
14 November 1854 resulted in the loss of a large quantity stores including clothing, viz. 
on Prince: woollen socks, 35,700; woollen frocks, 53,000; flannel drawers, 17,000; 
watch coats, 2,500; blankets, 16,100, and rugs, 3,700.
1128
 Given that a lead time of over 
two months was required to supply sufficient lime juice to permit dosing each man daily 
to prevent scurvy (see below) it is obvious that some forward planning by the 
government must have taken place during the summer to ensure that such large 
quantities of essential stores arrived in Balaklava when they did, and hence it is not 
surprising that the deficiencies in clothing and other necessaries only began to be made 
good some weeks later (see Table 10.2). 
The details of the large number of items issued to each regiment and the other 
departments were recorded in a ledger;
1129
 those drawn by the Medical Department, 
Ambulance Corps, and General Hospital between November 1854 and May 1855 
comprised jerseys, 7,933; blankets, 6,412; rugs, 5,057; drawers, 2,854; boots, 1,725; 
socks, 818; comforters, 650; mits, 282; fur caps, 108; and sheepskins, 104. 
 
The area of the Crimean peninsula occupied by the allies was not well wooded and the 
shortage of timber for fuel soon became a serious problem, and thereafter all categories 
of fuel had to be imported and transported to the camps (Table 10.3). It had not been 
usual practice for the Commissariat to provide troops with fuel, except when in 
barracks, and hence no provision for this had been made in advance of the invasion. 
Raglan subsequently ordered the CG to provided fuel for the Army on 11 November, 
though it was not until the end of December that ‘the troops in and near Balaklava 
                                                 
1127  A. Gordon to Aberdeen, 9 Mar. 1855; BL Add. MSS 42335. 
1128  BPP (1854-55), No. 247, p. 40. 
1129  WO/28/153. 
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received rations of fuel’ while until the onset of spring ‘the want of land transport made 
it impossible to carry it to the front, except in small quantities for use in hospitals.’1130. 
The provision of fuel resulted in a ‘considerable addition to the duties of the 
Commissariat,’ and some idea of the task can be gauged from the CG’s estimate of the 
amount of fuel and light required during December 1854 to meet the requirements 
stipulated in a General Order of 28 May 1854, viz. charcoal, 481 tons/month and 300 




Nowhere is the relationship between supply and health more immediately obvious than 
in the case of scurvy. This deficiency disease was noted first towards the end of October 
1854 (see Chapter 6) and local available supplies of lime juice were landed shortly 
afterwards (Table 10.4). Immediately he heard the news in mid-November Smith 
arranged for large volumes of juice to be forwarded to the Crimea but despite pressing 
the point to the military authorities it was not until the beginning of February 1855 that 
sufficient quantities arrived for the daily dosing of all the troops to commence. This 
proved beneficial, but as the soldiers’ diet was not necessarily always satisfactory it was 
decided to continue prophylactic dosing for the duration of the campaign, with the result 
that in the autumn of 1855 about two tons of juice was required each day to meet this 
need (Table 10.4). 
 
It can be appreciated from the correspondence summarized in Table 10.5 that 
inadequate living accommodation had serious repercussions for both sick and well 
during the months after the invasion, particularly as preference was given initially to 
accommodating horses and mules under cover rather than the sick, a policy 
understandably deprecated by Hall.
1132
 
The provision of huts became a priority once it was decided to over-winter in the 
Crimea.
1133
 Contracts were entered into in England and locally the QMG instructed the 
CG to purchase timber and other building materials.
1134
 The first of several 
                                                 
1130  BPP (1856), No. 2007, pp. 10-11. 
1131  CG to Raglan, 9 Dec. 1854; WO/28/193. 
1132  QMG to CRE, 25 Nov. 1855; WO/28/196 and Hall, diary entry, 1 Dec. 1954; RAMC/524/15. 
1133  The report of the Supplies Commissioners includes an overview on accommodation; BPP (1856), 
No. 2007, pp. 33-6 & 284-8. 
1134 QMG to CG, 7 Nov. 1854; WO/28/198. 
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consignments of loose boarding etc. sufficient for 10,000 men and 3,500 horses arrived 
from Black Sea ports on 25 November,
1135
 while the first of several ship loads of huts 
arrived from England on 25 December. 
The unloading of this bulky material increased congestion in the harbour area and 
caused considerable logistical problems as the huts were heavy and 250-300 men were 
required to man-handle a hut for 25 up to the camps for want of wheeled transport and 
pack animals,
1136
 while construction using sawn timber was hampered by the shortage 
of skilled labour. 
Regimental hospitals were originally housed in bell tents and marquees but huts 
became increasingly used and by March 1855 the ‘more seriously ill were being 
retained in regimental hospitals instead of being evacuated to Scutari,’1137 though the 
extent of provision for the well proved more variable.
1138
 The provision of 
accommodation was obviously considered a major priority and although hut building 
continued during the rest of 1855 4,000 men were still accommodated under canvas by 
its end, albeit all were in double tents with wooden floors.
1139
 
The provision of huts proved as massive undertaking; the number sent from 
England numbered 4,550
1140
 while c.38 miles of planking were imported,
1141
 and as late 
as the spring 1856 75 miles of roofing felt was sent to the Crimea to effect repairs.
1142
 
Huts were certainly better than tents but they were not an unalloyed success as they 
could become hot in the summer and the ventilation was not always adequate. In 
addition, they could prove unstable in windy weather unless appropriately strutted
1143
 
and were a greater fire risk than with tents.
1144
 Many required regular maintenance as 
they were constructed from poor materials, and the failure to undertake this proved a 
recurrent cause of complaint from MOs (see Table 10.3). For example, towards the end 
of 1855 Codrington informed Panmure that ‘of 640 huts including hospitals […] only 
                                                 
1135  BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 34 
1136  This is in contrast to I.K. Brunel’s prefabricated hospital erected at Renkioi; the components of 
which could be carried by one man or two. 
1137  Shepherd (1991), p. 295. 
1138  BPP (1856), No. 2007, pp. 38 & 284-8. 
1139  Journal of Proceedings, 30 Dec. 1855; WO/28/143. 
1140  BPP (1857), Session 2, No. 267. These comprised those for officers, 788; soldiers, 3,154; cook 
houses, 4; hospitals, 317; stables, 260; and stores, 27. 
1141  QMG to CRE, 19 July 1855; WO/28/138. 
1142  Undersecretary of War, 17 Mar. 1856; PoL. 
1143  Burgoyne to QMG, 18 Jan. 1855; WO/28/197. 
1144  DAQMG, Balaklava to QMG, 11 May 1856; WO/28/136. 
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100 are reported watertight. The old ones all want fresh covering, the best of the new 
ones leak badly at the joints, the thin single-board roofs of the smaller new ones are still 
worse, and felt is only just arrived.’1145 
Codrington informed Panmure in May 1856 that the Russians did not wish to 
purchase huts on the plateau and so they were being sold to individuals or used for 
firewood.
1146
 Some of the best huts were taken to Malta,
1147
 while a General Order dated 
22 May required that each regiment ‘will leave the camp perfectly clean, the huts 
empty, temporary stables and kitchens leveled, dug out tents and latrines filled up.’ 
Some days later Codrington suggested to Panmure that the Russian government 
will no doubt seize every hut ‘on our quitting’ and if it was not an ‘undignified dog-in-
the-manger proceeding, what a magnificent bonfire the whole camp would make!’ In 
his reply of 23 June Panmure opined that ‘if the Russians do not buy our huts, or have 
the decency to ask for them civilly’ he could ‘see no reason why a farewell bonfire 
might not be made of them;’1148 and that this happened was confirmed by Assistant 
Surgeon Grieg who counted ‘no less that ten fires blazing all over the camp’ on the 




The amount of food needed by men and animals of the Army was considerable. For 
example, each day a division of c.7,000 men required 3.1 tons of meat and 3.1 or 4.3 
tons of bread or biscuit, while the divisional animals would consume 6.25 tons of barley 
and 2.25 tons each of hay and chopped straw. 
Under normal circumstances the diet of the men was monotonous and not 
particularly appetizing or nutritious and it was usual for them to cater for themselves 
either singly or in small messes. This was inefficient in terms of manpower and fuel, 
and hence a move towards catering on a larger scale was an attractive proposition; and 
this became a more realistic objective when Alexis Soyer, sometime head chef at the 
Reform Club, volunteered to go to the East to advise on the feeding of the troops. His 
visit received official backing and he arrived at Scutari towards the end of March 1855, 
                                                 
1145  Codrington to Panmure, 29 Nov. 1855; WO/1/380. 
1146  Codrington to Panmure, 13 May 1856; WO/1/384. 
1147  Circulars to GOC Divisions and HoDs, 19 & 28 May 1856; WO/28/140. 
1148  Douglas & Ramsay (1898), II, pp. 249 &258. 
1149  Hill (2010), p. 200. 
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where he proved of ‘great service to this establishment and when his arrangements are 
perfected there will be little left to be done.’1150  
His ‘receipts (sic: recipies) have been highly approved’ and ‘printed by authority 
of headquarters,’1151 and though Nightingale found his stoves in the hospitals answered 
‘every purpose of economy and efficiency’ she concluded: ‘The patients [at Scutari] 
don’t like Soyer’s cookery […] nearly so well as ours, and I hear nothing but 
complaints. But I will not reopen our kitchens yet.’1152 The final sentence may betray a 
hint of bitterness, not surprisingly perhaps, as the special diet kitchens she had worked 




Before Soyer arrived in the Crimea on 5 May 1855 some improvements had been 
in some regimental catering facilities by the provision of stone cook-houses and the 
employment of permanent cooks.
1154
 Perhaps because of this Soyer anticipated 
opposition to his visit though ‘instead of enemies’ he found: 
 
from headquarters to every camp and regiment, the officers and medical gentlemen have 
rendered me the utmost assistance, so ready are they to improve the cooking of food for their 
brave companions in arms. The provisions allowed by the government I consider bountiful, 




His stoves, which could be carried in one piece by a mule, could be used by one or 
two men to cook for a battalion by placing them in a row.
1156
 They were also found to 
be ‘admirably adapted as regards despatch, cleanliness, and economy.’1157 Soyer was 
requested to attend a board of general officers to discuss the erection of soup kitchens 
and the issue of hot meals during the winter.’1158 This proposal was subsequently 
considered impracticable,
1159
 but his stoves were clearly not, as with some modification 
they were still in use some 150 years later.
1160
 
                                                 
1150  Cumming to Hall, 4 May 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/19/17. 
1151  Bracebrige, letter; Lady’s Newspaper, 7 June 1855 
1152  Nightingale to the Bracebridges, 7 Aug. 1855; Goldie (1997), p. 144 and McDonald (2010a), p. 
211. 
1153  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 148. 
1154  For example, in the 1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade; Fisher (2011). 
1155  Soyer to Editor of The Times, 3 June 1855; Soyer (1856), p. 265. 
1156  IGH Alexander’s evidence to the Royal Commission, 25 May 1857; BPP (1857-58), No. 2318, 
pp. 86-7. 
1157  Dr. G. Taylor to Soyer, 5 July 1856; Soyer (1856), p. 417. 
1158  AG to Soyer, 1 Sep. 1855; WO/28/123. 
1159  QM to Soyer, 7 Oct. 1855; WO/28/139. 
1160  Soyer’s camp kitchen is illustrated in ILN, 22 Sep. 1855. 
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By the autumn of 1855 the infrastructure in the camps had been developed further 
and at this juncture Hall reported on the stoves to the War Office in a practical, if 
slightly less enthusiastic manner than some other commentators: 
 
Most of the kitchens in camp are substantially built with coppers and stoves set, and […] as 
many saucepans and kettles as they require so they are better off than if they were supplied 
with M. Soyer’s stove kettle alone. […] many regiments are supplied with Feetham’s stove 
which is more portable and better adapted for the hospital purpose than Soyer’s. […] if the 
army takes the field camp kettles and A and B canteens would all that could be carried […] 
and M. Soyer’s stoves would have to be left behind. M. Soyer’s stoves would be a long time 
clearing its expense in the saving of fuel, as that is not generally an item of expenditure with 




Hall issued a Medical Department Memorandum on the composition of hospital 
diets on 27 January 1856 and this included three of Soyer’s recipes for making soup 
which ‘may not be unacceptable to those medical officers who have inexperienced 
hospital chefs.’1162 Shepherd concluded that: ‘There is no evidence that the medical 
officers viewed [Soyer’s] reforms unfavourably,’ but added the caveat that ‘It may well 
be that they were more ready to accept advice from a man, rather than from Nightingale. 
[…] Soyer had been sent out officially and was well known to so many people of 
influence at home [and also in the Crimea no doubt].’1163 
It cannot be determined if the troops would have enjoyed better health if Soyer’s 
culinary reforms had been introduced before the Army left for the East but by the spring 
of 1855 the government was probably relieved to sanction a famous chef to advise on 
nutritional matters, and thus hopefully prevent problems with catering occurring during 
the rest of the campaign. 
Irrespective of the problems encountered during the first winter matters were put 
right and when the Supplies Commissioners left the Crimea in early June 1855 they 
noted that: ‘supplies of food to the army […] were abundant, and the diet of the soldier 
[is] better than […] in any former campaign,’1164 though they did point out that: ‘It [is] a 
defect in [the] British Army, that no one is responsible for the fitness of the diet 
supplied to the troops,’ and they recommended that a staff officer should attend to ‘the 
supply of the Army’ thus making the best use of supplies available, especially locally. 
There is no evidence that this policy was put into effect in the Crimea; possibly because 
supplies of all kinds were freely available when the recommendation was made. 
                                                 
1161  Hall to Deputy Secretary at War, 19 Nov. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/3606. 
1162  RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3. 
1163  Shepherd (1991), p. 370. 





Raglan pointed out to Newcastle at the end of January 1855 that the ‘the organization of 
the British Army, which is framed for stationary service in the colonies, or for home 
duty, is undoubtedly defective for operations in the field.’1165And how right he was; and 
it is clear that this shortcoming coupled with a combination of bad weather, a lack of 
wheeled transport, and the deterioration of rudimentary rural roads resulted in 
substantial difficulties in bringing the ‘plenty’ in Balaklava harbour to the camps during 
the winter 1854-55. This combination of circumstances, coupled with the effects of the 
losses of stores sustained during the storm of 14 November, together with the failure to 
make timely provision of adequate shelter, proved catastrophic. Collectively these 
oversights overwhelmed the limited resilience of the army supply system and thus 
contributed directly to the excessive losses from disease described in Chapters 5 and 6. 
In his evaluation of the organization and performance of the Commissariat 
Sweetman concluded, inter alia, that the ‘numerical strength and the experience of 
Filder’s force were unsatisfactory,’ and the events of the first winter ‘cruelly exposed 
the dangers of relying on the existing contract system’ and of obtaining ‘waggons of the 
country [and] supplies from the theatre of war.’ The net effect was that the limitations of 
the systems of management, which was excessively complex and rigid, were ‘severely 
exposed’ and the department resembled ‘Charles Dickens’ Circumlocution office.’1166 
Wars are won or lost through logistical strengths and capabilities; for example, the 
loss of the American colonies can be attributed largely to a logistics failure.
1167
 While 
the problems in the Crimea did not lead to a strategic failure, they were disastrous 
enough, and in the final analysis it was the tenacity of those on the ground who did 
much to rectify matters. Their perseverance, coupled with improvements in the roads, 
the rationalization of land transport, and the construction of a railway, ensured that the 
necessaries for life were eventually brought to the camps on a regular basis, and the 
health of the troops improved considerably to give the Sanitary Success of 1856 to 
which reference has already been made. 
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Table 10.1: Correspondence and reports on roads and transport, November 1854-December 1855 
Originator Date Recipient Abstract [Reference] 
Newcastle 2 & 6 
Nov. 
Raglan Informing Raglan of the plan to build a railway. [Shepherd (1991), p. 
461 and WO/6/70] 
General Order 12 Nov.  The bad state of the roads renders the transport of the various supplies 




13 Nov. QMG If the roads in Balaklava are not repaired immediately they will soon 
become quite impassable. [WO/28/192] 
CG 13 Nov. QMG The condition of the road to the camp makes it is extremely difficult to 
keep up the supply of the troops. [WO/62/13 and WO/28/196] 
(Incidentally, the Queen’s Regulations make it clear that the QMG’s 
department was responsible for roads and communications.) 
General After 
Order 
14 Nov.  The roads […] between Balaklava and the lines, having become so bad 
as to render it impossible to convey provisions […] it is necessary that 
immediate steps be taken to repair them; for that purpose the Turkish 
troops at Balaklava are at this moment most available. [WO/28/50] 
CG 17 Nov. Sir 
Charles 
Trevelyan 
I am full of apprehension […] of keeping this Army supplied during the 
coming winter [...] the road from the harbour to the camp, not being a 
made one, is impassable after heavy rains; our obstacle in these respects 
will increase as the winter comes. We shall have many more stores to 
convey than we have hitherto had - fuel, for instance. In short, I am full 
of anxiety and dread on the subject. [Raglan Crimean Papers, (MM 
190), quoted by Hibbert (1961), p. 211] 





23 Nov.  Some carts were loaded with more than 600 lbs altho’ the roads were 
nearly impassable. Such conduct must shortly lead to the destruction of 
the transport of the Army. When the roads are heavy no more than 4 
bags of biscuit of 112 lbs each or 3 sacks of corn at 160 lbs each and 
other packages in proportion are to be place upon them. When pack 
animals are used the load is not to exceed 200 lbs. [WO/62/31] 
General Order 27 Nov.  In consequence of the state of the roads, and the death of many transport 
animals, the Commissariat is unable to convey to the camp the requisite 
supplies of forage. Regimental and Staff Officers must avail themselves 
of their own resources to bring up from Balaklava rations for their 
horses. 
CG 29 Nov. QMG The road along the quay of the harbour, it is all but impassable and if 




29. Nov. Hall […] the almost impassable state of the roads, the inefficiency of the 
overworked mules, and the badness of the weather, the sick […] could 
not be conveyed to Balaklava in the ambulance waggon today. […] This 
condition […] cannot last without occasioning very deplorable results 
and from the state of the transport there [is] little prospect of its 
alleviation. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p.163] 
GOC, Light 
Division 
30 Nov. QMG Pointing out the use of officers’ chargers for carrying rations would 
render the regiment in efficient in case of emergency. [WO/28/196] 
Russell 4 Dec. News item What necessity is there for all the suffering and privation created by this 
imperfect state of our communications? Why should not roads have 
been made when we sat down before the place? Their formation would 
have saved many lives, and have spared our men much sickness and 
pain. Had there been the least foresight […] we would have set the 
Turks to work at once while the weather was fine, and have constructed 
the roads which we are now trying to make under most disadvantageous 
conditions. [The Times, 25 Dec. 1854] 
Hall 6 Dec. DG Blankets and warm underclothing have arrived […] road from 
Balaklava is impassable and there are only a limited number of 
packhorses. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 22] 
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Table 10.1: Continued 
CG 6 Dec. Raglan The Commissariat Officers attached to Divisions have not any want of 
zeal or exertion under very trying circumstances … endeavouring to 
bring in supplies the arrival of which has been prevented by impassable 




13 Dec.  Letter 
home 
They are macadamizing our road and have done about a mile. Heath 
(1873), p. 125. 
DAQMG, 
Balaklava 
26 Dec. QMG The roads in and about Balaklava are in a very bad state. [WO/28/196] 
DAQMG, 
Balaklava 
10 Jan. QMG The roads are very bad from the thaw and the immense quantity of 
liquid muck. [WO/28/187] 
Dr G. Lawson 18 Jan. Letter 
home 
The roads still continue in a very bad condition, almost impassable to 
anything but baggage animals. The French are now making roads for us, 
macadamizing them with the stone which exists everywhere here in 
such great quantities; but it is a very long job. [Bonham-Carter & 
Lawson (1968), p. 150] 
Lord Raglan 20 Jan. The 
Queen 
The roads are so bad that wheeled carriages can no longer be used, and 
that the horse transport is diminished by sickness and deaths. [Benson & 
Esher (1907), pp. 87-8]  
Engineer’s 
Journal 
1-3 Feb.  The roadway adjoining the harbour had been properly drained, and 
raised about 14 inches […]. From thence towards Kadikoi the existing 
road had been partially macadamized for a distance of upwards of a 
mile. The new road to the front, proceeding from Kadikoi by way of 
Karani, had been macadamized as far as the rising ground to the west of 
General Vinoy’s division, or for a distance of upwards of a mile. 
[Elphinstone (1859), p.87] 
Panmure 12 Feb. Raglan In this Major General Airey has totally failed, and thereby shown 
himself deficient in those qualities which constitute the very primary 
requirements of a QMG. To his want of foresight I mainly attribute the 




? Feb. Letter 
home 
Our sanitary measures have from the first been neglected. The Russians 
were in no position to attack us when we first came round, we had no 
trenches to guard, our commissariat horses were still alive, the roads 
were still good, and yet not a tent did we send to the front for at least ten 
days, and much sickness was the consequence. No roads were made, no 
attempt to store provisions in front, no piles of firewood collected, no 
regimental cook houses established; each man did for himself, and three 
or four times the necessary fuel was used. Houses were pulled down, 
which now would have been invaluable as hospitals or store-houses; 
[no] precautionary measure was taken [in case of] failure in immediately 
occupying Sebastopol. Mr Filder [….] great fault has been want of 
foresight, and bad calculation as to the number of horses required; to 
which may be added a total want of even an attempt at taking care of the 
animals […] When the roads became so bad that carts had to be given 
up, he allowed his bullocks to be killed and eaten; when the roads had 
again hardened not a dozen bullocks [remained]. [Heath (1873), pp. 
166-7] 
Estcourt 23 Feb. General 
Wetherall 
The railroad is nearly ready to the village of Kadikoi […] Balaklava has 
become […] a very well ordered place. [NAM 1962-10-95-2] 
QMG 1 Mar. DAQMG, 
Balaklava 
All forage and fuel for the camp […] will be brought up by rail and 
issued at Kadikoi […] assist […] in carrying out this arrangement. 
[WO/28/137]  
DJAG 6 Mar. Letter 
home  
We have suffered because you good people in England or your rulers 
would not give us transport fit for an army of 30,000 men, properly 
organized to do its work. What little transport we had was under the 
control of Filder who had enough to do looking after his eternal 
contracts for biscuit salt pork and rum – No doubt mistakes have been 
made here […] not making a road from Balaclava […] After the wet 
weather set in we never strong handed enough to carry on the siege and 
make roads to. [Robins (2005), pp. 88-92] 
G.L. Goodlake 9 Mar. Letter 
home 
Roads are now in capital order and everything is going well; sickness 
has decreased and everybody seems in better spirits. [Springman (2005), 
p. 106] 
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Table 10.1: Continued 
Airey 16 Mar Diary 
entry 
The stationary engine at the top of the first incline began working 
today. [HRO/BY53/1/1-5] 
Estcourt 16 Mar, Wetherall The rail road is at work for near two miles. It has been effective at 
clearing Balaklava. [NAM 1962-10-95-2]  
Panmure 16 Mar. Raglan Admonishes Lord Raglan for not providing sufficient information on 
[…] the failure to provide a road from Balaklava to the camp. [Douglas 
& Ramsay (1898), I, pp. 103-6]  
Panmure 19 Mar. Raglan It was the duty of the QMG to have provided […] communications with 
the camp. This was neglected. What was the result? […] all intercourse 
between the Army and its supplies was carried out under unexampled 
difficulties. […] In regard to warm clothing; no doubt it was served out 
as soon as it was received from Balaklava; but why was it not received 
sooner? Because there was no road. [WO/33/1/22/55] 
Panmure 19 Mar. Raglan I am glad to hear such good accounts of the railway, and hope […] it 
has enabled you to take up sufficient material […] You say nothing of 
forage, and I sincerely trust it has arrived. [Douglas & Ramsay (1898), 
I, p. 111] 
DAQMG, 
Balaklava 
29 Mar. QMG  Mr Beattie indicates that the railway is ready to carry sick. 
[WO/28/187] 
Russell 30 Mar. Newspaper 
report 
The railway is now completed up to the plateau, and […] carried close 
to headquarters, where there will be a large depôt and station 
established. [The Times, 16 Apr. 1855] 
Estcourt 14 Apr. Wetherall The plateau has become a large town, and the rail road is well up to 
within ¾ of a mile from this station. [NAM 1962-10-95-2] 
Captain R. 
Barnston 
7 May Letter 
home 
The road to Balaklava is very good, like a board. [Trevor-Barnston 





9 June Panmure The road between Balaklava and camp broke up about 20 November 
and the transport power of the Commissariat was reduced by a third as 
it was impassable to carts. The real cause of the deficiency of transport 
therefore appears to have been the want of forage, not the want of ships 
or animals. (The special difficulties facing the Commissariat supplying 
a static army in a barren country was also emphasized.) 




16 June Letter to 
the Editor 
On good roads, as on those now leading from Balaklava to the camp, 
the patients are conveyed in great comfort in either class of the 
ambulance wagons. [MT&G, 30 June 1855] 
Simpson 1 Sep. Panmure I […] feel anxious about this Land Transport, neither it nor the rail 
being at present equal to what we require of them. […] Sir George 
Maclean […] will I trust put our supplies beyond risk of failure. 
[Douglas & Ramsey (1898), I, pp. 368-9] 
Panmure 11 Sep. The Queen The Army is delivered from the trenches. It can be spared to repair its 
roads and prepare for its winter repose. [Douglas & Ramsey (1898), I, 
p. 381]  
Hall 25 Sep. Simpson The men are employed […] in making roads and preparing for their 
own comforts during the winter. [MT&G,13 Oct. 1855 and The Lancet, 
20 Oct. 1855]  
Simpson 25 Sep. Panmure Our men are free from trench work, and can be put on roads […] the 
Civil Corps are failures. Mr Doyne and some of his officers are 
excellent, but the men give more annoyance and trouble than is 
agreeable.[Douglas & Ramsey (1898), I, p. 405] 
Simpson 9 Oct. Panmure As to our roads, I begin to dread their completion before winter. Our 
safety depends on them. [Douglas & Ramsey (1898), I, p. 436] 
Codrington 17 Nov. Panmure Main road to the camp is nearly complete […] the Division roads from 
it to […] and to regimental camps are progressing. [Douglas & Ramsey 
(1898), I, p. 493]  
Hall 27 Dec. Chief of 
Staff 
Frostbite has been found in men employed in carrying stones on the 




Table 10.2: Reports on the supply and distribution of warm clothing and blankets in the Crimea, 
November 1854-January 1855 
Originator Date Recipient Abstract [Reference] 




Blankets and warm under clothing for the sick have arrived in the Jura. 
[BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 163 and Mitra (1911), p. 371] 
1st Royal 
Dragoons 
4 Dec. Regimental 
history 
A good supply of warm clothing was issued during the month. [M&SH, 
I, p. 25] Incidentally, in his evidence to the Roebuck Committee Lord 
Lucan mentioned that ‘clothing that was sent out from England began 
to be served out in December, and that [it] was remarkably good’ [BPP 
(1854-55), No. 156, p. 301] 
Coldstream 
Guards 
4 Dec. Regimental 
history 
Some warm clothing and extra blankets were issued […] the number of 
the latter was increased on requisition of the MO. [M&SH, I, p. 112] 
Captain L. 
Heath, RN 
13 Dec. Letter Blankets and other warm clothing are pouring in. I observe all people 
connected with commissariat or other supply departments put down 
any deficiencies to the loss of the Prince. It must have been a most 
useful loss to them and have saved their characters on many occasions. 
[Heath (1873), p. 125] Incidentally, the losses on Prince included 
woollen socks, 35,700; woollen frocks, 53,000; flannel drawers, 
17,000; watch coats, 2,500; blankets, 16,100, and rugs, 3,700. [BPP 
(1854-55), No. 247] 
DAQMG, 
Balaklava 
28 Dec. QMG Warm clothing was being issued […] great impediment is experienced 









Send the following message by the first opportunity to Lord Raglan. In 
addition to what was taken by steamers of the 8th, 15th, and 22nd 
December to Constantinople a steamer left Trieste for there on the 30th 
with: 17,156 fur coats. 24,900 fur caps, 64,000 pairs of gloves, 11,800 
woollen shirts, 18,000 woollen drawers, 2,500 woollen socks, and 5 
wooden houses. [WO/28/155] 




Recommends regimental surgeons apply to the QMG’s store at 
Balaklava for blankets and warm clothing. There are plenty for sick 
and well. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 112] 
Engineer’s 
Journal 
13 Jan.  Vast quantities of warm clothing […] had been disembarked, and […] 
almost every man had been supplied with a second blanket, a jersey 
frock, flannel drawers and socks, and with some kind of winter coat, in 
addition to the ordinary great coat. [Elphinstone (1859), pp. 79-81] 
Dr G. 
Lawson, 
18 Jan. Letter 
home 
Things were beginning to improve, though very slowly at first. Warm 
clothing had already arrived ‘in enormous quantities’, and ‘a daily 
inspection of the men is now ordered’ to see they really have the warm 
clothing that has been issued to them. [Bonham-Carter & Lawson 
(1968), p. 150] 




The warm clothing has been a great comfort; the sheep skin coats 
especially, and the buffaloe [sic] skins in the field hospitals; but we 
cannot make much progress in getting the men off the ground. […] the 
boots sent are much too small. [NAM 1962-10-95-2]  
Special 
Correspondent 
20 Jan News item The warm clothing is now being carried up in larger quantities to be 
divided amongst the troops. [Daily News, 3 Feb. 1855] 
Surgeon J.A. 
Bostock 
22 Jan Letter 
home 
Each man [in the SFG] has had one pair of cloth trousers, woollen 
drawers, and under-shirt given him, but these only supply the place of 
the rags he had been wearing for more than a year previously, and are 
no sufficient protection against the weather we have to endure. One 
hundred great coats lined with fur are the only extra clothing as yet 
supplied for the whole regiment, with twenty buffalo skins which I use 
for the sick in the hospital tents. In other respects the men are dressed 
as you see them in England. [Bostock (1897), p. 224] 
Mr Monsell, 
MP 
3 Mar. Statement 
to House of 
Commons 
Between Nov. 1854 and Jan. 1855 the Ordnance sent out about 2,000 








Recipient Abstract [Reference] 




The provision of fuel is a matter of great importance. I do not apprehend any 
difficulty in laying in an adequate supply of wood but it would require time. 
[…] The stoves and grates must be sent from England. (also referred to 
obtaining coal.) [WO/62/13] 
News item 12 
Aug. 
 On Turkish coal mines on the Black Sea. [ILN, 12 August 1854] 
Raglan 23 Oct. Newcastle Finding water and of getting wood has been a daily unceasing exertion, and 
the climate has told on them.[Kinglake (1891), IV, p. 451] 
OC, 21st 
Regiment 




2 Nov. QMG The patent fuel is to be landed and Mr Adams wants me to allow it to put 
into our yard, as he says the Turks will steal it if piled up in the open. Am I 
allowed to place it there on not? [WO/28/192] 
Surgeon, 6th 
Dragoon 
2 Nov. CO, 6th 
Dragoons 
Points out the difficulty of obtaining fuel even to cook the men’s rations in 
hospital, to say nothing of the impossibility of affording them warm drinks 
etc. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 171 & 200] 
Lord de Ros 2 Nov Herbert An apparatus called an Etna […] can without fuel make a hot drink in 5 
minutes with a small quantity of naphtha. This is invaluable in a barrack or 
hospital where there is a difficulty about fires at night. 
[W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/321a] 
Smith subsequently agreed on 21 Nov. that it was a good proposal and some 
stoves had been sent to Scutari. [W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/321b] 
DAQMG, 
Balaklava 
4 Nov. QMG Charcoal has been landed [and] heaped up against the wall. If exposed to the 
wet it will be quite useless. […] If it were in bags, I would be able to put it 
into some house, but it would be much better if possible to have it kept on 
board ship, than landed, till required. (The CG was requested to furnish a 




4 Nov. Lt Col. 
Sullivan 
Requesting the issue of camp kettles and a supply of wood. If large cooking 
places were erected the consumption of fuel would be less. [BPP (1857-58), 





Diary No wood has been issued … and as forests do not exist here, the only fuel 








Communicate with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe respecting purchasing 
supplies of fuel, wood and coal at Heraclea. To be forwarded to the Army as 





QMG The patent fuel has been landed and Mr Adams wants […] it to be put into 






QMG The captain of the Victoria is ordered away and states that he has still a 






Diary Wood is the material most difficult to procure, as well as for fires as for the 
construction of huts, most of the brushwood having been exhausted. 





Fuel much wanted for the army. Sir E. Lyons states there are always large 
vessels in the Bosphorus ready laden with firewood for Constantinople 
market. Any number at once might be sent up to Balaklava - suggests a letter 






Respecting the proper preservation of charcoal. […] Some is being thrown 
ashore near the mouth of the harbour. [WO/62/13] 
Hall 29 
Nov. 
QMG Recommending charcoal to be issued to the sick and well to cook their food 
with. [RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/973] 
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29 Nov. PMO, Light 
Division 
Many of the men […] return from their necessarily severe duties, 
almost in a torpid state […] the want of proper cooking utensils; and 






The general health of the men is deteriorating progressively […] 
Exposure to the inclemency of the weather, severe night duties, 
defective commissariat, want of fuel for cooking, are causes more than 
sufficient to account for the change. [M&SH, I, p. 210] 
QMG 3 Dec. Hardinge It is with the greatest difficulty that the men can collect a sufficiency 
of firewood to boil their little mess tins of water, and altogether the 
suffering of the troops is very great. [Cambridge University Add. 
9554/1/9]  
Hall 4 Dec. Purveyor 
Wreford, 
Scutari 
Today an order has been given to issue compressed fuel and light 
which will be a great boon to them if they can get them brought up 
from Balaklava. [RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/1013] 
PMO, Light 
Division 
4 Dec. GOC, Light 
Division 
Something has to be done in the shape of hutting, cooking places, fuel 
etc. as the soldier being without fuel has to consume his miserable 
food half raw. Unless some precautions are taken I fear the army will 
soon be totally inefficient. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 147] 
Hall 6 Dec. Smith Order has been given […] for the issue of compressed fuel [….] and 
there are only a limited number of packhorses. [PoL and BPP (1857-
58), No. 2379, p. 22] 
AG 12 Dec. Memorandum A board [is] ordered to assemble to-morrow [to] consider and report 




16 Dec.  The Order lists the fuel allowances for the different ranks, including 
the medical officers. [WO/28/53] 
QMG 19 Dec. Memorandum It [seems] most singular that the CG should be unable to commence 
the issue of this fuel at once, for he admits that on the 13 November he 
wrote to Scutari for the stores of charcoal which were ready at that 
place to be sent to this country. From the 13 November to 30 
December is a period of more than 6 weeks, amply sufficient for fresh 




19 Dec. Dr Linton Difficulty of obtaining wood as all timber in the neighbourhood has 
been destroyed. Requests that his hospital is supplied with fuel. [BPP 





 Left Attack: […] many damages had been done to the parapets by the 
troops breaking up the fascines and gabions for firewood. It was the 
only resource they had of procuring wood for cooking their meals in 
the trenches. [Elphinstone (1859), pp. 74-6] 
DJAG 28 Dec. Letter home The French I hear are more in dread of a lack of fuel than anything 
else. The trees and brushwood have long disappeared and there are not 




29 Dec.  ... that charcoal may be used as fuel in tents with safety during the 
day, as sufficient ventilation is then maintained; but that during then 
night, when the tents are closed, its use is dangerous. The Commander 
of Forces […] directs that in […] tents, where charcoal is burned, the 
braziers shall be removed and the stoves extinguished at tattoo. 
(Incidentally, this Order was issued prior to the deaths of several 
officers from carbon monoxide poisoning in early January; See Hinton 
(2001)) 
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[..] temporary kitchens were erected at an early period, but the supply of 
fuel failed at the beginning of December. [M&SH, I, p. 337] 
DAQMG 8 Jan. 
1855 
QMG A great quantity of wood was landed from some vessels. [WO/28/187] 
Dr W. 
Cruickshank 
8 Jan. Dr J. Forrest Officers in the General Hospital have complained about the insufficient 
supply of fuel. The supply of charcoal is barely sufficient for culinary 




CG Lord Raglan desires that charcoal for the hospital in every regiment may be 
sent up daily to camp. [WO/28/137 and WO/28/179] 
QMG 12 
Jan. 






News item Wood from the wrecks of 14th November [on] the beaches that fringe the 
cliffs [would supply] the Army of a month. The Navy will not lend their 
boats and men to collect the wood [and] they will not let the transport 





 These frosts hardening the ground improved the communication to the 
front, but they materially added to the difficulty of supplying fuel for 
hospital and cooking purposes. There is a great scarcity of wood of every 
description […] The brushwood on the Inkerman ridge had long been used 
up … steps had been taken to supply this deficiency, by employing 
working parties to cut brushwood in the neighbourhood of the Monastery 
of St George, the supply thus obtained was altogether too insignificant for 
the wants of the Army. […] fortunately large quantities of charcoal arrived 
at Balaklava, and great exertions were made to collect it in front. Manual 
labour was employed, as no other means of transport existed; […] a 
division of Turkish troops was almost entirely withdrawn from the 
Engineers. The siege works suffered […] but the Army at large derived 
great benefit […] and a daily allowance of charcoal was soon after issued 
to the troops on duty in the trenches, independently of the […] supplies 
which they received in camp. [Elphinstone (1859), pp. 79-81] 
AG 14 
Jan. 
CG From the great difficulty the troops experience in procuring fuel for 
themselves, the commander of the forces desires that you forthwith take 






Smith Requesting an opinion on a stove patented by Messrs Price and Co., 
Vauxhall, called the Crimean Army Stove, which, from its portability, 
facility of heating, it is thought would prove useful on the field and 
hospitals. Smith replied on 25 January and recommended that 100 are sent 
to the Crimea, and if they proved valuable more should be sent. They could 
be adapted to provide warm water if a square pan is fixed in the oven 
which the edibles occupy. The Secretary to the Ordnance informed the 
Smith on 8 February that the ‘boiling vessels’ had been added to the order. 
Hall subsequently informed Smith on 19 February 1856 that it was the 
opinion of the majority of MOs that they were not applicable to army 
service. A particular type of fuel has to be carried with the lamp, which 
might not be available when expended. [PoL] 
Surgeon, SFG 18 
Jan. 
Diary We burn charcoal generally during the day in rude braziers (old mess 
kettles with holes punched in), or Maltese stone stoves. Fuel is procured 
easily in Balaklava, but there is much difficulty in getting it up. [Robinson 
















To name a steamer to proceed to Constantinople for charcoal. 
[WO/28/137] 
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Table 10.3: Continued 
DAQMG, 
Balaklava 
20 Jan. QMG Charcoal, sheepskin coats, buffalo robes, forage, and planks 
were carried away during the day on horses. [WO/28/187] 
Commandant, 
HQ 
21 Jan. QMG Turks at the wood heap near the Monastery have […] carried 
away […] in 20 days at least, 56,000 lbs, on average 75 Turks 
have been employed per day. This would give 40 lbs as the 
weight each man carries. They have carried off all the trees and a 
considerable portion of the top and lop. The artillery has been 
supplied with from 2 to 3 thousands stakes. […] A considerable 
amount of top and lop still remains. The root grubbing is going 
on and there will probably be full employment for the Turks as 
carriers for the next fortnight. After that there will be no wood of 
any kind for the use of the army, either British or French, to the 
south of Headquarters as far as the sea. [WO/28/193] 
QMG 27 Jan. Capt. Christie Give instructions that when there is no charcoal wood must be 
issued. [WO/28/137] 
CG 29 Jan. QMG Wood is issued when charcoal cannot be procured. [WO/28/178] 
J. Wood, 
Ordnance Board 
31. Jan DG The Board has accepted an offer of Messrs Price and Co. to 
supply 250 candle stoves and 93,000 lbs of fuel. 100 for the 
General Hospital; 100 for Scutari; 50 for Smyrna. [PoL] 




Latterly there has been a sufficiency of fuel and [and] the duty 
men […] have more time to cook their rations and to clean their 
persons. […] On the 13th a supply of camp kettles was received 
and two men per company were told off to act as cooks. [M&SH, 
I, p. 133] 
19th Regiment January Hall’s monthly 
summary 
A ration of charcoal, tho’ ordered has only been issued once to 
the men for the want of transport. [RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1]  
68th Regiment January Regimental 
history 
The cooking throughout the winter has been tolerably well 
effected, as the men were out into messes of tents … and all not 
on duty were required to attend to the cooking, and to help to 
procure roots for fuel. [M&SH, I, p. 357] 
Panmure 12/2/55 Raglan [In future] General Officers will mention in [their] reports any 
difficulties [with] the issue of rations, fuel or forage; and [to 
inquire] into all neglect and visit upon the delinquent 
punishment due to this fault. [WO/33/1/13/55] 




28/2/55 Letter home We send to […] Heraclea for coal. [Trevor-Barnston (1998), p. 
61]  
88th Regt February Regimental 
history 
The want of fuel was still experienced. [M&SH, I, p. 400] 
QMG 1 Mar. DAQMG, 
Balaklava 
All forage and fuel for the camp before Sebastopol will be 
brought up by rail and issued at Kadikoi. [WO/28/137] 
Supplies 
Commissioners 
9 June Panmure When the Army arrived before Sevastopol it was impossible to 
organise the established regimental system of cooking […] Each 
man had to cook for himself, to procure his own fuel and light 
his own fire. [WO/33/1/44/55, pp. 5-12]  
Hall 20 July DG Charcoal cannot be obtained in the Crimea but is freely available 
in the neighbourhood of Constantinople and the Bosphorus. 
[RAMC/3978/F/CO/1/2/2737] 
DG 4 Aug. Military 
Undersecretary, 
War Department 
Charcoal is very objectionable and should not be used unless 





News item In the adjacent commissariat store (near the Artillery) an 
immense stack of wood was blown down with a noise 
resembling a very heavy cannonade. Horses that were stabled in 
tents were terribly frightened by the unexpected fluttering of the 
canvas around them. [ILN, 22 Dec. 1855] 
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 The following ration of fuel will be issued by the Commissariat until 15/10/1855: 






[…] complaints are still made of insufficiency of fuel for the stoves in the hospital 
huts. […] the allowance having been fixed by rations instead of by weight. […] the 
difficulty might be met by allowing extra fuel […] in emergencies like that of the 
19th when the thermometer fell to 2½º, and this could be arranged with the 







For fear of running short of firewood I had 1,000 men in Sebastopol yesterday and 
to-day to pull down houses, and we have got such a stock. […] The wood is a 
wonderful mixture - shelves, doors, window-seats, pieces of cupboards, boats, masts, 
gun-carriages etc., a great deal of it much too good for firewood though, and, with 
the aid of the carpenter is to be used to make porches for all the hospital hunts first, 





Table 10.4: Supply of lime juice to the Army 




AG Scurvy has been diagnosed in the 1st Bn, Rifle Brigade. Recommends 
procuring fresh vegetables, onions, potatoes, etc. from neighbouring 
ports. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 161] (Dr Dumbereck was 





Lime juice having been landed superintending MOs can obtain a case 
each for their Division, each case contains 36 pints. [RAMC 
397/F/RT/2]  
Hall 2 Nov. Smith The state of health as of 28 October is by no means satisfactory. 
Efforts are being made to supply vegetables as the men are beginning 
to show symptoms of scurvy. [WO/33/2A and BPP (1857-58), No. 






Following the receipt of Hall’s letter of 2 November Smith requested 
the ‘urgent necessity of immediately transmitting a supply of lime or 
lemon juice for the use of the forces in the Crimea.’ The Military 
Secretary reported on 20 November that directions had been given to 
ship 40,000 lbs in steamers to the Commissary General as there was 
insufficient available on board ships in the Black Sea and in store in 
Malta. It was squeezed last year and it is doubtful if the quality is equal 
to that issued to the Navy. Smith informed Hall of this the next day. 
[WO/32/2A; PoL; and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 18 & 20] 
Smith 27 
Nov. 
Hall Holyrood and Esk steamers will sail on the 24 and 25 November with 
10,080 lbs and 20,016 lbs of lime juice respectively. [WO/33/2A] 
Hall 1 Dec. Monthly report 
for November 
1854 
In a short time I hope limejuice will arrive in sufficient quantity to 
issue a portion to each soldier daily. At present it is issued freely to all 
who require it. [WO/17/1730; RAMC 397/F/RT/1/1 (in Hall’s hand); 
BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 159] 
Smith 6 Dec. Hall An additional supply of lime juice amounting to 40,000 gallons will 





Smith The Naval Department has no lime juice to spare but suggests that a 
supply may be obtained from Messina. [WO/33/2A] 
Smith 27 
Dec. 
Dr Hall 9,900 lbs of lime juice have been shipped from Deptford on Sydney 
Hall completing the order for 40,000 lbs. [WO/33/2A and PoL] 





Lime juice has been freely issued medicinally, but it should be given 
[…] as a preventive measure, and fresh meat and vegetables should be 
procured at any price if obtainable. [WO/17/1730; 
RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1 (in Hall’s hand); BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 159] 
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Table 10.4: Continued 
CG, Malta 3 Jan. Sir C.E. 
Trevelyan, 
Treasury 
Regarding the purchase of 40,000 gallons of lime juice. The addition 
of 10% alcohol will act as a preservative while the provision of dried 
vegetables should reduced the need for lime juice. [WO/33/2A] 
Smith  16 Jan.  Undersecretary, 
War Department 
There should be no delay in sending out at least 20,000 gallons of line 
juice in the next two months. He does not advise sending oranges as he 
fears distribution would prove ‘almost impracticable.’ [WO/33/2A] 
Hall 27 Jan. AG The daily issue of lime juice to the troops is to commence. Preserved 
vegetables should be issued if available. Instructions for their cooking 
have been circulated to medical men. [BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 163] 
HQ 31 Jan. General Order Lime juice will be issued and mixed as follows: 5 pints lime juice, 8 
pints rum, 18 pints water, and 4 lbs sugar for 100 men. [WO/28/130] 
Smith 2 Feb. Military Secretary The quantity of lime juice sent out in Holyrood and Esk will not 
be sufficient for the needs of the Army. No lime juice had arrived 
in Balaklava according to letter of 12 January. The necessity of the 
immediate delivery is now very urgent. [WO/33/2A] 
Military 
Secretary 
5 Feb. Smith The lime juice conveyed by Holyrood had been landed at Balaklava on 
19 January. [WO/33/2A] 
Estcourt 6 Feb. General Wetherall We are giving lime juice mixed with rum, and preserved vegetables 
when we can. The order is that these should be issued to the troops by 
the Commissariat upon requisition, but the difficulty is always getting 
them up to camp [NAM 1962-10-95-2] 
Smith 7 Feb.  Undersecretary, 
War Department 
Mr Wild (CG, Malta) should be required to make every effort to 
forward lime juice to the Army. [PoL] 
Estcourt 10 Feb. General Wetherall Vegetables and lime juice is being administered all through the camps; 
but to improve the condition of the blood is the work of time. [NAM 
1962-10-95-2] 
Hall 14 Feb. QMG The issue of lime juice has been attended with the most beneficial 
effects when it has been regularly administered and should be given 
daily as a ration to the whole Army. If given in that way and combined 
with fresh vegetable and fresh meat it would soon correct the tendency 
to scurvy. [WO/28/176 and RAMC/396/F/RT/2 (copy)] 
QMG 15/2/55 CG Are you prepared to issue a daily ration of 1 oz of lime juice to the 
troops? [WO/28/137] 
HQ 16 Feb. General Order Till further orders, one ounce of lime juice may be issued as part of the 
daily ration. The Commissary General will be pleased to deliver this 
ration at the camps. [WO/28/130] 
Smith 22 Feb. Military Secretary, 
Horse Guards 
Reporting the receipt of a letter from Dr Hall dated 2 February. Lime 
juice has arrived and is being daily issued to every man in the force. 
[PoL and WO/33/2A]  
Hall 12/3/55 Smith Scurvy is disappearing fast and bowel complaints are neither so 
numerous nor so intractable as they were. [PoL and BPP (1857-58, No. 
2379, p. 436]  
Hall 24 Feb. Raglan In view of the sameness of the men’s diet and the want of a full an 
constant supply of fresh meat and bread, as well as vegetables, I am of 
the opinion lime juice could not be dispensed with. Strongly 
recommend its continuance. [WO/33/2A] 
Hall 1 Oct. Smith Measures have been taken by the CG to keep up an ample supply of 
lime juice and vegetables, either fresh or preserved. [WO/33/2A] 
CG 7 Dec. Hall The demand of 14,000 gallons monthly exceeds the supply in 








Table 10.5: Correspondence and reports on accommodation, November 1854-December 1855 
Originator Date Recipient Abstract [Reference] 
Hall 2 Nov. 
1854 
Smith If the Army is to winter in the Crimea it is to be properly housed, for no 




Raglan Lord Stratford has been requested to secure suitable hutting material for 
20,000 men and to ‘engage native artisans [for] making and erecting the 
huts of a temporary nature which may hereafter be superseded by the 
frame houses ordered in England.’ [WO/6/70/22] 
Hall 19 
Nov. 
QMG If the army is to remain […] it will be absolutely necessary to provide 
more shelter for the sick [or many] will perish. The storm of the 14th 
November blew down all the hospital marquees and […] I question 





Recently purchased timber and planking should be used to house horses 






Letter home We are told to ‘build huts for the Winter’, the only objection to this 
being having no wood, and the men having no time […] but to cook 
their scanty rations, and snatch a little sleep in their soaking tent when 
not in the trenches. [Mawson (2001), p. 53] 
Hall 27 
Nov. 
Diary entry Nothing has been done about hutting the sick and the Pasha said that we 






It is scarcely to be expected that the general health of the regiment will 
improve until the weather moderates and more adequate shelter is 





There is a great want of hospital huts and cooking utensils, and [fuel]. 
[M&SH, I, p. 375] 
Hall 1 Dec. Diary entry Captain Chapman of the Engineers came over about huts for the sick 
[…] but Lord Raglan desired the cavalry horses and those of the 
artillery are to be put under cover first. When I applied for the sheds at 
Karani it was the commissariat donkeys that were to have preference 
over sick soldiers, and now it is horses, and then men, Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. 
The world has come to a fine pass. No provision has been made for 
sheltering any portion of the Army. [RAMC/524/15] 
PMO, Light 
Division 
4 Dec. GOC, Light 
Division 
I request you urge on the authorities the imperative necessity [of doing 
something] in the shape of hutting, cooking places, fuel etc. […] Unless 
some precautions are taken I fear the army will soon be totally 







Diary Rode […] to see [the AQMG] about getting wood for hutting. […] there 
was none for officers, that the work must be done by ourselves, and we 
must find our own transport. This is an impossibility as we now have to 
carry up the provisions for the army […] for which purposes 120 horses 
and sixty men went today, besides 10 for our own forage, 4 for stores. 
[Angelsey, 1971, p. 64] 
DJAG 28 
Dec. 
Letter to C.J. 
Selwyn 
Well houses are arriving thick and fast at Balaklava they might as well 
be at Kamschatka [on Russia’s Pacific coast], there is no possibility of 
their being transported to the front until the works of the siege are over. 
[Robins (2005), p. 57] 
Hall 2 Jan. 
1855 
Smith Tent accommodation very defective […] and although purchased 
waterproof coverings etc. for the bottoms, the men suffered from being 
wetted. [PoL] 
Hall 4 Jan. QMG Wooden huts, with stoves, need to be erected at once both in Balaklava 
and in camp. Bell tents do no afford sufficient protection for sick men 
during the inclement weather and proper protection is required for their 




5 Jan. PMO, 4th 
Division 
Will need 110 men to carry up one hut. The General of Division has 
ordered that no men can go on a fatigue party to Balaklava until they 
have been off trench duty for 24 hours. [RAMC/397/F/CO/32/2] 
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6 Jan. CO, 19th 
Regiment 
In a Circular Memorandum […] Dr Hall stated that [there are] wooden 
huts now in Balaklava […] and he invites MOs to second his efforts by 
making demands for the comfort and welfare of the sick under their 
care! I cannot obey this injunction otherwise than again by stating […] 
the absolute necessity of some further protection for the sick, and 
healthy men also, than the tents at present occupied by them. […] the 
prospects of recovery of the patients are very much diminished by the 
limited protection offered by my hospital accommodation. 
(Annotated by General Codrington: ‘There is no doubt of the necessity 
of some better accommodation for the sick than exists at present.’ 
Further annotated by the QMG: ‘Every effort is made to bring up huts 
for the sick by artillery stripped wagons. But the Commissariat 
transport, having failed, no assistance can be expected from the 





8 Jan. Letter home The houses they have made so much fuss about in England […] have 
arrived, but they are useless for want of nails, which they say have been 
forgotten. [Fisher (2011), p. 144] 
QMG 10 Jan. GOC, 3rd 
Division 
Every endeavour will be made to bring up huts for sick. All available 




10 Jan. Colonel F. 
Horn, 20th 
Regiment 
Each hut with the tools weighs 25 cwt. and 100 men to bring them up so 
each will only have to carry 28 lbs. Horn declined to provide the men as 
it […] was the duty of the government to provide for the troops. [A 4th 
Division] order states that no soldier can go to Balaklava unless he has 
24 hours clear of the trenches. […] He hopes the IGH will lay the 
matter more clearly before the Field Marshal than it yet appears to have 
been done. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 169] 
Hall 12 Jan. Smith An effort is being made to get wooden huts … Some regiments [send] 
fatigue parties […] for them. Other commanding officers say it is the 
duty of the government to provide transport […] and do nothing. In the 
meantime men are deprived of the shelter [they need]. […] Had huts 
and stores been here at the beginning of October instead of January 
things would have been better. Our duty now is to do the best we can 
for the sick with the means at our disposal. Want of transport, and the 
almost impassable state of the roads, have prevented the MOs from 
doing what they wished for the sick. [PoL and BPP (1857-58), No. 
2379, p. 276] 
Dr Hall 15 Jan. PMO, 1st 
Division 
[…] above all try and get wooded huts for the sick. […] so housed 
would get well as soon as at Scutari. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 113] 
DJAG 18 Jan. Letter to C.J. 
Selwyn 
None of the men are yet in the wooden houses. They will not 
understand in England that we have not transport for heavy goods […] 
the pieces of huts are large and heavy. It takes 180 men to carry up a hut 
for 20 men. [Robins (2005), p. 67] 
Hall 18 Jan. Smith Waterproof bottoms [for tents] do not answer in practice as the water 
[leaking into the tents] forms pools instead of being absorbed into the 
earth. […] whereas a strip of McIntosh cloth spread under the blankets 
answers admirably well [and] might be adopted with great advantage to 
the health of the troops. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, pp. 32-3] 
Burgoyne 18 Jan. QMG The huts received from England are unstable in windy weather and 
require appropriate strutting. [WO/28/196] 
QMG 19 Jan. GOC, 
Divisions 
(1) Every regiment to send one or more carpenters to Balaklava to be 
instructed in the manner in which [huts] are to be put together, and (2) 
The barrack huts sent from England have no stability in themselves to 
withstand a strong wind, […] they should be carefully strutted; beams 
for the purpose will be issued. [WO/28/196] 
Special 
correspondent 
20 Jan. News item The huts are showing themselves about our position. The hospitals are 
being got up first. The houses look very snug. [Daily News, 3 Feb. 
1855] 
Raglan 23 Jan. Newcastle […] if the Commissariat were adequately provided with transports, and 
[huts] brought up, there would be no other cause of suffering than the 
severity of a Crimean winter, and the duties imposed of carrying on a 
siege in such a climate at this season of the year. [WO/1/371 and The 
Times, 8 Feb. 1855]  
Cavalry 
Division 
25 Jan. Orders Timber for huts […] should not be allowed to drag on the ground as a 
portion of the mortised timber is worn away. [WO/28/159] 
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4 Feb. Evidence to 
Roebuck 
Committee 
The wooden huts at the hospital at Balaklava were well adapted for 
hospitals […] and the men seemed to be pretty comfortable. [BPP 
(1854-55), No 156, pp. 288-9] 
QMG 8 Feb. Admiral Boxer Representations have been made that the wharf for landing huts has 
been appropriated for other purposes. He must make arrangements to 
facilitate landing them. [WO/28/137] 
QMG 11 
Feb. 
Capt. Keane Admiral Boxer has been written to prevent the crowding of the wharf 





Letter to the 
editor 
In the first week of February, when we were fortunately supplied with a 
hospital hut, the strikingly rapid improvement in the more aggravated 
cases, and the speedy convalescence of the slighter ones. Pointed out 
the fons et origo mali [source and origin of evil], as well as their 
palpable remedy and prevention. [MT&G, 31 Mar. 1855] 
Hall 23 
Feb. 
Smith The sick are [comfortable] in huts or marquees that now begin to appear 






If [the government] had prepared the huts, and warm clothing; and all 
had been waiting in the Bosphorus for our call, we should not have 
cared much about winter. [NAM 1962-10-95-2]  
Hall 1 Mar. QMG Complaints have been made of the leaky condition of the hospital huts 
in camp, and of the inconvenience and injury the sick have sustained 
[…] I request […] this very serious defect [is] remedied as soon as 
possible. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 126] 
SS2 Hanbury 6 Mar. PMO, 
Balaklava 
The temperature in the huts […] is considerably increased under […] 
the sun […] absorbing power of the black felt. Suggest [a] whitewash is 





Dr Hall Recommending that the roofs of the huts are painted with a white colour 
the rain will not wash off as even now when the sun is at its height the 
heat is very great. [BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 207] 
41st Regt Mar. Monthly 
summary 






The troops were much employed in constructing huts for barrack and 
hospital accommodation, and many of the tents were boarded over, and 
made tolerable dry and comfortable. [M&SH, I, p. 447] 
AS D. Greig 24 
Apr. 
Letter home  The first look of the camp certainly astonishes you. What a multitude of 
tents and wooden huts everyone exclaims. Scattered in all directions as 





Health improved and should improve further following the move of 
some men from huts to tents. [RAMC/397/FRT1/2] 
Hall 10 
May 
QMG Forwarding a letter from SS Hadley reporting the wretched condition of 
the roofs of the huts at the Castle Hospital. [RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2059 
and BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 207, p. 122] 
QMG 12 
May 
CG To procure a supply of tarred canvass from ships in harbour to cover 




QMG The use of waterproof blankets to protect the bedding in the huts was 
insufficient, given the extent of the leaking. 




Letter home You people at home are quite insane - you send us out hospital huts 
three ship loads, you so arrange that when one ship arrives, not a hut 
can be put up as a part of each hut is [in] each ship so if one had been 





Requesting him to carry out the system of ventilation of the hospital 
huts proposed by Dr Hall. [WO/28/138] 
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Letter to the 
Editor 
Each regiment has a certain number of wooden huts, or canvas 
marquees, devoted to the sick. In each division, also, a number of huts 
form a General Divisional Hospital. The huts are of two sizes; one, 28 
feet by 16 for 16 patients; the other, 60 feet by 20, for 30 patients. The 
floor is boarded, and raised about a foot from the ground; the interspace, 
in those most recently erected, being filled with charcoal. Free 
ventilation is secured by side windows, but the beds appeared […] too 
crowded, both in the huts and marquees. […] There is no attempt at 
drainage to these huts; all excrement, etc., is carried to holes dug in the 






Of the 199,780 feet [37.8 miles] of planking 24,780 feet [4.7 miles] are 





[Hospital] huts erected in February are now so leaky from exposure to 
sun and rain […] The roofs are out of repair from shrinking of the felt; 
there are so many cracks in the boards comprising the other parts the 
patients are obliged to move from the weather side during wind and 
rain. [RAMC/397/FR/T/1/2] 
Hall 1 Aug. QMG 158 hospital huts are required, viz. infantry, 50; cavalry, 14; RA and 
RS&M, 30; Ambulance Corps, 2; LTC, 12; stores, 22; and staff and 
offices, 80. [RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2853 and RAMC/397/M/1/16] 
Hall 3 Aug. QMG Timber and boarding will be needed for hospital kitchens and latrines. 
Huts in use require upgrading; the walls need to be double thickness or 
covered in blankets, and the roofs carefully felted. Reference was also 
made to improvements for the tents. [RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2858 and 
BPP (1857-58), No. 2379, p. 126] 
Smith 4 Aug. Military 
Undersecretary 
As troops are likely to over winter in the Crimea it is essential they 
should be furnished with tents of a superior description. The bell tent is 
in many respects objectionable […] insufficient to protect from the wet 
or the cold, and is altogether uncomfortable. [PoL] 
Simpson 9 Aug. Panmure Many of the old huts may probably serve another winter, when 
strengthened, newly felted, and repaired. All this has been 
contemplated. Gloster huts are far the best. [WO/28/198] 
Panmure 22 
Aug. 
Simpson Huts are going out to accommodate 1,600 officers, 50,000 men, and 
3,160 patients. State whether you can with the material on the spot and 
supplies from Sinope provide accommodation of the remainder of the 
Army and all horses. [WO/28/198] 
QMG 6 Sep. General Jones, 
CRE 
General Simpson is anxious with regard to the stability of hospital huts 
and wishes to know […] how they may be strengthened etc. 
[WO/28/192] 
Hall 7 Sep. Smith Hospitals have covered kitchens, mostly built of stone. Latrines with 
paved pathways are in the course of erection The regimental hospitals 
[appear like] fixed quarters with iron bedsteads, bedding etc. These 







Letter home We have heaps of huts come out in various patterns, but unfortunately 
no one knows how to put them together. I believe they have telegraphed 
home for the necessary conjurer, but until his arrival, they are lying 
about like melancholy Chinese puzzles! [Mawson (2001), p. 191 
Hall 27 
Oct. 
QMG The roofs of the huts at the Castle Hospital are defective; and immediate 






As winter approaches it is regretted that that huts have not been 











Hospital huts are being prepared for the winter, insufficient felt has 
been supplied. [RAMC/397/FR/T/1/2] 
Hall 10 
Nov. 
Smith I have been fighting and battling to get the hospital huts put in order for 
the winter, but anything for the sick is such uphill work one would 
imagine the sick were not an integral part of the Army. [Wellcome MS 
8520 ff. 282-90 and Mitra (1911), pp. 401-4] 
Codrington 17 
Nov. 
Panmure The main road to the camp is nearly complete – the division roads are 
progressing. I wish more huts were up. [Douglas & Ramsay (1898), I, p. 
493]  
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Table 10.5: Continued 
Codrington 18 
Nov. 
Hall Pray tell me if there is any regimental hospital that you think inadequate 
or incomplete for the fair probability of sick. Some must have good hut 
accommodation for upwards of 100, others of course less; but is there 
any one really defective for its probabilities. [RAMC/397/F/CO/18/1] 
AS D. Greig 19 
Nov. 





Cavalry regiments should take steps to repair their own hospital huts as 
has been done by the many of the infantry regiments who have secured 




Panmure Hutting is going fairly well […] and the damages of so many huts by 
the explosion (31 destroyed and 62 damaged) are being quickly 
remedied. [Douglas & Ramsay (1898), I, p. 501] 
Codrington 27 
Nov 
Panmure The huts are not the least watertight, very bad roofs, leak at joints, thin 
wood, and defective. [Douglas & Ramsay (1898), I, p. 511] 
Codrington 29 
Nov. 
Panmure Of 640 huts including hospitals on this plateau, only 100 are reported 
watertight. The old ones all want fresh covering, the best of the new 
ones leak sadly at the joints, the thin single-board roofs of the smaller 
new ones are still worse, and felt is only just arrived. [WO/1/380, ff. 
359-382] 
Hall 1 Dec. Monthly report 
for Nov. 
The hutting of an Army is, however, a great undertaking, and I fear the 
work will not be completed before the winter sets in. Wooden huts too 
are apt to leak from fitting defects, and unless felt arrive in time much 
discomfort will be experienced. Many of the old hospital huts require 
repair, and few new ones have arrived to replace them. Repairs are 
being proceeded with as quickly as possible in all the divisions. 
[WO/70/1731]  
Codrington 1 Dec. Panmure The huts sent out are anything but decently watertight. […] the best new 
ones, those long ones of 70 feet, with double boards and felt, were yet 
defective at the junction of the roof-squares [so] that the water came in 
plentifully, and the men had to use their waterproofs […] while lying 
down … I had ordered that the hospital huts containing the sick should 
first have all assistance […] to make them sound; but to limit […] to 
huts that actually contain sick. [Douglas & Ramsay (1898), II, pp. 2-3] 
Smith 1 Dec. Dr Hall The DG regrets some hospital huts are in need of repair and he directs 
that the QMG should be pressed again for action to be taken. Failing 
that the subject will be brought up with the Minister for War. [PoL] 
MT&G 1 Dec. News item In the great majority of the Regimental Hospitals, warm, double-walled, 
and spacious huts have [replaced] marquees; and in [in the remainder 





3 Dec Letter home The new huts in the front have, too, succumbed to the blast from the 
Euxine, all for a want of a few additional sticks as ties between the 
rafters and uprights. [Ward (1970), p. 91] 
QMG 15 
Dec. 
Codrington Considerable progress has been made in hutting the troops […] owing 




Smith No efforts have been spared to get old huts repaired, but very few new 
ones have been received. The huts of the Light Division destroyed or 
damaged by the explosion have been repaired. 





The new single boarded plate huts let the water in […] and a want of 





There are now not more than 4,000 soldiers under canvas […] in double 





Figure 10.1: Railway network, 13 April 1855 (WO/78/1028) 
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Figure 10.2: Balaklava harbour, July 1855 (MPH/1/121) 
 
B, RE hutting and timber yard; C, sick wharf; D &E, RE wharf and office; F, rough timber wharf; H & K, 
corn wharf and rum store; M & N, railway depot, saw mill and wharf; O, fuel wharf; R & S, ordnance 
shot depot and wharf; T, cattle wharf; V, Sardinian wharf; W, French wharf. 
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Chapter 11 
Commissions and committees 
 
The serious health problems in the Army during the winter of 1854-55 prompted the 
government to send three Commissions of enquiry to investigate matters on the spot, 
while a Select Committee chaired by John Roebuck, MP, was convened after the 
resignation of Aberdeen’s administration to ascertain what had been going wrong, and 
who was to blame.
1168
 The proceedings of these enquiries were published (see 
Bibliography) and the crucial question posed in this chapter is:- Did the results of their 





The first of the three Commissions sent to the East comprised Drs A. Cumming, T. 
Spence, who drowned on Prince on 14 November 1854 and was replaced by Dr P.S. 
Laing, and P.B. Maxwell, a barrister. Their brief was to make recommendations rather 
than institute reforms and the matters addressed in their report included, inter alia, 
staffing levels, particularly hospital orderlies, the duties of the purveyor, laundry 
facilities, and the preparation and distribution of food, while with respect to Scutari they 
suggested the acquisition of a ship for a store, a steamer to ply between Scutari and 
Constantinople, and open boats to assist the landing of evacuees. 
Much criticism has been levelled against the hospitals at Scutari and part of the 
problem was the lack of an overall command structure, as enunciated by Stratford: 
‘Sillery, Boxer, and Menzies are excellent well-intentioned men, but they are not of the 
most clear-headed or energetic race, and the great obvious want is that of a head.’1169 
Not surprisingly Maxwell was critical of several aspects of management when he visited 
on 10 November 1854 though his ‘first impression [was] favourable […] I found ample 
ventilation, comfortable bedding, and healthy looking convalescents. The fine weather, 
the ample building, and abundant supply of water may have contributed to give the 
                                                 
1168  For further details see Shepherd (1991), pp. 373-411. 
1169  Stratford to Raglan, 16 Nov. 1854; Lane-Poole (1888), pp. 381-2. 
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place an air of cheerfulness.’1170 Similarly, the PMO reported to Hall that Nightingale’s 
initial reaction was encouraging: 
 
The hospitals are […] in tolerable order as regards cleanliness and comfort, and this opinion 
has been expressed […] by various officers of our own and Naval service, and […] 
Nightingale, who had been to most hospitals in Europe, and stated that on her arrival here 





Clearly things deteriorated when large numbers of seriously ill patients arrived 
during the next few weeks, but that was more a reflection of the facilities being 
overwhelmed than anything else; and by the time the Sanitary Commissioners arrived in 
March 1855 conditions had improved once again (see below). 
Maxwell also confirmed that the wards and latrines were not as bad as has been 
stated by some critics, and that the PMO was not to blame: ‘I have been backwards and 
forwards in that [Barrack] hospital for three months; though I found sometimes the 
effluvium from the privies offensive […] I never found anything positively offensive in 
any of the wards or corridors.’1172 However, the unsatisfactory state of the latrines at 
Scutari was due principally to their construction, and the misuse to which they are put, 




Hall: The water closets […] speedily got choked up from the men recklessly thrusting old 
shoes and other articles down them. When […] put right, I advised small iron gratings to be 
placed over them, so as to prevent [this], but it was not attended to; hence the disgusting 
scene, described by Mr Osborne, in the Barrack Hospital. Nothing of that kind existed when I 




Resident engineer: The soil, etc., was, conveyed from the closets […] by means of 
earthenware piping 7 inches in diameter, protruding from the inner side of the walls of the 
building. The whole system of drainage was most defective, and constant repairs were 
therefore needed […] About the middle of September 1854 a general repair of […] the closet 
pipes in the Barrack Hospital was made [and] up to the 5
th
 December [they] underwent a 
general repair no less then three separate times. […] caused chiefly by the obstruction of the 
pipes from […] throwing old clothing, bones, and other refuse matter down them, thus 
completely stopping the passage or bursting the pipes, and thereby causing most offensive 





                                                 
1170  Maxwell to Herbert, 10 Nov. 1854; W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/356. 
1171  Cantlie (1974), pp. 123-4. Incidentally, Bostridge (2008, p. 224) suggested that Nightingale, 
showed self-discipline by ‘making a tactical move designed to disarm [Menzies].’ It is difficult to 
know how this was the case given the remark was made soon after her arrival and the hospital had 
yet to be overwhelmed. 
1172  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 100. 
1173  Captain E.A. Gordon, RE 
1174  Letter to Editor, 9 July; The Times, 27 July 1855. 
1175  Elphinstone (1859), Appendix 53, p. 291. 
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Incidentally, the resident engineer also reported on 5 December that: ‘The pipes 
conveying the water supply were entirely renewed from its source, a distance of 
upwards of four miles, and sedimentary wells were formed at intervals along its course.’ 
 
Select Committee of the House of Commons 
 
The Roebuck Committee investigated the ‘Condition of the Army before Sebastopol’ 
and produced five reports, three of which contain the answers to 21,431 questions posed 
to witnesses.
1176
 The responses provided by senior commanders who had returned home 
suggested that overwork, and not a shortage of food, was the principal factor that caused 
the breakdown in the health of the troops (Table 11.1). 
The fifth report, which provides a short summary of some of the problems that 
faced the Army, opened with the following obvious realistic conclusions, although they 
were only made after making allowance for difficulties resulting from a long period of 
peace, and the storm of 14 November 1854: 
 
An army encamped in hostile country, at a distance of 3,000 miles from England, and 
engaged in a severe winter in besieging a fortress which for want of numbers, it could not 
invest, was necessarily placed in a situation where unremitting fatigue and hardship had to be 
endured. Your Committee are, however, of the opinion that this amount of unavoidable 
suffering [was] mainly to be attributed to dilatory and inefficient arrangements for the supply 




A serious shortcoming of Roebuck’s initiative was the impossibility of cross-
examining personnel with the Army, and all the information they considered was 
necessarily out of date. Incidentally, Herbert made a pertinent observation with respect 
to the AMD: ‘[The Committee’s] acceptance of gossip and hearsay evidence, […] the 
bullying Old Bailey tone to Dr Menzies and the small fry contrasted with the civility to 
Newcastle [and] the condemnation of Dr Hall, who is unheard.’1178 
In the event the Committee made no specific recommendations; an omission 
perhaps, although by June 1855 most of the problems would have been already 
addressed, either wholly or in part. 
 
                                                 
1176  BPP (1854-55), No. 156, 218, 247 & 318. 
1177  BPP (18554-55), No. 318, p. 3. 




The Commissioners, Sir John McNeill and Colonel A.M. Tulloch, arrived in 
Constantinople on 6 March 1855, too late to have much impact as by then abundant 
supplies of food, clothing and other necessaries were being received, huts were being 
erected, a railway was under construction, and the roads were under improvement so 
wheeled transport could be used again. 
The Commissioners subsequently reported their retrospective assessment to 
Panmure on 10 June:  
 
The sick from the Crimea were nearly all suffering from diseases chiefly attributable to diet 
[…] supplied […] during the winter, consisting principally of salt meat and biscuit with […] 
insufficient […] vegetables, [which] was calculated […] to produce those diseases. […] Dr 
Sutherland, of the Sanitary Commission […] entirely concurred in the necessity of 
substituting fresh meat for salt, and fresh bread for biscuit, as well as increasing the supply of 




The commissioners also made some additional observations in their official report: 
 
The medical evidence appears […] against […] anything peculiarly unfavourable in the 
climate, and all the officers […] examined, referred to overwork, improper diet, exposure to 
cold and moisture, with deficient shelter, inadequate clothing, and defective boots, as the 
causes of disease. […] there can be no doubt that the mortality was really the effect, not of 
any one cause apart from the others, but of a combination of the whole. […] this enquiry 
[has] demonstrated how indispensible it is to the soldier’s efficiency, especially in the field, 




As with the Hospital Commission no formal recommendations were made and 
hence the report represents little more than a source of historical information. This fact 
might explain in part why its publication was delayed until after the war and the blame 
game had come into operation. This not unexpected development resulted in the 
convening of the so called Chelsea Board of General Officers whose controversial 
report exonerated the QMG and AG from any blame for the events of the winter of 
1854-55, although Filder, the CG, did come in for some criticism,
1181
 and he responded 
to this by publishing a pamphlet by way of a defence. 1182 
No specific comments were made in the Supplies Commissioners’ report about 
the functioning of the AMD, and there was little on health matters with the exception of 
an apparent misunderstanding about the availability of quinine and the supply and issue 
of lime juice to prevent scurvy. Smith, however, did ask Hall for his opinion on the 
                                                 
1179  BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 1. 
1180  BPP (1856), No. 2007, p. 37 & 47. 
1181  BPP (1856), No. 422 & 2119. 
1182  Filder (1856). 
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report and his reply of 28 April 1856 included comments on marquees and other 
equipment, the provision of transport, the issue of warm clothing, and the availability 
and supply of medicines. He also suggested corrections on matters of detail.
1183
 
The report of the Chelsea Board was considered a whitewash by several 
contemporary commentators; and by implication an animadversion of the 
Commissioners. McNeill chose to make no response publicly,
1184
 but Tulloch published 
a rejoinder in which he emphasized that in his opinion the losses from disease would 
have been substantially less if supplies had been adequate, and, on this basis he could 
not accept the conclusion of the General Officers that nobody in the Crimea was 







Palmerston appreciated that that the health problems in the Army were not dissimilar to 
those faced by the public health authorities in Britain (see Chapter 1)
1186
 and shortly 
after he became Prime Minister he sent a Sanitary Commission to the East with a view 
to establishing civilian standards of hygiene in the camps and hospitals. 
The Commissioners, Dr J. Sutherland, Mr R. Rawlinson, a civil engineer, and Dr 
H. Gavin received their instructions from Panmure on 19 February 1855, and they, with 
a small staff,
1187
 arrived at Constantinople on 3 March tasked with dealing with ‘the 
hospitals, but not with the sick, and the camp, but not with the troops.’1188 Their brief 
was to attend principally to environmental matters, and it is clear from their report there 
was plenty of scope for this in and around the various general hospitals and the town 
and harbour of Balaklava, and much effort was subsequently expended in attempting to 
put these matters to rights. 
Palmerston, who had been a supporter of Edwin Chadwick, adopted a bellicose 
attitude over the sanitary issue before the Commissioners arrived in Turkey by assuming 
                                                 
1183  Mitra (1911), pp. 479-503. 
1184  McNeill subsequently provided a forward to the 2nd edition of Tulloch (1857) published during 
1880. In this he was critical of both Kinglake and the Chelsea Board. 
1185  Tulloch (1857), pp. 149-69. 
1186  Palmerston to Panmure, 13 Feb. 1855; Douglas & Ramsay (1898), I, p. 63. 
1187  Gavin died following a shooting accident and was replaced by Dr Gavin Milroy who arrived in the 
Crimea on 22 July 1855. 
1188  BPP (1857), Session 1, No. 2196, p. 4. 
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they would be: ‘opposed and thwarted by the medical officers, by the men who have 
charge of the port arrangements, and by those who [clean] the camp. Their mission will 
be ridiculed and their recommendations and directions set aside unless enforced by the 
peremptory exercise of your [Raglan’s] authority.’1189 
In the event this extreme view proved unwarranted as the Commissioners told the 
Commandant at Scutari that they ‘cannot but express their gratification at the zealous 
cooperation they have received not only from your Lordship, but from the officers […] 
at Scutari and Kulali.’1190 In like manner, Raglan instructed that every facility should be 
given to the Commissioners ‘in the execution of the duties confided to them.’1191 Hall 
collaborated with them by providing ‘much information respecting the health of the 
Army, and for facilities in examining the camps and hospitals,’1192 while at the end of 
May Hall informed Raglan that; ‘Every precaution is being taken to remove nuisances 
from the camps […] and to improve their sanitary condition […] and in this the Sanitary 
Commissioners […] afford cordial assistance;’1193 although, as the editor of the AMJ 
surmised, progress was probably not as rapid as it might have been because: 
 
The mismanagement of medical matters in the East [had] arisen rather from the want of 
fuller power and authority in the heads of the AMD, than from any absence of ability or 
deficiency of skill, is a sufficient proof of the necessity there is for entrusting all purely 
sanitary arrangements to properly qualified medical men.’1194 
 
It is important to add that the active support of the Commander-in-Chief was 
essential to achieve progress and it has been suggested that in this respect Raglan should 
not escape censure. For example, he: ‘had it within his power to beat cholera [when in 
Bulgaria as his] medical staff had already pointed out the need to construct latrines 
[and] filter the drinking water;’1195 while after the invasion he tried unfairly to blame the 




                                                 
1189  Palmerston to Raglan, 22 Feb. 1855; NAM-1968-07-290-1. 
1190  WO/33/1/24/55, p. 4. 
1191  General Order, 26 Mar. 1855. 
1192  BPP (1857), Session 1, No. 2196, p. 79. 
1193  Hall to Raglan, 14 May 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2086. 
1194  AMJ, 4 May 1855. 
1195  Small (2007), pp. 40-3. 
1196  Ponting (2004), pp. 192-3. 
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Scutari 
The military barrack at Scutari was far from ideal as a hospital, yet in February 1855 
Panmure seemed content with the arrangements that Paulet had made for the sick
1197
 
while the resident engineer reported favourably on a visit paid by the Commissioners on 
6 March: ‘On their inspection of the various buildings in British occupation […] they 
expressed themselves as agreeably surprised at the cleanliness and comfort of the 
different establishments,’ and ‘there was little or nothing left for them to point out, by 
way of amelioration.’1198 The Commissioners themselves told Paulet on 10 March that 
they had found that: 
 
The wards of the Barrack Hospital are lofty, and not over crowded. [In our opinion] the 
Barrack Hospital bears marks of much having been done to improve its sanitary condition; 
[…] The General Hospital […] is the best of all the Scutari hospitals, as its structure admits 




Paulet subsequently reported to Panmure: ‘Drs Sutherland and Gavin […] who 
have made a cursory inspection of the hospitals, have expressed themselves agreeably 
surprised at their cleanliness and comfort, and state that there will be very little for them 
to point out here.’1200 While in their final report the Commissioners commented that 
‘there was abundant evidence that the military authorities had been actively engaged 
before our arrival, in improving this hospital, and much had evidently been done with 
that object.’1201 
That there was scope for improvement in the various hospitals is not at issue and 
the Commissioners set to work in clearing the vicinity of the hospital of animal 
carcasses and filth, and suggested modifications for the hospital building. Nightingale 
appeared to be satisfied by their industry though the PMO, resident engineer, and 
Charles Bracebridge, Nightingale’s companion, seemed less impressed: 
 
Nightingale: The Sanitary Commission is doing something, and has set too work burying 




PMO: The Sanitary Commission […] went mooning about here telling us what every one 
with eyes and nose could not fail to detect and have left the place much in the same state they 
                                                 
1197  Panmure to Paulet, 23 Feb. 1855; WO/6/70 and 28/199/1. 
1198  Elphinstone (1859), Appendix 53, pp. 292-3. 
1199  WO/33/1/55/24, pp. 1-2. This point was repeated in the official report; BPP (1857), Session 1, No. 
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 […] The graveyard has been inspected by the Sanitary Commissioners who have 
made some suggestions. There never appeared to me any injurious consequences to be 




Resident engineer: One of their few recommendations, (with respect to the ventilation of the 
privies built in the angle of the Barrack yard), was at variance with the expressed opinion of 
the Engineer officer, and ordered the compliance with which was the cause of subsequent 
complaint on the part of the medical authorities. […] In March the Commissioners ordered 
some slight alterations to some of the privy drains, and the reconstruction of one of the main 
sewers, the results of which were of a very dubious character and were the cause of constant 




Bracebridge: The Commissioners were ‘incompetent’ and that ‘these patchings are of little 
use.’1206 
 
An anonymous contemporary commentator also questioned the effectiveness of 
the Commissioners in a well-researched pamphlet printed after the publication of the 
Royal Commission’s report:  
 
The Eastern Sanitary Commission […] after ten days spent in examining, and maturing their 
plans […] commenced their works [but by] the beginning of July, they say, ‘after all that 
could be done in the way of temporary improvement, cleansing, and flushing, the drains 
under and near the hospitals, from their inherent bad construction, were still nothing but 
cesspools, communicating, by open tubes, with the interior of the hospitals.’1207 Such 
miserable results, after four months of ‘scientific labours,’ appeared unsatisfactory even to 





It was not unreasonable for the Non-Commissioner to question why the 
Commissioners took so long to reach this conclusion and why they did not admit that 
the objectionable smells did not appear to have a detrimental effect on the health of the 
patients. The Non-Commissioner continued by quoting several more extracts from the 
Commissioners’ report and concluded that their ‘endeavours […] were attended with no 
better success than those of the officer of the Royal Engineers during the winter [of 
1854-55];’ a reasonable opinion in the circumstances that does not accord with 
suggestion made by a biographer of Sir Edwin Chadwick who wrote that the influence 
of the ‘famous Crimean Sanitary Commission […] on the campaign is incalculable in its 
importance,’ but that ‘the story of that intervention is too well known to be repeated 
here;’1209 while more recently McDonald stated erroneously that the Barrack Hospital at 
                                                 
1203  Cumming to Hall, 10 Apr. 1855; NAM-2007-07-16-19. 
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1208  A Non-commissioner ‘Report’, pp. 25-7; RAMC/397/M/2. 
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Scutari ‘had to be re-engineered by a team of visiting experts before the death rate could 
be brought down.’1210 
 
Nearly all the British land forces were located in a relatively small area of the Crimean 
peninsula, and, as was demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, it was the high incidence of 
serious and potentially fatal diseases amongst them that strongly influenced the 
mortality rates in the hospitals at Scutari, a point made by Hall in his evidence to the 
Royal Commission on 19 June 1857: ‘The sanitary commission claim credit for 
reducing the sickness at Scutari […] but forgot that Scutari was supplied from the 
Crimea, and that the supply of sick had fallen off one half. […] It was the character of 
disease that had changed.’1211 
It would appear at that Nightingale agreed with Hall at the time when she told 
Herbert unequivocally that: 
 
Scutari was only a symptom of the army’s malady, not a cause, and once things began to 
improve at Balaclava, things improved at Scutari. Once the men on the plains below 
Sevastopol began to get better food and the weather became warmer, their strength increased, 
they became more resistant to disease, the numbers arriving at Scutari went down, the wards 




Sutherland, nevertheless, questioned Hall’s assertion by suggesting to the Royal 
Commission that the some of the improvements were due to the activities of the 
Sanitary Commissioners, though he did ‘attribute part of the diminished mortality in the 
hospitals to the very cause to which Sir John Hall appears desirous of attributing the 
whole.’1213 
Clearly there was a conflict of interests as Sutherland would have been anxious for 
the Commissioners to get some credit, otherwise their mission might be perceived as 
pointless. Nightingale suggested misleadingly that their work was nearly complete by 
June 1855,
1214
 but, unfortunately for supporters of Sanitary Commission, Shepherd has 
proposed a more realistic explanation: 
 
[Kinglake’s] suggestion that the mortality rates fell at the end of March because of the work 
of the Commission is scarcely tenable. It is inconceivable that the work involved in relaying 
drains and other major improvements was completed in two weeks. More likely the mortality 
                                                 
1210  McDonald (2010b), p. 72. 
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rate fell because the admission rate came down at this time, thus reducing the lethal effect of 
overcrowding, because the severity of the medical cases admitted from the Crimea lessened at 




Another issue that obviously affected peoples’ judgment of the hospitals was their 
previous experience. For example, AS Edward Wrench, informed his father on 28 
December 1854 that he had received two letters from Scutari. One was from somebody 
who had not been to the Crimea and thought that it was uncomfortable and horrid and 
the other from Harvey Ludlow who thought it was a sort of Paradise,
1216
 while at the 
end of January AS J.J. Scott, 57
th
 Regiment, who, like Ludlow was at Scutari on sick 
leave from the Crimea, thought the Barrack hospital was ‘as comfortable as can be 
expected’ and ‘well supplied in with good rations and warm dress.’1217 
 
Crimea 
When the Commissioners landed in the Crimea on 2 April 1855 they considered the 
‘health of the army […] was by no means good,’ but ‘hardly below […] the usual 
standard of armies in the field, and its health was better than that often experienced by 
armies similarly circumstanced,’1218 while two weeks after their arrival the Chief of 
Staff informed Panmure that: ‘The state of our camps is another subject of 
misrepresentation at home. I know them all […] and more cleanly encampments I never 
saw. I consider them quite healthy and wholesome in all respects.’1219 This may have 
been due in part to Hall and several MOs having visited the camps weekly to inquire 
‘into the state of the sick and the sanitary condition of the camp.’1220 
 
Balaklava: The town and harbour of Balaklava1221 were small and it was soon ‘in a 
filthy and revolting state’, and though Raglan issued orders for it to be cleansed there 
was no one to attend to it.
1222
 A board of inquiry into the sanitary state of the town was 
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1220  Special Correspondent, 19 Mar.; The Times, 2 Apr. 1855. 
1221  The management of shipping in the harbour is explained in Gordon (1855). 
1222  Russell, 4 Oct.; The Times, 23 Oct. 1854. 
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convened on 17 January 1855 with Sir Colin Campbell as President.
1223
 The report has 
not been found but despite any recommendations matters deteriorated further as a 
consequence of the excessive traffic passing to and from the port.
1224
 Towards the end 
of March things began to improve and the resident PMO informed Hall that ‘attention 
was at last aroused and the town is in consequence improving in every way,’ latrines 
‘much wanted here are about to be built’ and a ‘police has been established to prevent 
the committing of nuisances in the street, a practice much in vogue at one time.’1225 
Not surprisingly the Commissioners deemed the harbour unsatisfactory as being 
non-tidal the water became congested with refuse including, carcasses, offal and dung, 
with the consequent ‘evolution of large quantities of sulphuretted hydrogen gas.’ 
However, they conceded that the Commandant and Port Admiral had used ‘their best 
endeavours to improve the sanitary condition of the place’ but they were hampered by a 
‘want of labour and means of transport;’ a problem that, despite the activities of the 
Commissioners appeared to persist until the arrival of the AWC as native labourers 
were ‘by no means efficient […] and most expensive.’1226 
The Commissioners made several requests to Headquarters during the following 
weeks for assistance with labour and equipment, only to be informed that the demands 
of the siege frequently made this impossible. Raglan himself, though not unsympathetic, 
considered that the government should have provided the Commissioners with the 
wherewithal to obtain the resources they needed to carry out the tasks expected of them, 
and not have had to rely on the Army to provide them. Incidentally, this was a potential 
problem anticipated earlier by the Earl of Shaftsbury when he wrote to Panmure on 18 
February 1855: 
 
The Commissioners should have the power of hiring, on their account, such numbers of 
workmen as they may find necessary. The entire success of this undertaking will depend on 
instructions given to Lord Raglan, Lord W. Paulet, and other authorities, to carry into 





                                                 
1223  The board members included three MOs, a chaplain of each persuasion, a captain, RN, if possible, 
and the Commandant; WO/28/108. This was about a month before Panmure issued the Sanitary 
Commissioners with their instructions on 19 Feb. 1855. 
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In the event, Sutherland later acknowledged that improvements occurred only 
gradually so that by ‘several months before the evacuation’ Balaklava had ‘became as 
clean and healthy a little sea-port as one would wish to see’ and that ‘it required little or 
no interference on [the Sanitary Commissioners] part.’ He also pointed out that this 
satisfactory state of affairs was only achieved after ‘a great expenditure of labour and 
money.’1228 This improvement was also confirmed by Major Barnston who wrote on 7 
January 1856 that Balaklava: ‘is a most astonishing place now; and nothing could be 
cleaner or more regular. The harbour is quite black with cormorants; they have turned 
out such excellent scavengers that any one shooting at them is immediately flogged […] 
and his gun seized.’1229 
 
Harbour police: This unit, which comprised ten men who wore a distinctive uniform 
resembling that of the Thames Police, was responsible for maintenance of the sanitary 
condition in the port.
1230
 However, despite unambiguous harbour regulations,
1231
 the 
masters of the cattle transports ignored these instructions on occasions and threw 
carcasses and dung over board while in harbour instead of waiting until after they put to 
sea. The disposal of general fifth and the offal from the animals slaughtered in the town 
presented a continual logistical challenge and, like the carcasses, most had to be taken 
out to sea in a ‘dirt barge’ and disposed of well away from land.1232 
On the matter of carcasses the QMG requested Boxer to ‘devise some means for 
preventing the dead carcasses towed out to drift again into harbour.’ He replied to say 
the steam tug’s captain had strict instructions ‘to tow cattle and offal well out to sea and 
to the lee of the harbour’s entrance. Every practicable means are made to keep the 
harbour [clear] and great praise is due to the water police for their vigilance.’1233 On 
occasions the carcasses did not sink and those ‘floating off the rocks beneath the 
Genoese Castle and Sanatorium’ represented a ‘serious detriment [to] the inmates and 
[was] in direct violation of the port and harbour regulations, with respect to dead cattle 
                                                 
1228  Sutherland (1857), p. 23. 
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and the like.’1234 To obviate this problem it was recommended that ‘before being let go 
their sides and entrails should be freely slashed, so as to cause the carcass to sink.’1235 
 
Camps before Sevastopol: The impression given by some commentators is that 
Hall and his colleagues were remiss in not ensuring that the camps, including the 
latrines, were kept in a satisfactory state from a hygienic point of view. Hall was well 
aware of the problem, however, and reported incidents to HQ from time to time,
1236
 
while the Queen’s Regulations made it clear that the responsibility for camp cleanliness 
lay with the military authorities, and not the AMD. For example, a General Order of 12 
May 1854 required the privies to be examined daily by a QM and MO, and to report 
weekly on their cleanliness. 
The topic was the subject of several General Orders issued during the summer of 
1854,
1237
 with one of 11 November requiring that ‘all burials may take place at a 
sufficient distance from the sources of water supply, from the camps of any troops.’ The 
topic apparently ceased to be a priority after the hurricane of 14 November and it was 
not until the spring of 1855 that a proactive interest was taken by HQ once again. For 
example, the GOC of Divisions were reminded that their AQMG was required to ensure 
that all dead animals are buried at least 3 feet deep; latrine trenches are dug sufficiently 
deep and earth thrown on the soil every morning, and […] the most stringent measures 
are taken to prevent men answering the calls of nature except in the latrines; all offal, 
dirty clothes, rags, broken bottles etc. are burned or buried every morning; and 
particular attention is paid to the cleanliness of that part of the camp near the 
commissariat, ambulance, hospital and reserve ammunition.
1238
 These instructions do 
not appear to have been followed implicitly on occasions and a divisional commander 
had to be reminded of his responsibilities: 
 
I am desired by Lord Raglan to call your attention to the sanitary condition of the camp under 
your command, and to beg that dead horses may be buried, the latrines attended to, and the 
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collections of the refuse, rags and rubbish either buried or burnt. In the latter case, care must 




Hall also wrote in strong terms to the AG on the subject of ‘camp nuisance’ on 24 
January 1855: 
 
Proper latrines should be dug in all camps, and the soil covered over daily with earth, all 
dead animals ought to be buried […] The pioneers [should be] directed to clean round the 
hospital marquees and men’s tents daily, collect all offal, dirty and condemned cloths, and 
rags which are merely thrown outside the tents and allowed to rot. The trenches […] should 
be deepened to carry off surface water […] the matter will have to be enforced by authority, 
because no regiment can be so pressed for duty men, as not be able to spare a party for a 




Shepherd considered that the need for Hall to have to remind the AG ‘of such 
elementary rules of hygiene at this stage of the campaign was a considerable reflection 
on all concerned.’ Shepherd did not exclude the regimental doctors from criticism, 
however, as he thought they should have done more to get matters better organized, 
though he conceded that it reflected, in part, ‘the complete lack of executive power of 
even the most senior medical officers.’1241 
The QMG subsequently requested that a general of the day be appointed to 
‘supervise the regularity and cleanliness [of the camp] in every particular’ in accordance 
with the Queen’s Regulations.1242 This was not acceded to by Raglan although he 
convened a board of senior MOs with Hall as President to investigate the sanitary 
condition of the Army, possibly in response to the impending arrival of the Sanitary 
Commissioners in the Crimea. The Board reported on 10 March with recommendations 
on diet and water, clothing, camps, and duties,
1243
 and attention of the COs was drawn 




General Officers commanding Divisions, and the Officers Commanding in the camps of the 
siege trains, and of the R. Sappers and Miners, will send daily […] a report that the 
cleanliness of their camps has been attended to, that dead animals have been buried, and 




These instructions must have resulted in improvements because by the end of 
March 1855 Hall was able to report to Raglan: 
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The rations are abundant, the men are well clothed, and due attention is paid to the sanitary 
condition of the different camps. The supply of water is ample at present, and means are 
being adopted to insure it in future, by constructing new tanks, cleaning out those already in 
use, and digging fresh wells. […] The hospitals are on a respectable footing, and amply 
provided […] for […] the sick.1246 
 
The Sanitary Commissioners found as a consequence of these developments: ‘the 
camp [before Sevastopol was] remarkably clean and the external sanitary arrangements 
[…] well attended to,’ in spite of ‘the pressing nature of the siege duties’ and, although 
there were some defects, there were ‘some regimental camps to which it would have 
been difficult to have suggested improvements.’1247 This state of affairs was reported to 
the QMG following an unannounced tour of the camps unertaken by the Commissioners 
towards the end of April. They expressed themselves: 
 
much surprised and gratified with the appearance of the camp and of the hospitals, and said 
that were it were not for Balaklava, they might at once return to England, as no sanitary 
recommendations were required from them for the upper camp. One of them (Mr Sutherland) 
said ‘It would be an insult to the Army if we were to offer any suggestion.’ [while] Mr 
Rawlinson said ‘There can be no sanitary measure we could recommend which I have not 
seen carried out today in some phase or other, varying, of course, in different regiments 
according to the ability and zeal of the commanding officers and surgeons.’1248 
 
On 17 May 1855 the Commissioners sent Raglan a list of obviously sensible 
recommendations, viz. refuse should be burnt, carcasses and offal should be buried at 
least three feet deep, waste food should be burnt or buried and not thrown into latrines, 
latrines should not be kept open for too long and the contents should be covered daily 
with earth and charcoal until the level is within two feet of the surface when the latrine 
should be closed, places where animal are picketed should be kept constantly clean and 
the dung and refuse burnt, and tents should be struck regularly and the ground exposed 
to the air and sunshine.
1249
 General Simpson confirmed to the Commissioners on the 20 
May  1855 that most if not all of these recommendations had already been introduced, 
and hence no further orders were needed; indeed the camps were ‘well policed, and 
clean considering all things.’1250 Nevertheless, continued watchfulness was necessary as 
an inspection made during July 1855 found that, unlike the infantry regiments, some 
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cavalry camps were not in a ‘good sanitary condition,’1251 while shortly afterwards it 
was stressed that ‘great attention’ was being paid ‘to cleanliness in the camps, and to 
prevent overcrowding in either tents or huts.’1252 
Hall agreed with the Commissioner’s suggestions, though he begged ‘to observe, 
that on almost all points had been anticipated,’1253 while after the war he informed the 
Royal Commission that ‘the recommendations made by the Sanitary Commission had 
been recommended before by the medical men and most of the things had been put into 
effect, more or less.’1254 When he gave evidence to the Royal Commission on 17 July 
1857 Sutherland claimed that he had not seen the recommendations made by Hall’s 
Board, which in the circumstances seems rather unlikely, and he clearly objected to 
Hall’s statement as it implied that the Commission did not have much impact on 
events.
1255
 The upshot was that Sutherland was requested to clarify the contents of a 
letter he wrote on 19 July 1855 to Lord Shaftsbury in which he had stated 
unequivocally ‘that the sanitary recommendations made by [him] had been anticipated 
by the army medical officers on the spot.’ In his reply Sutherland dodged the issue by 
stating that his comments referred only to the sanitary state of the camps, and not to 
either Scutari or Balaklava, and that the Commissioners ‘had only wished the worst 
practices to be avoided and the best systematically adopted. […] all depends on the 
commanding officers of regiments [but] we […] found the medical officers thoroughly 
alive to the nature of the changes required […] but without power to carry them out.’ 
Sutherland also mentioned that they had ‘endeavoured […] to limit our requirements to 
what was barely necessity’ and concluded by stressing that none of his comments 
should be construed as any criticism of the ‘medical officers in the field’, whom he held 
in ‘high esteem.’1256 
In his unpublished account of the campaign Hall noted, with some justification, 
that ‘if the same power had been granted to the medical officers of the Army that was 
conceded to the Sanitary Commissioners, there would have been no occasion to send the 
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latter out to the seat of war,’1257 and, not unexpectedly, he considered that their 
contribution to the well-being of the troops in the Crimea was relatively limited, 
although he was mindful to add a caveat: 
 
So far as the labours of the Sanitary Commissioners came under my notice, I think their 
services might have been dispensed with without any detriment […] as there was nothing 
[…] which had not been either suggested, or was not in actual operation before their arrival. I 
speak of what came under my own observation in the Crimea; but they may have furnished 




Hall was not alone in his views on the usefulness of the Commission as the following 
quotation from an anonymous letter, possibly a MO, attests: 
 
It makes me sick to read of people being sent out to investigate the cause of our great 
mortality. What else could any one expect under the circumstances? Starving men without 
clothes to their back, or shoes to their feet, exposed to inclement weather in a manner that 





while the artist William Simpson opined that: ‘A sanitary commission could have done 
nothing [in the winter]’ and when the good weather came I don’t know any better 
sanitary authority than it was. Well the sanitary gentlemen did arrive, and lived I think 
in Balaklava.’1260 
 
Trenches before Sevastopol: The conditions in the trenches clearly deteriorated in 
the autumn of 1854
1261
 and tended to be unsanitary (see Table 11.2) so the men were 
exposed to ‘an atmosphere, often unavoidably vitiated by the excretions of the masses 
engaged on such duty.’1262 William Simpson inferred that the Sanitatary Commissioners 
were unwilling to risk going close to the front line
1263
 and so it is perhaps not surprising 
that, apart from a recommendation for burying the dead, there was only one specific 
reference to the trench system in their report when Sutherland wrote to Simpson 18 July 
1855 about the ‘bad sanitary conditions in the trenches’ and the ‘offensive emanations’ 
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that arose following the disturbance of graves, and recommended the area should 




Personal cleanliness: The Sanitary Commission seemingly did not consider the 
personal cleanliness of the troops was part of their brief as soap was not mentioned in 
their report. In fact, the shortage of soap became an issue within weeks of the invasion; 
for example, the surgeon in the 77
th
 Regiment noted during November 1855 that there 
was none for washing ‘hospital blankets and other things, as the patients are very 
filthy.’1265 This situation caused Smith to complain to Horse Guards that there was a 
‘great want of the means of securing personal cleanliness in the Army [arising] from the 
impossibility of obtaining soap.’1266 Hall was informed shortly afterwards that ‘thirty 
tons of soap have been shipped for the use of the troops; ten of which were forwarded at 
the close of November.’1267 
There is no doubt that the personal cleanliness of the men was an important issue 
as evinced by a memorandum written by the AG following representations from MOs. It 
was undated but the context suggests that it was written during the spring of 1855 and 
was directed at divisional GOCs: 
 
greater attention is necessary to the ventilation of the tents, and the cleanliness of the persons 
of soldiers. These are points [that should] be looked to by the Commanding Officers of 
regiments […] They are subjects for their own care and vigilance. […] The men must also be 
encouraged to wash their clothes and their persons thoroughly, and means should be taken to 
enforce this necessary duty of cleanliness upon those whose habits may less incline them to 




Hall also issued a memorandum to divisional PMOs informing them he was sorry to 
find that: 
 
itch, scurvy and ulcers and great personal filth prevail amongst the men […] for want of […] 
regimental MOs in making periodic inspections [as] required by the Regulations of Service. 
He [Hall] therefore requests […] that this duty is performed weekly. […] government has 
provided soap, and there is no excuse for the men going about from one week’s end to 
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Not surprisingly this relatively terse memo provoked a defensive reaction from some 
MOs. For example Surgeon W.G. Watt, 23
rd
 Regiment, responded: 
 
The tents are frequently visited by the Assistant Surgeons or himself during the week and he 
is perfectly aware of the filthy state of the men and from the amount of duty this is almost 
unavoidable. The men frequently only have 12 hours off duty and the extreme difficulty of 
procuring wood and water even for cooking has been pointed out by me more than once.
1270 
 
While a letter from another surgeon was published in the Daily News on 10 March 
1855: 
 
Dr Hall: […] accuses the regimental surgeons of inflicting scurvy and all kinds of disease 
and abominations on the men by their neglect. […] Recrimination has always been held to be 
a bad arrangement, and to place those who have recourse to it in a very suspicious position. 
[…] Regimental surgeons have been well aware of the uncleanly state of their men […] I 
have […] tried with my commanding officer to devise a plan for the personal ablution of the 
men. But […] hardly able to get sufficient water […] with no means of heating water but 
open fires […] no vessels for purposes of washing, no soap, […] no change of underclothing 
etc. […] it becomes impossible […] to carry out a system of proper cleanliness. […] the 
regimental surgeon has no power for forcing a system among men on duty in a regiment; his 
control extends only over the sick in hospital. He may recommend, but his power stops there. 
 
The anonymous surgeon clearly did not hold Hall in high regard as he then accused him 
unfairly of negligence: ‘Let the country judge between the regimental surgeons and Dr 
Hall whose name has become so familiar in connexion with the neglect at Alma, neglect 
in camp, neglect on sick transports, and neglect in the hospitals at Scutari.’ 
 
Select Committee on the Army Medical Department 
 
The proceedings of the Stafford Committee were published on the 3 July 1856 and the 
recommendations they made for the reform of the AMD were clearly influenced by 
what took place in the Crimea.
1271
 The committee members obviously appreciated the 
contribution made by the MOs as they had been told of: ‘the admirable manner in which 
the army and civil surgeons have performed their duties in the East, and [the] 
Committee are glad to [acknowledge] the high opinion they entertain of their 
merits,’1272 while later in the report they recorded their praise for the ‘zeal, energy, and 
courage’ displayed by the MOs and civil surgeons ‘under the most trying 
circumstances.’ The report contained only one specific reference to the health of the 
troops in the Crimea, however, viz. Colonel Lord West opined on 30 May 1856 that 
                                                 
1270  Watt to PMO, Light Division, 17 Feb. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/31/13. 
1271  BPP (1856), No. 331. For a commentary on this topic, and a list of the recommendations, see 
Cantlie (1974, I, pp. 198-200. 
1272  BPP (1856) No. 331, p. iv and The Lancet, 26 July 1856. 
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this had been affected by overwork and want of proper food, and that the MOs were not 
responsible for this or the ‘great sickness that prevailed in the Crimea;’ which was 
exacerbated by a ‘deficiency of all proper appliances, medical comforts, and 
medicines.’1273 
 
Dr Hall’s rejoinders 
 
Hall was obviously upset by criticisms that he and the AMD received in these official 
reports on matters which were either outside his control or for which he had no 
executive responsibility, and this prompted him to make a number of public statements 
in order to set the record straight. 
 
Roebuck Committee Reports: Hall sent a letter to the editor of The Times on 9 
July 1855 following receipt of the reports and it was published on 27 July (See 
Appendix 11.1). In addition to defending his statement to Raglan on the condition of the 
Scutari hospitals he pointed out that sufficient bandages and lint had been available 
during the battle of Inkerman, and confirmed that a substantial amount of alcoholic 
beverages and other comforts that had been issued by the Purveyor for the benefit of the 
sick and wounded by listing the amounts distributed. 
The principal bone of contention was that in October 1854 Hall had informed 
Raglan that the hospitals at Scutari were ‘in as good a state as could reasonably 
expected,’1274 and some nine months later, despite all that had occurred in the meantime, 
he still was prepared to adhere ‘to every syllable I then wrote, and I consider I am quite 
as good a judge of the subject, and quite as worthy of credit, as the Duke of Newcastle’s 
informants, whose reports may, perhaps, refer to an earlier or a later period than 
mine.’1275 
Some of the correspondence and opinions about the Scutari hospitals during the 
time of Hall’s visit and during the weeks following are summarized in Table 11.3 and it 
is clear from these he was justified in his response to the Committee’s reports for the 
following reasons: Dumbreck’s evidence to the Committee was misrepresented as he 
ventured no opinion on the subject of Hall’s visit. He was in the Crimea at the time and 
                                                 
1273  BPP (1856), No. 331, p. 124. 
1274  BPP (1854-55), No. 318, p. 20. 
1275  BPP (1854-55), No. 247, p. 243. 
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that he had been too unwell to examine the hospitals at Scutari on his way home, 
although he was visited on board by the Cumming, the PMO.
1276
 This Dumbreck made 
clear in a letter to The Times in which he concluded ‘that he has been most unfairly 
placed in seeming antagonistic to Dr Hall’1277 (see Appendix 11.1). 
Newcastle’s criticism of Hall was unfounded as, given the time interval; he must 
have been referring to events at Scutari which took place after the battle of the Alma 
when things were indeed extremely disorganized. By the time Hall arrived matters had 
settled down and this was confirmed by several commentators who held similar 
opinions to Hall, including Nightingale (Table 11.3), although she changed her mind 
later by saying that Raglan could have ‘corrected’ the ‘wrongs’ if he had not been 
misled by Hall’s report of ‘flourishing’ conditions in Scutari.1278 However, this was a 
misinterpretation of events on her part as it was some weeks later when the hospitals 
were overwhelmed by the large number of seriously ill patients from the Crimea; 
something nobody could have predicted at the time.
1279
 
Hardinge also censured Hall and suggested that Raglan should have taken action 
against him;
1280
 however, there was no need for an enquiry on Raglan’s part as he would 
have been satisfied with Hall’s assessment since it had been confirmed by the British 
ambassador, his senior ADC, Lord Burghersh, and Paulet (Table 11.3), and hence this 
suggests that it was unreasonable of Nightingale to agree months later with the opinion 




Sanitary Commission Report: The report contains no personal criticism of Hall but 
he responded by issuing a pamphlet, presumably because he thought there was necessity 
to defend his reputation.
1282
 This prompted Sutherland, to publish a reply,
1283
 following 
which Hall published a rejoinder.
1284
 Thereafter the debate ceased, in public at least. 
                                                 
1276  BPP (1854-55), No. 156, p. 605. 
1277  The Times, 1 Aug. and The Lancet, 4 Aug. 1855, 
1278  McDonald (2010a), p. 20. 
1279  Over 12,000 patients were admitted to the hospitals on the Bosphorus during the three months 
from Nov. 1854; M&SH, II, General Hospital Returns I. 
1280  BPP (1854-55), No. 247, pp. 243-4. 
1281  McDonald (2010b), p. 84. 
1282  Hall (1857). 
1283  Sutherland (1857). The Commissioners submitted a preliminary report to Panmure on 17 Mar. 
1855. A version was ‘printed solely for the use of the Cabinet’ on 14 Apr. 1855; WO/33/1/24/55 
& 33/1/25/55. 
1284  Hall (1858). 
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The three pamphlets contain considerable detail and are valuable historical 
documents. Together they comprise over 40,000 words and there is evidence of the 
authors trying to score points off each other. In his response Sutherland pointed out that 
there had been no advanced planning with respect to the sanitary condition of the camps 
and hospitals, and suggested that if this may have contributed to the high mortality 
during the first winter. However, a long siege had not been envisaged by the military 
authorities and so there would have been little incentive to spend time and money on 
such matters, and by the time the calamity of the first winter became apparent it was too 
late to do anything until camp life became better organized in the spring. Action was 
then taken to improve the environment generally from a sanitary viewpoint and for this 
Hall claimed some credit and not unreasonably stressed that in his opinion the 
contribution of the Commissioners was much less than they asserted. 
 
Supplies Commission Report: During a debate in the House of Commons on the 
role of the Supplies Commissioners held on 12 March 1857 Palmerston made a passing 
reference to the Sanitary Commission: ‘Dr Sutherland and his associates took the 
medical arrangements of the hospitals and of the camp into immediate consideration and 
suggested improvements which were of the utmost consequence to the troops [and] the 
sick and wounded.’1285 
This seemingly innocuous remark provoked a reposte from Hall dated 14 March, 
a reply made by Sutherland in order to safe guard his own reputation, and two further 
letters in support of Hall’s ‘spirited and courageous’ stance. The texts of all four are 
given in Appendix 11.2, and confirm the differences in the opinions held by the MOs 
and the sanitarians with respect to the management of the camps and hospitals in the 
Crimea. 
Hall was also supported by J.M. who served in the Crimea and made the point to 
the editor of the MT&G that: ‘The so-called Sanitary Commission only arrived in the 
Crimea in the month of April, when we had emerged from our difficulties, and “the sun 
of our prosperity had begun to shine,” to use an Oriental proverb,’ and that some of their 
ideas would have been ‘amusing’ if they had not been ‘presumptuous and insulting.’1286 
 
                                                 
1285  Hansard and The Times, 13 Mar. 1857. 




The members of the Royal Commission convened to enquire into the health of the Army 
in 1857 considered it their ‘duty not to neglect the lessons that may be drawn from [the 
late war].’ For example, in their report,1287 they emphasized the contrast between the 
two winters of the campaign thereby agreeing with other commentators that during the 
first winter the troops suffered from: ‘work altogether disproportioned to their strength, 
from broken rest, insufficient clothing and shelter, unwholesome food, and want of 
cleanliness.’1288 The report continued: ‘As the spring advanced, to these causes of 
disease and mortality were added others, arising from want of drainage and ventilation, 
and the nuisances resulting from the lengthened occupation of the same ground without 
sufficient countervailing precautions.’ This opinion, which reflected the views of 
Nightingale, is at variance with that of the Sanitary Commissioners who had observed 
that during this time the camps were generally well managed from a sanitary standpoint. 
However, there can be little doubt that the improvements in the living conditions of the 
troops made during 1855 contributed to the good health that they enjoyed during 1856 
and so it comes as no surprise that the Commissioners stressed that the provision 
wholesome food and huts that were well drained and ventilated, together with ensuring 
the camps were thoroughly cleansed, were all factors contributing to this success. 
Incidentally, the Commissioners analysed data on mortality among home-based 
British troops during the 1840s and up to 1853, and were rightly alarmed when they 
appreciated how much higher their mortality rate was than in the civilian population. 
The assessment of their recommendations demands great care, however, since it can be 
demonstrated that the decrease in mortality rate which continued up to the beginning of 
World War One seemingly started at the beginning of the 1850s and not after 1858, 
albeit for reasons which are likely to be complex and which have yet to be specifically 
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The Hospital Commission had an opportunity for making an immediate difference as 
one of the Commissioners assumed medical charge at Scutari early in 1855, but the 
conflicting reports emanating from the hospitals during the following weeks makes it 
difficult to ascertain how much was actually achieved. Nightingale considered the 
Commission a ‘lame duck’,1290 but given the Sanitary Commissioners found that 
conditions were not as bad as expected some weeks later implies that improvements had 
been made in line with the Hospital Commissioners’ suggestions. 
The reports of the Supplies and Sanitary Commissions and the Roebuck 
Committee provide an insight into what went wrong during the winter of 1854-55 but 
their deliberations started too late to have any worthwhile impact on the health and well-
being of the troops at the front. 
Hall took steps to protect his reputation, and that of the AMD, when he 
appreciated that the Sanitary Commissioners were granted credit officially for merely 
enunciating what he knew was required; and could have been done if the AMD had 
been accorded the necessary power and resources so to do. To suggest that his reactions 
were sour grapes, as suggested by some commentators, is unreasonable as he took care 
to provide evidence to support his viewpoint. 
Some of the Sanitary Commissioners’ recommendations were little more than 
common sense. However, to be fair, Sutherland did appreciate that there was ‘really 
nothing to learn’ in ‘sanitary methods or procedure […] but much to avoid,’ and there 
was undoubtedly ‘the supreme necessity of greater vigilance in preventing the 
occurrence of sanitary defects.’1291  
The Sanitary Commission remained in the Crimea until the end of the campaign 
and this would have assisted Hall as they had the power to insist on corrective measures 
being taken as required. After the war one of Hall’s colleagues, J.M., suggested that the 
Commissioners were there merely ‘to assist us in forcing on the military authorities 
more immediate and prompt attention to our [the MOs] recommendations, being 
invested in more power than […] the principal medical officers of the Army’.1292 
                                                 
1290  Bostridge (2008), p. 129. 
1291  Sutherland (1857), pp. 35-6. 
1292  J.M. (1857). 
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Exchanges between Hall and Sutherland after the war reveal that both sought to 
justify their actions, and preserve their reputations. Hall was probably in a stronger 
position in that he had previously identified the problems, and that these could have 
been rectified by the AMD if provided with suitable resources. The relative weakness of 
Sutherland’s position was illustrated by his responses to the Royal Commission in 
which he attempted to talk up the Commissioners successes. He had no alternative but 
to concede that the improvement in the ‘health of all the hospitals’ on the Bosphorus 
was due in part to ‘the less severe character of the cases sent from the Crimea’ but he 
was at pains to point out that this ‘favourable change’ had ‘advanced simultaneously 
with the progress of the sanitary works.’1293 
The sustained improvement in health was acknowledged by Panmure in spring of 
1856 when he informed Codrington that he was ‘easy […] as long as I see Dr Hall’s 
columns in the Morning State as they are,’1294 and then again in the House of Lords on 8 
May 1856 when proposing a vote of thanks to the armed forces: 
 
A comparison between [the Armies’] health and that of troops at home are truly remarkable 
[…] for the week ending April 21 […] admissions to the hospitals were 1.56 per cent in 
proportion to the strength; the deaths 0.02, and proportion of sick to well 3.72 per cent. […] 
During the above period the admissions [in the camp at Aldershot] were 2.71 per cent; 




Panmure’s sentiments were reiterated by Nightingale who wrote in 1858 that: 
‘history does not afford its equal – of any army after a great disaster arising from 
neglect, having been brought into the highest state of health and efficiency.’1296 
Nevertheless, by this time it suited the political agenda of Panmure, Nightingale, and the 
sanitarians to ascribe the Sanitary Success to environmental and other improvements 
recommended by the Sanitary Commissioners. However, this cannot be proved, and in 
reality it was more probably the enhancement in living standards and primary health 
care, which involved, inter alia, segregation of patients and minimizing overcrowding, 
coupled with the ending of duty in unsanitary trenches, that accounted for what was 
recorded. 
After the war Nightingale and her associates reconsidered the medical statistics 
and chose to conclude that the fall in the mortality rate at Scutari was a direct result of 
                                                 
1293  BPP (1857), Session 1, No. 2196, pp. 48-9. 
1294  Panmure to Codrington, 21 Dec. 1855; W&SHC/2057/F8/III/C/43 & 47 and Douglas & Ramsay 
(1898), II, p. 28. 
1295  Hansard, 8 May 1856. 
1296  See Cantlie (1974), II, p. 201 and McDonald (2010a), p. 864. 
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the arrival of the Sanitary Commissioners. By doing this, they failed to acknowledge 
that improvements were already in hand, and that the majority of patients were from the 
Crimea where the health of the troops in the camps had improved during the spring 
without any input from the Commissioners and as a result by May 1855 there were 1750 
of 3000 beds at Scutari spare and that nearly all patients were suffering from a ‘fever of 




Table 11.1: Responses of senior officers to questions posed by the Roebuck Committee during March 
1855 on the health of the troops under their command, and recorded in the second report 
Officer Question 
no. 
Abstract of the response 
Sir De Lacy Evans, 2nd 
Division 
717 [The troops’] suffering [was] mainly attributable to exposure and 
overwork […] not so much a want of clothing. 
914 The main cause [of the misery] was overwork and exposure at night […] 
we [in the 2nd Division were] never really […] deprived of any regular 
issue of provisions […] 
Major-General H. J. W.  
Bentinck, Guards Brigade 
1209 [The troops suffered] from hard work, not want of food 
1323 [Illness was due] principally [to] over-work in the trenches and on picket; 
exposure to damp and wet, over exertion, in short. 
1361 [Mortality was] principally to exposure more than the want of clothing. 
H.R.H. Duke of 
Cambridge, 1st Division 
3860 I conceive that the men were worked to a degree that no man could stand 
it without being seriously affected in their health by it. 
4090 I think [the medical men] were very efficient in deed. I have no fault to 
find what ever in that respect. 
Lt. Col. J. P. Sparks, 38th 
Regiment, 3rd Division 
5305 The duty became very severe latterly; […] the extreme severity of the 
weather and […] more duty to than usual, was what caused the disease. 
5306-7 Not badly [off for provisions] for troops in the field. We had a good deal 
of fresh provisions in the 3rd Division. 
[BPP (1854-55), No. 156] 
 
                                                 
1297  The Lancet, 2 June 1855. 
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Table 11.2: References to the unsanitary conditions in the trenches before Sevastopol, April-June 1855 
Date Sender Recipient Abstract [Reference] 
30 Apr. Hall QMG Cases of cholera have taken place in front, all admitted from the trenches, 
The stench in the advanced trench and about the caves arises from human 
excrement and from the decomposition of bodies buried there. 
[RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/1960 and BPP (1857-58), No, 2379, p. 122] 
31 Mar. Hall Monthly 
summary 
Continued fever has prevailed in the 88th Regiment […] the sanitary state 
of the camp is good; the filthy state of the trenches may have something to 
do with the fever.’ [RAMC/397/F/RT/1/1]  
11 May HQ General 
Order 
The dirty state of some of the trenches, particularly the Right Attack, had 
been reported to the Commander of the Forces. Field Officers on duty will 
give directions that a party of the guard shall be employed in covering the 
places used as latrines with sufficient lime and soil. This work is to be 
continued daily. [WO/28/130]  
31 May Hall Monthly 
summary 
The filthy state of the trenches seems to exercise a baneful influence on the 
health of the men. The sanitary condition of the camp continues 
satisfactory. [RAMC/397/F/RT/1/2] 
4 June Hall AG The surgeon in medical charge of the Light Division reported on the 
‘offensive nature of the latrines in the trenches’ […] complaints of this 
nature are so frequently made, there must be grounds for them. 
[RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/2286 and BPP (1857-58), No, 2379, p. 124] 
30 June Hall Monthly 
summary 
The surgeon of the 14th Regiment attributes bowel complaints to exposure 
in the trenches, sudden changes in temperature, and miasmata occasioned 
by decomposition of animal and vegetable matter. [RAMC 397/F/RT/1/2] 
1 July AG Trench 
QM of the 
week 
The caves on the left of the 3rd parallel are in a very dirty state and require 
immediate cleansing. The latrines in the 3rd parallel require more lime. In 
the Right Attack the privies and graves about the quarries are offensive and 
a coating of charcoal would prove useful. [WO/28/110] 
M&SH* Cholera  p. 42 
et seq. 
Refers to the filthy state of the trenches and that a proportion of cases of 
cholera occurred either when in the men were in trenches or shortly after 
they came off duty. 
Diarrhoea or 
dysentery 
p. 142 These enteric diseases were thought to be associated with ‘deleterious 
emanations evolved from the trenches and other places.’ 
Fever p. 161 ‘during the spring and beginning of summer, fever of a remittent form 
prevailed […] probably caused by the miasmata generated in the trenches, 
for since the fall of Sebastopol cases have not been noticed.’ 
p. 213 The Medical Officers ‘attributed the more severe forms of the fever pre-
eminently to the filth and effluvia of the trenches.’ 
* BPP (1857-58), No. 2434. 
 
Table 11.3: State of the hospitals on the Bosphorus during September and December 1854 
Date Sender Recipient Abstract [Reference] 
4 Sep. PMO, Scutari Smith Everything connected with the hospital [presumably the General 
Hospital] is going smoothly […] the whole hospital [has been obtained] 
from the Turkish authorities, which will provide for nearly 200 more 
sick. [PoL] 
12 Sep. PMO, Scutari Smith All the sick and wounded will be placed in the General Hospital, and 
remove slight cases to the barracks, now fitted up as a temporary 
hospital. Not yet received the hospital attendants requested from Dr Hall. 
[PoL] 
25 Sep. Own 
correspondent 
(Chenery) 
News item The barracks, though left in a very dirty state by Turkish soldiers, have 
been cleansed and white-washed, and, though not sumptuous, are 
sufficiently comfortable. […] the health of the men is wonderfully 
improved by the air of the Bosphorus, and most of those under the 
surgeon’s hands on their arrival are convalescent in a few days. [The 
Times, 9 Oct. 1854] 
29 Sep. PMO, Scutari Smith Hospitals very crowded; has taken measures for the prevention of low 
fevers and gangrene, by cleanliness and ventilation. All the wounded 
attended to and going on well. [PoL and BPP (1854-55), No. 156, pp. 
554-5] 
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Table 11.3: Continued 
29 Sep. PMO, Scutari Hall ‘all the wounded were […] doing well. In a hospital […] crowded with 
men [with] wounds yielding a constant offensive discharge, […] 
precaution is […] necessary to ward off […] low fever and gangrene, and 
accordingly I […] ensure a thorough and constant ventilation [and] 
instant removal of all noxious substances such as old dressings, and 
paying […] attention to the patients’ personal cleanliness. [Cantlie 
(1974), II, p. 63] 
3 Oct. Hall Diary entry Arrived at Scutari and went to the General Hospital […] I find it crowded 
with sick and wounded. Great inconvenience has been experienced in 
consequence of Mr Tucker’s neglecting to send down the Purveyor’s 
stores from Varna. I have reported him and will bring him to court-
martial if charges can be proved. [RAMC/524/15/6 and quoted by 
Shepherd (1991), p. 171]  
5 Oct. Dumbreck* Military 
Secretary 
Dr Hall has made every provision for the attendance in the sick at 
Scutari. Reporting that Dr Menzies has detained some MOs in transit, 
and also some convalescent MOs for service at Scutari. 
[RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/730] 
5 Oct. Hall Raglan […] the sick and wounded are going on better almost than could have 
been expected. From the sudden and great influx of patients from the 
Crimea some confusion and difficulty getting them put up at first was 
experienced for want of hospital equipment which I had directed Mr 
Tucker, Purveyor to send down from Varna to Scutari when the Army 
embarked for the Crimea but which he had not attended to. 
The sick and wounded are all accommodated either in the General 
Hospital or in part of the main Barrack where there is still space for more 
sick or wounded […] The removal of these 500 convalescents on board 
ship and the departure of invalids, with the additional wards in the 
General Hospital and […] in the main Barrack […] will I hope be 
sufficient to meet any emergency that might arise. [NAM-1968-07-293-
5] 
5 Oct Hall Smith The sick and wounded are doing better than I could have expected and Dr 
Menzies under many disadvantages has done wonders for their 
accommodation. [RAMC/397/D/CO/1] 
14 Oct. Commandant, 
Scutari 
QMG The deaths in the hospital are decreasing, and the wounded officers are 
improving fast. [WO/28/186] 






Having just returned from Scutari, on sick leave, I learn with regret and 
astonishment that reports […] to the effect that the sick and wounded 
have been grossly neglected, and that there was a great want of lint and 
bandages, and dressings […] as well as wine and other comforts […] 
these reports, to my certain knowledge, are utterly false and groundless. 
[…] The wounded in [Andes and Vulcan] were well cared for. […] 
Nothing could exceed the devoted attention of the medical staff […] No 
distinction [was made between officers and men]. [Also published in The 
Globe, 18 Oct., AMJ, 20 Oct., and ILN, 21 Oct. 1854] 
19 Oct. Letter home News item The state of the hospital is now much improved, thought there not a little 
left to be desired. A vessel full of medical stores […] has been brought 
back. But The sufferings of the men are very great. There are many who 
declare that there wounds have not been looked at for four, five, or six 
days at a time. [Hampshire Advertiser, 4 Nov. 1854] 
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Table 11.3: Continued 
20. Oct Hall Smith The whole hospital establishment has now been put in a very creditable 
state, and the sick and wounded are all doing as well as could possibly be 
expected.† […] Some little confusion was occasioned […] by the sudden 
influx of an immense number of sick and wounded, which was increased 
by Mr Purveyor Tucker’s neglect of orders to send down all the spare 
stores from Varna to Scutari; […] by the strenuous and unceasing labour 
of Menzies and the MOs under him, all difficulties have in great measure 
been surmounted in a short time. I flatter myself we shall have a hospital 
establishment that will bear comparison with one of the same magnitude, 
formed under similar disadvantages, or indeed, may I venture to say, 
under any circumstances and I feel assured that the arrival of Mr Wreford 
will infuse new life into the Purveyor’s department which are much 
required. I should wish, however, the footing on which the Purveyor’s 
Dept with regard to the Medical dept is to be placed should be distinctly 
defined by official authority. […] I have no ambition to add to my 
labours or add to incur any additional responsibility, and if the finance 
concerns of the hospital are removed from my control I shall be 
delighted; but I question, from what I have seen, if it would be a wise 
proceeding for the interests of the public, to remove the Dept from local 
control, and supervision, and where the establishments are most like the 
hospitals here it is not judicious to let the accounts run on for months 
without check. [RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/833, with an abstract in PoL. The 
text in italics was quoted in Nightingale (1863); See McDonald (2010a), 
p. 642] 
20 Oct Hall Diary entry Embarked in the Himalaya on my return to the Crimea and sailed on the 
morning of the 22nd.‡ 
24 Oct. Stratford Raglan I [visited] the hospitals and barracks at Scutari. […] there is room for 
improvement; but things are in much better order than at first, though 
many new sufferers have just come in. […] medical attention was no 
longer deficient; and that medicines were so abundant to make the offers 
of a respectable chymist (sic) here superfluous. [Lane-Poole (1888), p. 
377] 
25 Oct. PMO, Scutari Smith Dr Hall, on his visit, expressed himself satisfied with the hospitals and all 
the arrangements. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe visited on the 22nd inst. 
and was satisfied with all he had seen, also the cleanliness and the care 
and attention shown to the sick. [PoL]  
25 Oct, Stratford Clarendon ‘When I last visited the hospital and barracks […] I found […] 
considerable improvements […] Those with whom I conversed […] 
spoke with cheerfulness and contentment; and the medical attendants 
assured me that, […] they were sufficiently numerous to attend, not only 
the British, but to the […] Russians […]’ [FO/78/1004] 
26 Oct. The Times 
correspondent 
News item Scutari is in much more decent order, although there is a deficiency of 
medical attendance. The supply of medicines is now sufficient, and the 
place has been cleansed of its former impurities. But the sufferings of the 
men have been very great, and it cannot be too frequently impressed on 
those in authority at home that the preparations for such events as those 
now occurring ought to be on the largest scale. [The Times, 8 Nov. 1854]  
27 Oct. Hall Raglan I only left Scutari on the 21st. I can speak from personal observation of 
the satisfactory progress the majority of the wounded are making there. 
[…] amongst such a number of severe and dangerous injuries […] a 
certain number of casualties can be expected […] I am sure his Lordship 
will be pleased to hear that numbers of men are already able to walk 
about, and some few even have been discharged from hospital. […] 
There is 35 medical staff […] The evacuation to non-effectives to 
England will release accommodation. This, with 35 MOs, and more 
expected, should be sufficient for all our wants. 
[RAMC/397/F/CO/1/1/819] 
4 Nov. Spence Smith Just returned from Scutari perfectly delighted to find things so well 
managed. A great number of sick and wounded from Balaklava just 
landing, those unable to walk carried to hospital on stretchers and put to 
bed immediately they arrive. All beds on trestles have a neat and 
comfortable appearance, 400 excellent iron bedsteads have lately been 
obtained for the Turks. [W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/315]  
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Table 11.3: Continued 
4 Nov. Hall News item Dr Hall states the sick and wounded at Scutari are going on most 
satisfactorily; that every man is provided for his comfort and 
accommodation, and that although 2,103 beds are occupied, there are 
1,100 more in readiness. [MT&G, 4 Nov. 1854] 
8 Nov. Bracebridge Herbert The place is clean and airy; few bad smells. [Quoted by Goldie, ‘Letters’, 
p. 64] On returning to England Bracebridge changed his view, as evinced 
in a speech he made that was reported in The Times, 16 Oct. 1855. 
10 Nov. Maxwell Herbert I have devoted a little time to a quiet survey of the hospitals. […] My 
first impression is favourable […] I found ample ventilation, comfortable 
bedding, and healthy looking convalescents. The fine weather, the ample 
building, and abundant supply of water may have contributed to give the 
place an air of cheerfulness. [W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/356] 
13 Nov. Anonymous 
correspondent 
Letter At present everything is going on satisfactorily at Scutari, and I have not 
heard any complaints made of overcrowding on the transports that have 
come with the wounded from the Crimea. [ILN, 2 Dec. 1854]  
14 Nov. Apothecary, 
Scutari 
Smith There was no want of medicines and surgical appliances and all 
statements to the contrary were false and unfounded. [Evidence to 
Roebuck Committee, 22 Mar. 1855; BPP (1854-55), No. 156, p. 427 and 
MT&G, 31 Mar. 1855] 
15 Nov. Own 
correspondent 
News item The state of the hospitals [at Scutari] continue to steadily to improve, and 
notwithstanding the very large number of wounded brought down since 
the battle of Inkermann (sic), a degree of order is maintained, which, 
under all the circumstances, must be considered creditable to the 
authorities. […] it is really wonderful there has been so little confusion. 
[The Times, 30 Nov. with a note in the AMJ, 1 Dec. 1854] 
18 Nov. Raglan Newcastle Lord Burghersh, Raglan’s senior ADC, passed through the Bosphorus 
between 12 and 14 November and reported that the hospitals were in a 
satisfactory condition, while Dr Cumming, one of the hospital 
commissioners, also assured Lord Raglan that he was quite pleased with 
the state in which he found things there. [WO/1/170/ff. 109-112] 
28 Nov. Herbert Smith Mr Bracebridge speaks highly of Dr Cumming. He says things are 
decidedly mending, that they have derived a great deal of assistance from 
The Times fund, […] that the service medical men are indefatigable. […] 
Nightingale speaks very well of Dr Menzies, zealous and humane, but 
wanting in energy to keep the young ones to their work. Of Dr 
Macgregor (sic) she speaks in unmeasured terms of praise. 
[W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/332] 
29 Nov. Herbert Cumming I am very glad to have received a very improved account of the hospitals 
at Scutari. […] Nightingale [speaks] in high terms of the medical men. 
Indeed all do justice to their exertions. But they had a task put upon them 
beyond any strength, and the confusion of the transport service […] no 
doubt added much to their difficulties, by leaving without any certainty 
of regular supplies. [W&SHC/2057/F8/III/B/331] 
1 Dec. Paulet Raglan In general […] the patients are better looked after than has been expected 
and appear as comfortable as circumstances will admit. [NAM-6807-293-
8] 




I yesterday [visited] both Hospitals of Scutari. […] I have never passed 
through wards more cleanly, […] I could make a hearty meal in the 
centre of any one ward. The sick and wounded, fast approaching 
convalescence, looked cheerful and happy. […] an officer of the 47th 
Regiment, who assured me that he believed no hospitals in the world 
could be spoken of in truth with greater satisfaction. [MT&G, 13 Jan. 
1855] 
* Dumbreck acted as PMO in the Crimea during Hall’s absence at Scutari. 
† Cantlie quotes this correctly, (1974, p. 67) while Shepherd (1991, pp. 172 & 202), and Bostridge (2008, p. 222), 
who probably copied Shepherd, wrote ‘are doing better that I would have expected’, thus altering the emphasis of 
Hall’s assessment. In PoL the word ‘state’ was replaced with ‘footing’. 











Appendix 11.1: Abstract of a letter to the editor of The Times from Dr Hall dated 9 July 
and published on 27 July 1855, and in The Lancet on 4 August 
 
(The text in italics was referred to in Nightingale’s ‘Notes’; see McDonald (2010a), p. 642.) 
 
[In] the report of the Committee on the State of the Army before Sebastopol […] notice the following 
statement:- ‘With this confirmation by Dr Dumbreck […] of the whole testimony relating to this painful 
subject, your Committee are totally at a loss to comprehend the report of Dr Hall [regarding] the Barrack 
Hospital, the scene of so much misery and suffering. The Duke of Newcastle states that the disgraceful 
condition of the hospitals was first brought under his notice in the middle of October. Dr Hall was at 
Scutari from the 3
rd
 to the 23
rd
 of October. Dr Hall's report seems to have misled both Lord Raglan and 
the government at home, and to have occasioned much delay in measures taken afterwards for the remedy 
of evils which might have been arrested earlier in their progress.’ 
You pronounce these observations […] to be ‘a just rebuke for my false report,’ without […] 
knowing anything of the circumstances under which it was written. […] so far from my report being a 
false one, I reiterate and adhere to every syllable I then wrote, and I consider I am quite as good a judge 
of the subject, and quite as worthy of credit, as the Duke of Newcastle’s informants, whose reports may, 
perhaps, refer to an earlier or a later period than mine. 
Dr Dumbreck’s evidence […] refers to a later period than […] my report. […] he was […] in the 
Crimea […] until the 17th of November. Now, my report refers to a period not later than the 21st of 
October [when] I left Scutari, and [when] every man in hospital had new and clean bedding, and all his 
substantial wants were […] attended to. With ordinary capacity on the part of the principal medical 
officer […] and activity on that of the purveyor, this condition of things ought to have been maintained, if 
not improved. The General Hospital itself, a building erected, furnished, and set apart for the reception of 
sick, was from the first well-appointed, but in the Barrack Hospital [had been] temporarily and hurriedly 
converted into a hospital for the reception of sick and wounded brought in suddenly in great numbers, 
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there was, necessarily, considerable confusion for the first few days; […] and I have no hesitation in 
saying that 2,000 wounded men would derange the economy of any hospital in London for some days, 
notwithstanding all the resources of means and medical attendance. […] When I was at Scutari there was 
ample accommodation for the sick and wounded then in hospital, and for half as many more, but the 
battles of Balaklava and Inkermann (sic) filled this at once […] 
When I was at Scutari in June 1854, I desired washermen to be hired to do the washing of the 
hospital, and before I left for Varna they were in full and efficient employ. This plan, I understood, was 
changed afterwards [by Mr Ward] to one of contract, which broke down, as might have been expected. 
Another subject which I had great difficulty in getting arranged was the condition of the water closets, 
which speedily got choked up from the men recklessly thrusting old shoes and other articles down them. 
When these were put right, I advised small iron gratings to be placed over them, so as to prevent a 
repetition of the evil, but it was not attended to; hence the disgusting scene, described by Mr Osborne, in 
the Barrack Hospital. Nothing of that kind existed when I was there in October, but to become so would 
only require a few days. 
 
Appendix 11.2: Sir John Hall’s response to a speech made by Lord Palmerston on 12 
March 1857 
 
Hall’s letter, 14 March 1857: It was with astonishment that I read in the report of that part of Lord 
Palmerston’s speech […] that the excellent condition of the military hospitals in the Crimea was 
attributable to the advice and suggestions of Dr Sutherland and other Sanitary Commissioners. 
His Lordship has been misinformed on this matter, and I owe it to my reputation to state that 
neither Dr Sutherland nor any member of the Sanitary Commission had anything whatever to do with 
either the organization or management of the military hospitals in the Crimea, and I believe them all to be 
gentlemen of too much honour and probity to take credit of anything of the kind. 
What valuable information they have furnished to the government at home I am unable to say; but 
as far as their suggestions on sanitary matters in the Crimea are concerned it is admitted by themselves 
that almost everything they could think of was either in actual operation, or had been recommended by 
the Medical Department before their arrival; but as they were invested by government with greater power 
than was accorded to the PMO of the Army, they thought they might assist in getting useful measures 
carried out. 
I should have allowed this report to have gone unnoticed, as I have done many others, did it not 
proceed from an authority which stamps it in the public estimation as a denial, on that part of government, 
of all credit, due either to myself to the medical department, for months of anxiety, toil, and privation in 
the Crimea; and it is disheartening to medical officers to find that the need for praise which is so justly 





Sutherland’s reply, 18 March 1857: In The Times of this date there is a letter from Sir John Hall, 
referring to Lord Palmerston’s speech of the 12th inst., and containing certain observations on the 
proceedings of the Sanitary Commission in the Crimea, in reply to which I should feel obliged by your 
permitting me to say a few words. 
It is quite true as stated by Dr (sic) Hall that the Commission had nothing whatever to do ‘with 
either the organization and management of the military hospitals.’ We were, in fact, precluded by our 
instructions with these matters. But we were required to see that the sanitary condition of the hospitals, as 
to ventilation, water supply, number of sick etc., was such as to give scope to medical treatment. We also 




A M.D.’s letter, 17 March: I happened to be engaged at the Balaklava hospital when Dr Sutherland 
first arrived in the Crimea [and who] had nothing to find fault with – nothing even to suggest beyond 
what had been suggested over and over again if we had means to carry out our common-sense 
suggestions. I believe every other hospital in the Crimea was in the same improved condition when Dr 
Sutherland made his first appearance. […] it is absurd to overrate the value of his labours in the Crimea, 




                                                 
1298  Hall to Editor, 14 Mar.; The Times, 17 Mar. 1857. 
1299  Sutherland to Editor, 17 Mar.; The Times, 18 Mar. 1857. 
1300  M.D. to Editor, 17 Mar.; The Times, 19 Mar. 1857. 
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Pars Parva’s undated letter: I can bear […] testimony to the reasonable nature of the protest which 
Sir John Hall has put forward […] against the preposterous assertion that the Sanitary Commissioners had 
the smallest share of bringing about the healthy and effective condition of the troops in 1855-6. […] They 
hunted out smells, wrote reports, sniffed among the latrines and slaughterhouses, jotted down bad odours, 
meddled without mending. But what practical good they did I [and] many others, never knew […] At all 
events, let it be seen how far they are justified in appropriating any of the credit due to the hard-worked, 




                                                 
1301  Pars Parva to Editor; The Times, 19 Mar. 1857. 
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Chapter 12 
Aftermath of the Crimean War 
 
The exploitation of modern technology during the Crimean War and the institution of 
the Victoria Cross an the award of other orders and medals are considered in the first 
two sections while administrative reform and the reorganization of the Army Medical 
Department recommended by the Royal Commission are then discussed. Many 
campaigns have been characterized by inadequate planning and a lack of resources; 
features not only of the Crimean War but also campaigns in South Africa (1899-1902), 
Mesopotamia (1914-18) and Gallipoli (1915-16); analyses of which comprises the 
fourth section , while the final pages comprise a retrospective discussion on the whole 
project. 
 
Technology and medicine 
 
Numerous technological advances were a feature of the 19
th
 century and their utilization 
has justified several commentators considering the conflict as the first modern war. 
However, with the possible exception of Brunel’s design for a prefabricated pavilion 
hospital, a concept which proved of value in future wars,
1302
 there is little evidence that 
the conflict acted a catalyst for specific development; unlike the World Wars which 
stimulated many influential innovations, for example, in the field of reconstructive 
surgery and the development of medicinal drugs and equipment. Nevertheless, extensive 
use was made of steam powered ships to bring supplies from distant ports to harbours 
close to the front, while the development of a railway network facilitated their 
distribution to the Army; a situation in stark contrast to the Russian experience in which 
supplies had to be conveyed long distances overland using pack animals and carts 
drawn by draught animals.
1303
 Notwithstanding technological advances in firearms and 
ordnance, such as the rifled musket, other benefits of industrialization included the 
employment of a floating bakery, steam powered saw mills, vulcanized rubber products, 
a desalination plant,
1304
 and an engineering factory ship; while the electric telegraph 
                                                 
1302  Hill (1870) and Shepherd (1996). 
1303  Though an important development, it is an exaggeration to suggest that ‘the railway, a symbol of 
the industrial power commanded by the middle class, was the sole unqualified success of the 
Crimean War’ as suggested by Lalumia, (1981), p. 52. 
1304  Similar equipment that was employed during the Gallipoli campaign, albeit sited on Mudros; 
Harrison (2010), p. 200. 
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improved communications between London and the front and could have be used to 
facilitate the supply of essential items if necessary. 
Victorian inventiveness also resulted in various items of medical equipment being 
sent to the Crimea for assessment.
1305
 These included electro-magnetic coils for 
stimulating weakly patients, washing machines, soda water makers, vapour baths, cork 
mattresses, waterproof beds, Liston splints, chloroform inhalers, and patent cooking 
stoves. As early as July 1854 Hall noted in this diary that he had been sent several ‘new 
inventions to report on, as if we have nothing else to think about but the jims of quacks 
and speculators.’ This comment suggests that that some of this equipment probably 
proved to be of little or no value, although Hall reported that vulcanized India rubber 
cloth was better than oiled cloth,
1306
 and Ritchie’s cork mattresses proved: ‘A good and 
really useful invention for field service and in the event of the war continuing they will 
come into universal use.’1307 
From the point of view of medical practice chloroform anaesthesia, which had 
come into use towards the end of the Kaffir War of 1846-1852, was regularly used
1308
 
but otherwise surprisingly little was published on clinical topics by MOs who saw 
active service; and from this Shepherd concluded that: ‘It was not easy to judge to what 
extent the intensive clinical experience in medicine and surgery gained during the war 
was assimilated [and] influenced practice in either service or civilian life.’1309 Macleod 
and Fraser published on the surgical treatment of gunshot wounds
1310
 but it was not 
until the New Zealand Wars that the benefits of avoiding interference with wounds, 
burning all foul dressings, employing an effective disinfectant based on potassium 
permanganate, and the insistence on frequent hands washing were recognized. As a 
result conditions such as erysipelas, gangrene, and secondary haemorrhage became less 
                                                 
1305  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 136. 
1306  Hall to Smith, 24 Apr. 1855; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/2/1908. 
1307  Hall to Smith, 22 Feb. 1856; RAMC/397/F/CO/1/3/4287. 
1308  For authoritative reviews on the subject see Shepherd (1985), Connor (1998), and Metcalf (2005), 
while Scotland and Heys (2013) provide a general account of the development of military 
anaesthesia during the 19th century. Prior to the invasion Hall advised against the use of 
chloroform under battlefield conditions prior and for this he subsequently received unwarranted 
criticism; for a discussion on this issue see Hinton (2015). 
1309  Shepherd (1991), p. 597. 
1310  Macleod (1858) and Fraser (1859). 
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of a problem, while both starving a fever and blood-letting had also become a ‘thing of 
the past.’1311 
The crucial role of water in the epidemiology of cholera was not generally 
accepted during the mid-1850s, and, as the germ theory was a development for the 
future the management of what are now classed as infectious diseases was along the 
traditional lines current at the time, and do not resonate with 21
st
 century clinical 
medical practice. In contrast, attention to basic hygiene, including the separation of 
wounded convalescents from medical cases and reducing overcrowding, clearly paid 
dividends; the mass administration of lime juice successfully prevented scurvy;
1312
 
simple casualty clearing stations utilized during the assaults of 18 June and 9 
September 1855 would have permitted patient selection, now termed triage; while the 
advantage of treating of BFIs close to the front, as was amply demonstrated during 
World War One,
1313
 was also recognized by Hall and his colleagues. 
 
Victoria Cross, orders and medals 
 
One of the lasting legacies of the war was the institution of the Victoria Cross by a 
Royal Warrant dated 29 January 1856.
1314
 The names of the 111 winners of the medal 
were published in eight editions of the LG between the 24 February 1857 and 6 May 















 who both won the medal on 8 
September 1855, and Surgeon, later DIGH, J. Mouat, 6
th
 Dragoons, who saved the life 
of Captain Morris, 17
th
 Lancers, during the battle of Balaklava.
1317
 All three surgeons 
had been assisted by an NCO, and in the case of Mouat and Sylvester, they also 
received the VC, namely, Sergeant Major C. Wooden, 17
th





 When the draft citation for Hale’s VC was submitted to 
Panmure on 28 April 1857 he queried if the sergeant (C. Fisher, 7
th
 Regiment) had been 
                                                 
1311  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 257. 
1312  Incidentally, scurvy, which may retard the healing of fractures, proved a problem during the 
American Civil War and some theatres in World War One; Bourne (1944). 
1313  Harrison (2010), p. 297. 
1314  LG, 5 Feb.  1856. 
1315  LG, 5 May 1857 and the MT&G, The Lancet. & BMJ, 9 May 1857. 
1316  LG, 20 Nov. 1857; The Lancet & MT&G, 28 Nov.; and BMJ, 5 Dec. 1857. 
1317  See Hinton & Starling (2011) for an account of Mouat’s gallant conduct in New Zealand. 
1318  LG, 26 Oct. 1858 & 24 Feb. 1857. 
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recommended. The Military Secretary confirmed that he had not, although his name 
appeared in Hale’s citation.1319 On the other hand, Lieutenant W. Hope, 7th Regiment, 




Of the 83 VCs won by Army personnel 49 (59%) were awarded during six days of 
engagement in battle with the remainder during the year long siege (Table 12.1). A 
surprisingly large number (34, 41%) of the deeds involved assisting a wounded 
comrade, either wholly or in part and this included all three surgeons and over half 
(56%) of the NCOs (Tables 12.2 and 12.3). 
It was stipulated in the Royal Warrant that the VC could be awarded to any 
member of the armed services irrespective of rank. However, there was a strong bias in 
favour of the military officers; in that although the MOs, military offices, NCOs, and 
men comprised approximately <1%, 4%, 14%, and 82% of the army strength they were 
awarded 3.5%, 31.5%, 32.5%, and 32.5% respectively of the 83 VCs won by Army 




MOs and other members of the AMD, and a few civilian surgeons, who served in the 
Crimea between 18 September 1854 and the fall of Sevastopol were entitled to the 
Crimea medal and where appropriate the clasps for Alma, Inkermann (sic), Balaklava, 
and Sebastopol.
1322
 Personnel who arrived either after 8 September 1855, or who served 
only in Turkey did not qualify for the medal, although some commentators held the 
opinion that those stationed in the base hospitals in Turkey merited the medal given the 
risks they took to their health attending the sick, and to a lesser extent the wounded. 
 
Several senior MOs were awarded the Order of the Bath
1323
 (Table 12.4) although the 
distribution did not entirely satisfy the editor of the MT&G who pointed out that the 
only one naval surgeon received the CB in contrast to one KCB and seven CBs awarded 
                                                 
1319  WO/32/7303. 
1320  LG, 5 May 1857. 
1321  This disparity illustrates the divisive aspect of any system of awards; a topic discussed in extenso 
with respect to the VC by Mead (2015). 
1322  The medal rolls from the Crimean campaign are WO/100/22-34. 




 The naval hospitals appear to have functioned better than those 
of the Army, and, although Dr David Deas deserved credit for that, the comparison is 
hardly fair since the soldiers generally suffered more hardship than the sailors, even 
those manning the batteries, as they did not have the benefit of assistance from the fleet 




The list of recipients of the Legion of Honour were published in the LG on 4 August 
1856 (449 individuals) and 1 May 1857 (102).
1326
 Of 551 awards five recipients 
participated in the siege of Kars while 31 (5.5%) of those who served in the Crimea 
were MOs, with preponderance being on the medical staff (Table 12.5). The Legion of 
Honour was not awarded for bravery but five of ten medical staff officers awarded the 
5
th
 Class had been noticed for conspicuous bravery, namely, DIGH J. Mouat, CB; SS2 
H.T. Sylvester, MD; ASS T.C. Brady; and Acting ASs G. Fair, MD, and C. 
O’Callaghan. Similarly, two of the three regimental surgeons similarly honoured were 
mentioned in despatches for their courage, namely, ASs W.Y. Jeeves and J. Gibbons. 
The overall ratio of MOs to Army Officers to NCOs and men in the Army was c.1:4:95 
while the comparable ratios for those decorated were 1:19:5 thus indicating bias in 
favour of the military officers. 
 
Dr H. Sandwith was the first member of medical profession to receive the Order of the 
Medjidie for special services rendered during the siege of Kars.
1327
 The awards to 66 




The Victor Emmanuel II, King of Sardinia authorized the issue of 400 ‘Al Valore 
Militaire’ medals to officers, NCOs, and men of the British Army.1329 Seven medals 
were awarded to regimental surgeons, but none to staff surgeons (Table 12.7). 
 
                                                 
1324  MT&G, 29 Mar. 1856. In the event, Deas, who died in 1876, was advanced to KCB in 1867: 
Annual Register Chronicle, 1876, pp. 129-30. 
1325  In the event, Deas, who died in 1876, was advanced to KCB in 1867: Annual Register Chronicle, 
1876, pp. 129-30. 
1326  LG, 4 Aug. 1856. A decree issued by the Emperor of France on 3 Apr. 1857 authorized the 
award of the Legion of Honour (5th class) to a further 12 medical officers printed in the LG, 1 
May 1857 and also in the MT&G and The Lancet. 
1327  LG, 8 Feb. 1856. 
1328  LG, 2 Mar. & 8 June 1856. 




The lessons learnt in the Crimea can be separated into those specific to the campaign 
and those that could have been learnt in previous campaigns. The unique elements 
revolved around the theatre of operation as a logistical problem, and the dangers of a 
large scale raid turning into a prolonged siege conducted by a static army, and it was 
this component that provided the principal topic for this thesis, and which was resolved 
in large part by the personnel in the Crimea. The second category is more fundamental 
and concerns the administration of the Army; a topic expanded upon in a monograph by 




Discussions on the reform of the Army during the decades prior to the war 
evinced little enthusiasm for change, and it needed the declaration of war to provide an 
impetus for reorganization, albeit limited in extent. Briefly, the administration was 
simplified with the responsibilities for War and Colonies being separated into two 
departments (June 1854); the transfer of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War 
Office (December 1854); the discontinuation of Herbert’s post of Secretary at War 
(February 1855); and the abolition of the Board of Ordnance (May 1855), with the 
consequence that when the war ended the Secretary for War had political control over 
the ‘Commissariat, Ordnance Department, reserve and line troops together with the 
legal and financial duties of the War Office.’ 
Several senior politicians clearly considered that the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army (Lord Hardinge) was not a ‘powerful military voice’ and the failure to appoint a 
strong successor meant that the Army had little impact on departmental changes, and 
hence ‘tighter political control [was] achieved over the Army, and outstanding problems 
of civil-military relations […] had moved decisively in favour of the politicians,’ with 
the result that ‘the relevant victories and defeats in the field of army administration 
occurred not on the Heights of Sevastopol, but in the Palace of Westminster.’ 
Despite these positive developments the ‘relative positions of the Minister for War 
and the Commander-in-Chief [were not] as clearly defined as desirable’ and when the 
‘[War] Department concentrated in Pall Mall […] Horse Guards [was left] utterly 
isolated in Whitehall.’ Whether this physical separation contributed to the lack of 
                                                 
1330  Sweetman (1984), pp. 128-33. 
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progress in reform is a matter of speculation; needless to state it required Bismark and 
Napoleon III later in the century ‘to goad the national conscience into military reform 
once more.’ Furthermore, the Army remained largely amateur with promotion by 
purchase remaining in place until 1871. This was consistent with British concerns about 
militarism but it limited the scope for effective reform. 
At the level of practical administration the Crimean War reinforced ‘the oft-
repeated cries for military supply services,’ and this resulted in belated the formation of 
several ‘quasi-military’ units, viz. the Medical Staff Corps, Land Transport Corps, 
Mounted Staff Corps, Army Works Corps and Civil Engineering Corps’ and of these 
only two ‘survived the war to be fully militarised and reorganised respectively as the 
Army Hospital Corps and the Military Train. Making use of able-bodied soldiers and 
ultimately commanded by Horse Guards, they became part of the Army. 
 
The Royal Commission 
 
Cantlie concluded that Herbert was the ‘first Minister who ever set himself the task of 
saving the life of the soldier’ and though out of office when the war ended he played a 
leading role in the most high profile post-war initiative, as President of the Royal 
Commission convened to enquire into the ‘Regulations affecting the sanitary conditions 
of the Army’.1331 The Commission took evidence between May and July 1857 and their 
report published in February 1858 was directed towards future reorganization rather 
than a retrospective analysis of what occurred in the Crimea; and there was no attempt 
to apportion blame for any failures that occurred during that time. The Commission’s 
recommendations included the reorganization of the Medical Department, the institution 
of an Army Medical School and a Statistical Branch, and the improvement in the 
construction of barrack and hospital accommodation; four topics addressed 
subsequently in greater detail by dedicated sub-commissions. These developments 
suggest that the Crimean experience had awakened the national conscience to the reality 
that soldiers deserved to be treated with care and consideration during both peace and 
war. In addition, a Royal Warrant promulgated in October 1858 ‘brought about new and 
advantageous prospects for medical officers.’ 1332 
                                                 
1331  See Chapter 11 for the Commissioners’ conclusions on the health of the Army. 
1332  Cantle (1974), II, p. 196. 
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The Medical School, inaugurated at Fort Pitt during March 1860, moved to Netley 
in 1863.
1333
 Dr Parkes, one of the first professors, published a Manual of Practical 
Hygiene in 1864.
1334
 Parkes, a civilian, had no first hand experience of combat, and it is 
not obvious how its contents, which essentially describe best contemporary practice, 
were influenced by what he may have heard about what took place during that 
campaign. There are no index entries for the Sanitary Commission, sanitary officers or 
female nurses. There is a brief mention of cholera in the French Army when in Bulgaria 
(p. 62) and clothing in the Crimea (p. 366), but no acknowledgement of Nightingale’s 
post-war contribution to matters of hygiene, apart from a passing comment on the 
design of hospitals (p. 310).
1335
 The book, which was dedicated to the memory of Lord 
Herbert and is probably more a legacy of the Royal Commission than the Crimean War, 
become a standard text on the subject and ran to several editions including a number 




The foundation stone for a hospital at Netley Abbey on Southampton Water was laid by 
Queen Victoria on 19 May 1856,
1336
 too late to play a part in the war, though it proved 
a welcome replacement for the unsatisfactory facilities at Chatham. The Royal Victoria 
Hospital subsequently proved an asset during both World Wars, given its location on 
Southampton Water, but by the 1970s it became redundant and all but the chapel, which 
now houses a museum, was demolished. 
A military hospital was also constructed in Sheerness, and although planned 
during the war, the foundation stone was not laid until July 1856. It opened the 





                                                 
1333  For details see Cantlie (1974), pp. 217-33. 
1334  Parkes (1864). 
1335  The American equivalent of Parkes’ book was published by Hammond in 1863, and includes a few 
references to the Crimean War. For example, the design of the hospital huts (pp. 394-6), the poor 
ventilation of hospitals (pp. 429-31), and the ‘alimentation of the soldier’ (pp. 556-65). 
1336  ILN, 24 May 1856. 
1337  For details see Hughes (2016). 
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Army Medical Department 
 
The development of the AMD during the remaining years of the 19
th
 century have been 
covered comprehensively in chapters entitled ‘Era of reform’ and ‘Reorganisation’ by 
Cantlie; ‘Epilogue’ by Shepherd; and ‘Medical Reforms after the Crimean War’ by 
Scotland and Heys.
1338
 A detail assessment of this topic lies outwith the aims of this 
thesis but it is germane to note that Surgeon Thomas Longmore, 19
th
 Regiment, was 
appointed Professor of Surgery at the Army Medical School in 1860 and went on to 
publish ‘many useful texts, including studies relating to his experiences in the Crimean 
War.’ No less than six Crimea War veterans became the DG of the AMD; namely, 
Thomas Alexander (appointed 1858), James Gibson (1860), Thomas Logan (1867), 
William Muir (1874), Thomas Crawford (1882), and William Mackinnon (1889). 
Shepherd concluded that when Mackinnon retired in 1896 the ‘service following this 
succession of directors-general [was] substantially reshaped and improved to face the 
new century;’1339 for example the scheme devised in 1885 for the evacuation of 
casualties from the front back to England;
1340
 and doubtless the experience these 
officers gained in the Crimea would have contributed in some degree to this optimistic 
situation. 
Of the civil surgeons several went on to have impressive careers: T. Spencer 
Wells and J.W. Hulke became Presidents of the Royal College of Surgeons, G. Macleod 
succeeded Joseph Lister
1341
 as the Professor of Surgery at Glasgow University; G. 
Rolleston became the Linacre Professor of Anatomy at Oxford University; and J. 




Conduct of future campaigns 
 
The Indian Mutiny (1857-9) took place too soon after the Crimean War for the ‘medical 
service to be influenced by either its experience in [that war] or by the observations of 
                                                 
1338  Cantlie (1974), pp. 196-237 & 267-91; Shepherd (1991), pp. 591-624; and Scotland & Heys 
(2013), pp. 259-76. 
1339  Shepherd (1991), pp. 610-1. 
1340  Bricknell (2002). 
1341  Among his many accomplishments Lister developed the concept of antiseptic surgery during the 
mid-1860s 
1342  Shepherd (1996). Incidentally, Shepherd (1991), pp. 640-5 provides a brief CV for these 
individuals and several other civilian surgeons. 
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the Royal Commission’ and hence the ‘only significant gain […] was the presence of 
[MOs] who had seen recent active service.’1343 The China Wars of 1858-60 also 
benefited from experienced MOs; while two notable features were the employment of a 
sanitary officer for the first time and the ‘provision of two 200-bed hospital ships, the 
Mauritius and the Melbourne, which were well-equipped with operating rooms and “all 
the latest appliances”.’1344 The Chinese experience proved ‘noteworthy’ for ‘the 
excellence of its medical arrangements and the high standard of health which was 
maintained throughout.’1345 A conclusion that confirms Shepherd’s proposition that 
‘some reforms had already been put to the test’ and had ‘proved their worth.’1346 
However, institutional inertia ensured that the restructuring of the medical services 
proceeded slowly despite the recommendations of the Royal Commission. The dictum si 
vis pace pare bellum
1347
 was never acted upon and fundamental errors in military 
planning were repeated with ‘the result that ‘the hard earned experience of previous 
campaigns was often forgotten and lessons had to be painfully re-learned,’1348 or as 
George Santayana (1863-1952) opined: ‘Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it.’ For example, the South African War (1899-1902) and the 
campaigns in Mesopotamia (1914-18) and Gallipoli (1915-16) were: 
 
run [like] colonial wars […] with authority concentrated in the commander and his small 
staff; [a system] wholly unsuited to large, complex operations [which] required […] co-
ordination between the different branches of the Army, as well as between the Army and 
Navy. [In addition] medical matters were rarely given serious consideration [with the] 
commanders […] in the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia deliberately [excluding] medical 
officers from their staff. Preparations for the evacuation and treatment of the wounded 
were consequently based on wildly unrealistic estimates [and as] sanitation and hygiene 
were treated with indifference […] thousands of deaths [were] caused by diseases such 




One of consequences of the medical disasters encountered during these campaigns 
was the convening of official commissions of enquiry.
1350
 These evaluated the problems 
                                                 
1343  Shepherd (1991), pp. 601-3. No female nurses were officially employed during the campaign. 
1344  Shepherd (1991), p. 604. Both vessels were employed as hospital transports during the Crimean 
campaign. Incidentally, a floating steam factory ship, Volcano, also accompanied the expedition; 
The Times & Daily News, 25 May 1857. 
1345  Cantlie (1974), II, p. 253. 
1346  Shepherd (1991), p. 604 
1347  ‘If you want peace, prepare for war.’ 
1348  Shepherd (1991), p. 620. 
1349  Harrison (2004), p. 11. See also Harrison (2010), pp. 201-2. 
1350  BPP (1901), Cd. 453, 454 & 455; BPP (1917-18), Cd. 8610; and BPP (1919), Cd. 371. 
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and suggested policy changes that might prevent their recurrence. The reports contain 
much information of historical interest but there was a tendency for the ‘establishment’ 
to protect its own and several of the senior military commanders appear to have been let 
off relatively lightly; shades perhaps of outcome of the Chelsea Board of General 
Officers which was convened after the Crimean War, and which exonerated both Airey 
and Estcourt, the QMG and AG.
1351
 
Selected extracts from reports of these commissions support the proposition that 
although ‘each theatre of operation [is] ecologically distinct and [poses] unique 
problems,’1352 the approaches adopted to solve medical problems and the predisposing 
military causes have certain similarities, although not every problem occurs in every 
campaign and the solutions may differ in detail. In addition, it was not necessarily 
possible to adopt techniques found successful in one campaign in another; for example 
the approach to wound management adopted on the high veldt proved inadequate when 





When the South African War commenced there were sufficient medical personnel and 
equipment for only two Army Corps and one general and two stationery hospitals and 
inevitably this resulted in staff shortages later in the campaign. Further problems which 
resonated with the Crimean experience included a shortage of adequately trained 
hospital orderlies necessitating the employment of privates or convalescents, while the 
provision of hospital transport on requisition from the Army Services Corps caused 
avoidable delays on occasions. The ambulance waggons were heavy and uncomfortable 
for patients and more suitable vehicles were required; similarly the design of the tents 
and marquees supplied by the British Army needed improvement. On the other hand not 
all was bad, viz.: Requisitions from South Africa concerning the sick and wounded were 
‘promptly met by the home authorities’ and they were ‘ably supported by [those] in 
South Africa;’ the ‘civil surgeons [did] their duty extremely well;’ the way the orderlies 
‘discharged their duties has deservedly been the subject of high praise;’ and ‘great 
assistance [was rendered] by the Red Cross and other charities.’ 
                                                 
1351  BPP (1856), Nos. 422 & 2119. 
1352  Harrison (2010), p. 291. 
1353  Harrison (2004), p. 110. 
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The Mesopotamian Commission concluded that the Indian government failed 
persistently to ‘minister to the wants of the forces.’ For example, hospital facilities for 
patients evacuated to India during 1915 were totally inadequate and did not become 
available until a year after the invasion.
1354
 Fortunately, improvements were introduced 
during latter part of campaign and medical needs figured prominently in the planning of 
military operations, with obvious beneficial effect.
1355
 Specific recommendations of a 
medical nature included granting the DMS greater powers during wartime; forming a 
sanitary organization which reported to the PMO but was separated from personnel 
treating the sick and wounded;
1356
 and locating responsible officers permanently at the 
ports to ensure that medical equipment and personnel were properly embarked and 
disembarked. 
 
The Dardanelles Commission conceded that the failure to advance rapidly after the 
initial landing in Gallipoli inevitably necessitated the immediate evacuation of the 
wounded and thus precluded triage and severely limited the amount of emergency 
treatment that could be provided on the beaches. On the other hand, Harrison concluded 
that in the case of sanitation and water supply the GOC (General Hamilton) and his staff 
were ‘largely (and wrongly) absolved of blame, but in the case of the evacuation they 
did not evade censure altogether.’1357 
It was concluded that the military authorities gave insufficient consideration ‘to 
the measures necessary to carry out such an expedition with success,’ and the 
‘difficulties of the operations were much underestimated.’ The DMS had no 
‘opportunity of estimating the number of hospital ships required,’ and the failure to 
include him in the Headquarters Staff was a mistake as he was not kept ‘fully informed 
of the operations which were proposed;’ an oversight that Harrison concluded was 
probably ‘the most important reason for the shortcomings of medical operations.’1358 
                                                 
1354  See Harrison (2010), pp. 207-9 for a harrowing commentary on the inadequate provision made for 
the sick and wounded during the first years of the campaign. 
1355  Harrison (2004), p. 12. 
1356  Incidentally, it was stipulated that the Sanitary Commission sent to the East should play no part in 
the management of the sick and wounded, but concentrate on improving the environment from a 
sanitary point of view. 
1357  Harrison (2010), p. 195. 
1358  Harrison (2010), p. 201. 
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The supervision of transports was hampered by a want of satisfactory communication 
between the ships and shore although the field ambulances and clearing stations 
operated efficiently given the circumstances; the supply of medicines and medical 
requisites was generally adequate; the food was satisfactory although it lacked variety; 
and considerable assistance was received from the naval surgeons on the transports and 
other vessels. 
 
Some of the considerable amount of statistical information generated during these 
campaigns was summarized in one of the official histories of the Great War.
1359
 The 
summary in Table 12.8 indicates that though there was a considerable reduction in 
mortality from disease in the later campaigns this was not the case for wounds; a 
reflection possibly of the increase in the killing power of weaponry since the Crimean 








 century British military campaigns indicates that the 
Crimean War was not exceptional from a medical point of view, though it proved 
challenging for several reasons: dysfunctional management systems in the Army as a 
whole, especially during the early months; long lines of communication and the total 
reliance on shipping for supplies; the need to evacuate large numbers of sick and 
wounded during the first winter; epidemics of cholera in 1854 and 1855; and the 
appearance of scurvy and other medical conditions associated with malnutrition and 
excessive hardship during the winter of 1854-55. It was these last two factors that 
proved crucial in precipitating the catastrophic deterioration in the health of the troops 
during the winter of 1854-55; rather than either a primary breakdown in hygiene or the 
presence of the cholera bacillus. 
 
The practical problems of attempting the invasion of the Crimea late in the season were 
set out in a memorandum prepared by Burgoyne on 29 August 1854: 
 
There are two causal circumstances that may prove great impediments to the success of this 
enterprise. One is the advance of the season. The equinoctial gales […] may interrupt […] the 
                                                 
1359  Mitchell & Smith (1931). 
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communications between the armies and the fleet. And the other is, that […] the troops […] 
enfeebled and much shaken in body, as well as […] morale, by climate, disorder, and the want 




The overall consequences of landing in the Crimea under these circumstances 
were summarized subsequently in a private letter written by Estcourt on 23 February 
1855 to Wetherall, the AG at Horse Guards: 
 
The cause of our difficulties and losses too is simply a want of preparation for such an 
enterprise as this. When the Government had determined to undertake for political reasons the 
invasion of the Crimea contrary to military advice, it would at least have been wise, in as 
much as the military discouragement arose from the lateness of the season, the want of time 
before winter, to prepare for a winter’s siege. If they had done so: if they had prepared the 
huts, and warm clothing; and all had been waiting in the Bosphorus for our call, we should not 
have cared much about winter. If we had been successful and had marched into Sebastopol 
[…] the expense would have been added to the expense of the war. […] Ah! If you had been 
listened to and each man had been supplied with a water proof sheet, I do believe we should 





In the spring of 1855 the editor of the MT&G noted that Pringle had observed that 
‘winter expeditions, though severe in appearance, are attended by little sickness, if the 
men have good shoes, quarters, fuel and provisions.’ However, these simple 
requirements were not met during the winter of 1854-55 and hence the ‘mortality has 
been what might have been anticipated’ and that the men ‘died by thousands’ from 
those diseases expected under these circumstances such as ‘diarrhoea, dysentery, fever, 
rheumatism, thoracic inflammations, and frost-bites.’1362 This disaster necessitated the 
evacuation of large numbers of patients with a grave or hopeless prognosis and this 
factor largely determined the mortality rates recorded in the hospitals on the Bosphorus. 
Improvements in hospital facilities and primary health care in the Crimea, which were 
made difficult by the exingencies of the siege, eventually resulted in the capacity to treat 
seriously ill patients locally. The health of the troops in the Crimea improved slowly, 
but not uniformly, from the end of January 1855, well over a month before the arrival of 
the Sanitary Commission. Given that most patients at Scutari came from the Crimea the 
reduction in the mortality rates after March would, at least in part, be attributable to this 
factor. Nightingale supported this opinion when she informed Panmure that: ‘The men 
sent down to Scutari in the winter died because they were not sent down till half 
                                                 
1360  Wrottesley (1873), II, p. 72. 
1361  NAM-1962-10-95-2. 




 while Cantlie considered, on the basis that many patients suffered untreatable 
conditions such as intestinal ulceration associated with dysentery or typhoid, that 




Raglan appreciated that conditions had began to improve after the turn of the year 
when he wrote to the Queen and the Newcastle on the 20 and 23 January 1855 
respectively: 
 
To the Queen: Lord Raglan can […] assure your Majesty that […] all his thoughts are 
occupied in endeavouring to provide for […] your Majesty’s troops. It has not been [possible] 
to lighten […] their duties. Those exacted […] for the preservation of the trenches and 
batteries; and there are many other calls upon the men, […] the roads are so bad that wheeled 
carriages [cannot] be used, and […] horse transport is diminished by sickness and deaths and 
the Commissariat […] cannot bring up the daily supplies without their assistance thereby 
adding […] to their labour and fatigue. […] the Allied Armies […] can derive no resources 
from [the country] and consequently all […] stores and provisions […] must be imported. 
Such a necessity forms […] a difficulty of vast magnitude […] productive of the most serious 




To the Duke: The weather has become milder; but the country is still in a dreadful state from 
melted snow. The army is well supplied with warm clothing, and if the Commissariat were 
adequately provided with transports, and the huts could be at once brought up, there would be 
no other cause of suffering than the severity of a Crimean winter, and the duties imposed of 




Improvements in the Crimea were also appreciated in Constantinople when the 
Ambassador reported on 8 February that ‘a marked improvement has taken place in […] 
the health of the Army.’1367 A few days later a staff officer at Scutari was informed by 
an officer ‘just come in from the Crimea’ that ‘matters are greatly improved in the last 
few days and it is really to be hoped they will continue improving.’1368 On the same day, 
Paulet, the commandant at Scutari, informed Herbert that ‘Everything seems to be 
improving and the increased accommodation […] will enable us to thin the hospitals 
considerably.’1369 Panmure also heard of these developments from Raglan when he 
wrote on 24 February: ‘There is certainly an improvement in the sick, and if the weather 
becomes moderate, I expect further amendment;’1370 while Sir Henry Ward, the Lord 
                                                 
1363  Small (1999), p. 76. 
1364  Cantlie (1974), p. 125. 
1365  Benson & Esher (1907), pp. 87-8. 
1366  The Times, 8 Feb. and WB&CA, 9 Feb. 1855. 
1367  Stratford to Clarendon, 8 Feb. 1855; FO/8/1072. 
1368  Captain Macdonald, 93rd Regiment, to his mother, 8-12 Feb. 1855; Hinton (2010). 
1369  W&SHC/2057/F8/III/C/21. 
1370  Douglas & Ramsey (1898), I, p. 78. 
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High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands, reported to Panmure privately on 4 March: 
‘Things are certainly improving in the Crimea. All letters today agree about that. The 
weather has been atrocious, but the camp is healthier, the warm clothing generally is in 
use, and the rations more regularly received.’1371 Similarly, the QMG informed the AG 
at Horse Guards on 15 March: ‘the general health of the men is improving vastly, still 
we want one thing to put us right on our legs again, viz. rest.’1372 
These opinions were confirmed by the official report of the Hospital Commission: 
 
[…] our visit to the Crimea took place [during the first three weeks of January] when the 
condition of the sick and wounded and the state of the hospital accommodation […] were at 
their worst. We believe that they have much improved since our departure. Signs of 
improvement were already perceptible before we sailed from Balaklava; for abundance of 
warm clothing was in course of distribution, and the materials for huts were being carried up 
to the camp. Since then, commodious huts have been […] erected in the encampment of each 
regiment, for hospital, as well as other purposes and the sickness which prevailed among the 




This report provided independent confirmation of Hall’s medical report for 
February 1855: ‘Altho’ much sickness, and mortality continued to prevail in the Army 
[…] there is evident improvement in the general health of the men; and from their 
increased comforts there is every reason to believe that this will continue.’1374 Hall’s 
prediction proved correct as admission rates to the hospitals in the Crimea, and the 
mortality from disease in the Army, fell during the spring until late May 1855 when the 
illnesses frequently associated with summer campaigning made their appearance. If it 
had not been for a recrudescence of cholera in the Crimea during the summer the overall 
mortality rate from disease would have been much reduced although not to the low 




Most senior officers lacked the experience at the start to prosecute a campaign far from 
home; a position summarized by Harrison: 
 
It was not that generals were particularly callous, or that military doctors were incompetent, 
as some observers later claimed. Rather, the nations involved had not fought a large war for 
                                                 
1371  National Archives of Scotland, GD45/8/200. NB Letters received at Corfu would have been 
written at least seven to ten days previously. 
1372  Airey to Wetherall, 15 Mar. 1855; NAM-1962-07-97-17. 
1373  BPP (1854-55), No. 1920, p. 14. 
1374  WO/17/1730, with a longer version in Hall’s hand in RAMC/397/FRT1/1. 
1375  Snow’s conclusion that cholera was spread by water was published in 1855; too late to have an 
impact on the management of the epidemics in the Crimea; Snow (1855). 
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some time; war ministers, generals and senior medical officers were all largely inexperienced 
in planning the logistics of a major campaign.’1376 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that things went wrong during the months following 
an inadequately planned invasion late in the season by an inexperienced and relatively 
poorly equipped army, to face an enemy of uncertain strength in a country about which 
little was known, and which had extremely limited resources to provide for the needs of 
the armies such as harbour facilities, shelter, roads, and sources of forage and fuel.1377 
The majority of MOs would have had little or no experience of active warfare and 
working under battle field conditions and obviously had to learn on the job,
1378
 while to 
complicate matters the composition of the Army changed constantly.
1379
 Many new 
arrivals were young lads ill-equipped for camp life and trench warfare and would only 
have learnt the ropes after they arrived in camp. Fortunately, as time progressed there 
would have been an increasing number of experienced NCOs and men (many of whom 
would have replaced those in the original invading force) who could provide necessary 
discipline, assistance, and encouragement which would have been greatly to their 
benefit. 
 
The senior Army staff came in for criticism for their apparent lack of efficiency, 
particularly during the first winter when they were faced with insuperable difficulties. It 
would be wrong to assume that the likes of Estcourt, Airey, Filder, and Hall were not 
essentially effective men of business who were well aware of what was needed to 
rectify matters. A glance at their official and private correspondence will confirm that 
they were this from the start, while perusal of General Orders demonstrates that the 
Army was administered formally throughout the campaign irrespective of the trials and 
tribulations experienced. 
The main problem was that these men and their subordinates had to operate within 
a system which had been run down since 1815 and had not been reformed. It may have 
been sufficient to manage during peacetime but proved woefully inadequate for an army 
on campaign. In due course, and in a relatively short time, workable systems of 
                                                 
1376  Harrison (2008), p. 14. 
1377  Roger Fenton’s photographs of the British camps attest to the barren nature of the countryside. 
1378  For example, on 14 Sep. 1854 Smith wrote to Hall; ‘You will have […] great difficulties for the 
first twelve months while the inexperienced get experienced;’ NAM-2007-07-16-5. 
1379  For example, the Guards Brigade had seven COs during the campaign; Springman (2008), pp. 
202-5. 
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management were developed locally which were satisfactory by the standards of the day 
and ultimately contributed to the Sanitary Success of 1856. The signing of the peace 
treaty in March of that year resulted in a major change in priorities, and the rapid 
evacuation of the troops became the imperative. Fortunately the military authorities 
remained committed to maintaining sanitary discipline in the camps. For example, each 
regiment was required to leave its camp; ‘perfectly clean, the huts empty, temporary 
stable and kitchens levelled, […] tents and latrines filled up. General Officers will […] 
turn their attention to this subject, which is of importance to the health of the troops who 
remain.’1380 It is not possible to determine the impact of this Order but the inevitable 
reduction in the impetus for further infrastructural improvements, coupled with the 
concomitant dismantling of the camps, did not have a detrimental effect on the men’s 
health during the final weeks of occupation. 
 
The historiography of the campaign has tended to concentrate on the disasters of the 
first winter and the perceived incompetence of the heads of department on the one hand, 
and to overemphasize the contributions made by the talented and well connected 
Nightingale and the experienced government sponsored Sanitary Commissioners on the 
other. Inevitably this has resulted in an unbalanced view of what took place, and this has 
been distorted further by commentators who to have failed to consider events in strict 
order of occurrence and have been influenced by hindsight. In consequence this aspect 
of the war has been inaccurately portrayed in both academic works and popular culture. 
Smith and Hall both came in for considerable criticism, particularly during the 
first year of the campaign. However, they both remained in post throughout when 
there would have been opportunities to have had them replaced. Why was this? Could 
it be that they and their medical colleagues were good at their jobs and the blame lay 
elsewhere? In the final analysis, the solutions for the Army’s health problems were 
not strictly medical but ones that required the provision of sufficient supplies coupled 




                                                 
1380  General Order, 22 May 1856. 
1381  It would seem that Hall was sufficiently well regarded by Panmure for him to support his 
application for an increase in his half-pay pension of £1/10/- a day given that the had served for 39 
years and 11 months. In the event an increase to £1/17/11d was authorized, backdated to 1 Jan. 
1857; WO/43/519/ff. 25-81. 
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The medical services in the two World Wars have been evaluated in extenso by 
Harrison. He concluded, inter alia, that an ‘army in disarray […] finds it extremely 
difficult to implement effective measures for the prevention of disease and treatment of 
the sick and wounded’ and though ‘such difficulties were never insurmountable’ and 
they could be overcome by ‘efficient organization and sanitary discipline.’ The ‘medical 
failures were generally a failure of command, and that their [successful resolution] 
depended on the intelligent co-operation of the Army as a whole;’1382 hence ‘epidemics 
are as much a consequence of military failure as their cause,’1383 though even 
‘ubiquitous’ diseases such as dysentery could be controlled by introducing appropriate 
control measures and paying attention to detail. 
Harrison’s conclusions resonate to a degree with the events of 1854-56 when the 
British Army, initially thrown into ‘disarray’, subsequently proved that the ‘difficulties 
were never insurmountable;’ and as has been mentioned in Chapter 10, it was one the 
hospital commissioners (Maxwell), who after a short time in the Crimea, appreciated 




A systematic evaluation of archival and contemporary published sources have 
verified that the turning point in the Army’s fortunes was achieved shortly after 
Maxwell wrote to Herbert, and that the foundations for the recovery of the troop’s 
health were laid by personnel in all departments of the Army working under hazardous 
and trying conditions during the first months of 1855. The Sanitary Commissioners 
together with railway navvies and AWC, with the assistance of the LTC, were then able 
to build on these foundations, and their contribution, coupled with improvements in 
management and infrastructure generally, ensured that the ‘plenty’ referred to by 
Maxwell was brought to the camps, and that the hard-won Sanitary Success of 1855 
continued throughout the final months of the campaign. 
 
                                                 
1382  Harrison (2004), pp 277 & 283. 
1383  Harrison (2010), p. 292. 




Table 12.1: Award of the Victoria Cross to Army personnel during the Crimean campaign, 1854-56 
Corps Battles* Siege Total (%) 
 Assaults† Siege ops‡ 
Cavalry 9 0 0 9 (11) 
Infantry 16 14 27 57 (68.5) 
Royal Artillery 2 3 3 8 (9.5) 
RE and RS&M 0 4 4 8 (9.5) 
Army staff 1 0 0 1 (1) 
Total VCs (%) 28 (33.5) 21 (25.5) 34 (41) 83 (100) 
[Based on the synopses in Arthur (2005).] 
* Alma, Inkerman, and Balaklava. All the cavalry VCs were won during the battle of Balaklava 
including that awarded to Surgeon Mouat. 
† The assaults of on the Quarries and on the Redan on 18 June and 8 September 1855, during which two 
assistant surgeons won the medal. 
‡ Includes the engagement on 26 October 1854 known as Little Inkerman. 
 
Table 12.2: Nature of the deed for which the Victoria Cross was awarded to Army personnel during the 
Crimean campaign, 1854-56 
Corps Principal act of bravery* Total VCs 




E and W 
Cavalry - 9 - 9 
Infantry 37 15 5 57 
Royal Artillery 6 1 1 8 
RE and RS&M 5 - 3 8 
Army staff 1 - - 1 
Total VCs (%) 49 (59) 25 (30) 9 (11) 83 (100) 
* Based on the synopses in Arthur (2005). 
 
Table 12.3: Ranks of Army personnel awarded the Victoria Cross during the Crimean campaign, 1854-56 
Rank Principal act of bravery* Total VCs Proportion 
(%) 
W and E & W 
Action with the 
enemy (E) 
Assisting the  
wounded (W) 
E & W 
Major and above 6 - - 6 - 
Captain and lieutenant 13 5 2 20 35 
NCO 12 11 4 27 56 
Private 18 6 3 27 33 
Surgeon/Assistant Surgeon - 3 - 3 100 
Total VCs (%) 49 (59) 25 (30) 9 (11) 83 (100) 41 
* Based on the synopses in Arthur (2005). 
 
 -466- 
Table 12.4: Medical Officers appointed to the Military Division of the Order of the Bath* 
London Gazette Class Recipient 
5 February 1855 Knight Commander(KCB) IGH Dr John Hall 
Companion (CB) DIGH Dr David Dumbreck (KCB, 1871) 
DIGH Dr William Linton (KCB, 1865) 
DIGH Dr John Forrest 
DIGH Thomas Alexander† 
DIGH John Robert Taylor 
Staff Surgeon 1
st
 Class Dr Archibald Gordon 
Staff Surgeon 1
st
 Class James Mouat (KCB, 1894) 
2 January 1857 Companion (CB) DIGH James Brown Gibson‡ (KCB, 1865) 
Senior Surgeon Richard Coffin Elliot, RA 
* Dr H. Sandwith, late Inspector General of Hospitals in the service of the Sultan of Turkey, was 
admitted as an Honorary Member of the 3
rd
 Class of Civilian Division of the Order on 10 May 1856; 
LG, 13 May 1856, p. 1757. 
† Director General of the Army Medical Service, 1858-1860. 
‡ Director General, 1860-1867. 
 
Table 12.5: Award of the Legion of Honour, by class, to army personnel 










Officers Officers Surgeons Officers Surgeons NCOs 
& Men 
Army staff 22 23 - 47 - - 92 (17) 
Medical staff  - 1 - 22 - 23 (4) 
Commissariat  - - 6 - - 6 (1) 
Cavalry Regts  2 - 17 - 12 31 (5.5) 
Infantry Regts  19 - 202 3 60 284 (51.5) 
Royal Artillery  6 - 52 4 19 81 (15) 
RE and RS&M  2 - 20 - 7 29 (5) 















[LG, 4 August 1856 and 1 May 1857] 
* A civilian, Henry Adrian Churchill, Esq., CB. 
 
 
Table 12.6: Award of the Order of the Medjidie to 66 members of the medical profession by class of the 
Order and the rank of the recipient 
Rank* London Gazette Total  










Inspector General of Hospitals 1 2 - - - 3 (4.5) 
Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals - 4 3 2 - 9 (14) 
Staff Surgeon 1
st
 class - - 14 - 1 15 (23) 
Staff Surgeon 2
nd
 class - - 3 - - 3 (4.5) 
Surgeon - - 20 - - 20 (31) 
Assistant Surgeon - - 16 - - 16 (23) 




Table 12.7: Award of the Sardinian Medal ‘Al valore Militaire’ to the various corps in the Army of the 
East 
Corps Officers Surgeons NCO’s and men Total (%) 
Army Staff 43 - - 43 (10.75) 
Cavalry 19 1 10 30* (7.5) 
Infantry 178 4 82 264 (66) 
Royal Artillery 32 2 15 49 (12.25) 
RE and RS&M 11 - 3 14 (3.5) 
Total (%) 283 (70.75) 7 (1.75) 110 (27.5) 400 (100) 
[BPP (1857), Session 2, No. 2259] 
* Thirty-two medals were allocated to the cavalry regiments but no nominations were received from the 
6
th
 Dragoon Guards; these medals were subsequently issued to two infantry officers and these are 
included in the infantry total. 
 
Table 12.8: The number of NCOs and men who suffered from wounds, sickness or injury during World 
War One campaigns, the South African War, and the Crimean campaign 
Location Period Force Wounds Sickness or injury 
Number Deaths Ratio 
(%) 
Number Deaths Ratio 
(%) 
Western Front 
(p. 108, Table 2)* 
1914-18 British 1904287 142898 7.5 3401183 30841 0.9 
Macedonia 
(p. 188, Table 4)* 
1915-18 British and 
Dominion 
17256 1223 7.1 467419 3668 0.8 
Dardanelles 
(p. 201, Table 5)* 
1915-16 British 46154 2931 6.4 139140 2043 1.5 
Egypt and 
Palestine (p. 210, 
Table 3)* 
1915-18 British and 
Dominion 
37426 2761 7.4 485400 5734 1.2 
Mesopotamia 
(p. 224, Table 5a)* 
1914-18 British 20821 2156 10.3 283064 4534 1.6 
Mesopotamia 
(p. 224, Table 5b)* 
1914-18 Indian 35411 2817 8.0 517392 11892 2.3 
South African War 
(p. 271, Table 9a)* 
1899-
1902 




1854-56 British 18253 1761 9.6 144420 16297 11.3‡ 
* The page and table number in Mitchell & Smith (1931). 
† M&SH, II, General Return A. 





A (i) Primary Material: Unpublished official documents, etc. 
Abbreviation Title [Notes] 
ADM Admiralty papers in The National Archives. 
FO Foreign Office papers in The National Archives. 
General Orders General Orders were issued by the Army HQ on most days during the campaign and several 
collections have been preserved in TNA, e.g. WO/28/50, WO/28/51, WO/28/130, and 
WO/28/131. Longhand transcriptions can found in divisional order books in WO/28.  
A book containing the General Orders issued at Fort Pitt is preserved in the Army Medical 
Services Museum. 
NAM-1962-10 The papers of General Sir Augustus Wetherall in the National Army Museum. [Wetherall was 
AG at Horse Guards until succeeded by General Richard Airey] 
NAM-1968-07 Lord Raglan’s papers in the National Army Museum. 
NAM-2007-07 Sir John Hall’s papers in the National Army Museum. 
MPH Maps and plans from War Office records in The National Archives. 
PoL, I or II Précis of Letters Written and Received by the Director-General of the Army Medical Department 
in Reference to the Medical Arrangements Required at the Commencement and during the War 
with Russia 1854-55-56, (War Office, 1858) [The in- and out-letters are listed in date order in two 
volumes and hence the volume and page number are only included in a reference when the date is 




Sir John Hall’s papers in the RAMC archive in the Army Medical Services Museum [A digitized 
version of some of the archive is available on line via the Wellcome Library web site.] 
W&SHC/2057 Sidney Herbert’s papers in the Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre, Chippenham. 
WO War Office papers in The National Archives. 
 
A (ii) Primary Material: Unpublished private correspondence, diaries, etc. 




J. Hall, Observations on the Difficulties Experienced by the Medical Department of the Army, 
During the Late War in Turkey, by Sir John Hall, M.D., K.C.B., Principal Medical Officer of that 
Army. [There is longhand (RAMC/397F/RT/2) and printed, but unpublished, version (WO/33/3B). 
The latter was headed ‘Confidential’.] 
Williams 
(Undated) 
Transcripts in the author’s procession of letters written by Assistant Surgeon John Ignatius Purcell 
Williams, 1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade. The original letters, together with Williams’s medals, were 
sold by DNW on 27 June 2012. 
 
B (i) Primary material: Published official documents, etc 
Abbreviation Title  
Colborne & 
Brine (1857) 
J. Colborne and F. Brine, The Last of the Brave, (London: Ackermann, 1857). A second edition 
was published in 1858 under the title Memorials of the Brave. 
General Orders Book: General Orders Issued to the Army of the East, from April 30, 1854 to December 31, 1855 
Selected by the Hon Sir Alex H Gordon, (J.W. Parker, London, 1856). 
CD: Crimean War Publisher, Crimean War General Orders 30th April, 1854 to 30th June, 1856 
(2012). Available from <http://cw-publishers.russianwar.co.uk> 
Hart (1856) H.G. Hart, The New Annual Army List, and Militia List for 1856, (London: John Murray, 1856). 
Parkes (1857) Report on the Formation and General Management of Renkioi Hospital on the Dardenelles, 
Turkey, (War Department, April 1857) 
Sayer (1857) Captain Sayer, Despatches and Papers Relative to the Campaign in Turkey, Asia Minor, and the 








B (i) Primary material; British Parliamentary Papers 
Abbreviation Title (Short title) and [Notes] Publication date 
BPP (1854-55), No. 126 Military Medical Officers (Turkey). Return of the Medical Officers 
Attached to the Forces Serving in Turkey. 
23 Feb. 1855 
BPP (1854-55), No. 156 Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol: Second Report. 30 Mar. 1855 
BPP (1854-55), No. 204 Return of the Total Number of Officers and Men in the Army who 
have been Killed in the Crimea; and Like Return of the Number 
Wounded […] up to 15th Match 1855. 
1 May 1855 
BPP (1854-55), No. 218 Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol: Third Report. 3 May 1855 
BPP (1854-55), No. 247 Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol: Fourth Report. 17 May 1855 
BPP (1854-55), No. 318 Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol: Fifth Report. 18 June 1855 
BPP (1854-55), No. 428 Medical Officers (Army and Navy). 4 May 1855 
BPP (1854-55), No. 449 Official Reports on the Hospitals at Scutari, Kululee, Abydos, and 
Smyrna, since February Last.  
1 Aug. 1855 
BPP (1854-55), No. 512 Correspondence Relative to the State of the Harbour at Balaklava. 11 Aug. 1855 
BPP (1854-55), No. 1920 Report upon the State of the Hospitals on the British Army in the 
Crimea and Scutari. (Hospital Commission) 
23 Feb. 1855* 
BPP (1854-5), No. 1990 Report on the results of different methods of treatment pursued in 
epidemic cholera throughout England and Scotland in 1854. 
Undated 
BPP (1856), No. 331 Report from the Select Committee on the Medical Department 
[Army]. (Stafford Committee) 
3 July 1856 
BPP (1856), No. 345 Return of Ships Engaged as Transports, Between 1 January 1855 and 
1 April 1856, Inclusive. 
8 July 1856 
BPP (1856), No. 422 Index to the Report of the Board of General Officers Appointed to 
Enquire into the Statements Contained in the Reports of Sir John 
M’Neill and Colonel Tulloch. (Chelsea Board) 
29 July 1856 
BPP (1856), No. 422 Index to Report of the Commission of Inquiry onto the Supplies of the 
British Army in the Crimea. (Supplies Commission) 
29 July 1856 
BPP (1856), No. 2007 Report of the Commission of Inquiry onto the Supplies of the British 
Army in the Crimea. (Supplies Commission) 
10 June 1855 & 
Jan. 1856* 
BPP (1856), No. 2119 Report of the Board of General Officers Appointed to Enquire into 
the Statements Contained in the Reports of Sir John M’Neill and 
Colonel Tulloch. (Chelsea Board) 
4 July 1856* 
BPP (1857) Session I, 
No. 42. 
Return Concerning the Late Army of the East. 13 Feb. 1857 
BPP (1857), Session 1, 
No. 71 
Medical Statistical Returns of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, during 
the Years 1854 and 1855. 
27 Feb. 1857 
BPP (1857), Session 1, 
No. 133 
Return of the Names of Officers […] of the Army […] 17 Mar. 1857 
BPP (1857), Session 1, 
No. 2196 
Report to the Right Hon. Lord Panmure, G.C.B., etc. Minister at 
War, of the Proceedings of the Sanitary Commission Dispatched to 
the Seat of War in the East, 1855-56. 
1 Dec.1856* & 
Mar. 1857 
BPP (1857), Session 2, 
No. 267 
The Number of Huts Supplied by the Ordnance or War Departments 
during the Years 1854-55 and 1855-56 
13 Aug. 1857 
BPP (1857), Session 2, 
No. 2229 
Report of the Pathology of the Diseases of the Army of the East. Mar. 1856 
BPP (1857), Session 2, 
No. 2259 
List of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men Selected to 
Receive the 400 was Medals for Military Valour, Presented by His 
Majesty the King of Sardinia to the British Army Engaged in the Late 
War in the East. 
1857 
BPP (1857-58), No. 425 A Report […] Relative to the Sanitary Condition of the Army of the 
East […] by Dr Mapleton. 
5 Feb. 1855 
BPP (1857-58), No. 482 Select Committee on Consular Services. 27 July 1858 
BPP (1857-58), No. 2318 Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the 
Regulations Affecting the Sanitary Condition of the Army, the 
Organization of Military Hospitals, and the Treatment of the Sick and 
Wounded. (Royal Commission) 
9 Feb. 1858 
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BPP (1857-58), No. 2379 Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the 
Regulations Affecting the Sanitary Condition of the Army, the 
Organization of Military Hospitals, and the Treatment of the Sick and 
Wounded, Appendix LXXIX. [Transcripts of 977 letters and 
documents that relate to medical matters.] 
9 Feb. 1858 
M&SH vice BBP (1857-
58), No. 2434 
Medical and Surgical History of the British Army which Served in 
Turkey and the Crimea during the War against Russia in the Years 
1854-55-56. 
1858 
BPP (1860, No. 51 Return relating to the Patriotic Fund. 6 Feb. 1860 
BPP (1863), No. 3207 Report of the Barrack and Hospital Improvement Commission on the 
Sanitary Condition and Improvement of Mediterranean Stations. 
1863 
BPP (1901), Cd. 453, 
454, & 455 
Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider and Report 
upon the Care andTreatment of the Sick and Wounded during the 
South African Campaign. 
Jan. 1901 
BPP (1917-18), Cd. 8610 Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire 
into the Operation of War in Mesopotamia. 
17 May 1917 
BPP (1919), Cd. 371 The Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission. 4 Dec. 1917 
 
B (ii) Primary material: Published private correspondence, diaries and memoirs, newspapers and 
journals, etc. 
Abbreviation Title [Notes] 
A Lady Volunteer 
(1856) 
A Lady Volunteer (Frances M. Taylor), Eastern Hospitals and English Nurses. (London: 
Hunt and Blackett, 1856). 
Anglesey (1971) The Marquess of Anglesey (ed.) Little Hodge. His Letters and Diaries of the Crimean War, 
(London: Leo Cooper, 1971). 
Anon (1856) Instructions to Army Medical Officers for their Guidance on the Appearance of Spasmodic 
Cholera in the United Kingdom, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1856). 
Bostock (1897) J.A. Bostock, Letters from India and the Crimea, (London: George Bell, 1897). 
Buzzard (1915) T. Buzzard, With the Turkish Army in the Crimea and Asia Minor (London: John Murray, 
1915). 
Calthorpe (1979) S.J.G. Calthorpe, Cadogan’s Crimea (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979). 
Crimean Army Fund 
(1855) 
Report of the Committee of the Crimean Army Fund, September 1855, (London: Richard 
Clay, 1855) 
Elphinstone (1859) H.C. Elphinstone, Journal of the Operations of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Part 1, 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1859). 
Eyre-Todd (1903) G. Eyre-Todd (ed.), The Autobiography of William Simpson, R.I. (Crimean Simpson), 
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903). 
Filder (1856) Commissary General Filder, The Commissariat in the Crimea: being Remarks on those Parts 
of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Supplies of the British Army which 
Relate to the Duties of the Commissariat, (London: W. Clowes, 1856). 
Fisher (2011) G. Fisher (ed.), Crimean Cavalry Letters, (Stroud: The History Press, 2011) 
Fraser (1859) P. Fraser, A Treatise upon Gunshot Wounds of the Chest, (London: John Churchill, 1859). 
Gavin (1848) H. Gavin, Sanitary Ramblings, (London: John Churchill, 1848). 
Gordon (1855) W. Gordon, Balaclava and the Sebastopol Inquiry, (Dated December 1855; downloaded 
from Dracobooks, 5 May 2015). 
Hall (1857) Sir J. Hall, Observations on the Report of the Sanitary Commissioners in the Crimea during 
the Years 1855 and 1856, (London: W. Clowes, 1857). 
Hall (1858) Sir J. Hall, Sir John Hall’s Rejoinder to Dr. Sutherland’s Reply to his Observations on the 
Report of the Sanitary Commissioners, at the Seat of War in the East in 1855 and 1856 
(London: W. Clowes, 1858). 
Heath (1873) L.G. Heath, Letters from the Black Sea during the Crimean War, 1854-1855, (London: 
Richard Bentley, 1873). 
H.B. (1856) H.B., Letters from the Crimea during the Years 1854 and 1855, (London: Emily Faithfull, 
1856). [Henry Blishen, Rifle Brigade, was killed on 8 Sep. 1855.] 
Hill (2010) D. Hill, Letters from the Crimea, (Dundee: Dundee UP, 2010). 
Hodge (1856) W.B. Hodge, ‘On the mortality arising from military operations’. Journal of the Statistical 
Society of London, XIX: iii (1856), pp. 219-71. 
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J.M. (1857) J.M., ‘The Crimean Sanitary Commission and the Army Medical Officers’, Medical Times 
and Gazette, 4 Apr. 1857. [Probably James Mouat, MD, who was awarded the VC for 
bravery during the battle of Balaklava.] 
Macleod (1858) G.H.B. Macleod, Notes on the Surgery of the War in the Crimea with Rremarks on the 
Treatment of Gunshot Wounds, (London: John Churchill, 1858). 
Mawson (2001) M.H. Mawson (ed.), Eyewitness in the Crimea, (London: Greenhill Books, 2001).  
Milroy (1858) G. Milroy, ‘On the Sickness and Mortality in the French Army in the East from 1854 to 
1854’, British Medical Journal, 17 Apr. 1858 and Medical Times and Gazette, 1 May 1858. 
Nightingale (1859) A Contribution to the Sanitary History of the British Army during the Late War with Russia, 
(London: Harrison, 1859). [Published anonymously] 
Osborne (1855) S.G. Osborne, Scutari and its Hospitals, (London: Dickinson Brothers, 1855). 
Robins (2005) C. Robins (ed.), Romaine’s Crimean War, (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2005). 
Robinson (1856) F. Robinson, Diary of the Crimean War, (London: Richard Bentley, 1856). 
Snow (1855) J. Snow, On the Mode of Communication of Cholera, (London: Churchill, 1855). 
Soyer (1856) A. Soyer. Soyer’s Culinary Campaign, (London: G. Routledge & Co., 1856). 
Sterling (1895) A. Sterling, The Highland Brigade in the Crimea, (Minneapolis: Absinthe Press, 1995). 
[First published in 1895.] 
Sutherland (1850) Appendix (A) to the Report of the General Board of Health on the Epidemic of Cholera of 
1848 and 1849, (London: HMSO, 1850). 
Sutherland (1857) J. Sutherland, Reply to Sir John Hall’s ‘Observations’ on the Report of Sanitary Commission 
Despatched to the Seat of War in the East, 1855-56, (London: Harrison, 1857). 
Terrot (1898) S. Terrot, Reminiscences of Scutari Hospitals in Winter 1854-55, (Edinburgh: Andrew 
Stevenson, 1898). 
Thompson (1857) R. T. Thompson, ‘Mortality among Officers of the British Army in the Crimea’, Journal of 
the Statistical Society of London, XX (1857), pp. 54-60. 
Trevor-Barnston 
(1998) 
M. Trevor-Barnston (ed.), Letters from the Crimea and India, (Whitchurch: Herald Printers, 
1998). 
Tulloch (1857) Colonel Tulloch, The Crimean Commission and the Chelsea Board Being a Review of the 
Proceedings and Report of the Board, (London: Harrison, 1857). 
Ward (1970) S.P.G. Ward, (ed.) The Hawley Letters, (Society of Army Historical Research Special 
Publication No. 10, 1970) 
Wrottesley (1873) G. Wrottesley, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, Bart., 
(London: Richard Bentley, 1873), Vol. II. 
Wyatt (1858) J. Wyatt, History of the First Battalion Coldstream Guards During the Eastern Campaign 
from February 1854 to June 1856, (Privately printed, 1858). 
 
C: Earlier and later published works 
Abbreviation Title [Notes] 
Adkin (1996) M. Aidkin, The Charge. The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade was Lost, 
(London: Leo Cooper, 1996). 
A Non-commissioner 
(Undated) 
A Non-Commissioner, A Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Army 
Particularly during the Late War with Russia, (Undated pamphlet). 
Arthur (2005) M. Arthur, Symbol of Courage. The Men Behind the Medal, (London: Pan Books, 
2005). 
Badem (2010) C. Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856), (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
Baldwin et al. (2004) G. Baldwin, M. Daniel, and S. Greenough, All the Mighty World. The Photographs 
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Name in the text Full name* Post(s) 
Aberdeen George Hamilton-Gordon, 
5th Earl of Aberdeen 
Prime Minister to Jan. 1855. 
Airey Major General Sir 
Richard Airey, KCB 
QMG, Army of the East, Sept. 1855 to Nov. 1855 when succeeded 
Sir James Freeth as QMG to the Forces. 
Alexander Dr Thomas Alexander  PMO, Light Division. A member of the Royal Commission, he 
succeeded Smith as DG of the AMD during 1858. 
Aitken Dr William Aitken, MD A civil surgeon appointed to assist Dr R.D. Lyons in the 
investigation of ‘the nature of the diseases from which the troops 
were suffering.’ Their report was published as BPP (1857), 
Session 2, No. 2229. 
Boxer Rear Admiral Edward 
Boxer 
Sometime Port Admiral on the Bosphorus and then at Balaklava. 
He died on cholera on 4 June 1855. 
Bracebridge C.H. Bracebridge He and his wife accompanied Miss Nightingale to the East. 
Brunel Isambard Kingdom 
Brunel 
A civil engineer who designed the ss Great Britain which was 
employed as a troop ship and the prefabricated hospital erected at 
Renkioi. 
Burgoyne Lieutenant General Sir 
John Burgoyne, RE 
Served on the staff in the Crimea as as Lieutenant General but npot 
as the CRE. An advocate of a formal siege, he was recalled during 
February 1855 to resume his duries as Inspector General of 
Fortifications. 
Calvert Frederick William Calvert HM’s consul on the Dardanelles. 
Christie Captain Peter Christie, 
RN 
Agent of Transports, Balaklava. He died of disease on 1 May 
1855. 
Clarendon George William Frederick 
Villiers, 4th Earl of 
Clarendon 
Foreign Secretary, 1853-1858. 
Codrington General (LR) Sir William 
John Codrington, KCB 
GOC, Light Division and then GOC Army of the East, 11. Nov. 
1855-July 1856. 
Cumming IGH Alexander Cumming A Hospitals Commissioner and then PMO, Scutari, Feb.-Oct 1855. 
Dumbreck DIGH David Dumbreck Acted as PMO when Hall when was sent to Scutari by Raglan. He 
was invalided to England during Nov. 1854. 
Estcourt Major General James 
Bucknall Bucknall 
Estcourt 
AG, Army of the East, Aug. 1854 until his death on 24 June 1855. 
He was succeeded by Brevet Colonel William Lygon Pakenham. 
Fergusson Lieutenant General Sir 
James Fergusson, KCB 
GOC Malta and then Governor of Gibraltar. 




Fremantle Rear Admiral Charles 
Howe Fremantle 
Sometime Port Admiral, Balaklava 
Gavin Dr Hector Gavin, MD A Sanitary Commissioner. He died on 21 Apr. 1855 as a result of a 
shooting accident. 
Hall Dr, later Sir, John Hall, 
MD, KCB 
PMO, Army of the East. 
Hardinge Field Marshal Viscount 
Henry Hardinge 
C.-in-C. British Army 1852-1856. 
Hawes Benjamin Hawes Hawes held an unelected position of Deputy Secretary at War, 
1851-7. He was a brother-in-law of I.K. Brunel, 
Herbert Sidney Herbert, later 
Baron Herbert of Lea 
Secretary at War to Feb. 1855; Chairman of the Royal 
Commission, 1857; Minister of War 1859-1861. 
Lawson DIGH Robert Lawson Sometime PMO at Balaklava. Transferred to Scutari after the Avon 
affair on the authority of a General Order. 
Layard Austen Henry Layard A Liberal MP who paid an unofficial visit to the East. 
Linton IGH William Linton Served in the Crimea until becoming the PMO at Scutari during 
Oct. 1855 in succession to Cumming. 
Lyons, RN Admiral Sir Edmund 
Lyons 
Lyons succeeded Admiral Dundas in command of the 
Mediterranean Fleet. 
Lyons, MD R.D. Lyons A civil surgeon appointed by Panmure to investigate ‘the nature of 
the diseases from which the troops were suffering.’ He was 
assisted by Dr Aitken and their report was published as BPP 
(1857), Session 2, No. 2229. 
McGrigor Sir James Smith’s predecessor as DG of the AMD. 
McNeill Sir John A Supplies Commissioner who collaborated with Miss Nightingale 
after the war. 
McMurdo Colonel (LR) William 
Montague Scott 
McMurdo 
The DG of the LTC. 
Mapleton Dr Henry Mapleton, MD Sometime physician to Raglan. His report ‘relative to the sanitary 
condition of the Army of the East’ was prepared for Smith in 1855 
and published as BPP (1857-58), No. 425. 
Maxwell Peter Benson Maxwell A barrister and Hospitals Commissioner. Author of the 
anonymously published pamphlet Whom shall we hang? 
Menzies DIGH Duncan Menzies PMO, Scutari from June 1854 until invalided in Jan. 1855. 
Milroy Dr Gavin Milroy A Sanitary Commissioner from 22 July 1855. 
Mundy Colonel G.C. Mundy Military Undersecretary at the War Office. 
Newcastle Henry Pelham Clinton, 5th 
Duke of Newcastle 
Minister of War until Feb. 1855 when he was succeeded by Lord 
Panmure. 
Nightingale Florence Nightingale Superintendent of a party of nurses sent to Turkey by Sidney 
Herbert and remembered by many by the sobriquet ‘the lady with 
the lamp.’ 
Osborne The Hon. the Revd Sidney 
Godolphin Osborne 
Visited Scutari in a private capacity for about six weeks, leaving 
on the 19 December 1854. He gave evidence to the Roebuck 
Committee and published Scutari and its hospitals in 1855. 
Pakenham Brevet Colonel William 
Lygon Pakenham 
Succeeded Major General Estcourt as AG. 
Palmerston Henry John Temple. 3rd 
Viscount Palmerston 
Prime Minister from Feb. 1855. 
Panmure Fox Maule, Lord Panmure Minister of War from Feb. 1855. 
Parkes Dr Edmund Alexander 
Parkes 
A civilian who was the Superintendent at the Renkioi Hospital. 
Paulet Major General (LR) Lord 
William Paulet 
Commandant on the Bosphorus from Nov. 1854 until he assumed 
command of the Light Division, Nov. 1855. 
Peel Frederick Peel Liberal MP for Bury and Undersecretary for War under Lord 
Palmerston. 
Raglan Field Marshal Fitzroy 
Somerset, 1st Baron 
Raglan 
C.-in-C., Army of the East, until his death on 28 June 1855. 
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Roebuck John Arthur Roebuck, MP Liberal MP for Sheffield. He chaired the Select Committee of the 
House of Commons which was convened to investigate the 
‘Condition of the Army before Sebastopol’. 
Romaine William Govett Romaine The Deputy Judge Advocate General for the Army of the East. A 
civilian appointed by the Government, and hence not part of the 
military establishment. 
Russell William Howard Russell Special correspondent of The Times. 
Sayer Captain Frederic Sayer Sayer served in the Crimea until invalided for wounds in Oct. 
1854. Published Despatches and Papers relative to the Campaign 
in Turkey, Asia Minor and the Crimea during the War with 
Russia in 1854, 1855, 1856 in 1857. 
Sillery Major Charles Sillery Commandant at Scutari, June-Nov. 1854. He continued serving 
there on the staff of his successor, Paulet. 
Simpson General Sir James 
Simpson, KCB 
Chief of Staff from Mar. 1855 until he succeeded Raglan. He 
resigned on 10 Nov. 1855 
Smith Dr, later Sir, Andrew 
Smith, MD, FRS 
Succeeded Sir James McGrigor as DG, AMD, in 1852. A member 
of the Royal Commission, he resigned in 1858 and was appointed 
KCB (Civil) in the same year. 
Raglan Field Marshal Fitzroy 
Somerset, 1st Baron 
Raglan 
C.-in-C., Army of the East, until his death on 28 June 1855. 
Roebuck John Arthur Roebuck, MP Liberal MP for Sheffield. He chaired the Select Committee of the 
House of Commons which was convened to investigate the 
‘Condition of the Army before Sebastopol’. 
Romaine William Govett Romaine The Deputy Judge Advocate General for the Army of the East. A 
civilian appointed by the Government, and hence not part of the 
military establishment. 
Russell William Howard Russell Special correspondent of The Times. 
Sayer Captain Frederic Sayer Sayer served in the Crimea until invalided for wounds in Oct. 
1854. Published Despatches and Papers relative to the Campaign 
in Turkey, Asia Minor and the Crimea during the War with 
Russia in 1854, 1855, 1856 in 1857. 
Sillery Major Charles Sillery Commandant at Scutari, June-Nov. 1854. He continued serving 
there on the staff of his successor, Paulet. 
Simpson General Sir James 
Simpson, KCB 
Chief of Staff from Mar. 1855 until he succeeded Raglan. He 
resigned on 10 Nov. 1855 
Smith Dr, later Sir, Andrew 
Smith, MD, FRS 
Succeeded Sir James McGrigor as DG, AMD, in 1852. A member 
of the Royal Commission, he resigned in 1858 and was appointed 
KCB (Civil) in the same year. 
Spence DIGH Thomas Spence A member of the Hospitals Commission He drowned on Prince on 
14 Nov. 1854. 
Stafford Augustus Stafford Conservative MP for Northamptonshire North who visited Scutari 
and the Crimea. He was a member of the Royal Commission. 
Storks Major General (LR) 
Henry Storks 
Commandant at Smyrna from Mar. 1855 until he succeeded Paulet 
as Commandant on the Bosphorus in Nov. 1855. He was a member 
of the Royal Commission. 
Stratford Viscount Stratford de 
Redcliffe 
Ambassador in Constantinople. 
Sutherland Dr John Sutherland, MD A Sanitary Commissioner, a member of the Royal Commission, 
and a collaborator of Miss Nightingale after the war. 
Tulloch Colonel Alexander 
Murray Tulloch 
A Supplies Commissioner. 
Wetherall Major General Sir George 
Augustus Wetherall, KCB 
AG of the Forces, 1854-1860. 
* The rank of military personnel is that they held when the Peace Treaty was ratified on 27 April 1856, or when 
they died. LR = Local Rank 
